Iran Update, September 5, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.   

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program. The E3 triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[i] The E3 previously told Iran that they would delay the reimposition of UN sanctions by up to six months if Iran met three key conditions, which include restoring the IAEA’s access to Iranian nuclear facilities, addressing concerns about Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, and engaging in direct talks with the United States.[ii] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 4 in Qatar to discuss Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the resumption of IAEA access to Iran’s nuclear sites.[iii] A Wall Street Journal reporter stated on September 4 that the talks produced no progress, and neither side shifted its stance during the talks.[iv] Iran and the IAEA are expected to meet in Vienna on September 5.[v] Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in Vienna Reza Najafi stated on September 5 that the discussions will define cooperation under Iran’s parliamentary law and establish the “new form of cooperation” with the agency.[vi] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA.[vii]  Iran recently allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to monitor fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), but has barred them from accessing or inspecting damaged nuclear sites.[viii]

The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah.[ix] The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plan to place all weapons under the state’s control during a cabinet session on September 5.[x] The Lebanese Council of Ministers ordered the LAF to create a plan on August 5 that will attempt to establish a state monopoly over arms in Lebanon.[xi] The Lebanese cabinet has decided to keep the details of the LAF’s plan and the cabinet’s deliberations confidential.[xii] The LAF plan will reportedly take 15 months to implement and will focus on clearing weapons in five geographical sectors, starting with Beirut, according to Lebanese media.[xiii] It is unclear what the other four geographical sectors are. Lebanese Information Minister Paul Morcos announced that the LAF will begin implementing its plan in accordance with its available resources and logistics, which suggests that the LAF faces certain resource and logistical constraints but does not specify the constraints.[xiv] Morcos noted that the LAF’s implementation process is contingent upon Israeli compliance with the US proposal.[xv] The US proposal stipulates an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the agreement’s implementation, and the LAF completely disarming Hezbollah by the end of 2025.[xvi] The 15-month plan would not disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025, meaning that Israel could operate in Lebanon even under the US proposal as currently written and reported. Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed, however.[xvii] Hezbollah has not released any official statements on the Lebanese government‘s approval of the LAF plan. Hezbollah and its Shia allies symbolically withdrew from the cabinet session during discussions on the LAF plan and have vehemently opposed the plan in public statements prior to the approval.[xviii]

Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF’s campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the 15-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts and prevent the group’s disarmament.  Senior Hezbollah officials have repeatedly argued that Hezbollah should not be subject to disarmament, given its “unique” status as defenders of Lebanon against Israel.[xix] Hezbollah has repeatedly initiated offensive wars against Israel on its own accord, which undermines the sovereignty of the Lebanese government.[xx] These wars have frequently wrought significant destruction across Lebanon.[xxi] The group has already threatened to use force against the Lebanese government to coerce or compel it to cease its disarmament plans, which indicates that Hezbollah will attempt to subvert any disarmament efforts.[xxii]

A Hezbollah effort to delay or stop LAF efforts to disarm it would enable it to reorganize and regenerate its forces and possibly defeat a disarmament effort before disarmament can be successful. Hezbollah has undergone a review of its strategy in Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire to shape its reconstitution effort and reduce reliance on external support.[xxiii] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons and restructured its financial system in August 2025 to confront its financial challenges.[xxiv] Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah began appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[xxv] Iran has reiterated that it will support Hezbollah in its efforts to rebuild and has even reportedly attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah in recent weeks.[xxvi] Hezbollah will strengthen slowly as a result of these efforts unless it is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government’s disarmament effort.

The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. US officials told the New York Times on September 4 that the Lebanese government would likely receive significant amounts of money for military equipment and LAF salaries if the Lebanese government implements a “serious disarmament plan.”[xxvii] Lebanese officials said on September 5 that unspecified foreign countries have pledged to provide Lebanon with aid, but that Lebanon will not receive any economic investments unless it restricts arms to the state.[xxviii] These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by providing services that the government fails to provide. The influx of aid would also increase support for the government should the government prove able to provide reconstruction funds and other social services historically provided by Hezbollah. Hezbollah previously led such reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to access funds to pay for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure following the conflict with Israel in late 2024.[xxix] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[xxx] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xxxi] This economic stimulus within communities from the Lebanese government would complement the LAF’s disarmament campaign by reinstating the Lebanese government as the primary service and security guarantor in Hezbollah strongholds. 

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF’s campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the 15-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts and prevent the group’s disarmament. Hezbollah will reconstitute slowly unless its reconstitution is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government’s disarmament effort.
• Economic Support for Lebanon: The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by enabling the government to provide services that Hezbollah previously provided.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.