Iran Update, November 2, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Recent Houthi advances in Lahij Governorate are part of a Houthi campaign that is designed to confront the internationally recognized government of Yemen with simultaneous dilemmas intended to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts. Houthi forces may struggle to consolidate their gains in exposed terrain, particularly if government-aligned forces can sustain air support and reinforce threatened positions.
• Houthi forces advancing into al Maqatirah District are threatening government reinforcement and resupply routes on multiple fronts. The Houthis’ establishment of positions in al Maqatirah District and possible future advances south threaten Aden City, and as such, are likely designed to impose a dilemma on government forces on whether to divert forces from other fronts and Government forces are currently fighting against the Houthis south of Taiz City in an effort to break the Houthi encirclement of Taiz City and along the Red Sea coastal front in order to recapture territory near the Bab al Mandeb.
• The Houthis may struggle to sustain advances south toward the coastal plain if the Yemeni government receives sufficient air and military support.
• Senior Iranian officials met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior People's Republic of China (PRC) officials on November 2, likely to ensure Iran's political and military alignment with its primary political and defense partners amid recent reports about imminent US plans to attack Iran. Both Russia and the PRC have previously supported Iran's regional attack campaign by providing Iran with targeting intelligence and satellite imagery of US military positions. Russia almost certainly cannot provide Iran with significant material or financial support due to its own ongoing constraints, however.

Toplines

Recent Houthi advances in Lahij Governorate are part of a Houthi campaign designed to confront the internationally recognized government of Yemen with simultaneous dilemmas in order to undermine its ability to prioritize and respond to threats on multiple fronts. The Houthis captured mountainous positions in al Maqatirah District on November 2 that provide Houthi forces with high ground that overlooks Tur al Bahah District, which sits between Taiz Governorate’s rugged, mountainous terrain and the coastal plain leading to Aden City.[i] Geolocated footage indicates that Houthi forces likely advanced southeastward from Hayjat al Abd and captured Souq al Roubah on November 1, which is located at a key crossroads leading north into al Shamayatayn District.[ii] Geolocated footage posted on November 2 also indicates that Houthi forces then advanced further south from Souq al Roubah and captured Jabal Irf.^[iii] Jabal Irf overlooks the last government-controlled sections of the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC). Houthi positions in this area could enable the Houthis to establish fire control over Yemeni government-aligned reinforcements transiting north along the GLOC.

Houthi advances in the direction of Aden are part of a broader Houthi campaign that is designed to confront the Yemeni government with competing demands for its forces and resources across multiple fronts. The Houthis’ establishment of positions in al Maqatirah District and ability to advance south threatens Aden City, and as such, are likely designed to impose a dilemma on government forces on whether to divert forces from other fronts and efforts. Government forces in southwestern Yemen are currently fighting against the Houthis around Taiz City in an effort to break the Houthi encirclement of Taiz City and along the Red Sea coastal front in order to recapture territory near the Bab al Mandeb.

Houthi advances into al Maqatirah District since October 30 are threatening government reinforcement and resupply routes on multiple fronts, for example. The Houthis likely aim to seize additional sections of the Taiz-Aden GLOC, which also sets conditions for the Houthis to besiege or capture Aden City in the future, if they choose to do so.[iv] Additional Houthi control of the Taiz-Aden GLOC would also further isolate government-aligned forces encircled in Taiz City and constrain the government’s ability to reinforce its positions across the region.

Houthi advances in al Maqatirah also threaten government positions along the Red Sea coastal plain. Houthi forces may also attempt to outflank and isolate government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coastal front by advancing towards the Mokha-Taiz GLOC, which supplies government-aligned forces operating on that front. Such an advance would compound the pressure on government-aligned forces by threatening both their positions on the Red Sea coast and the routes needed to sustain them. Houthi forces would likely face the same vulnerabilities to air attacks in lowland terrain that could constrain any theoretical advance toward Aden, however.

The Yemeni government has already diverted forces from the coastal plain to meet the Houthi threat in al Maqatirah, which underscores the dilemmas imposed by the Houthis’ campaign. The Yemeni government reportedly redeployed an unspecified number of Red Sea coast-based Southern Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield Forces units to al Maqatirah District on November 2, likely to contain the Houthi advance.[v] These forces have previously helped halt Houthi advances along the Red Sea coastal plain since the Houthi offensive began in September 2026.[vi] Their redeployment could weaken the government's defense on the coastal plain, depending on the size and characteristics of the units deployed. The recent appointments of several new commanders to the al Maqatirah area, including a commander of the government-aligned National Shield Forces, also indicates Yemeni government concern about Houthi advancs in al Maqatirah.[vii]

The Houthis’ current efforts to capture Taiz City further compound the Yemeni government’s competing operational demands as Houthi advances in al Maqatirah District threaten to draw government forces away from efforts to break the encirclement of Taiz City. Yemeni government-aligned forces and civilians in Taiz City are facing food, fuel, medicine, and other resource shortages after the Houthis severed the last Yemeni government ground lines of communication (GLOC) into central Taiz Governorate on October 6.[viii]  The Houthis’ continued encirclement of the city and control over major roads in the area limit the government’s ability to maneuver across southwestern Yemen while permitting the Houthis to carry a high volume of forces and supplies north toward Taiz City along more established roadways. Yemeni government forces encircled in Taiz City reportedly launched counterattacks into al Misrakh District, Taiz Governorate, on November 2, possibly in response to the Houthi advances in al Maqatirah.[ix]

The Houthis may struggle to sustain advances south toward the coastal plain if the Yemeni government receives sufficient air and military support.  The terrain south of Tur al Bahah would expose Houthi forces to greater risk from air attack given that lowland terrain south of Tur al Bahah offers less terrain protection than the mountainous positions Houthi forces currently occupy in al Maqatirah District. Government-aligned forces, supported by air assets, have previously halted Houthi attempts to capture remaining government-held areas of the Red Sea coastal plain and the Bab al Mandeb Strait since September 10.[x] These setbacks suggest that Houthi forces may struggle to consolidate their gains in exposed terrain, particularly if government-aligned forces can sustain air support and reinforce threatened positions. The Houthis’ ability to exploit their current high ground will therefore depend in part on whether they can advance south before government-aligned forces establish effective defensive positions. The Houthis may nevertheless achieve a broader operational effect even if they fail to advance further south. Continued Houthi advances could force the government to divert additional forces from Taiz and the Red Sea coastal fronts, disrupt reinforcement and resupply routes, and weaken its ability to respond to Houthi offensives elsewhere. 

Senior Iranian officials met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior People's Republic of China (PRC) officials on November 2, likely to ensure Iran’s political and military alignment with its primary political and defense partners amid recent reports about imminent US plans to attack Iran. Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei discussed regional developments in a phone call with Putin on November 2.[xi] Rezaei and Putin likely discussed US-Iran negotiations and the potential for renewed US strikes on Iran. SNSC Deputy Secretary Ali Bagheri Kani separately discussed ongoing US-Iran negotiations with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on November 2.[xii] Iranian officials’ discussions with Putin and Wang follow three days of Iranian talks with Qatari mediators.[xiii] Iran does not appear to have made any meaningful concessions during the negotiations and continues to reiterate its maximalist demands, which effectively represent a complete US surrender.[xiv] Iranian officials likely discussed continued political and military support from Russia and the PRC for Iran, particularly in the event that the United States resumes a major strike campaign in Iran. Iranian attacks on the region and recent US economic restrictions have increasingly isolated Iran on the world stage, and both Russia and China have long provided Iran with military, diplomatic, and economic support, including throughout the recent conflict.^[xv]  

Rezaei and Bagheri Kani also likely discussed ongoing Russian and PRC military support for Iran in preparation for potential renewed US strikes. Both Russia and the PRC have supported Iran’s regional attack campaign by providing Iran with targeting intelligence and satellite imagery of US military positions.[xvi] Moscow and Beijing have also both provided Iran with weaponry that has likely enabled Iran to attack US and regional targets. Russia reportedly sent Iran modified Shahed drone variants with increased accuracy that are harder to intercept, according to Western and Ukrainian intelligence.[xvii] Russia has also provided Iran with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and the PRC is rumored to have struck a deal with Iran to also deliver PRC-manufactured MANPADS.^[xviii] The PRC has long supported Iran’s ballistic missile manufacturing capabilities, and the PRC has provided Iran with dual-use technologies, including missile engine parts, and about 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate—a precursor for missile fuel—before and during the 2026 US-Iran War.[xix] Reuters separately reported in July that Iran was close to purchasing PRC-manufactured anti-ship missiles, which Iran could use to threaten or target vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.[xx] Iran may seek to secure additional shipments of military equipment and guarantees of continued intelligence support in the event of renewed US strikes on Iran. Russia almost certainly cannot provide Iran with significant material or financial support due to its own ongoing constraints, however.[xxi]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

See topline section.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups, has continued to establish checkpoints in southeastern Iran in order to more aggressively target regime security forces and undermine the regime’s authority in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The MPF posted footage on November 2 that showed a group of armed fighters stopping vehicles and collecting drivers’ information at an unspecified location along the Khash-Zahedan road, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xxii] The MPF stated that it established the checkpoint to identify senior regime officials “involved in suppressing the people.”[xxiii] The MPF recently established a similar checkpoint on the Khash-Saravan road on October 25.[xxiv] Iranian regime security forces separately reportedly dismantled an anti-regime militant cell trying to establish another such checkpoint on the Zarabad-Konarak road in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 2. It is unclear if this cell is affiliated with the MPF. The checkpoint on Zarabad-Konarak road lies nearly 300 kilometers south of the two successful MPF checkpoints and is likely subject to a distinct security environment. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the MPF’s ability to establish such checkpoints suggests that the group assessed that security forces would be unlikely to disrupt their activity in these areas, either due to a lack of capability or willingness. The reported disruption of an anti-regime cell much farther south may suggest that anti-regime groups face different levels of freedom of operation across the province, and that the regime retains the ability to disrupt their activities in at least some areas. It is unclear if the regime’s successful security operation will deter anti-regime groups from attempting to continue to establish checkpoints in southeastern Iran.[xxv]

The MPF likely continues to publish footage of their operations on their Telegram account in order to generate fear among regime officials and affiliates while discouraging civilians from cooperating with the regime in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Regime media claimed on November 2 that the MPF’s footage of its ”checkpoint” on Khash-Zahedan road was ”propaganda” and emphasized that the incident only lasted a few minutes.[xxvi] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the extent or duration of the MPF’s control over the checkpoint. That regime media highlighted the incident nevertheless reflects the regime’s concerns that the MPF could use such claims and footage, regardless of their veracity, to erode civilian perceptions of regime control in the province.

Lebanon

Hezbollah announced on November 2 that it began distributing financial assistance pledges to families in southern Lebanon, likely as part of the group’s ongoing efforts to compete with Lebanese government reconstruction efforts and regain popular support. Hezbollah announced that it began disbursing "promissory notes" to residents of southern Lebanon out of the group's office in Nabatieh City on November 2.[xxvii] Hezbollah has not specified when it will begin distributing payments to Lebanese citizens at the time of this writing. Hezbollah’s announcement marks the first implementation of the group’s “Promise and Commitment” financial assistance program that Hezbollah Executive Council Head Ali Damoush announced on October 13.[xxviii] Hezbollah-aligned media reported on November 2 that Hezbollah intends to provide displaced families in Beirut and the southern suburbs with up to $14,000 USD, including quarterly payments of up to $2,000 USD for furniture and 12 monthly payments of up to $500 USD for rent.[xxix] Families outside of Beirut and the suburbs can receive up to $12,000 USD in similar intervals.[xxx] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Hezbollah’s ability to provide financial support to Lebanese citizens is essential to the group’s ability to rehabilitate its image among the Lebanese population, particularly its Shia support base, following two costly wars against Israel in the past two years that have made the group increasingly unpopular.[xxxi] Hezbollah’s decision to distribute pledges of financial assistance to families in Nabatieh City follows the Lebanese government’s announcement on October 2 that it created 23 reconstruction programs to rebuild Nabatieh City and other areas in southern Lebanon.[xxxii] Hezbollah likely seeks to demonstrate that it can provide reconstruction assistance more effectively than the Lebanese government.[xxxiii]

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiyah threatened on October 30 that it would respond to any US use of Iraqi territory or airspace to conduct attacks on Iran.[xxxiv] Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya is a member of a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which also includes Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[xxxv] Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya did not provide any specific details other than warning that it would respond to US use of Iraqi territory or airspace. Other members of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, who are often considered closest to Iran and most kinetically active, have not yet publicly threatened US forces and assets to deter the United States from attacking Iran amid recent reports about imminent US plans to attack Iran. The Iraqi militias have historically relied on such threats in periods of regional escalation, including prior to the start of the US-Israel-Iran War in February 2026.[xxxvi] Iraqi militias used drones to surveil the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27, however, which CTP-ISW previously assessed serves as a more subtle threat amid the changing political situation in Iraq and Iranian preferences.[xxxvii] It is unclear if the other Iraqi militias supported Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya's public threat or if Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya is acting of its own accord.

Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya also reiterated that the group continues to reject disarmament on October 31.[xxxviii] The militia claimed that the Iraqi federal government's disarmament plan involves regulating and limiting militia weapons between September 2026 and June 2027 rather than disarming the militias.[xxxix] The federal government is still negotiating the details of the agreement with the militias. Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to actually disarming the militias in line with US demands.[xl]

Further reports indicate that the Iraqi federal government has made or is currently considering a deal to offer the Iraqi militias positions within the Iraqi government in exchange for disarming.[xli] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media on October 29 that unspecified militias have reached an "understanding" with Zaydi to disarm in exchange for "key" government positions.[xlii] Iraqi media reported on November 1 that four unspecified militias are demanding that they select the next Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) head after Zaydi fired the previous head on October 26.[xliii] Iraqi media added on November 1 that the Iraqi militias are planning to present other candidates as independent technocrats if their initial candidates are not selected to lead the organization.[xliv] The militias' demand to fill this position could reflect results of the ongoing Shia Coordination Framework-militia negotiations or possibly Zaydi's own negotiations with the militias. Shia sources close to the framework told Iraqi media that the framework has rejected any Sunni figures, including former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi, from filling the position.[xlv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the framework is probably offering government positions to the militias in order to both incentivize the militias that have agreed to disarm to fully comply while motivating militias that have refused to disarm to agree to the government’s still unreleased disarmament plan.[xlvi] The United States has reportedly vetoed any militia-affiliated candidate from filling the INIS head position.[xlvii] INIS was the most capable Iraqi intelligence body for decades until Zaydi's predecessor, former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, allowed Iranian-backed actors to infiltrate the organization.[xlviii]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces attempted to advance into central Jawf Governorate, likely to set conditions to recapture the governorate’s capital in al Hazm. Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly engaged Houthi forces and attempted to advance in the Dahida area in central Jawf Governorate on November 2, according to an anti-Houthi journalist.[xlix] Saudi Arabia reportedly provided close air support.[l] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether Yemeni government forces captured the ”Dahida” area at the time of this writing. Yemeni government media separately published footage of government-aligned forces engaging Houthi forces in al Jawf Governorate on November 2.[li] A Saudi AH-64 Apache gunship provided close air support to Yemeni ground forces.[lii] Saudi air support has likely contributed to the success of Yemeni government-aligned advances in Jawf Governorate in recent days, including the capture of Jabal Huwayshiyan, a mountain overlooking al Hazm, on October 31.[liii] Yemeni government forces also deployed a likely Saudi-provided M163 VADS anti-aircraft vehicle to conduct direct-fire attacks on Houthi positions in al Jawf Governorate on November 1.[liv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Yemeni government advances in al Jawf Governorate likely aim to recapture al Jawf's capital, al Hazm City.[lv]

The Houthis claimed on November 2 that they struck airports and military equipment in Saudi Arabia over the past 48 hours.[lvi] The Houthis claimed that they struck King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, a Saudi military transport plane at Jizan International Airport, and an early warning radar in Jizan Province with drones over the past 48 hours. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Houthis' claims at the time of this writing. Saudi Joint Forces Command separately reported on November 2 that Saudi forces intercepted a ballistic missile over southern Saudi Arabia and two drones over Riyadh Province.[lvii] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of the Houthis’ ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to halt military operations against the Houthis and accept the Houthis’ demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[lviii]