Iran Update, October 1, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran [i]Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Iranian regime appears to be trying to mitigate internal economic pressure by taking steps to remove itself from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist, which currently hampers Iran’s access to the international financial system. FATF is the global body that sets international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[ii] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies. An FATF blacklist designation requires all FATF member states to sanction and restrict international financial interactions with Iran.[iii] The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council approved Iran’s accession to the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention on October 1, which is the final convention required for Iran to exit the FATF blacklist.[iv] The Expediency Discernment Council approved Iran’s accession to the other required convention, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, in May 2025.[v] The CFT is a set of international policies and measures that prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using financial resources.[vi] The Expediency Council is an administrative assembly appointed by the Supreme Leader to resolve differences between the Iranian Parliament and the Guardian Council.[vii] Sadegh Amoli Larijani, who is Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s brother, heads the Expediency Discernment Council. Amoli Larijani has historically opposed Iran joining the FATF, but Ali Larijani and other pragmatic figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, have supported taking actions to remove Iran from the FATF blacklist.[viii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian previously stated in September 2024 that his government has “no choice but to resolve FATF” and emphasized that addressing the FATF designation is essential to improving Iran’s economy.[ix] It is very unlikely that Iran will halt financial support for the Axis of Resistance, which makes its removal from the blacklist doubtful even if it has adopted international treaties on transnational crime and terrorist financing. Iranian officials have repeatedly framed support of the Axis of Resistance as a core national security policy.

The Expediency Discernment Council may have also advanced CFT accession to calm Iran’s domestic markets, which have faced sharp currency depreciation following the reimposition of UN Security Council snapback sanctions on September 27.[x] The European Union (EU) also reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29 that it had lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[xi] Several Iranian officials framed the reimposition of snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” against Iran and downplayed the sanctions’ economic impact.[xii] These remarks come after four unspecified Iranian officials and two unspecified “insiders” told Reuters on September 27 that the reimposition of sanctions will deepen Iran’s economic isolation and fuel public anger.[xiii] The Iranian rial lost 14.5 percent of its value after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered snapback sanctions on August 28, falling from 1,013,000 rials to a US dollar to its lowest value at 1,160,000 rials on October 1.[xiv]

The US Department of Defense announced on September 30 that it reduced the US military presence in Iraq.[xv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xvi]  The Department of Defense said that the mission reduction is “an effort to transition to a lasting US-Iraq security partnership.”[xvii] An unspecified US official told Reuters on September 30 that the United States will reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000, most of whom will be redeployed to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[xviii] The official added that the United States is in the process of transferring control of Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to the Iraqi federal government.[xix] A Shia Coordination Framework member said on October 1 that the framework “welcomes” the Department of Defense’s announcement.[xx] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iraqi Shia parties, most of which Iran backs. A US Embassy in Baghdad spokesperson characterized the force reduction as a transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”[xxi]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly threatened to attack US forces if the United States postpones its military withdrawal from Iraq.[xxii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not responded to the Department of Defense’s announcement at the time of this writing.

US President Donald Trump issued an executive order on September 29 declaring that the United States will consider “any armed attack” on Qatar as a “threat to the peace and security” of the United States.[xxiii] President Trump's executive order also obligates the United States to take all “appropriate” measures, including “diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military” measures to defend US and Qatari interests.”[xxiv] Qatar is a major non-NATO US ally, which provides it with military and economic privileges but does not entail any security commitments from the United States.[xxv] Trump‘s order marks the most significant declaration of US commitment to defend Qatar since 1992 and follows Israel’s September 9 strikes on Hamas leaders in Doha.[xxvi] Both the United States and Qatar have expressed their public dissatisfaction with Israel for its strikes in Qatar. The largest US military base in the Middle East is in Qatar.[xxvii] Trump’s executive order comes shortly after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that Qatar and the United States are finalizing an ”enhanced defense cooperation agreement” during a trip to Doha on September 16.[xxviii] The United States and Qatar have concluded several defense cooperation agreements since 1992 that have addressed US military access to Qatari facilities, US training of Qatari forces, and US arms sales to Qatar.[xxix] None of these agreements, including the Trump executive order, explicitly commit the United States to defending Qatar from external attacks with military force.

Trump renewed the United States’ commitment to defend Qatar on the same day that he publicized his 20-point plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[xxx] Qatar, which had acted as the primary mediator between Hamas on one hand and Israel and the United States on the other from Fall 2023 to early September 2025, suspended its role as a mediator following Israel‘s strikes on Doha.[xxxi] Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced on September 30 that Qatar would return to its role as mediator after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called him and apologized on September 29 for striking Hamas leaders in Doha.[xxxii] Thani confirmed on October 1 that Doha passed Trump’s ceasefire plan to Hamas negotiators.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s Access to Global Markets: The Iranian regime appears to be trying to mitigate internal economic pressure by taking steps to remove itself from the Financial Action Task Force blacklist, which currently hampers Iran’s access to the international financial system. It is very unlikely that Iran will halt financial support for the Axis of Resistance, which makes its removal from the blacklist doubtful even if it has adopted international treaties on transnational crime and terrorist financing.
• US Forces in Iraq: The US Department of Defense announced on September 30 that it reduced the US military presence in Iraq. A US Embassy in Baghdad spokesperson characterized the force reduction as a transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”
• US-Qatar Relations: US President Donald Trump issued an executive order on September 29 declaring that the United States will consider “any armed attack” on Qatar as a “threat to the peace and security” of the United States. Qatar is already a major non-NATO US ally, which provides it with military and economic privileges but did not entail any security commitments from the United States prior to Trump’s executive order.

Iran

The Iranian Guardian Council ratified a law on October 1 to harshen punishments for espionage and cooperation with Israel and other “hostile countries.”[xxxiv] The Iranian parliament approved the bill on June 29.[xxxv] The Guardian Council ratified another law on October 1 to regulate non-military drones. The Iranian parliament likely passed these bills in an attempt to address counterintelligence concerns and protect against drone attacks after the Israel-Iran War.[xxxvi] Israel smuggled small drones into Iran and then launched them from secret locations to target Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure in the opening hours of the Israel-Iran War.[xxxvii] The Iranian regime has arrested hundreds of purported ”Israeli spies” since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War to address the regime’s fear of real and perceived Israeli penetration in Iran.[xxxviii]

A high-ranking Iranian delegation may have briefly visited Minsk, Belarus, on September 30. An Iranian media outlet shared Flight Radar screenshots that show a plane registered to the Iranian regime departed Minsk on October 1, flying toward Iran.[xxxix] Unverified social media posts claimed that Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani may have been aboard the plane as part of an Iranian delegation to Minsk.[xl]  The SNSC is a body responsible for deciding Iran’s national security and defense policies within the stated intent of the supreme leader.[xli] Iranian regime-affiliated media did not confirm the diplomatic visit.[xlii] Larijani’s travel could be related to earlier agreements between the two countries. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed 12 memoranda of understanding on bilateral trade and military technology cooperation with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 20.[xliii] Iran seeks Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare equipment that Israel damaged during the Israel-Iran War, according to an August 2025 Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service assessment.[xliv]  

The United States sanctioned 22 entities and 22 individuals on October 1 for supporting Iran’s defense industry and nuclear and missile programs. The US sanctions come after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27. The US Treasury Department sanctioned 21 entities and 17 individuals involved in the acquisition of goods and technology for Iran’s Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and for supporting Iran's missile and military aircraft production.[xlv] The State Department sanctioned five other individuals and one other entity.[xlvi] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the following entities, among others:

• Beh Joule Pars Commercial Engineering Company: This company coordinates the procurement of accelerometers, gyroscopes, and microelectromechanical system components for entities that are subordinate to the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), including the Shahid Hemmat Space Group. AIO oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program.[xlvii]
• Tamin Sanat Amen Company: This company is subordinate to Beh Joule Pars and operates in Iran’s oil, gas, petrochemical, and steel manufacturing sectors.
• Abzar-e Daghigh-e Taha Company: This company procures gyroscopes and provides services to the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is subordinate to AIO.
• Pasargad Helicopter Company (PHC): This company has attempted to procure American helicopters and spare parts for the Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA).[xlviii] The United States sanctioned PANHA in 2018 for providing maintenance, overhaul, and manufacturing support for military helicopters used by the Iranian armed forces.[xlix]

The US State Department separately sanctioned five Iranian individuals and one Iranian entity affiliated with Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) on October 1.[l] The SPND played a leading role in Iran’s nuclear weapons research program before 2003. [li]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Turkey is waiting for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government to reach a diplomatic solution on integration amid reports that Turkey deployed military assets near SDF-government frontlines in Aleppo Province.[lii] Erdogan said on October 1 that Turkey will ”preserve Syria's territorial integrity”--which is a euphemism for military action against the Kurdish-dominated SDF--if the Syrian transitional government and the SDF fail to complete an integration agreement.[liii] Erdogan added that “if diplomatic initiatives are left unanswered, Turkey’s policy and position are clear,” which is presumably a reference to Turkish military intervention in Syria.[liv] Erdogan's comments on Syria follow reports that Turkey deployed military assets to Kuweires Airbase in Aleppo Province on September 28.[lv]  The new assets included bridge layers long enough to cross some narrow sections of the Euphrates River, but Kuweires is relatively far from the river and an unlikely place to stow the bridgelaying equipment because it is less than ten kilometers from the frontline. Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened military action against the SDF as integration negotiations between the two sides have stalled.[lvi] The Turkish Defense Ministry said that SDF engagements with the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are a threat to “regional peace and stability” on September 25.[lvii]

SDF and MoD forces exchanged artillery fire near Tishreen Dam, Aleppo Province, on October 1.[lviii] Both sides blamed the other for initiating the engagement.[lix] Syrian state media reported that the SDF targeted MoD positions to the west of the Tishreen Dam with artillery and drones on October 1.[lx] A local source reported that MoD counter-battery fire targeted SDF positions east of Tishreen Dam.[lxi] The SDF released a statement on October 1 that accused the MoD of targeting the Tishreen Dam with artillery, which reportedly hit the dam itself and nearby civilian homes.[lxii] No casualties have been reported at the time of writing. The SDF and MoD last engaged each other near Tishreen Dam on September 22.[lxiii]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched a drone targeting Eilat, southern Israel, on October 1.[lxiv] The Israel Defense Forces intercepted a drone from Yemen on October 1.[lxv] The Houthis have not claimed responsibility for the drone attack at the time of this writing. The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since October 2023.[lxvi]

The Houthis claimed responsibility on September 30 for a cruise missile attack targeting the Dutch-flagged and owned cargo ship MV Minervagracht in the Gulf of Aden.[lxvii]  The Houthis disabled the Dutch cargo ship and injured two of its crew on September 29.[lxviii] The Houthis have targeted international shipping to impose an economic “blockade” on Israel since October 2023.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.