Iran Update, September 8, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian officials are signaling openness to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiations with the United States, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, reported on September 8 that the regime has decided to resume negotiations with the United States under the condition that the UNSC does not reimpose sanctions on Iran under the snapback mechanism during negotiations.[i] The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback mechanism on August 28, which means that UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on Iran on September 27 unless the UNSC extends sanctions relief for Iran.[ii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately published an op-ed in the Guardian on September 7 in which he stated that Iran is ready to accept limits on uranium enrichment and allow extensive international oversight of its nuclear facilities in exchange for sanctions relief.[iii] Araghchi specifically directed his op-ed to the E3.

Iranian leaders have recently expressed openness to resuming cooperation with the IAEA. Iran and the IAEA held their third round of talks in Vienna on September 6.[iv] Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated following the meeting that Iran and the IAEA are close to reaching a new cooperation agreement.[v] Grossi suggested that Iran and the IAEA have not, however, agreed on a timeline for the resumption of IAEA inspections and stated that it is also unclear what the IAEA would do when inspections resume.[vi] Iran may calculate that expressing willingness to cooperate with the IAEA and the United States will help Iran deter potential snapback sanctions. It is unclear if Iran is willing to make meaningful concessions on its nuclear program in talks with the IAEA or the United States, however. Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months in exchange for Iran restoring full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[vii] Araghchi and Grossi will reportedly meet in Cairo this week to finalize a new cooperation agreement.[viii]

Iran is likely preparing for future conflicts with Israel and the United States by increasing funding for the Iranian armed forces and evaluating the combat readiness of armed forces units. The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a six-clause bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities.”[ix] The IDF destroyed Iranian air defense systems and achieved air superiority over large parts of Iran during the Israel-Iran War, and Iran likely seeks to bolster its defensive capabilities in preparation for potential future conflicts.[x] The bill includes the following clauses.

1. The Planning and Budget Organization and Oil Ministry must pay the entirety of the funds allocated to strengthening the Iranian armed forces in the budget for the current Persian calendar year (March 2025-2026) and the previous Persian calendar year (March 2024- 2025).
2. The Planning and Budget Organization must fund the Supreme National Security Council’s defense allocations from public savings or the transfer of oil sales shares.
3. The Central Bank of Iran must provide the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) with up to two billion euros from blocked foreign assets or other overseas currency resources to implement emergency defense plans.
4. The Planning and Budget Organization, Central Bank of Iran, and Economy Ministry must provide the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry with two billion euros for “foreign purchases of major defense items.”
5. The Planning and Budget Organization and Oil Ministry are authorized to allocate $1.5 billion in oil revenues to the Iranian armed forces.
6. Iran will allocate 30 percent of its revenue from air transit fees to Artesh air defense systems annually.[xi]

The clause to purchase “major defense items” is notable given that Iran has signaled interest in acquiring military equipment from foreign countries, such as China and Belarus, since the end of the Israel-Iran War.[xii] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh, who is responsible for Iranian arms sales and purchases, traveled to China in late June 2025 in his first foreign visit after the 12-day war.[xiii] Iranian media expressed support for purchasing Chinese military equipment, such as J-10 aircraft, after the war.[xiv] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian recently traveled to Belarus, where he reportedly sought Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment that Israel damaged during the June 2025 war.[xv]

Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami separately visited three Artesh Air Force bases in Esfahan, Tabriz, and Hamedan, respectively, on September 6 to evaluate the combat readiness of units stationed at these bases.[xvi] Hatami visited the Artesh Air Force 8th Tactical Airbase in Esfahan, 3rd Tactical Airbase in Hamedan, and 2nd Tactical Airbase in Tabriz. Israel struck all three bases during the Israel-Iran War.[xvii] Hatami stated that Iran is preparing for another round of confrontation with Israel.[xviii]

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on September 7 that Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War destroyed a key Iranian centrifuge research and development site, the Kalaye Electric Company, in Tehran.[xix] The Kalaye Electric Company is a subsidiary of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and manufactures advanced centrifuges for the Iranian nuclear program. Centrifuges are used to enrich uranium. The United States sanctioned the Kalaye Electric Company in February 2007 for its involvement in Iran’s weapons of mass destruction program.[xx] The Institute reported that centrifuge design teams developed new centrifuge models and improved existing ones at the site.[xxi] Iran also reportedly previously tested advanced IR-8 centrifuges at the site.[xxii] There have been no repair efforts at the site following the war, according to the Institute.[xxiii] US and Israeli airstrikes during the war targeted Iran’s centrifuge production facilities as well as active centrifuges, which will likely hinder Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.[xxiv]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei outlined a series of economic recommendations on September 7, which highlights the regime’s concern about worsening economic conditions and their potential to undermine internal stability.[xxv] Khamenei delivered a speech during a meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet on September 7 in which he called on the government to “discipline the market” and ensure Iranians’ access to essential goods.[xxvi] Khamenei’s directive to “discipline the market” comes as the Iranian rial traded above one million rials per one US dollar on August 28.[xxvii] Khamenei also ordered government officials to build up reserves of essential goods, break import monopolies by diversifying suppliers, and guard basic goods against sudden price hikes.[xxviii] The Iranian regime’s official data shows that Iranian household incomes have risen about 12.5 times since 2016, while the price of basic food items has increased more than 20 times.[xxix] Khamenei further emphasized that production is the key to economic progress and instructed officials not to cut electricity to factories except in emergencies.[xxx] Iranian media reported in late August that electricity shortages have forced about 50 percent of factories to go offline, which has created ripple effects across the economy.[xxxi]

Khamenei also instructed Iranian officials and media outlets to emphasize Iran’s strengths and avoid portraying Iran as weak.[xxxii] Khamenei’s directive comes after the Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry restricted “provocative” media coverage of potential snapback sanctions.[xxxiii] Iranian authorities directed outlets to frame the E3‘s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) recent decision to trigger the snapback mechanism as proof of European dependence on the United States and to emphasize Iran’s resilience.[xxxiv] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi similarly directed Iranian media on September 7 to present potential snapback sanctions as a political setback but not as an economic catastrophe and warned that exaggerating the impacts of potential sanctions could inflame public anxiety.[xxxv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent further public frustration about deteriorating economic conditions and reduce the risk of economic-related unrest.

The Shia Coordination Framework (SCF), which is a loose coalition of Iraqi Shia political parties, is trying to bypass the Iraqi parliament to strengthen the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxxvi]  The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is comprised of many militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xxxvii] Iraqi media reported on September 7 that the SCF may plan to have the Iraqi Prime Minister issue an executive order to restructure and expand the PMF’s authority after the SCF’s attempt to do so through the legislature stalled.[xxxviii] The SCF supported the Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which would have likely increased Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key PMF structures.[xxxix] Sunni and Kurdish parties walked out of parliament on July 16 in protest against the contentious legislation.[xl]  Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad al Sudani withdrew the bill from the parliamentary agenda on August 27, reportedly due to threats from the United States to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill.[xli] The new SCF plan is reportedly modeled after former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s 2016 Executive Order, which formally established the PMF.[xlii]  The SCF plan would likely force Sudani to choose between two politically damaging options. He could issue an executive order to strengthen the PMF and risk the United States following through on its threats to sanction Iraq. He could, alternatively, refuse to issue the executive order and risk provoking a backlash from Iranian-backed Iraqi actors and militias. 

Hezbollah officials welcomed the Lebanese Council of Ministers’ approval of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plan to monopolize weapons, likely due to the plan’s implementation being contingent upon Israel withdrawing from Lebanon and ceasing its military operations in Lebanon.[xliii] The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the LAF plan on September 5 under which the LAF will attempt to disarm Hezbollah and establish a state monopoly on all weapons.[xliv] Hezbollah Political Council Deputy Head Mahmoud Qamati told Reuters on September 6 that Hezbollah viewed the outcome of the September 5 cabinet session positively given that the government declared that the implementation of the LAF plan is dependent on Israel withdrawing from Lebanese territory and ceasing its operations in Lebanon.[xlv] Other Hezbollah officials have echoed Qamati’s statement, calling the cabinet session a “step” toward “correcting” the government’s previous cabinet decisions to disarm Hezbollah.[xlvi] Hezbollah has consistently rejected calls to disarm, often citing continued Israeli operations in Lebanon as justification for retaining its weapons.[xlvii] The LAF plan did not include an official timeframe for disarming Hezbollah due to the LAF’s resource constraints, which may also contribute to Hezbollah officials’ support for the plan.[xlviii] Hezbollah has consistently rejected any timetables for its disarmament.[xlix]

Hezbollah officials may calculate that Israel will not agree to the LAF plan and that Hezbollah can thereby delay or prevent the implementation of the disarmament plan. Lebanese officials, including Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, have stated that the Lebanese-approved US proposal will not become effective or be implemented until Israel agrees to it.[l] The LAF disarmament plan is part of the US proposal. The US proposal requires Israel to withdraw from its five positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the proposal's implementation. The proposal also stipulates that the LAF will completely disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[li] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, however.[lii] An Israeli journalist reported on August 25 that the Israeli government will not discuss the US proposal and has no intention of responding to it.[liii] Israeli officials later stated that Israel would conduct “reciprocal measures” if the LAF takes steps to disarm Hezbollah.[liv] Israel has rejected previous proposals that would require Israel to withdraw from Lebanon before the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.[lv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) shifted to a “forward defense” posture in August 2025 to maintain Israel’s “strategic superiority” in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting capabilities that could pose a threat to northern Israeli towns.[lvi] IDF Operations Chief Brigadier General Yisrael Shomer reiterated on September 7 that the IDF’s mission in southern Lebanon is not yet finished given that Israeli civilians have not fully returned to northern Israeli towns.[lvii] The November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement included an addendum that ensures the Israeli right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose to Israel.[lviii] The IDF has acted on this addendum and continued to operate against Hezbollah since November 2024, including via airstrikes and raids targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.[lix]

Hezbollah could use any delay in the Lebanese state’s efforts to disarm it to reorganize and regenerate its forces, which would increase Hezbollah’s relative strength vis-a-vis the Lebanese government and thus likely make it more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah has undergone a review of its strategy in Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire to shape its reconstitution effort and reduce reliance on external support.[lx] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons and restructured its financial system in August 2025 to confront financial challenges.[lxi] Iranian officials and Axis of Resistance-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah has begun appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[lxii] Iran has reiterated that it will continue to support Hezbollah and has reportedly attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah in recent weeks.[lxiii] Hezbollah’s recent actions highlight how it is actively trying to refill its ranks, reconstitute its weapons, retain its Shia support base, and regenerate its smuggling networks. Any delay in the implementation of the LAF plan or US proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these objectives.

Key Takeaways

• Iran-IAEA Negotiations: Iranian officials are signaling openness to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiations with the United States, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: The Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) is trying to bypass the Iraqi parliament to strengthen the Popular Mobilization Forces. The SCF may plan to have the Iraqi Prime Minister issue an executive order to restructure and expand the PMF’s authority after the SCF’s attempt to do so through the legislature stalled.
• Iranian Military Readiness: Iran is likely preparing for future conflicts with Israel and the United States by increasing funding for the Iranian armed forces and evaluating the combat readiness of armed forces units. The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved a six-clause bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities.”
• Iranian Economy: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei outlined a series of economic recommendations in a speech, which highlights the regime’s concern about worsening economic conditions and their potential to undermine internal stability. Khamenei also instructed Iranian officials and media outlets to emphasize Iran’s strengths and avoid portraying Iran as weak.
• Iranian Centrifuge Capacity: Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War destroyed a key Iranian centrifuge research and development site, the Kalaye Electric Company, in Tehran, according to satellite imagery and the Institute for Science and International Security. US and Israeli airstrikes during the war targeted Iran’s centrifuge production facilities as well as active centrifuges, which will likely hinder Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim traveled to Iran on September 5, where he held a series of meetings with senior Iranian officials to discuss bilateral relations between Iraq and Iran. An unspecified informed source cited by Iraqi media claimed that Hakim planned to deliver a “message” from Iraqi politicians regarding mediation with the United States and regional de-escalation.[lxiv] Hakim held separate meetings with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani on September 7 to discuss strengthening political and security cooperation.[lxv] Hakim also met with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, who is Ali Larijani’s brother.[lxvi] Sadegh Larijani claimed that the United States and Israel seek to weaken the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) to form a “greater Israel,” referring to recent US pressure on the Iraqi government to withdraw proposed legislation that would have empowered the PMF within the Iraqi security and political space. The Expediency Discernment Council serves as an advisory body to the Iranian Supreme Leader and resolves disputes between the Guardian Council and Iranian parliament.[lxvii] Hakim is reportedly expected to meet with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during his visit to Tehran.[lxviii]

Syria

Likely Assadist information operations that exploit minority fears of Syrian transitional government forces could undermine the legitimacy of government operations that target Assad-era criminal networks. Assadist remnants launched a disinformation campaign that falsely claimed that the General Security Service’s (GSS) arrest of 40 Hezbollah-linked smugglers and criminals in al Qusayr, Homs Province, on September 6 was an effort by the transitional government to forcibly displace Christians from al Qusayr.[lxix] A local journalist in western Syria reported that the GSS arrested 40 individuals in al Qusayr for offenses ranging from arms and narcotics smuggling to involvement in Assad regime atrocities.[lxx] The GSS reportedly arrested individuals who had cooperated with Hezbollah-linked smuggling networks led by Iyad Habib Jaafar.[lxxi] Jaafar is a notorious Assad regime-era trafficker who was allegedly one of six prominent traffickers responsible for the majority of Captagon and weapons smuggling between Lebanon and Syria through al Qusayr.[lxxii] Syrian media alleged that Jaafar was the “de facto ruler” of the border region between al Qusayr and Lebanon’s Hermel countryside before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[lxxiii] Iyad Jaafar belongs to the Lebanese Jaafar clan, which is a Hezbollah-affiliated family that maintained smuggling networks in al Qusayr but withdrew to Lebanon after the GSS took control of the Syria-Lebanon border in February 2025.[lxxiv]  

Likely Assad regime loyalists may have launched a disinformation campaign in response to the arrest of Hezbollah-affiliated traffickers and criminals on September 6 to try to increase tensions between Syrian Christians and the Syrian transitional government.[lxxv] The information operation claimed that the GSS carried out the arrests to forcibly displace Christians from al Qusayr.[lxxvi] Syrian-Kurdish media circulated the false claim on September 7.[lxxvii] Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) Spokesperson Noureddine al Baba denied claims that the GSS arrested individuals in al Qusayr to displace Christians and confirmed that the GSS transferred the detainees to the Homs judicial system on September 7.[lxxviii] Local Syrian media added that the arrested individuals included Sunnis, Christians, and Alawites.[lxxix] A pastor in al Qusayr denied that the GSS operation aimed to forcibly displace Christians.[lxxx] Assadist remnants previously attempted to conduct a false flag attack on a church in Tartous Province on August 6 to heighten fears among the Christian community and incite sectarian violence.[lxxxi]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched drones targeting six sites in Israel on September 7:[lxxxii]

• One drone targeted Ramon Airport in Eilat.
• Three drones targeted two unspecified military targets in the Negev Desert.
• One drone targeted an unspecified site in Ashkelon.
• One drone targeted Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv.
• Two drones targeted an unspecified site in Ashdod.

The Houthis claimed that their attack on Ramon Airport disrupted air traffic and shut down the airport.[lxxxiii] The IDF confirmed on September 7 that it intercepted several drones from Yemen but acknowledged that one drone penetrated Israeli air defenses and hit Ramon Airport, injuring civilians and temporarily closing the airport.[lxxxiv]

The Houthis separately launched three drones on September 8 targeting Ben Gurion Airport, Ramon Airport, and an unspecified target in Dimona.[lxxxv] The IDF intercepted the three Houthi drones.[lxxxvi]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.