Iran Update, October 27, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran likely used its meeting with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to pressure the trio of countries to help forge a US-Iran deal that would achieve key Iranian objectives. Iran is presumably attempting to exploit regional concerns that renewed fighting and US-Iran tensions could embroil regional countries in the future and is aiming to portray the United States as the source of the problem.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias almost certainly used two drones to surveil the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27 in order to threaten and deter the United States from striking Iran. The militias’ decision to use drones is more subtle than previous militia threats and is likely a response to the changing political situation in Iraq and Iranian preferences.
• The Houthis are attempting to deter Egypt from furnishing Saudi Arabia with defensive military support following Egypt’s parliament approval of “purely defensive” military assistance to Saudi Arabia, including Egyptian forces that will remain in Saudi territory and not assist in Saudi attacks on Houthi targets, on October 2

Toplines

Iran likely used its meeting with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to pressure the trio of countries to help forge a US-Iran deal that would achieve key Iranian objectives. Iranian officials asked senior Saudi, Pakistani, and Turkish officials to use their close relationships with Washington to persuade the United States to accept Iran’s proposed efforts to resume negotiations, according to Emirati media.[i] Iran also likely attempted to persuade the three countries to accept a regional non-aggression pact.[ii] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei said that Iran sought regional arrangements without external involvement and the withdrawal of foreign—i.e., US and allied—forces.[iii] Rezaei also told Houthi Ambassador to Iran Ibrahim al Dulaimi on October 27 that the recent Tehran meeting aimed to establish regional security arrangements and address foreign forces’ withdrawal.[iv] Expelling the United States from the region would satisfy a long-held Iranian aspiration making it nearly impossible for the Gulf to prevent Iran from controlling the strait if Iran chose to do so. A senior Pakistani security official separately told Reuters on October 26 that the summit focused on a “regional non-aggression network” and that the Mecca Pact countries and Qatar could serve as guarantors for a future agreement.[v]

Iran is presumably attempting to exploit regional concerns that renewed fighting and US-Iran tensions could embroil regional countries in the future and is aiming to portray the United States as the source of the problem. Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran on October 26, but Iran is unlikely to accept such an agreement unless it can also secure a US withdrawal from the region.[vi] Regional sources said that the summit made no progress on any issue.[vii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias almost certainly used two drones to surveil the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27 in order to threaten and deter the United States from striking Iran.[viii] The embassy's defenses intercepted the drones.[ix] A security source speaking to Iraqi media denied that the drones carried explosives.[x] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continuously used drones to attack the US Embassy in Baghdad in March and April 2026, even using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to fly through and recon the embassy.[xi] The Iraqi militias almost certainly used the surveillance drones on October 27 to threaten additional militia attacks on the embassy if the United States and Israel resume their attacks on Iran.

The use of these drones also has tactical benefits beyond the strategic effects achieved through threats and deterrence. The drones could observe possible targets, and the activation of the air defense system surely provided lessons in how that system operates. This threat comes as Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned in a memo on October 23 that Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to target US personnel.[xii]

The militias’ decision to use drones is more subtle than previous militia threats, which is likely a response to the changing political situation in Iraq and Iranian preferences. The Iraqi militias have traditionally publicly threatened US forces and assets to deter the United States from acting against certain Iranian interests.[xiii] The Iraqi militias verbally threatened the United States prior to the start of the US-Israel-Iran War in February 2026, for example.[xiv] The modus operandi of some of these groups has changed, however, in part driven by new Iranian preferences and in part by evolving Iraqi political dynamics. Iran has increasingly relied on smaller cells of Iraqi militia members directly managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to conduct attacks over the more historic Iraqi militias.[xv] Iran has also reportedly pressured some of the Iraqi militias to focus on politics and Iraqi state capture over kinetic activity.[xvi] The withdrawal of US forces in Iraq simultaneously robbed the Iraqi militias of their nationalist veneer by tying attacks on US forces to the nationalist impulse to expel the ”occupier.” Public threats tie militias and their political arms to attacks on US forces, which invites US strikes against Iraq. The Iraqi public is disdainful of actions that make Iraq a battlefield for Iran and the United States historically.[xvii] The militias' use of different tactics also comes amid increased pressure by the United States and Iraq's neighboring countries on the Iraqi federal government to act against the militias.[xviii] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reacted to this pressure by attempting to curb militia operations, despite facing limitations from Iran's infiltration of Iraqi institutions and the overall strength of the militias.[xix]

The Houthis are attempting to deter Egypt from furnishing Saudi Arabia with defensive military support. Egypt’s parliament approved “purely defensive” military assistance to Saudi Arabia, including Egyptian forces that will remain in Saudi territory and not assist in Saudi attacks on Houthi targets, on October 26.[xx] Houthi Supreme Political Council member Mohammed Ali al Houthi claimed on October 27 that Egypt has effectively "declare[d] war" on the Houthis by deciding to send military assistance to Saudi Arabia.[xxi] Such assistance could, in principle, support Saudi efforts to defend its territory. The Houthis understand that it is more favorable to fight only Saudi Arabia rather than a larger coalition, even if that coalition is only furnishing Saudi Arabia with defensive support.[xxii] Such defensive support could enable Saudi Arabia to continue fighting longer because better defenses could, in theory, translate into less successful and impactful Houthi attacks. The Houthis have similarly warned and threatened other Saudi partners, including Mecca Pact allies Pakistan and Turkey, against supporting Saudi Arabia in recent weeks in attempts to isolate the kingdom.[xxiii]

The Houthis are also insinuating that they could attack shipping through the Suez Canal as part of this effort to deter Egypt and other international partners from supporting Saudi Arabia militarily.[xxiv] Mohammed Ali al Houthi claimed that the Houthis already provide "protection" for the Suez Canal, which mirrors Houthi assertion of control over the Bab al Mandeb and illegitimate authority to dictate international maritime traffic norms.[xxv] The Houthis possess several drone and missile systems that could strike vessels in the Suez Canal, but these capabilities and veiled threats do not, on their own, indicate that the group is willing to disrupt maritime traffic in the canal.[xxvi] Targeting vessels at such distance would also be extremely difficult, given the requirements to sense and track moving targets at extreme range. The Houthis have claimed that they will not attack non-Saudi vessels in the Red Sea in order to avoid provoking an international military response, akin to the US strike campaign in Yemen in 2025.[xxvii]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

See topline section.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis claimed that they struck the world’s largest oil refinery in Saudi Arabia on October 27 as part of their campaign against Saudi Arabia. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Houthis’ claim at the time of this writing, however. The Houthis claimed that they struck the Ras Tanura oil refinery in Saudi Arabia with a ballistic missile on October 27 for the first time in the 2026 fighting.[xxviii] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi oil infrastructure in order to compel Saudi Arabia to concede to Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[xxix] The Houthis had previously refrained from targeting Saudi Arabia’s most significant oil facilities in this current conflict, including Ras Tanura, however. The Houthis may have targeted Ras Tanura to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia to compel it to concede to Houthi demands following reports that Saudi Arabia and the Houthis failed to arrive at a ceasefire agreement during negotiations in Iran on October 26.[xxx] An Iranian source told Emirati media on October 27 that the Houthis conditioned any ceasefire agreement on Saudi Arabia lifting its blockade of Houthi-controlled airports, which Saudi Arabia presumably rejected.[xxxi]

The Houthis separately claimed to have struck King Khalid Air Base, Abha International Airport, and Najran International Airport in Saudi Arabia in addition to the Saudi Defense Ministry headquarters in Riyadh on October 27.[xxxii] The Saudi Joint Forces Command reported that Saudi air defenses intercepted five ballistic missiles and four drones over Saudi Arabia, including Riyadh, on October 27.[xxxiii]

Yemeni government-aligned forces continue to engage Houthi forces west of Taiz City in an effort to break the Houthi encirclement of the city and central Taiz Governorate. A Yemeni government-aligned military official separately told UK-based, Saudi-owned media on October 27 that Yemeni government-aligned forces advanced into previously Houthi-controlled mountainous terrain west of Taiz City in Sabr al Mawadim District on October 27. Geolocated footage published by the Yemeni government confirmed Yemeni government-aligned forces’ presence in this area on October 27.[xxxiv] Yemeni government-aligned forces are likely attempting to advance into these areas to deny the Houthis the ability to occupy the elevated terrain that the Houthis could use to engage or direct fires at Yemeni government-aligned forces in lower terrain in Taiz City. Yemeni government-aligned forces will need to recapture and secure key segments of the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication as well as break the Houthis’ encirclement to restore reliable routes for resupply and reinforcements to Taiz City, however.[xxxv]

Yemeni government-aligned forces are continuing to engage Houthi fighters on the southern edge of the Red Sea coastal plain, including areas along the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The Yemeni government-aligned Homeland Shield Forces and Southern Giants Brigades recaptured hilltops and surrounding territory overlooking the Bab al Mandeb Strait near al Ghurayrah, according to geolocated footage posted on October 27.[xxxvi] Yemeni government sources told UAE-based international media on October 27 that Yemeni government-aligned forces have launched an offensive to recapture territory along the Bab al Mandeb with Saudi close air support.[xxxvii] CTP-ISW has not observed significant offensive efforts by Yemeni government-aligned forces near the Bab al Mandeb or on the southern Red Sea coastal plain, although Yemeni government-aligned forces continue to engage Houthi fighters in the vicinity. An independent Yemeni journalist reported that the Houthis briefly captured parts of Jabal Kahbub, which is a low mountain range that overlooks the coastal plain's southeastern edge, before Yemeni government-aligned forces reversed most of these gains on October 27.[xxxviii] Jabal Kahbub’s position and elevation are advantageous for spotting and firing on enemy forces on the southern coastal plain. Government-aligned forces’ control over this mountain range protects other government-aligned forces on the plain.[xxxix]