Iran Update, September 19, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iran is attempting to prevent snapback sanctions by offering an interim deal that secures concessions upfront from the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), but avoids any meaningful commitments regarding its nuclear program and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian and US officials have reportedly been in direct contact in recent days to discuss a new nuclear proposal.[i] Iran‘s new proposal stipulates that Iran would resume talks with the United States over an interim deal while the E3 simultaneously halts the snapback process and extends UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 for several months to allow time for negotiations. UNSC Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, prohibited Iran from engaging in “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons…until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day.”[ii] Iran’s proposal said that the United States must also provide a guarantee that there will be no more strikes on Iran once an interim deal is reached. Iran would then begin retrieving its 60 percent highly enriched uranium stockpile. The proposal calls for the following three steps to be conducted after Iran’s retrieval and the United States provides a security guarantee:

• The UNSC will permanently terminate Resolution 2231.
• Iran will dilute its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile to 20 percent for use in fuel plates at the Tehran Research Reactor.
• The United States will lift sanctions it agreed to in the interim deal, and both sides will begin talks for a “final agreement.”

An unspecified political source told Amwaj Media that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi submitted the Iranian proposal to US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead nuclear negotiator Steve Witkoff on September 16.[iii] Araghchi separately gave the same proposal to E3 foreign ministers and EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 17.[iv] The E3 responded to the proposal, calling it “insufficient in substance.”[v] An unspecified source familiar with the proposal stated that the Iranian proposal demands “far-reaching actions,” but includes “no concrete action” from Iran.[vi] The United States has not responded to the proposal at the time of writing.[vii] These Iranian steps are inconsistent with the stated US position on any nuclear agreement with Iran.

The UNSC rejected a draft resolution on September 19 to permanently lift sanctions on Iran.[viii] South Korea, which is the UNSC’s current president, finalized a UNSC resolution on September 8 to extend sanctions relief for Iran.[ix] South Korea was required to hold the resolution for 10 days after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism if no other UNSC member held the resolution. The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[x] The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA. Snapback sanctions target Iran’s arms transfers and nuclear program more broadly, including its domestic enrichment activities.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, likely in response to multiple security concerns, including Iran.[xi] The agreement is a mutual defense guarantee under which an attack on one party would trigger a response by both countries.[xii] Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif stated on September 18 that Pakistan's nuclear program "will be made available" to Saudi Arabia if necessary.[xiii] Asif added that Pakistan or Saudi Arabia has not specified a “country whose attack would automatically trigger a retaliatory response," which demonstrates that the agreement aims to address multiple security concerns rather than a single security threat.[xiv] Iranian media have portrayed the agreement as a response to Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha, Qatar, that drew condemnation from Gulf states.[xv] Iranian outlets have also framed the agreement as a challenge to US influence in the region. An Iranian media outlet stated on September 19 that the agreement signals that "the era of unilateral dependence on America is over."[xvi] The outlet claimed that the agreement shows that Saudi Arabia is shifting away from the United States toward other "independent options."[xvii] Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been losing faith in US security guarantees for several years, at least since Iran targeted Saudi oil facilities with multiple missiles and drones in 2019, and a separate Iranian-backed attack struck Abu Dhabi, UAE, in 2022.[xviii] The timing of this agreement suggests that the recent Israeli strike in Doha factored in the Saudi decision to pursue and sign the agreement. But Iran has repeatedly targeted regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in the past, with much less precision and to a much greater effect than the Israeli strikes in Doha. The Iranian drone and missile attack in 2019 forced Saudi Arabia to dip into its oil reserves to support exports.[xix] Iran has backed hundreds of Houthis and Iraqi militia attacks targeting the Gulf states since 2015 as well.[xx] Iran similarly conducted missile and drone strikes in Pakistan in January 2024, claiming to target members of the Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl.[xxi] Iran has also repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of fomenting internal unrest in Iran and backing anti-regime groups in southeastern Iran.[xxii] Saudi Arabia has historically supported US efforts to curb Iranian influence in the region, including by fighting Iran‘s regional proxies such as the Houthis in Yemen.[xxiii] CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran may be more concerned about this development than Iranian media coverage would suggest, given Iran’s repeated attacks or support for attacks in both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The Iraqi federal government has reportedly suspended an agreement to import Turkmen gas due to US pressure. The deal would have enabled Iran to manage the gas flow and receive 23 percent of the gas daily.[xxiv] Such an arrangement would have given Tehran additional revenue and leverage over Baghdad, depending on the specific terms of the deal. Iraq would have imported over five billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas through Iran under the deal, which Iraq and Turkmenistan first proposed in 2023, according to four unidentified Iraqi officials and documents viewed by Reuters.[xxv] The Iranian state-owned National Iranian Gas Company would have reportedly managed the gas flow, and Iran would have received up to 23 percent of that gas daily. This arrangement would have benefited Iran and presumably enabled Iran to gain some revenue. It would also give Tehran leverage over Baghdad, assuming Iran could adjust the specific amount of flow from Turkmenistan if Iran desired. The United States rejected the Iraqi federal government’s previous attempts to justify the agreement, including an offer to employ a third-party international monitor to ensure that the agreement complied with US sanctions and anti-money laundering rules. An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on electricity issues implied that the United States would sanction Iraqi banks and financial institutions if the agreement moved forward. A source familiar with the matter told Reuters on September 19 that the United States refused to approve “arrangements that would benefit Iran.”[xxvi] The US opposition to this agreement comes as the United States continues to pressure the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq.[xxvii] This deal would have nominally decreased Iraq’s reliance on Iranian gas imports, but Iran’s ability to ”manage” gas flows and receive 23 percent of the gas flow would have benefited Iran.

Iraq continues to rely on Iran to meet its energy demands. An unidentified Iraqi power official told Reuters on September 19 that Iranian gas fulfills nearly a third of Iraq’s total power generation.[xxviii] The United States revoked a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity in March 2025, but Iraq has continued to import Iranian gas.[xxix] Iran’s ongoing, chronic energy shortages have complicated its ability to supply gas to Iraq, however. The office of Iraqi Electricity Minister Ziad Ali Fadel stated on August 1, ahead of Fadel’s meetings with Iranian officials in Tehran, that Fadel would discuss ways to ensure Iran’s commitment to its contracts regarding oil exports to Iraq.[xxx] Iraqi energy shortages run the continued risk of threatening Iraqi political stability by triggering power outages, though the destabilizing effects of power outages in Iraq are less pronounced after the summer. Summer power cuts have previously caused major anti-government demonstrations in Iraq, which would be especially concerning ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[xxxi] Iraq has continued to pursue alternative pathways to fulfill its energy demands beyond relying on Iran, including via potential imports of Qatari and Omani gas and improvements to its existing energy infrastructure.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions on Iran: Iran is trying to prevent snapback sanctions by offering an interim deal that secures concessions upfront from the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) but avoids any meaningful commitments on its nuclear program and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cooperation. These Iranian steps are inconsistent with the stated US position on any nuclear agreement with Iran.
• Saudi-Pakistan Defense Cooperation: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, likely in response to multiple security concerns, including Iran. Iranian media have portrayed the agreement as a response to Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha, Qatar. Iran has repeatedly targeted regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in the past and backed numerous militia attacks targeting the Gulf states.
• Iraq Energy Imports: The Iraqi federal government has reportedly suspended an agreement to import Turkmen gas due to US pressure. The deal would have enabled Iran to manage the gas flow and receive 23 percent of the gas daily. Such an arrangement would have given Tehran additional revenue and leverage over Baghdad, depending on the specific terms of the deal.

Iran

Iran tested an unidentified ballistic missile at the missile test range in the Semnan Space Center in Semnan Province on September 18.[xxxiii] Iranian provincial officials confirmed on September 18 that Iran had conducted a missile test.[xxxiv] Iranian security officials have not specified which missile they tested or the missile’s specifications. A Western news outlet claimed that the tested missile may be part of the Sejjil-class system due to the missile’s silhouette and launch characteristics. The Sejjil-class system is Iran’s most advanced domestically produced medium-range ballistic missile.[xxxv] Iran launched a Sejjil ballistic missile against Israel for the first time on June 18 during the Israel-Iran War.[xxxvi]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces and Turkey have continued to cooperate against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on and near the frontlines in Aleppo Province. Local Syrian sources reported that the MoD and SDF exchanged small arms fire on September 18 near al Baij, Aleppo Province.[xxxvii] The frontlines between the MoD and SDF near al Baij are separated by a 20-meter-wide canal, which acts as a barrier that forces must cross to access the other side. No military casualties have been reported at the time of writing. A local source reported that a Turkish drone flew over Deir Hafer approximately two hours before the engagement in nearby al Baij, possibly conducting reconnaissance.[xxxviii] A drone over this area of Syria can observe the entire SDF-held salient around Deir Hafer if the drone is operating at or over 1,000ft of altitude, and most of the salient if it is operating at or around 500ft of altitude. The MoD and SDF previously exchanged artillery fire between the MoD-controlled towns of al Kayariya, Rasm al Ahmar, and Habubba Kabir, and the SDF-controlled Jirah Military Airport within the Deir Hafer salient on September 10.[xxxix]

The recent SDF-MoD engagement, which possibly involved Turkish drone reconnaissance, follows a recent increase in Syrian-Turkish military cooperation. Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson Rear Admiral Zeki Akturk said that the Turkish military will remain in Syria to “fight terrorism,” a reference to the SDF, on September 18.[xl] Turkey will reportedly give the Syrian government a ”deadline” until the end of 2025, after which it will take military action against the SDF.[xli] Turkey previously signed a defense agreement with Syria on August 13 and reportedly began training Syrian MoD personnel in Turkey on September 9.[xlii] The defense agreement stipulates that Turkey will help procure military equipment for Syria and train Syrian forces.[xliii]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted a ground raid using Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) intelligence in Jarjisa, Hama Province, on September 19, which killed a senior Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader.[xliv] This is the first time that the Iraqi CTS has provided US CENTCOM with intelligence to support a counter-ISIS operation in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xlv] US CENTCOM reported on September 19 that its forces conducted a raid that killed Omar Abdul Qader Bassam (Abdul Rahman al Halabi), who was planning external attacks against the United States.[xlvi] Local media claimed Bassam directly planned the 2013 suicide attack on the Iranian embassy in Beirut that killed 23 people.[xlvii] A Syrian source said Lebanese authorities previously detained Bassam in Roumieh prison in Lebanon for being an ISIS member.[xlviii] Lebanese authorities later transferred him to the Assad regime, which first imprisoned Bassam in the Palestine Branch Prison and then in the notorious Sednaya Prison.[xlix] Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) forces captured Sednaya in December 2024 and reportedly released Bassem along with all surviving prisoners.[l] Bassam was reportedly the ISIS “chief of operations and external security” and was responsible for planning and supervising "remote provinces," according to Iraqi intelligence.[li] The Iraqi CTS stated on September 19 that Iraq’s intelligence monitoring and judicial support over the past several months led to the CENTCOM operation.[lii] CTS did not claim or suggest that Iraqi forces entered Syria. Local media said that the General Security Service (GSS) cordoned off Jarjisa, indicating that CENTCOM coordinated the operation with Damascus and demonstrating the Syrian government’s support for the counter-ISIS mission.[liii] CENTCOM and Syrian security forces previously coordinated on a joint counter-ISIS raid in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on August 20, which killed a senior Iraqi ISIS leader.[liv]  

Arabian Peninsula

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a ballistic missile and two drones that the Houthis launched targeting Israel on September 18.[lv] The Houthis claimed to have launched at least three drones targeting Eilat and Beersheba, Israel.[lvi] Shrapnel from one of the intercepted drones struck a hotel in Eilat, as CTP-ISW reported on September 18.[lvii] The Houthis also fired a Palestine-2 ballistic missile targeting Tel Aviv, which the IDF intercepted on September 18.[lviii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese and Cypriot officials reportedly discussed the issue of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel on September 16.[lix] Lebanese media reported that unspecified Lebanese security officials met with Cypriot intelligence chief Tasos Tzionis in Beirut on September 16 to discuss the status of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel and potential strategies to secure their release.[lx] At least 19 Lebanese citizens remain imprisoned in Israel, most of whom are linked to Hezbollah, according to Israel.[lxi] Tzionis reportedly reiterated Cyprus’s desire to help mediate the release of Lebanese prisoners during the meeting.[lxii] Tzionis separately met with unspecified Hezbollah officials during his visit to Beirut.[lxiii] Hezbollah has consistently identified the release of Lebanese prisoners as one of its key priorities.[lxiv]

Cypriot mediation could potentially help implement the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah. The US proposal states that Israel will release Lebanese prisoners within 60 days of the proposal coming into effect.[lxv] An Israeli journalist reported on August 25 that the Israeli government will not discuss the US proposal and has no intention of responding to it, however.[lxvi] Tzionis is reportedly in contact with unspecified foreign countries ”capable of pressing Israel” to release Lebanese prisoners.[lxvii] Lebanese officials have previously called on the United States to pressure Israel to release Lebanese prisoners.[lxviii] Cyprus has previously had some success in mediating prisoner releases, such as the release of the Israeli-Russian dual citizen Elizabeth Tsurkov on September 9.[lxix] Israeli Mossad chief David Barnea thanked Tzionis for Cyprus’ assistance in the release of Tsurkov and stated that Cypriot-Israeli cooperation ”has proved itself once again.”[lxx]

The Lebanese government condemned Israel’s recent airstrikes in southern Lebanon and claimed that continued Israeli airstrikes are hindering the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) ability to implement its disarmament plan.[lxxi] The IDF struck six Hezbollah Radwan Force sites in southern Lebanon on September 18.[lxxii] The LAF stated on September 18 that continued Israeli airstrikes will prevent the LAF from fully deploying its forces to southern Lebanon as part of its disarmament plan and hinder its ability to disarm Hezbollah.[lxxiii] The LAF disarmament plan stipulates that the LAF will disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River in three months.[lxxiv] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, however.[lxxv]