September 15, 2025

Iran Update, September 15, 2025

Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Adham Fattah, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

A recent op-ed from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media offers insight into how some elements of the Iranian regime may be viewing the relationship between the United States, Israel, and the Gulf in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha.[i] IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim released an op-ed on September 14 in which it claimed that Israel has played an increasingly divisive role in the relationship between the United States and the Gulf states.[ii] Tasnim suggested that the Gulf states should make their continued economic cooperation with the United States contingent upon US efforts to “contain” Israel.[iii] The report also added that the Gulf countries can diversify their partnerships with other countries with US adversaries, particularly Russia and the People‘s Republic of China (PRC).[iv] It is unclear if Iranian officials are directly attempting to convince Gulf states to undertake any of these efforts in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes on Hamas leaders in Qatar.

Tasnim’s op-ed is consistent with how Iranian officials have been framing Israel’s September 9 strikes as an opportunity to unite regional powers in an anti-United States, anti-Israel regional coalition.[v] Tehran interim Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami recently addressed the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia—all countries that have security partnerships with the United States—and warned that Israel would strike their country next if it was allowed to grow in power.[vi] Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani similarly urged regional Islamic countries on September 13 to establish a ”joint operations room” against Israel to avoid their ”own annihilation.”[vii] Proposals like Larijani’s are unlikely to be taken seriously by the Gulf states because Iran has consistently conducted military attacks targeting the Gulf and could continue to do so in the future.

Qatar hosted an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 15 to discuss the recent Israeli strikes in Doha.[viii] No Gulf state, including Qatar, has made any tangible moves to punish Israel for the strikes. Numerous Gulf and Arab leaders attended the summit, including Emirati Vice President Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sabah Khaled al Hamad al Sabah, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.[ix] The heads of state and other representatives condemned the Israeli strikes, reaffirmed solidarity with Qatar in its right to respond, and stressed the need for the international community to act urgently to ”deter Israel.”[x] The Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) discussed the repercussions of the Israeli airstrikes and asserted that the strikes constitute a direct threat to the Gulf’s joint security.[xi] The GCC stated that Israel’s ongoing ”aggressive policies” undermine the future of ”existing understandings and agreements” with Israel, likely referring to the Abraham Accords and other economic agreements between GCC countries and Israel.[xii]

Iran does not appear to have made serious commitments in its new agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Iranian effort to secure an agreement was likely an attempt to delay or prevent potential snapback sanctions. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed the Iran-IAEA agreement on September 9.[xiii] Grossi stated on September 10 that the agreement sets procedures for inspections and reporting on all Iranian facilities, including sites damaged during the 12-day War.[xiv] Araghchi stated on September 11 that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA will solely take place under a “new framework” that is defined by parliamentary law and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[xv] The SNSC Secretariat confirmed in a statement on September 14 that all cooperation with the IAEA requires SNSC approval and that Iran will provide reports to the IAEA only after establishing its own internal security and safety conditions.[xvi] Iran has continued to refrain from cooperating with the IAEA in the days since the agreement and has not provided the IAEA with any timeline for resumed inspections or any clarification about the whereabouts of its remaining stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium.[xvii] Iran’s newly defined limitations on its resumed cooperation with the IAEA follow a long pattern of Iran’s partial and conditional cooperation with the IAEA. Iran also restricted IAEA oversight after 2021 by removing monitoring equipment and expelling inspectors.[xviii] Iran has also historically restricted IAEA oversight by refusing access to certain facilities associated with its pre-2003 weapons program and by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[xix] The European Union (EU) warned at the 69th IAEA General Conference on September 15 that the IAEA has not been able to access most safeguarded facilities since June 2025.[xx]

Iran is simultaneously attempting to discourage the E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from imposing snapback sanctions by threatening to suspend Iran’s agreed cooperation with the IAEA if sanctions are imposed. Araghchi claimed on September 11 that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA is separate from its disputes with the Europeans over the snapback mechanism.[xxi] The SNSC specified on September 14 that any ”hostile” actions—including the imposition of snapback sanctions—would suspend Iran’s implementation of the Iran-IAEA agreement, which demonstrates that—contrary to Araghchi’s claim—Iran does view cooperation with the IAEA as connected with the snapback mechanism.[xxii] The E3 triggered the 30-day JCPOA snapback process on August 28 but offered to extend the deadline by six months if Iran restored full IAEA cooperation, resumed negotiations with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xxiii] Araghchi dismissed the E3 demands as “unrealistic, unreasonable, and contrary to Iran’s national interest.[xxiv] Iran has not complied with E3’s demands, which, combined with Araghchi’s comments, have left the E3 unconvinced that the Iran-IAEA agreement reflects any meaningful movement towards an Iranian effort to avoid snapback.[xxv]

The Syrian transitional government’s attempt to reconcile Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) violations in a Damascus suburb highlights the broader challenges that Damascus faces during Syria’s recovery from Assad’s rule and the civil war. Local sources told Reuters that General Security Services (GSS) personnel forcibly evicted about 22,000 Alawite residents from Damascus’s al Somaria neighborhood between August 27 and 29.[xxvi] An Interior Ministry commander named Hadi Askar (Abu Hudhayfah) reportedly led the operation.[xxvii] Al Somaria residents said GSS members demanded proof of home ownership and marked properties for eviction if residents failed to provide it.[xxviii] The GSS’s justification for the forced eviction was that the residents' homes were built on land illegally seized by the Assad regime in the 1970s, according to the Damascus governor.[xxix] The Assad regime forcibly displaced Sunni residents in Damascus’s Muadamiyat al Sham neighborhood to build the al Somaria neighborhood over it as military housing in the 1970s.[xxx] Syrian sources told Enab Baladi that over 200,000 former landowners from the original Muadamiyat al Sham neighborhood and their heirs retain claims to return to their land in al Somaria.[xxxi] Syrian human rights experts alleged to Enab Baladi that the GSS evictions in al Somaria constituted forced evictions on a selective basis and that government forces failed to provide proper notice or housing alternatives.[xxxii] The human rights experts explained that successful transitional justice for HLP violations must respect the rights of original landowners and violators and cannot be decided by the Syrian government alone.[xxxiii]

The evictions of the Alawite residents of al Somaria are emblematic of the country-wide challenges that Damascus faces as it attempts to rebuild Syria after decades under Assad rule and subsequent civil war. The Assad regime built multiple Damascus neighborhoods on top of others after displacing residents throughout its rule.[xxxiv] Turkey and its proxies have similarly displaced Kurds from their homes in northern Syria in acts of ethnic cleansing that seek to replace the Kurds with Sunni Arabs. The Syrian transitional government will need to contend with HLP reconciliation outside of Damascus, as well as internally displaced persons returning to their homes across the country. The transitional government will likely face continual challenges when addressing HLP violations, which can risk igniting long-held political or sectarian grievances.

Key Takeaways

Iran and the Gulf: A recent op-ed from IRGC-affiliated media offers insight into how some elements of the Iranian regime may be viewing the relationship between the United States, Israel, and the Gulf in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha. Iranian officials have framed Israel’s September 9 strikes as an opportunity to unite regional powers in an anti-US, anti-Israel regional coalition.
Regional Response to Doha Strikes: Qatar hosted an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 15 to discuss the recent Israeli strikes in Doha. No Gulf state, including Qatar, has made any tangible moves to punish Israel for the strikes.
Iran’s Cooperation with the IAEA: Iran is attempting to discourage the E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from imposing snapback sanctions by threatening to suspend Iran’s newly agreed-upon agreement with the IAEA if sanctions are imposed.
Transitional Challenges in Syria: The Syrian transitional government’s attempt to reconcile Housing, Land, and Property violations in a Damascus suburb highlights the broader challenges that Damascus faces during Syria’s recovery from Assad’s rule and the civil war.

Iran

French diplomatic sources speaking to French media said that Israeli intelligence assesses that US and Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War severely degraded Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon in the short term. An unspecified French diplomatic source told French media outlet Le Monde on September 13 that Israeli intelligence assessed in early September that US and Israeli airstrikes destroyed Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing sites and uranium enrichment facilities, particularly at Fordow and Natanz.[xxxv] The French source added that Israel assessed that Iran lacks the necessary equipment to begin rebuilding its nuclear weapons program in the short term, though Iran could rebuild its nuclear program over an unspecified longer period.[xxxvi] Israeli intelligence also assessed that Iran has maintained ”all” of its technical expertise despite Israel’s assassinations of more than a dozen scientists associated with Iran's nuclear program.[xxxvii] The Israeli assessments are consistent with an Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) report from early September, which noted that US and Israeli strikes destroyed or rendered inoperable all of the 20,000 Iranian centrifuges that Iran had installed across its three declared enrichment facilities.[xxxviii] The Israeli assessments and ISIS report also agree that Iran retains approximately 450 kg of highly enriched uranium in gaseous form.[xxxix]

Iraq

Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) head Brigadier General Ahmed Reza Radan discussed Iran-Iraq security cooperation with several Iraqi officials in Baghdad on September 13. Radan discussed strengthening border security and law enforcement cooperation with Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh and several other Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) officials, including Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Muhammadawi (Abu Fadak).[xl] LEC police forces helped Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the PMF violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[xli] Radan separately discussed security cooperation with Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari.[xlii] Radan’s discussions with Iraqi officials in part reflect Iranian concerns about Iranian internal security. Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can operate in Iran, which threatens Iranian regime stability.[xliii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah falsely claimed that it released Israeli-Russian dual citizen Elizabeth Tsurkov in return for various rewards, possibly in an attempt to portray Tsurkov’s kidnapping as a success that conceals that the group released Israeli-Russian dual citizen Elizabeth Tsurkov under US and Iraqi federal government pressure. Iranian-backed militias kidnapped Tsurkov, a Princeton University graduate student, in Baghdad in March 2023.[xliv] Kataib Hezbollah recently released Tsurkov on September 9.[xlv] A Kataib Hezbollah source claimed to Agence France Press (AFP) on September 10 that Tsurkov was released in exchange for a US withdrawal from Iraq.[xlvi] This withdrawal is already underway, independent of Tsurkov’s release.[xlvii] Other Iranian-backed Iraqi sources have provided other conflicting accounts. One source claimed that the militias exchanged Tsurkov for a Lebanese Hezbollah member.[xlviii] These accounts have since been disputed by multiple more reliable sources.[xlix] Multiple unspecified Iraqi government advisers and militia members told Saudi media on September 13 that US and Iraqi government pressure “forced” Kataib Hezbollah to release Tsurkov.[l] Unspecified sources close to the Iraqi government confirmed to AFP on September 13 that there was no deal to release Tsurkov and that Kataib Hezbollah released Tsurkov after bowing to “pressure.”[li] It is unclear how or through which mechanism the United States or the Iraqi government applied pressure on Kataib Hezbollah to release Tsurkov. The United States has recently pressured the Iraqi government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias by threatening to impose sanctions on Iraq, however.[lii]

The conflicting accounts from Iraqi militia sources indicate that Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi groups lacked coordination in their messaging campaign. This is emblematic of other coordination and command failures, such as the inability of the Iraqi militias to stop the unapproved and uncoordinated rocket attacks during the Israel-Iran War, which indicates that Kataib Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed Iraqi groups lacked coordination in their attempt to paint Tsurkov’s kidnapping as a success for the Axis of Resistance.[liii] A Kataib Hezbollah source told AFP on September 10 that Tsurkov was released in exchange for a peaceful US withdrawal from Iraq.[liv] It is unlikely that this report is accurate because the US withdrawal was already underway by the time Kataib Hezbollah released Tsurkov.[lv] Other Iranian-backed Iraqi sources have provided conflicting statements from Kataib Hezbollah. Iraqi sources told IRGC-affiliated media on September 10 that Tsurkov was exchanged for Lebanese national Imad Amhaz and an unidentified “Axis of Resistance” prisoner.[lvi]

Syria

Damascus has reportedly asked Turkey to delay any military action against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) amid increasing Turkish frustration over the pace of the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state. An unspecified senior Syrian official told Reuters on September 15 that Turkey “support[s]” military action against the SDF but that Damascus has asked Turkey to delay such action to allow more time for negotiations.[lvii] The Syrian official noted that Turkey is "growing impatient” with the SDF's limited progress toward implementing the SDF and government’s March 10 agreement.[lviii] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan remarked during a conference in Italy on September 13 that SDF is “dragging its feet” in advancing the agreement, but Turkey is currently giving both Damascus and the SDF an opportunity to “resolve“ their issues.[lix] Fidan said that there may be no “alternative“ if the situation “deteriorate[s],“ however.[lx] The unspecified Syrian official claimed that ”the deadline” is “essentially until the end of the year,” which is likely in reference to a deadline that Turkey issued to the Syrian government.[lxi] Damascus has long demanded that the SDF complete its integration into the Syrian state by the end of 2025, and Turkey may be threatening Turkish intervention along this timeline to both directly threaten the SDF and encourage the Syrian government to increase political and military pressure on the SDF.[lxii]

Damascus likely remains committed to negotiations with the SDF despite the lack of progress toward implementing the agreement. Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara told Syrian state media on September 13 that he has done “everything” to prevent a “battle or war” with the SDF, likely in reference to efforts from Damascus–both recently and in January 2025–to delay Turkish military action against the SDF in order to allow negotiations to continue.[lxiii] Shara is unlikely to support any military action that would destabilize Syria, such as a large-scale Turkish and Turkish-backed offensive against the SDF in the northeast. Shara said that he will not “give up an inch” of Syrian territory, however.[lxiv]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis have launched one ballistic missile and four drones targeting Israel since September 12. The Houthis claimed that they launched a ”Palestine 2” missile containing a cluster munition to target “sensitive targets” in Tel Aviv on September 13.[lxv] The Houthis previously claimed to fire a cluster munition targeting Israel on September 3.[lxvi] The Houthis also claimed on September 15 that they launched three drones targeting Ramon Airport in Eilat and one drone targeting an unspecified military strike in the Negev.[lxvii] The IDF stated that a hostile "aircraft“ activated alerts over Eilat and in Be’er Ora, which is about 15km north of Eilat.[lxviii] The IDF later stated that a false identification had activated the alerts.[lxix]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

[i] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/24/3399767/

[ii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/24/3399767/

[iii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/24/3399767/

[iv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/24/3399767/

[v] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-12-2025/

[vi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/21/3397316/

[vii] https://x.com/alilarijani_ir/status/1966781845644693708

[viii] https://www.gcc-sg dot org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-9-15-3.aspx ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-islamic-summit-warn-israeli-attacks-threaten-normalisation-ties-draft-2025-09-14/

[ix] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/9/15/arab-islamic-summit-expected-to-yield-concrete-measures-against-israel ; https://www.gcc-sg dot org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-9-15-3.aspx

[x] https://www.gcc-sg dot org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-9-15-3.aspx

[xi] https://www.gcc-sg dot org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-9-15-3.aspx

[xii] https://www.gcc-sg dot org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-9-15-3.aspx

[xiii] https://x.com/rafaelmgrossi/status/1965478494193995857

[xiv] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/multimedia/videos/statement-by-iaea-director-general-on-iran

[xv] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6586623

[xvi] https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/9001472

[xvii] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-agrees-to-give-u-n-atomic-agency-access-to-its-nuclear-sites-d99b56fd ;

https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1965747925411348883

[xviii] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/03/gov2025-8.pdf

[xix] https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/iran-withdraws-further-iaea-inspector-designations ;

https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/iran-defies-the-international-atomic-energy-agency/ ;

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-25.pdf

[xx] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/eu-statement-general-debate-69th-regular-session-iaea-general-conference-15-september-2025

[xxi] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6586623

[xxii] https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/9001472

[xxiii] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-launch-un-sanctions-process-against-iran-drawing-tehran-ire-2025-08-28/ ;

https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/russia-puts-forward-draft-resolution-on-extension-of-snapback

[xxiv] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6586623

[xxv] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/iaea-board-of-governors-on-the-jcpoa-september-2025-e3-statement

[xxvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-syrian-forces-emptied-alawite-suburb-x-means-stay-o-means-go-2025-09-12/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/society/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1

[xxvii] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/society/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1

[xxviii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-syrian-forces-emptied-alawite-suburb-x-means-stay-o-means-go-2025-09-12/

[xxix] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-syrian-forces-emptied-alawite-suburb-x-means-stay-o-means-go-2025-09-12/

[xxx] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/09/al-sumariyah-a-battle-over-land-and-identity-on-the-walls-of-damascus/

[xxxi] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/09/al-sumariyah-a-battle-over-land-and-identity-on-the-walls-of-damascus/

[xxxii] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/09/al-sumariyah-a-battle-over-land-and-identity-on-the-walls-of-damascus/

[xxxiii] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/09/al-sumariyah-a-battle-over-land-and-identity-on-the-walls-of-damascus/

[xxxiv] https://english.enabbaladi dot net/archives/2025/09/al-sumariyah-a-battle-over-land-and-identity-on-the-walls-of-damascus/

[xxxv] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/13/israeli-intelligence-admits-iran-s-nuclear-program-has-not-been-destroyed_6745348_4.html

[xxxvi] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/13/israeli-intelligence-admits-iran-s-nuclear-program-has-not-been-destroyed_6745348_4.html

[xxxvii] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/13/israeli-intelligence-admits-iran-s-nuclear-program-has-not-been-destroyed_6745348_4.html

[xxxviii] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-and-npt-safeguards-reports-september-2025#_ftn7

[xxxix] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-and-npt-safeguards-reports-september-2025#_ftn7

[xl] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/777118/ ; https://ina dot iq/ar/security/243303-.html

[xli] https://english dot alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2019/10/08/Iran-sent-thousands-of-troops-to-Iraq-for-Shia-pilgrimage-Iranian-commander

[xlii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/777009/ ; https://baghdadtoday dot news/283139-.html

[xliii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-13-2025/

[xliv] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/05/elizabeth-tsurkov-kidnapped-iraq-princeton-graduate-student/

[xlv] https://apnews.com/article/trump-iraq-tsurkov-c8b9ffbec07218b3032ed753afc53a78

[xlvi] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/862793/%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9

[xlvii] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC

[xlviii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/20/3396884

[xlix] https://www.newarab dot com/news/no-deal-behind-academic-elizabeth-tsurkovs-release-iraq

[l] https://english.aawsat dot com/features/5185691-tsurkov%E2%80%99s-final-night-baghdad-alone-near-tigris

[li] https://www.newarab dot com/news/no-deal-behind-academic-elizabeth-tsurkovs-release-iraq

[lii] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA ;

https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/270820253

[liii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-iraq-after-the-israel-iran-war-june-13-july-3-2025; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/862793/%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/20/3396884

[liv] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/862793/%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9

[lv] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC

[lvi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/20/3396884

[lvii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sectarian-violence-risks-dividing-syria-despite-sharaas-diplomacy-2025-09-15

[lviii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sectarian-violence-risks-dividing-syria-despite-sharaas-diplomacy-2025-09-15/

[lix] https://www.aa. dot com.tr/tr/politika/bakan-fidan-israil-in-insanliga-karsi-isledigi-suclari-ifsa-etmek-adil-bir-dunya-icin-atilacak-ilk-adimdir/3686113

[lx] https://www.aa. dot com.tr/tr/politika/bakan-fidan-israil-in-insanliga-karsi-isledigi-suclari-ifsa-etmek-adil-bir-dunya-icin-atilacak-ilk-adimdir/3686113

[lxi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sectarian-violence-risks-dividing-syria-despite-sharaas-diplomacy-2025-09-15

[lxii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sectarian-violence-risks-dividing-syria-despite-sharaas-diplomacy-2025-09-15/

[lxiii] https://sana dot sy/presidency/2284448/

[lxiv] https://sana dot sy/presidency/2284448/

[lxv] https://t.me/army21ye/3400

[lxvi] https://t.me/army21ye/3343

[lxvii] https://t.me/army21ye/3404

[lxviii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1967322749606793449

[lxix] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1967322749606793449

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