Iran Update, September 4, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare.[i] The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”[ii] The Tasnim report outlined the following three main areas that Iran must address to withstand hybrid warfare:

• Redefining Governance Structures and Processes: Tasnim called for re-engineering Iran’s governance system and warned that a centralized bureaucracy is too slow and brittle for hybrid war.[iii] Tasnim urged the regime to create mechanisms to monitor internal divisions, accelerate bureaucratic processes, and provide more authority to governors and local officials. It argued that decentralized power would make governance more flexible and resilient, which would speed up the regime’s responses to crises such as unrest, cyberattacks, or supply disruptions.
• Reforming the Relationship Between the Regime and People: Tasnim called for the regime to treat the Iranian people as Iran’s main strategic asset rather than dependents of the state.[iv] It stressed that victory in hybrid war requires citizens to actively participate in governance, including via neighborhood security, the economy, and cultural resistance. Tasnim highlighted that small, agile grassroots groups involved with technology, media, and culture would counter stronger adversaries and shape public opinion so that people accept hardships as part of a larger struggle for independence and survival.
• Developing Iran’s “resistance economy:” Tasnim called for the regime to turn the economy into a “defensive stronghold.”[v] It emphasized the need to end dependence on crude oil sales, cut reliance on food imports and gas consumption, and enforce tight control over foreign exchange and trade. Tasnim also called for building long-term cooperation with Axis of Resistance members, neighboring states, and emerging powers such as Russia and China to secure essential goods and bypass Western economic pressure.

Tasnim also warned that adversaries use media narratives to target the minds and will of the people, which the outlet referred to as “narrative warfare.”[vi] Tasnim’s call to prioritize narrative warfare is consistent with recent regime efforts to control domestic reporting on snapback sanctions.[vii] Iranian officials have recently directed outlets to downplay the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) activation of the snapback mechanism and avoid negative portrayals of Iran’s future.[viii]

Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats.[ix] Nour News is affiliated with Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. The Supreme National Security Council established the Defense Council following the Israel-Iran War to address emerging national security threats and streamline decision-making during wartime.[x] Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.[xi] Nour News stated that the Defense Council is responsible for setting and executing priorities for Iran’s armed forces to prepare Iran to confront such threats.[xii] Nour News identified the following recommendations for Iran to address these emerging threats: build multi-layered deterrence, conduct active diplomacy, and manage domestic public opinion.[xiii] Nour News’ emphasis on public opinion is consistent with previous calls by Iranian media and moderate and pragmatic regime officials to increase public trust and societal resilience, as well as resolve disputes between the regime and the Iranian people.

Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian proposal would allow Iran to determine how Iran’s nuclear activities would be investigated.[xiv] Iran also revoked the accreditations of two experienced IAEA inspectors in August for mistakenly taking documents from Fordow to Vienna that reportedly described the facility’s interior.[xv] The IAEA stated that the revocation was unjustified because the documents did not include any information that would compromise the facility’s security.[xvi] This comes after the Iranian parliament passed a law on June 25 suspending all cooperation with the IAEA.[xvii] IAEA Director General Grossi said on September 3 that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, but it is unlikely that any agreement will be reached due to Iran’s opposition.[xviii]

Emirati media reported that the United States has decreased its opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) efforts to have greater autonomy in post-war Syria, which is consistent with recent changes in US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s public statements about the SDF’s integration under the Syrian transitional government.[xix] A Washington, DC-based source implied to Emirati media on September 3 that the US State Department has softened its stance toward the SDF’s negotiating position in integration talks with the transitional government in response to the transitional government’s conduct in Suwayda Province.[xx] Syrian transitional government forces conducted atrocities against Druze fighters and civilians after they gained control of parts of Suwayda Province on July 15.[xxi]  The source said that State Department officials are “listening to them [the SDF] more than before.”[xxii] This report is consistent with US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack’s comments to the Washington Post on August 23 that the transitional government may “need to consider alternatives to a highly centralized state,” following the violence in Suwayda Province.[xxiii] Barrack had previously rejected SDF demands for federalism during previous rounds of integration negotiations prior to the start of intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province on July 13.[xxiv]

The State Department continues to demand that the SDF make concessions to the transitional government, however.[xxv] These concessions include requests for the SDF to relinquish control of Arab-majority areas within SDF territory and the SDF’s monopoly on oil production in northeastern Syria.[xxvi] US mediators now reportedly seek a compromise in which the SDF would partially integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) but retain limited autonomy.[xxvii] The source told Emirati media that an SDF negotiation delegation will travel to Damascus “in the coming days” for a new round of talks with the transitional government.[xxviii] Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials announced on September 4 that they have not yet received an official date from the transitional government for the resumption of negotiations, however.[xxix]

The SDF is also unlikely to relinquish demands for security guarantees from the transitional government due to fear of ethnic cleansing by Turkey and Turkish-backed groups that have integrated into the Syrian MoD. Turkey and Turkish-backed groups previously conducted ethnic cleansing against Syrian Kurds through the creation of ”safe zones” in Turkish-controlled Syria, in which Turkey displaced Kurdish civilians and replaced them with Syrian refugees from Turkey.[xxx] These SDF fears are particularly relevant due to US pressure on the SDF to relinquish control of SDF areas east of the Euphrates River. The Euphrates River is a significant defensive terrain feature that would enable the SDF to defend against any Syrian transitional government incursion from the western bank with relative ease. There are no significant defensive terrain features east of the Euphrates until the Khabour River. The majority of Syrian Kurds east of the Euphrates live behind the Khabour River. Defensive positions on the Khabour or Euphrates could be turned by an attack from the north out of Turkish territory, however. An unspecified Western diplomat said to Emirati media on September 4 that Turkey’s hardline position against the SDF will complicate negotiations even if the SDF and transitional government come to an agreement with US mediation.[xxxi] The diplomat added that ”the problem is that even if [President Ahmed] al Shara accepts devolution, Turkey will not, and he [Shara] cannot go against Ankara.”[xxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Iran: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare. The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”
• Iran: Iranian media outlet Nour News outlined on September 4 the role of the Defense Council in executing a new Iranian defense doctrine to counter hybrid threats. Nour News reported on September 4 that Iran now faces a new threat environment following the war that extends beyond conventional warfare to include other domains of power, such as information and electronic operations.
• Iran: Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War.
• Syria: Emirati media reported that the United States has decreased its opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) efforts to have greater autonomy in post-war Syria, which is consistent with recent changes in US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s public statements about the SDF’s integration under the Syrian transitional government. The State Department continues to demand that the SDF make concessions to the transitional government, however.

Iran

Iran is taking steps to rebuild its integrated air defense system after its air defenses were severely degraded during the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission met with Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi on September 2 to discuss efforts to strengthen the Iranian armed forces.[xxxiii] The Iranian government has reportedly allocated funds to the AFGS to repair Iran’s air defense systems.[xxxiv] Israel significantly degraded Iran’s air defenses during the Israel-Iran War.[xxxv] National Security and Foreign Policy Commission member Fadah Maliki claimed that Iran is interested in purchasing defense systems from Russia or China and added that agreements have reportedly been signed and are waiting to be implemented.[xxxvi] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Russia is unlikely to supply Iran with new air defense systems due to the commitment of Russian systems to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[xxxvii] Senior Iranian officials have held a series of multilateral meetings with Russian and Chinese officials in recent days on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit to discuss expanding cooperation in all fields.[xxxviii]

Iranian media confirmed on September 4 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi as the new Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander.[xxxix] Israel killed former Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid during the Israel-Iran War.[xl] CTP-ISW previously covered Abdollahi's appointment in its July 2 update.[xli] 

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

Syrian media reported on September 4 that the International Coalition likely conducted a drone strike that targeted a suspected Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader’s vehicle near the Aleppo International Airport.[xlii] The drone reportedly fired two missiles that killed the driver.[xliii] The US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not claimed responsibility for the strike at the time of this writing. US CENTCOM has repeatedly targeted members of designated terrorist organizations in Syria since the fall of Assad, including ISIS and Hurras al Din, which is an al Qaeda affiliate.[xliv]

Unspecified individuals conducted a car bomb attack targeting a General Security Services (GSS) commander in Damascus City on September 3.[xlv] Local Syrian media reported on September 4 that an IED placed on a parked vehicle detonated in Damascus City’s al Mezzeh neighborhood and caused no casualties.[xlvi] The GSS cordoned off the area and conducted a preliminary investigation after the attack.[xlvii] Unspecified individuals detonated a similar explosive device in al Mezzeh on August 16, which also caused no casualties.[xlviii] ISIS may be responsible for the recent attacks in al Mezzeh, given the intended target of the attack and previous ISIS attacks in the area before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xlix] Assadist insurgents, who have recently demonstrated their ability to conduct roadside IED attacks against vehicles, could also be responsible.[l] Assadist remnants released a video on September 3 that showed an IED attack against a travelling MoD vehicle on August 14 in Jableh, Latakia Province, which caused no casualties.[li]

Arabian Peninsula

Likely Houthi fighters targeted a vessel approximately 178 nautical miles northwest of Hudaydah, Yemen, on September 4.[lii] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that an unknown projectile impacted near the vessel.[liii] The vessel also experienced ”severe electronic interference“ during the incident. UKMTO added that the vessel and crew safely continued to their next port, and authorities began an investigation.[liv] The Houthis previously conducted complex rocket-propelled grenade and naval surface drone attacks targeting the Liberian-flagged Magic Seas and Eternity C vessels off the coast of Hudaydah in early July 2025.[lv]

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting a site west of Jerusalem and a drone targeting an unspecified site in Haifa on September 3.[lvi] The Houthis separately launched another ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion International Airport on September 4.[lvii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both missiles and the drone.[lviii] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lix]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Iran is attempting to smuggle funds to Hezbollah via supply routes through Syria and Iraq, which indicates that Iran continues to value Hezbollah’s ability to support Iranian objectives in the region despite setbacks since October 2023. Unspecified sources told Saudi media on September 4 that Lebanese and Syrian security agencies have identified increased Iranian attempts to smuggle funds to Hezbollah “in recent weeks,” some of which have reportedly been successful.[lx] The United States similarly identified “millions of dollars” worth of Iranian financial payments to Hezbollah that Iran facilitated via traditional money transfer systems and overland smuggling, according to the unspecified sources.[lxi] A senior Iraqi official reportedly did not respond to a request by an unspecified Iranian official to allow Iranian money transfer shipments for Hezbollah to transit through the al Qaim border crossing between Iraq and Syria.[lxii] Iran’s reported request to use official border crossings to smuggle money to Hezbollah comes amid Iran’s recent struggles to transfer funds via illegal border crossings due to US drone operations and increased Syrian MoD presence along the Syria-Iraq border.[lxiii] Iran also reportedly told Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework leaders to find new ways to rebuild its ground lines of communications across Iraq to supply Hezbollah.[lxiv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iran is similarly attempting to utilize its former supply routes in Syria to transfer funds to Hezbollah.[lxv]

Two unspecified Syrian sources told Saudi media that Iran “still maintains ties to old smuggling networks in Syria,” which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment of post-war smuggling networks in Syria.[lxvi] One of the sources noted that Iran may have established relations with new, unspecified groups in Syria to retain these supply routes after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[lxvii]

Hezbollah’s recent financial challenges suggest that Iran’s attempts to transfer funds have not yet made a major impact. Hezbollah has recently struggled to maintain its financial commitments to its fighters, which led the group to indefinitely freeze compensation payments in June 2025 and reduce the salaries of Hezbollah-affiliated workers in August 2025.[lxviii]