Iran Update, September 17, 2025

The Critical  Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) stated on September 17 that Iran has not taken any concrete steps required to delay the snapback mechanism.[i] The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[ii] The UN Security Council will reimpose sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with the foreign ministers of the E3 and EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 17 to discuss snapback sanctions.[iii] The E3 previously offered to extend the deadline by six months if Iran restored full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), resumed negotiations with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[iv] Iran signed an agreement with the IAEA on September 9 that set procedures for inspections on all Iranian nuclear facilities, but only within parameters set by Iran.[v] The agreement also did not provide a timeline for inspections or clarification about the whereabouts of its remaining stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium.[vi]  Araghchi stated on September 11 that the evaluation of enriched material buried under the rubble is still under review and will be submitted to the Supreme National Security Council, which will make the final decision based on Iran’s security concerns. European states remain unconvinced that Iran’s steps with the IAEA are serious.[vii] Kallas separately warned on September 17 that the “window for finding a diplomatic solution” on Iran’s nuclear issue is closing and added that Iran must take ”credible steps“ to meet E3 demands.[viii] Germany’s Foreign Ministry similarly stated that Iran has yet to take “reasonable and precise actions.”[ix] British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper also stated that Iran has not taken the necessary steps to avoid the reimposition of snapback sanctions and emphasized that the UK needs "concrete action.".[x]

The US State Department designated Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Kataib Imam Ali, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) on September 17.[xi] These four militias are part of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that consistently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[xii] US federal law makes it a crime for any person in the United States or subject to US jurisdiction to knowingly provide “material support or resources,” including financial services, training, or weapons, to a designated FTO.[xiii] The United States Treasury Department previously designated these militias and their leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).[xiv] The US Treasury Department has the authority to block the assets of SDGTs and any individual or entity that provides them with support or services.[xv] US individuals or entities are also prohibited, with limited exemptions, from engaging in any transaction with a designated SDGT.[xvi] These designations come as the United States continues to pressure the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq and disarm Iran-backed militias by threatening sanctions.[xvii]

The Suwayda Autonomous Government rejected a US-Syrian-Jordanian roadmap to resolve intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province. The rejection will complicate the transitional government’s effort to reconcile with the province and eventually integrate it into the state.  The United States, Syria, and Jordan announced a plan to “guarantee rights” and “promote societal reconciliation” in Suwayda Province on September 16.[xviii] The anti-government Suwaydawis were not included in the creation of the roadmap, which decreased the likelihood that the roadmap would succeed. The roadmap seeks to set up short and medium-term security and administrative arrangements to facilitate the province’s eventual integration into the Syrian state and commits the Syrian government to forming an independent commission for crimes committed in Suwayda.[xix] The autonomous Suwayda government’s judicial committee denounced the US-Syrian-Jordanian plan on September 16.[xx] The body criticized the roadmap's reliance on a “corrupt” Syrian judicial system and  on the Syrian government as a “neutral party.”[xxi] The committee—in tandem with its military wing, which is comprised of about 40 Druze militias—provides administrative services and security to communities in central, southern, and eastern Suwayda, while pro-government forces maintain control in Suwayda’s northern and western countrysides.[xxii] The committee argued in its denunciation of the roadmap that the violence committed in Suwayda in July 2025 justified the people of Suwayda’s right to ”self-determination.”[xxiii] The committee noted that self-determination may include either “self-administration” or “secession” from Syria.[xxiv] The Suwayda Autonomous Government’s denunciation of the roadmap contrasts with reactions from Syrian government allies and other regional powers. France, Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain all released statements welcoming the plan on September 16 and 17.[xxv]

The Druze leaders that the Syrian transitional government has partnered with for this roadmap likely do not hold the required influence in Suwayda to eclipse the popularity of the Suwayda Autonomous Government. The Syrian Interior Ministry appointed Druze militia leader Suleiman Abdul Baqi as Suwayda’s security director on September 15.[xxvi] Abdul Baqi formerly led the Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, which is a prominent Druze militia that has remained aligned with the government.[xxvii] Abdul Baqi, alongside Mudhafat al Karama leader Laith al Balous, has been one of the main Druze leaders to engage with the Syrian government since the fall of the regime. Both Abdul Baqi and Balous have reportedly lost significant local influence since the Suwayda violence in July 2025, and many Druze reportedly "publicly revile” them as traitors for their sympathy for the government.[xxviii] Pro-Hijri fighters burned down Abdul Baqi’s house and abducted his father in late August 2025, which demonstrated the degree of hostility between the two sides.[xxix] The pro-Hijri factions’ intimidation of Abdul Baqi suggests that he does not retain any favor with the factions that have joined the Suwayda parallel government’s administrative and military structures.

Reported Israeli support for anti-government Druze factions will also complicate the government’s efforts to reconcile with the Druze community. Two unspecified senior Druze commanders told Reuters on September 16 that Israel was helping to “unify” Druze factions in Suwayda and had delivered arms and ammunition to them since intercommunal violence erupted there in July 2025.[xxx] The two Druze sources and a Western intelligence source also said that Israel was paying salaries for “many of the roughly 3,000” anti-government Druze militia members.[xxxi] Hijri prominently called upon Israel and the international community for support during the violence in July 2025.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: The E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) stated that Iran has not taken any concrete steps required to delay the snapback mechanism. EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas separately warned that the “window for finding a diplomatic solution” on Iran’s nuclear issue is closing and added that Iran must take ”credible steps“ to meet E3 demands.
• US Sanctions Designations: The US State Department designated Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Kataib Imam Ali, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya as Foreign Terrorist Organizations on September 17. These militias and their leaders were previously designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
• Syrian State Formation: The Suwayda Autonomous Government rejected a US-Syrian-Jordanian roadmap to resolve intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province. The rejection will complicate the transitional government’s effort to reconcile with the province and eventually integrate it into the state.

Iran

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi visited the tactical headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) Ground Forces on September 16 to evaluate battle readiness.[xxxiii] Mousavi expressed satisfaction with the IRGC Ground Forces’ preparation.[xxxiv] Mousavi emphasized that Iran should maximize the mobilization of the Iranian population to enhance Iranian deterrence.[xxxv]  The IRGC Ground Forces primarily focus on internal security, but in recent years have projected more power abroad.[xxxvi] 

Iran executed a man whom it claimed was an Israeli spy on September 16.[xxxvii] An Iranian media outlet reported that the man provided the coordinates of important infrastructure facilities in telecommunications and security sectors to Mossad in exchange for cryptocurrency payments.[xxxviii] Iran has arrested hundreds of ”Israeli spies” since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War to address the regime’s fear of real and perceived Israeli penetration in Iran.[xxxix] Iranian authorities executed an Iranian nuclear scientist on August 6 for reportedly providing Israel with information about another nuclear scientist whom Israel killed during the war, for example.[xl]  

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are continuing to block Saudi investment in Iraq out of concern for the negative influence that increased Saudi influence could have on Iranian-backed power in Iraq.[xli] Political sources told Iraqi media that Iraqi militias disrupted a parliament session on September 16 to remove a bill that would approve over $75,000,000 of planned Saudi investment in Iraq.[xlii] The law would support Saudi energy and infrastructure investment in the Iraqi desert along the Iraq-Saudi border. A parliamentarian from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah’s Haquq Movement said that the law harms the Iraqi national interest and added that over 100 unspecified parliamentarians have signed a petition to block the inclusion of the law on the parliamentary agenda. The Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated parliamentarian previously introduced petitions to pressure the Parliament Speaker to remove this law from consideration in previous parliament sessions.[xliii] The Iraqi federal government has sought to pass this law through the Iraqi Parliament since former Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi’s premiership from 2020 to 2022.[xliv] Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali have both previously rejected Saudi attempts to invest in Iraq as a threat to Iraqi sovereignty.[xlv] It is notable that the Iraqi federal government has provided Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with state contracts to develop land along the Iraq-Saudi border via the militia-controlled Muhandis General Engineering Company.[xlvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also used areas along the Iraq-Saudi border to conduct attacks targeting the Gulf states.[xlvii] Iran remains interested in maintaining its own influence and that of its Axis of Resistance partners in Iraq.

Syria

Israel reportedly presented Syria with a proposal for a security agreement that would establish three demilitarized zones in southern Syria with increasingly restrictive rules depending on their distance from Israel.[xlviii] Two unspecified sources told Axios on September 16 that Israeli officials presented the proposal to Syrian officials several weeks ago. The agreement is intended to replace the 1974 disengagement agreement between the countries, according to the sources. The agreement would additionally designate a no-fly zone for Syrian aircraft from Damascus to the Israeli border. One source noted that Israel’s “central principle” of the plan is to maintain an air corridor to Iran through Syria in order to allow for possible Israeli strikes in Iran in the future.

Zone 1: The current buffer zone between Israel and Quneitra Province will be extended by two kilometers into Syrian territory.

Zone 2: An unspecified area adjacent to the buffer zone and “closest” to the Israeli border that Syrian military forces and heavy weapons will be unable to access. The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) and police will be able to access Zone 2. It is unclear how much territory is included in the second zone.

Zone 3: The area between the currently undefined border of the second zone and Damascus will be designated as a no-fly zone. It is unclear if military forces and heavy forces will be permitted.

This Israeli proposal echoes Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s call to fully demilitarize southern Syria in February 2025.[xlix] The Israeli government has maintained such calls in the months since then and has conducted airstrikes targeting Syrian government forces who “violated” the sought-after demilitarized zone.[l] The Israeli proposal is based on Israel's 1979 peace agreement with Egypt that divided the Sinai Peninsula into three zones with differing levels of demilitarization, according to the two sources.[li]

Syrian officials are unlikely to agree to the Israeli proposal in its current form, as it contains no major Israeli concessions to Syrian demands. The Syrian transitional government seeks to reinstate the 1974 demilitarized buffer zone between the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and Syria, curb Israeli incursions and airstrikes in Syria, and secure an Israeli withdrawal from recently seized territory in southern Syria, according to nine sources involved in the talks.[lii] The Israeli proposal only partly addresses one of these concerns in that it proposes that Israeli forces would “gradually withdraw” from Syrian territory, except the IDF’s recently seized outpost on Syrian Mt. Hermon.[liii] Damascus is formulating a counteroffer to the proposal, according to the sources.[liv] Israeli and Syrian officials will meet in London on September 17 and in Baku on September 19 to continue to discuss the issue, but it is unlikely that the parties will agree to a proposal that resembles this outline in the near future.[lv]

Arabian Peninsula

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Doha to discuss US commitments to Qatar following Israel’s September 9 strikes targeting senior Hamas leaders there.[lvi] Rubio met with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani on September 16 to discuss US-Qatari defense cooperation, ceasefire negotiations on Gaza, and the repercussions of Israel’s strikes in Doha.[lvii] Rubio announced after the meeting that Qatar and the United States are finalizing an ”enhanced defense cooperation agreement,” but did not provide further details.[lviii] A Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted that the recent Israeli strikes ”expedited” the need for a renewed defense agreement between Qatar and the United States.[lix] The Qatari spokesperson added that the defense agreement would not be considered a new agreement.[lx] The United States and Qatar previously expressed their discontent with the Israeli strikes in Qatar. Qatar is a major non-NATO US ally and houses the largest US military base in the Middle East.[lxi]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.