Iran Update, September 9, 2025

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9.[i] Several IAF fighter jets dropped at least 10 munitions on a residential building in northern Doha.[ii] Several Hamas Political Bureau members resided at the targeted building, according to the Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry.[iii] Senior Hamas officials and ceasefire negotiators, including Hamas Shura Council and Leadership Council head Mohammad Darwish and senior Hamas official and negotiator Nizar Awadallah, were reportedly meeting at the residence to review a recent US ceasefire proposal at the time of the strikes.[iv] The Israeli strikes reportedly killed several Hamas officials, including:

• Khalil al Hayya: Hayya was the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the leader of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team, and a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council.[v]
• Zaher Jabarin: Jabarin was the leader of Hamas in the West Bank, a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council, and a member of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team.[vi]
• Khaled Meshaal: Meshaal was a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council.[vii]

Hamas confirmed that the Israeli strikes killed five Hamas members, including the director of Hayya’s office, Jihad Labad (Abu Bilal), and Hayya’s son, Hammam al Hayya.[viii] Hamas claimed that its negotiating team survived the Israeli strikes but did not specify if any officials sustained injuries.[ix]

Three US officials told Axios that the US military detected Israeli fighter jets flying toward the Persian Gulf on September 9 and sought clarification from Israel.[x] The officials stated that “missiles were already in the air” by the time that Israel provided clarification to the United States. Axios reported that the Israeli strikes “infuriated” some of US President Donald Trump’s senior advisers because the US government was waiting for Hamas’ response to a recent US ceasefire proposal. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Israel’s strikes in Qatar, which is a major non-NATO ally of the United States, do “not advance Israel’s or America’s goals,” but added that eliminating Hamas is “a worthy goal.”[xi] Qatar condemned the strikes and stated that it will not tolerate “reckless Israeli behavior.”[xii] A Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson denied claims that the United States warned Qatar about the Israeli strikes in advance.[xiii] Qatar has reportedly suspended its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas following the strikes.[xiv]

Iran appears to be trying to fulfill the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. The E3 triggered the snapback mechanism on August 28.[xv] The snapback process lasts 30 days, which means that UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on Iran on September 27 if the UNSC does not extend sanctions relief for Iran. South Korea, which is the current president of the UNSC, finalized a UNSC resolution on September 8 to extend sanctions relief for Iran.[xvi] South Korea was required to table such a resolution 10 days after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism if no other UNSC member did so. Any permanent UNSC member (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto the South Korean resolution. The E3 previously outlined three conditions to extend the expiration date of the snapback mechanism, which is currently October 18, 2025. The three conditions are that Iran must account for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding inspections and verification of its nuclear sites, and resume negotiations with the United States. Iran rejected these conditions prior to August 28 but has since made progress toward fulfilling these conditions.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo on September 9 regarding Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.[xvii] Some reports have indicated that the Iran-IAEA agreement would involve Iran submitting a report on the status of its HEU to the IAEA in one month, after which the IAEA and Iran would negotiate how the IAEA could verify the Iranian report. Neither Iran nor the IAEA has confirmed the details of the agreement at the time of this writing, however.[xviii] Araghchi stated after the signing of the agreement that “any hostile action against Iran,” including the reimposition of UNSC sanctions, would make the Iran-IAEA agreement “null and void.”[xix] Araghchi similarly proposed an “interim deal” that would provide “more clarity” about the status of Iran’s HEU stockpile during a meeting with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in Qatar on September 5.[xx]

Iran has also indicated a greater willingness to negotiate with the United States on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, reported on September 8 that the regime has decided to resume negotiations with the United States under the condition that the UNSC does not reimpose sanctions on Iran during negotiations.[xxi] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei reportedly asked Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to seek Qatar's help in mediating with the United States and the E3 to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions.[xxii] UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on September 8 that Oman is “re-engaging” with Iran about “possible renewed dialogue.”[xxiii] Araghchi held a phone call with his Omani counterpart on September 8.[xxiv] Oman mediated the five rounds of talks between the United States and Iran before the Israel-Iran War.[xxv]

US and Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War severely degraded Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on September 8 that Iran no longer has a clear path to produce weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched up to 90 percent) because US and Israeli strikes destroyed Iran's gas centrifuge enrichment program.[xxvi] The Institute assessed that US and Israeli strikes destroyed or rendered inoperable all of Iran’s 20,000 centrifuges that it had installed across its three declared enrichment facilities.[xxvii] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently reported that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[xxviii] Iran would need to further enrich its 60 percent enriched uranium to be able to build a nuclear weapon. US and Israeli strikes also targeted Iran's centrifuge production and research and development facilities, which will almost certainly also hinder Iran's ability to enrich uranium in the near future.[xxix]

The Institute also published information about Iran’s fourth enrichment facility and reported that the facility does not appear to be operational after the war. Iran announced on June 12 that it would launch a newly built enrichment facility in response to a non-compliance resolution that the IAEA Board of Governors had passed earlier that day.[xxx] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami stated that Iran would operationalize the facility by installing and activating centrifuges there.[xxxi] Israel launched its first airstrikes targeting Iran on June 12, which suggests that Iran never installed centrifuges at the site. The Institute assessed that the new facility, known as the Esfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, is located within the tunnel complex at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center.[xxxii] The Institute reported that US strikes damaged the site and assessed that the site is not currently operational.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways

• Israeli Strikes Targeting Hamas Leaders in Doha: The Israeli Air Force conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Israel’s strikes in Qatar do “not advance Israel’s or America’s goals,” but added that eliminating Hamas is “a worthy goal.” Qatar has reportedly suspended its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas following the strikes.
• Iranian Efforts to Avoid Snapback Sanctions: Iran appears to be trying to fulfill the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions. Iran previously rejected the E3’s demands prior to August 28 but has since made progress toward fulfilling these conditions.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: US and Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War severely degraded Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on September 8 that Iran no longer has a clear path to produce weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched up to 90 percent) because US and Israeli strikes destroyed Iran's gas centrifuge enrichment program.

Iran

Iranian outlet Nour News published an op-ed on September 9 that described the environment after the Israel-Iran War as a dangerous state of societal "suspension."[xxxiv] Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representatives to the Iranian Defense Council.[xxxv] The op-ed echoed Khamenei’s September 7 speech in which Khamenei warned that the current state of “neither war nor peace” threatens Iran’s stability and must be overcome through economic resilience.[xxxvi] Nour News added that the state of “suspension” drains society, erodes social capital, and obstructs political, economic, and cultural growth.[xxxvii] Nour News argued that Iran can only restore deterrence and build resilience by shifting its focus inward to improve the Iranian economy, increase societal cohesion, and control media narratives.[xxxviii] Nour News tied this recommended approach to the doctrine of “active resistance,” which emphasizes mobilizing internal capacities rather than relying on external “negotiations or confrontation.”[xxxix]

Unspecified gunmen killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) intelligence officer in Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on September 7.[xl] The IRGC officer reportedly directed arrests and repression of civilians.[xli] The attackers’ identities and motives remain unknown, and no group has claimed responsibility for the attack.[xlii] The attack follows a series of recent Jaish al Adl attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xliii] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.

Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi visited the Artesh Air Force 5th Tactical Airbase (TAB) in Omidiyeh, Khuzestan Province, on September 9 to evaluate the combat readiness of units at the base.[xliv] Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami recently visited three Artesh Air Force TABs in Esfahan, Tabriz, and Hamedan on September 6.[xlv]

Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani formed a high-level committee on September 6 to investigate oil smuggling operations that involve mixing Iranian crude oil with Iraqi oil to help Iran bypass international sanctions.[xlvi] Sudani’s order comes after the United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil.[xlvii] Samarrai’s network blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before selling it to international buyers, which generated millions of dollars in revenue for Samarrai and the Iranian regime.[xlviii] Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) Director General Ali Nizar al Shatri denied on September 2 that crude oil has been mixed and smuggled at Iraqi ports and in Iraqi territorial waters under his watch.[xlix] Shatri replaced Khudair Abbas Abed as SOMO Director General in March 2025.[l] Abed enabled oil smuggling operations and leaked classified intelligence to a US-sanctioned Iraqi businessman as head of the Oil Ministry Audit Directorate in 2019.[li] The United States threatened in July 2025 to sanction SOMO and block the Iraqi federal government’s access to $350 million of Iraqi oil revenue if the government failed to prevent Iranian oil smuggling.[lii]

Syria

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck military facilities and weapons depots in Latakia and Homs provinces on September 8, some of which reportedly contained recently imported Turkish air defense systems.[liii] The IDF targeted the 19th Regiment’s air defense battalion in the village of Shinshir, Homs Province, and a weapons depot in the village of Maskana, Homs Province.[liv] The IDF also struck a Syrian Army barracks in Sqoubin, Latakia Province, causing casualties.[lv] An Israeli security source told Saudi media on September 9 that the IDF targeted Turkish missiles and air defense systems in Homs that Turkey had recently transferred to Syria.[lvi] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on September 9 shows explosions in a small building and along a row of trees at the 19th Regiment’s air defense battalion. Middle East Eye reported in April 2025 that Turkey planned to deploy Hisar surface-to-air missile systems to protect Turkish construction at an airbase in central Syria from Israeli airstrikes.[lvii] Syria formally requested Turkish military assistance after Israeli strikes targeted Damascus and Suwayda Province during intercommunal violence in July.[lviii]

Turkey has reportedly begun training Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) personnel and police officers under a defense agreement that Syria and Turkey signed on August 13.[lix] An unspecified source told Middle East Eye that Turkey is training approximately 300 Syrians, who are mostly soldiers but include some police officers, at two bases in central and eastern Turkey.[lx] A second unspecified source said that Turkey will train 5,000 Syrian MoD and police force members in the “short term,” and “at least 20,000 in the medium to long term.”[lxi] This training appears to be within the scope of a security agreement that Turkey and Syria signed on August 13. The agreement stipulates that Syria can consult Turkey on military issues and that Turkey will help procure military equipment for Syria and train Syrian forces.[lxii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara reportedly sought formal Turkish defense assistance to counterbalance Israeli strikes in Syria.[lxiii] Israel has previously rejected Turkish proposals to establish air defense systems in Syria and reportedly struck Turkish air defense systems in Homs Province on September 8 (see above).[lxiv] Israel and Turkey established a deconfliction mechanism in May 2025 to resolve military tensions in Syria.[lxv]

Syrian General Chief of Staff Major General Ali al Nassan and other Syrian MoD officials met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and his delegation in Damascus on September 9, likely to further negotiate Russian basing in Syria.[lxvi]  Nassan and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani also met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.[lxvii] Shaibani stated that any foreign presence in Syria “must be aimed at helping the Syrian people build their future,” likely in reference to Russian military bases in Syria.[lxviii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara also hosted the Russian delegation at the Presidential Palace in Damascus.[lxix] Shara is scheduled to visit Moscow on October 15 for the Arab-Russian summit.[lxx] Novak said that Shara’s visit to Russia is of “special interest” to Moscow.[lxxi] The Russian delegation’s visit to Damascus follows Shaibani’s recent trip to Moscow on July 31, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.[lxxii] The meetings also followed recent Russian troop movements between Russian bases in Latakia and Tartous provinces on September 5.[lxxiii]  Russia and the Syrian transitional government have been negotiating the status of Russian bases in Syria since January 2025.[lxxiv]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched a missile and a drone targeting Israel on September 9.[lxxv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a missile launched from Yemen that triggered sirens in several areas of Israel.[lxxvi] The IDF separately intercepted a drone over Eilat, southern Israel.[lxxvii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will prioritize confiscating Hezbollah weapons south of the Litani River under the LAF's disarmament plan.[lxxviii] The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved an LAF plan on September 5 under which the LAF will attempt to disarm Hezbollah and establish a state monopoly on all weapons.[lxxix] The plan stipulates that the LAF will disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River in three months.[lxxx] Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji stated that the first phase of the plan should be completed by the end of November 2025.[lxxxi] The LAF will set up additional checkpoints to prevent the smuggling of weapons out of southern Lebanon while it disarms Hezbollah there, according to Rajji.[lxxxii]  The LAF will not conduct raids, arrests, or weapons seizures north of the Litani River during the first three-month phase.[lxxxiii] The LAF will collect Hezbollah weapons in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and other unspecified areas in later phases of the disarmament process.[lxxxiv] The LAF plan appears to prioritize the full disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani River, where Hezbollah weapons and fighters pose the most immediate threat to residents in northern Israel.[lxxxv] Hezbollah fighters launched the vast majority of rocket and drone attacks targeting northern Israel after October 7, 2023, from south of the Litani River.[lxxxvi] Hezbollah has long stored the majority of its weapons in civilian infrastructure across southern Lebanon.[lxxxvii] The LAF began disarmament operations in southern Lebanon before the government approved the LAF plan for the rest of the country. The LAF had deployed forces to 116 positions in southern Lebanon as of June 2025.[lxxxviii] The LAF has also seized at least 500 Hezbollah weapons caches and military installations in southern Lebanon as of September 2025.[lxxxix] The LAF plan’s phased sequencing of geographical areas will help the LAF prioritize and effectively execute its disarmament plan despite the LAF’s resource constraints.[xc]

Lebanon and Syria have continued to take steps to resolve outstanding issues between the two countries. Lebanese and Syrian officials agreed on September 1 to form two specialized committees to resolve security and border issues.[xci] Lebanese and Syrian officials discussed Syrian detainees held in Lebanese prisons, missing Lebanese civilians in Syria, and Lebanese-Syrian border demarcation during the first committee meeting in Damascus on September 8.[xcii] The officials also reportedly discussed establishing “legal frameworks,” such as a judicial treaty to formalize prisoner exchanges between the two countries.[xciii] Syria and Lebanon also signed an agreement to enhance judicial and security cooperation between the two countries.[xciv] These meetings and agreements are part of Lebanon and Syria’s efforts to resolve issues that have previously complicated Lebanese-Syrian relations, including prisoner repatriation and border demarcation.[xcv] The Syrian government has consistently called on the Lebanese government to allow Syrian prisoners in Lebanon to serve their sentences in Syria, but Lebanese judicial officials have denied these requests.[xcvi]