Iran Update, September 18, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Senior Iranian officials, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, met with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov in Tehran on September 18 to discuss energy cooperation, likely in an effort to address energy shortages in Iran.[i] Paknejad and Tsivilyov reviewed the Iran-Russia April 2025 agreement for Russia to export 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Iran annually via Azerbaijan.[ii] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated in January 2025 that Russian gas deliveries to Iran would start at 2 billion cubic meters per year and could increase to 55 billion cubic meters annually.[iii] Iran, and especially northern Iran, faces recurring gas shortages during the winter because Iran has limited gas storage capacity, and energy production is concentrated in the South Pars gas field in southern Iran.[iv] Iranian media reported that Iran faces a potential steep decline in overall gas production over the next five to seven years.[v] Iranian officials may be concerned about potential unrest as a result of ongoing chronic energy shortages. Energy shortages have previously caused protests in northeastern Iran.[vi] Recent energy shortages have forced the Iranian government to temporarily shut down offices, banks, schools, and government buildings.[vii]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi also met with Tsivilyov and emphasized the importance of deepening bilateral defense cooperation amid Western sanctions.[viii] These meetings reflect Iranian efforts to deepen strategic cooperation with Russia under the framework of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.

French President Emmanuel Macron stated on September 18 that UN snapback sanctions on Iran are a “done deal” and will be reimposed at the end of September.[ix] Macron told Israeli media that Iran has failed to make serious commitments.[x] Iran reportedly presented the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) with a proposal earlier this week to extend the snapback deadline by several months in exchange for positive steps to curtail its nuclear program and an Iranian move to resume talks with the United States.[xi] The E3 reportedly viewed the proposal as “insufficient“, according to a source familiar with the proposal.[xii] The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[xiii] The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA.

Iran views Russia and China as critical to its efforts to rebuild its military and prepare for future conflict. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet Defa Press published an article on September 15 discussing how Iran will benefit from an upcoming BRICS naval exercise.[xiv] BRICS, which is an international economic coalition comprised of the PRC, Russia, and others, was scheduled to conduct a combined naval exercise with Iran and others in November 2025, though BRICS has delayed the exercise indefinitely. This would mark the first combined exercise with Iranian participation since the Israel-Iran war. The Iranian article asserted that the exercise would help Iran develop “modern tactics” across multiple domains, test domestically produced weapons, and share weapons technology and intelligence with other exercise participants.[xv] Indeed, combined exercises provide a controlled environment for militaries to test new tactics and equipment, enhance their interoperability, and learn from one another—all of which Tehran likely values heavily given its need to rebuild its military.

The Iranian discussion about the BRICS naval exercise came as Tehran has looked to the Adversary Entente for critical military and economic assistance. Iran has reportedly sought to buy advanced air defenses and fighter jets from the PRC and Russia in recent weeks.[xvi] Iran will need foreign help for the foreseeable future to reconstitute the damage that Israel inflicted upon Iranian air and air defense capabilities. Iranian officials and state media have separately emphasized in recent weeks the need to deepen economic cooperation with the PRC to withstand international sanctions.

The Iranian military establishment has discussed acquiring Russian-made Krasukha-4 electronic warfare (EW) systems as part of the Iranian military reconstitution effort. An Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet published an article on September 13 discussing efforts to strengthen Iranian air defense following the Israel-Iran war and focusing particularly on using Krasukha EW systems.[xvii] The Iranian military establishment has been very interested in improving its EW capabilities, particularly against the backdrop of the Russian war in Ukraine.[xviii] The Iranian leadership has more broadly emphasized the need to improve domestic defensive capabilities since the June 2025 Israel-Iran war.[xix] Russia developed the 1L269 Krasukha in 2010 as a ground-based EW system built to neutralize low earth orbit (LEO) spy satellites, ground-based radars, airborne surveillance radars, and radar-guided ordinance at ranges between 150-300 kilometers.[xx] Russia deployed the Krasukha-4 to Syria in 2015.[xxi] Commander of US Special Operations Command General Raymond Thomas reported in 2018 that Russian EW attacks in Syria had disrupted communications, EC-130s, and other equipment.[xxii] Satellite imagery captured in January 2024 showed that Iran had deployed a Krasukha-4 system to Bandar Abbas.[xxiii] Israel struck military targets at Bandar Abbas during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, though it is unclear whether the Krasukha systems were impacted.[xxiv] Israel used F-35s during its strikes into Iran, which are equipped with advanced counter-electronic warfare capabilities and can likely evade the Krasukha-4.[xxv] The Iranian military establishment may therefore be interested in new Krasukha-4 systems to defend against Israeli drone operations. Israel launched a wave of drones at the onset of its strike campaign in Iran to suppress air defenses and electronic countermeasures and damage missile launchers.[xxvi] Russia has used the Krasukha-4 EW system to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian military assets in the Russian rear and also explicitly credited the Krasukha-4 for the Russian ability to defend against Ukrainian ground-based counteroffensive operations in June 2023.[xxvii] Iran is likely hoping to acquire the Krasukha-4 and integrate these operational lessons in future defensive operations against Israel.

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions on Iran: French President Emmanuel Macron stated on September 18 that UN snapback sanctions on Iran are a “done deal” and will be reimposed at the end of September. Macron told Israeli media that Iran has failed to make serious commitments. The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
• Iran-Russia Energy Cooperation: Senior Iranian officials, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, met with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov in Tehran on September 18 to discuss energy cooperation, likely in an effort to address energy shortages in Iran. Iranian officials may be concerned about potential unrest as a result of ongoing chronic energy shortages.
• Iranian Military Cooperation with US Adversaries: Iran views Russia and China as critical to its efforts to rebuild its military and prepare for future conflict. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled outlet Defa Press published an article on September 15 discussing how Iran will benefit from an upcoming BRICS naval exercise. The Iranian article asserted that the exercise would help Iran develop “modern tactics” across multiple domains, test domestically produced weapons, and share weapons technology and intelligence with other exercise participants.
• Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: The Iranian military establishment has discussed acquiring Russian-made Krasukha-4 electronic warfare (EW) systems as part of the Iranian military reconstitution effort. Iran is likely hoping to acquire the Krasukha-4 and integrate these operational lessons in future defensive operations against Israel.

Iran

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base announced on September 18 that unspecified fighters fired small arms at and killed a Basij member in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xxviii]  The attack follows a series of recent Jaish al Adl attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xxix] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said it was an “honor” that the US State Department designated them as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). [xxx] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai said on September 17 that the FTO designation increases the group‘s “honor and elevation.”[xxxi] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada spokesperson Kadhim al Fartusi claimed that the designation will not affect militia activity because the militia does not participate in ”activities outside of Iraq.”[xxxii] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba military aide Abdul Qader al Karbalai similarly suggested on September 17 that the designation will not impact the group’s activities.[xxxiii] The US State Department designated both militias as FTOs on September 17.[xxxiv] Both groups are part of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that consistently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[xxxv] US federal law makes it a crime for any person in the United States or subject to US jurisdiction to knowingly provide “material support or resources,” including financial services, training, or weapons, to a designated FTO.[xxxvi] The designation comes as the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government in recent months to limit Iranian influence in Iraq and disarm Iran-backed militias by threatening sanctions.[xxxvii]

Syria

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara told Reuters on September 17 that a security agreement with Israel is a “necessity,” but that the agreement must respect Syria’s airspace, territorial unity, and require UN supervision.[xxxviii] Shara said on September 17 that Syria could reach a security agreement with Israel “in the coming days.”[xxxix] Shara’s own stated positions, Israel’s proposals for a continued presence in southern Syria and a demilitarized zone, and reports about the contents of the Syrian counterproposal to Israel indicate that any agreement in the short term is very unlikely.[xl] The contradictions between the stated Israeli and Syrian positions are significant and suggest that an agreement will not occur in the coming days. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani reportedly met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer in London on September 17 to discuss the recently proposed Israeli-Syrian security agreement.[xli]  A Syrian Foreign Ministry source told French media on September 19 that “there is progress in the talks with Israel” and there will be agreements before the end of this year.[xlii] An Israeli-Syrian security agreement is unlikely in the near future, due to differences between Israel’s proposal, which calls for three demilitarized zones in southern Syria, and Syria’s most recent counterproposal.[xliii]  A Syrian government source told Qatari media that Shaibani presented a counterproposal during the meeting that called for Israel’s withdrawal from territory that Israel occupied following Assad’s fall in December 2024.[xliv] The Syrian counterproposal also calls for the redeployment of a UN disengagement observer force (UNDOF) to the designated buffer zone between the countries.[xlv] Shaibani emphasized that ”regional security can only be achieved by respecting Syria's sovereignty and independence,” which directly contradicts Israel’s hopes for a demilitarized and no-fly zone in southern Syria.[xlvi] An unspecified diplomatic source also told French Media that Israeli and Syrian technical delegations will meet on September 19 to continue negotiations on a security agreement in Baku, Azerbaijan.[xlvii] Shaibani and Dermer will not attend the Baku meeting, however.[xlviii]

Turkey has continued to apply pressure on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government to coerce the SDF to integrate into the Ministry of Defense (MoD) under terms that are favorable to Turkey. Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Director Ibrahim Kalin met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on September 17 to discuss bilateral and regional security issues.[xlix] Kalin emphasized Turkey’s ”readiness to give all the support needed to the Damascus administration” against internal threats, which is likely a reference to the SDF.[l]  Turkish Defense Ministry Spokesperson Rear Admiral Zeki Akturk said that the Turkish military will remain in Syria to “fight terrorism and prevent the terrorist corridor,” in reference to the SDF, on September 18.[li] The Syrian transitional government reportedly asked Turkey on September 15 to delay military action against the SDF amid Turkey’s frustration over the SDF’s slow integration into the state.[lii] Kalin and Shara also discussed Syria’s fight against ISIS, the development of Syrian MoD capacity, border security, and efforts to improve economic conditions.[liii] Turkey reportedly began training Syrian MoD personnel on September 19 following a bilateral defense agreement signed on August 13.[liv]

Syrian state media reported that Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra met with the Russian Embassy’s defense attaché, Colonel Andrey Badrodinov, on September 18, to discuss “issues of mutual interest.”[lv] The details of the meeting have not been released at the time of this writing. Syrian Chief of the General Staff Major General Ali al Nassan previously met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov in Damascus on September 9, likely to continue negotiations on Russian basing in Syria.[lvi] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara said that Syria has maintained “a calm relationship with Russia” after the fall of Assad in an interview with Syrian media on September 12.[lvii]  

Arabian Peninsula

US White House Envoy Steve Witkoff met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer in London on September 17 to discuss resuming ceasefire negotiations following Israel’s September 9 strikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha.[lviii] An unspecified source told an Israeli journalist that the United States is acting as a mediator between Qatar and Israel to reach a solution to ease tensions and return Qatar to its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas.[lix] The source added that the United States urged Israel to take steps to reduce tension with Qatar.[lx] Qatar has served as a key mediator in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas since October 2023, but immediately suspended its mediation efforts following the Israeli strikes.[lxi] Qatar later stated that the strikes would not deter it from its role as a mediator but added that it is currently focused on protecting its sovereignty and responding to the Israeli strikes.[lxii] Qatari officials have continued to express their discontent with Israel’s strikes, calling them ”cowardly and treacherous.”[lxiii]

Qatar hosted a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Defense Council meeting in Doha on September 17 to discuss the recent Israeli strikes in Doha and Gulf security.[lxiv] Qatari, Emirati, Saudi, Omani, Kuwaiti, and Bahrani defense officials attended the meeting.[lxv] Gulf leaders agreed to strengthen defense and intelligence coordination.[lxvi] CTP-ISW has not yet observed any discussion of tangible or specific changes to GCC defense coordination at this time.

The Houthis likely launched a drone that struck a hotel in Eilat, Israel, on September 18. Eilat residents posted footage on social media of a drone that struck a hotel entrance in Eilat.[lxvii] The IDF stated that unspecified actors launched the drone ”from the east.”[lxviii] The Houthis have not claimed this attack at the time of this writing, but the Houthis have regularly launched drones targeting Eilat since the start of the Houthi missile and drone campaign targeting Israel in October 2023.

The Houthis likely launched at least one missile targeting Israel on September 18.[lxix] The IDF stated on September 18 that it intercepted one missile launched from Yemen.[lxx]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued multiple evacuation warnings for residents in southern Lebanon on September 18 for the first time since May 2025.[lxxi] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on residents of six specific buildings in southern Lebanon to evacuate and stated that the IDF will soon target Hezbollah military sites.[lxxii] The IDF struck the six sites shortly after it issued the evacuation warnings and reported that the targeted sites were Hezbollah Radwan Force weapons depots.[lxxiii] These evacuation warnings identified specific target buildings, unlike the IDF's previous warnings, which called for village-wide evacuations.[lxxiv] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[lxxv] The IDF shifted to a “forward defense” posture in August 2025 to maintain Israel’s “strategic superiority” in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting capabilities that could pose a threat to northern Israeli towns.[lxxvi] This is a continuation of the Israeli objective during the major combat operations phase of its campaign against Hezbollah in late 2024, which was to stop Hezbollah attacks and allow displaced civilians to return safely to their homes.[lxxvii] Israel accomplished this objective in late 2024 by executing military tasks that prevented a potential Hezbollah ground operation into northern Israel and stopped direct and indirect fire attacks targeting northern Israeli towns.[lxxviii] The November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement included an addendum that secures Israel's right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose to Israel.[lxxix] The IDF has acted on this addendum and continued to operate against Hezbollah since November 2024, including via airstrikes and raids targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.[lxxx]

Hezbollah officials have continued to warn the Lebanese government about potential internal conflict between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah, which is likely part of an effort to deter the government from taking serious action to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s fiery rhetoric but general inaction suggests that the group fears escalation because its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of protests or military escalation could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control. Hezbollah Executive Council Head Ali Damoush called on the Lebanese government on September 18 to not “drag” the LAF into confrontation with Hezbollah or Lebanese civilians.[lxxxi] Hezbollah parliamentarian Ihab Hamadeh stated on September 18 that the Lebanese people are ready to push Lebanon towards internal conflict, but Hezbollah has ”spared” Lebanon from ”slipping into that situation.”[lxxxii] Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have continuously threatened potential confrontation and anti-government protests if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah.[lxxxiii] Hezbollah has largely refrained from officially inciting protests in response to the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm the group, however. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement only called on supporters to protest once in August 2025, but later postponed the protests to allow for dialogue.[lxxxiv]