5 hours ago

Iran Update, November 16, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

 

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

  • Yemeni government-aligned forces' overextension and poor coordination are likely enabling the Houthis to accelerate their advances toward Aden City and set conditions to complete their capture of Yemen.
  • The Yemeni government's withdrawal from Red Sea coastal positions has likely only temporarily thwarted Houthi efforts to outflank and encircle government-aligned forces without resolving these forces' underlying vulnerabilities.
  • Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency outlined on November 14 how Iran could use Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s revocation of the regime’s 2,000-kilometer missile range limit to develop missiles capable of striking US bases in Europe and possibly the continental United States.
  • Hezbollah is reportedly redeploying some fighters and weapons to southern Lebanon, which could enable the group to pursue several courses of action (COAs) against Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Toplines

Yemeni government-aligned forces' overextension and poor coordination are likely enabling the Houthis to accelerate their advances toward Aden City and set conditions to complete their capture of Yemen. The Yemeni government's rapid withdrawal from the Red Sea coastal plain and western Lahij Governorate on November 15 and 16 indicates that Yemeni government-aligned forces are failing to effectively defend against Houthi advances in southwestern Yemen.[i] These Houthi advances are increasingly posing an existential threat to the Yemeni government by threatening its capital in Aden, which is one of few major cities that remain under government control. The Houthi movement views itself as Yemen's legitimate government and the group’s strategic objective is to control all of Yemen.[ii] Houthi military actions, including advances toward Aden and attacks on Saudi Arabia, are designed to set conditions for controlling all of Yemen by eroding the Yemeni government's territorial control and compelling Saudi Arabia to end its military operations in Yemen, which would seriously degrade Yemeni government-aligned forces’ ability to fight the Houthis.[iii] Houthi rule over all of Yemen would solidify the group's ability to threaten maritime shipping and regional states like Saudi Arabia and Israel because no local military force would have the capability to effectively challenge the movement's territorial control.

Yemeni government-aligned forces have established new front-line defensive positions after withdrawing from the Red Sea coastal plain. Government forces established defensive positions near Jabal Kharaz, which is about 80 kilometers east of the Bab al Mandeb Strait and 100 kilometers west of Aden, on November 15 and 16.[iv] Houthi fighters have advanced to establish control over former Yemeni government-held positions on the coastal plain, such as Dhubab Airport, and reportedly advanced eastward along the Mokha-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) toward Jabal Kharaz on November 16, according to an independent Yemeni journalist.[v]

The Yemeni government's withdrawal from Red Sea coastal positions has likely only temporarily thwarted Houthi efforts to outflank and encircle government-aligned forces without resolving these forces' underlying vulnerabilities. Yemeni government-aligned forces withdrew from the coastal plain and much of Lahij Governorate because their overextended frontlines between positions along the Mokha-Aden and Taiz-Aden GLOCs, on opposite sides of Lahij Governorate, left vast exposed rear areas for the Houthis to infiltrate and attack.[vi] Yemeni government-aligned forces’ need to defend the two far-apart GLOCs made it possible for the Houthis to infiltrate through the Yemeni government’s overextended, porous frontline between these roadways and threaten their defense of southwestern Yemen. The Houthis have repeatedly attempted to advance in these rear areas between the Taiz-Aden and Mokha-Aden GLOCs and threatened to sever the roadways and encircle Yemeni government-aligned forces on the frontlines in recent weeks.[vii] Yemeni government-aligned forces’ withdrawal to Jabal Kharaz has temporarily reinforced Yemeni government positions closer to the rear, but a long and porous frontline still exists between the GLOCs that the Houthis can, and likely will, attempt to infiltrate.

Yemeni government-aligned forces remain a fragmented coalition of rival factions that have repeatedly failed to coordinate beyond short-term tactical operations, which has contributed to military defeats since September 2026 and undermined Aden’s defense.[viii] Saudi Arabia replaced its Joint Forces Commander, who is responsible for overseeing Saudi military operations in Yemen, with Saudi Chief of the General Staff Fayyad al Ruwaili on November 16, likely in an effort to strengthen coordination among Saudi and Yemeni government-aligned forces.[ix] Yemeni government-aligned forces must rapidly improve coordination to halt Houthi advances, but a new Saudi Joint Forces Commander is unlikely to immediately overcome entrenched rivalries and command-and-control deficiencies across the fragmented anti-Houthi coalition.[x]

The Yemeni government's withdrawal also provides the Houthis with opportunities to further erode Yemeni government-aligned forces' ability to defend Aden and threaten maritime shipping. The Yemeni government forfeited over 80 kilometers of the Mokha-Aden GLOC to the Houthis by withdrawing to its present positions at Jabal Kharaz.[xi] This enables the Houthis to deploy reinforcements and supplies from major cities like Sanaa and Hudaydah to Lahij Governorate with less exposure to Yemeni government fire.[xii] Expanded Houthi control over the Red Sea coastal plain and western Lahij Governorate also enables Houthi fighters to deploy radars and short-range weapons that they can use to locate and attack vessels in the Bab al Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden if the Houthis decide to disrupt shipping.[xiii]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency outlined on November 14 how Iran could use Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s revocation of the regime’s 2,000-kilometer missile range limit to develop missiles capable of reaching US bases in Europe and possibly the continental United States.[xiv] Tasnim proposed reducing the payload of Iran's medium-range Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile to 500 kilograms (kg) to increase the missile’s range to 3,000-4,000 kilometers (km). Tasnim noted that such a range would enable the Khorramshahr-4 to reach southeastern, eastern, and potentially central Europe.[xv] The Khorramshahr-4 can currently carry a maximum payload of 1,500 kg and has a maximum range of 2,000 km.[xvi] Reducing a missile’s payload decreases the effectiveness of its impact. Iran may be willing to accept this trade-off to extend the range of some of its missiles, given the informational and deterrent value of demonstrating an ability to reach US bases and allied targets at greater distances. Iran's farthest attempted missile attack to date targeted Diego Garcia, a US base in the Indian Ocean located about 3,800 km from southern Iran.[xvii] Iran used two missiles in the attack, but the missiles' flight distance remains unknown because one missile failed mid-flight and the other was intercepted before impact.[xviii]

Tasnim also claimed that Iran could try to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of 5,500 km and above to attack the continental United States by developing existing Iranian space launch vehicle (SLV) technology.[xix] SLVs and ICBMs share similar technology, and the Defense Intelligence Agency previously noted in a 2019 report that Iran was developing its SLVs with lift capacity and boosters that could be capable of reaching ICBM ranges if they were reconfigured.[xx] Russia has helped Iran develop its SLV program in recent years.[xxi] Tasnim identified the Ghased, Zuljanah, and Ghaem SLVs as potential foundations for an intercontinental missile capability, noting that Iran would need to modify these systems or develop underground silos capable of launching larger missiles.[xxii] Iran would also need to develop new warheads able to withstand the extreme heat and pressure generated during high-speed atmospheric re-entry over intercontinental ranges.[xxiii] Some lower-level Iranian officials have advocated in recent months for Iran to develop ICBMs. Eighty-five parliamentarians published a letter in May 2026 to Mojtaba calling for the development of ICBMs to protect Iran, for example.[xxiv]

Hezbollah is reportedly redeploying some fighters and weapons to southern Lebanon, which could enable the group to pursue several courses of action (COAs) against Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). An Israeli military correspondent reported on November 15 that Israeli military intelligence assesses that Hezbollah is increasingly deploying fighters to villages located just north of the IDF's “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon.[xxv] The correspondent added that Hezbollah is reestablishing weapons stockpiles in these villages and conducting surveillance of IDF positions in southern Lebanon.[xxvi] CTP-ISW has observed limited instances of Hezbollah staging forces and conducting likely surveillance operations near IDF positions in southern Lebanon in recent weeks.[xxvii] Israeli military intelligence also reportedly estimates that Hezbollah maintains "thousands" of first-person view (FPV) drones and 10,000 rockets and missiles that are mostly positioned within range of striking targets in northern Israel.[xxviii] Hezbollah reportedly launched 1,000 drones and over 700 rockets at Israel between late April and late May 2026.[xxix] CTP-ISW has repeatedly assessed that Hezbollah is attempting to reconstitute its drone arsenal and increase the range and payload capacity of its FPV drones but cannot independently validate reported Israeli intelligence estimates of the group’s current drone, rocket, and missile stockpiles.[xxx]

CTP-ISW is considering three possible COAs that Hezbollah could pursue based on the report that Hezbollah is increasingly deploying fighters and weapons to southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is almost certainly redeploying forces and reconstituting its military capabilities to prepare to fight Israel, but the current indicators are agnostic to the scope and timing of a potential future conflict with Israel.

  • Hezbollah could be preparing to conduct offensive operations targeting northern Israel. The November 15 Israeli intelligence assessment highlighted that most of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal is located within range of striking northern Israel.[xxxi] Israeli media separately reported that Hezbollah is working to increase the range and payload capacity of its FPV drones, which could similarly be used to strike targets in northern Israel.[xxxii] Hezbollah could alternatively use its rocket and drone arsenal to target Israeli forces and positions in southern Lebanon, however. CTP-ISW has not observed clear threats that would normally indicate that Hezbollah is preparing for imminent attacks on Israeli territory, unlike the multiple public threats that Hezbollah issued leading up to the US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February 2026.[xxxiii]
  • Hezbollah could be preparing to conduct operations against the IDF to prevent further IDF advances into southern Lebanon. The IDF’s "Yellow Line" currently extends between eight and 10 kilometers within Lebanese territory from the Israel-Lebanon border.[xxxiv] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has threatened Hezbollah in recent weeks that the IDF would continue to advance in southern Lebanon if Hezbollah attacks Israel.[xxxv] Hezbollah views itself as Lebanon's primary defender against IDF incursions and would seek to prevent the IDF from advancing further into Lebanon and displacing the group's predominantly Shia support base.[xxxvi]
  • Hezbollah could be preparing to launch a broader campaign to expel the IDF from Lebanon. Hezbollah has historically used military force to attempt to compel Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon and the group continues to demand a complete IDF withdrawal from Lebanon.[xxxvii] Hezbollah previously targeted civilian populations in northern Israel as a tactic to compel the IDF to withdraw from southern Lebanon.[xxxviii]

The Israeli intelligence assessment of Hezbollah's military preparations follows reports from UK-based, Saudi-owned media in recent weeks that Iranian officials had instructed Hezbollah not to join a potential future conflict with Iran and that the group had agreed to the Iranian request.[xxxix] CTP-ISW previously assessed that these reports suggested that Hezbollah may refrain from attacking Israel in the near term, but CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the validity of these reports.[xl] Hezbollah officials have recently expressed a desire to avoid renewed fighting with Israel in order to protect the group’s Shia constituents in southern Lebanon from further attacks and displacement.[xli] Hezbollah’s concern about exposing its constituents in southern Lebanon to further IDF attacks likely reflects the group’s increasingly unpopular domestic standing since October 2023 due to its initiation of several destructive wars with Israel.[xlii] Hezbollah likely views recouping popular support, particularly among its Shia base, as a requirement for its political and military reconstitution.[xliii]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

  • Assessed Iranian War Aims:
    • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
    • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
    • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
    • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

 

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

 

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Iranian security forces continue to counter infiltration attempts by Kurdish opposition fighters along Iran’s western border. The IRGC Ground Forces Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base announced on November 15 that 4th Ansar ol Rasoul Operational Brigade forces killed a group of Kurdish Free Life Party (PJAK) fighters attempting to infiltrate Iran’s western border.[xliv] The base claimed that the fighters intended to conduct attacks and that its forces seized unspecified weapons.[xlv] PJAK has not commented on this incident at the time of this writing. Anti-regime media separately reported that PJAK fighters attacked three IRGC bases in Sardasht County, West Azerbaijan Province, less than 15 kilometers from the Iraq border, on November 15.[xlvi] The outlet claimed that PJAK fighters killed at least two IRGC personnel, including a commander.[xlvii] The IRGC has not commented on the reported attacks at the time of this writing. IRGC forces recently killed two PJAK fighters attempting to infiltrate Iran’s northwestern border near Sardasht on November 12.[xlviii] PJAK’s military wing confirmed that one of its members from Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province, was killed in that clash and threatened to respond to regime attacks on its fighters.[xlix] Iranian military commanders have recently emphasized that Iranian forces are increasing readiness along Iran’s northwestern and southeastern borders, reflecting the regime’s concerns about anti-regime militant activities.[l]
Lebanon

See topline section.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

 

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis likely launched drones targeting Saudi critical infrastructure on November 16.[li] Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki announced on November 16 that Saudi air defenses intercepted two Houthi drones near Riyadh and Mecca.[lii] The Houthis have not claimed any attacks on Saudi Arabia since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 15, however. The Houthis seek to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia to compel the kingdom to submit to Houthi demands, which include ending Saudi support for Yemen’s legitimate government, lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[liii]


[i] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-15-2026/ ; https://x.com/SouthArmed/status/2121848845323649444 ; https://x.com/war_cube/status/2121902775051362340?a=cYzmGnDniu06eBHcfpg&s=20 ; https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2122334979887653089?a=VdWiyyPxAyJnbH6aFA8&s=20 ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2122054923298996698?a=DnMVCZopYkIkY6vKEqQ&s=20

[ii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/ ; https://mei.edu/publication/ideological-underpinnings-houthis-red-sea-attacks/

[iii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-11-2026/

[iv] https://x.com/war_cube/status/2122315762194915597?a=pSvSPKK8CnxgO07jZ4o&s=20 ; https://x.com/IbrahimJalalYE/status/2121951445163606267 ; https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2121997086715518994

[v] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2122334979887653089?a=VdWiyyPxAyJnbH6aFA8&s=20 ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2122054923298996698?a=DnMVCZopYkIkY6vKEqQ&s=20

[vi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-15-2026/

[vii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-9-2026/

[viii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-blitz-leaves-saudi-arabia-exposed-iran-emboldened-2026-09-16/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-7-2026/ ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1939650450061431076?s=46&t=nQTab-m77zhUUBSh8E68DQ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-8-2023

[ix] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/الخليج/5341931-السعودية-أمر-ملكي-بتكليف-الرويلي-قائداً-للقوات-المشتركة-والسلمان, https://www dot 2dec.net/news84759.html

[x] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-blitz-leaves-saudi-arabia-exposed-iran-emboldened-2026-09-16/

[xi] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2122334979887653089?a=NhS4fYeq3Zn9yGAx_mY&s=20

[xii] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2122361805162881176?a=Vw6943L6gq7fgJKqiWQ&s=20

[xiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/ ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5320216-تقرير-خبراء-من-الحرس-الثوري-زاروا-باب-المندب-لتركيب-رادارات ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-houthi-saudi-arabia-attacks-38b82107

[xiv] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/08/23/3739310 ;

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-10-2026/; https://www.isna dot ir/amp/1405081610374/

[xv] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/08/23/3739310

[xvi] https://www.armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/missiles/ballistic-missiles/khorramshahr-4-mrbm

[xvii] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-us-israel-war-updates-2026/card/iran-targeted-diego-garcia-base-with-ballistic-missiles-rb7MdZW1CfwRTauDYHOt?st=BEDGPY ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-10-2026/

[xviii] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-us-israel-war-updates-2026/card/iran-targeted-diego-garcia-base-with-ballistic-missiles-rb7MdZW1CfwRTauDYHOt?st=BEDGPY; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-10-2026/

[xix] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/08/23/3739310

[xx] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf pp. 31

[xxi] https://www.newsweek.com/putin-once-laughed-at-irans-missile-threat-to-europe-now-he-could-use-it-12709001

[xxii] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/08/23/3739310

[xxiii] https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/08/23/3739310

[xxiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-3-2026/ ; https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1167942

[xxv] https://t.me/moriahdoron/34799

[xxvi] https://t.me/moriahdoron/34799

[xxvii] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2122337402115047912 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2122338954485645591 ; https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2120920808776511908

[xxviii] https://t.me/moriahdoron/34793

[xxix] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2058964412971545021?s=20

[xxx] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-13-2026 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-26-2026/

[xxxi] https://t.me/moriahdoron/34793

[xxxii] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/live-1108366/

[xxxiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-19-2026/

[xxxiv] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1546681/israel-is-reportedly-considering-reducing-its-buffer-zone-in-lebanon.html

[xxxv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-he-is-not-seeking-attack-iran-again-before-israel-election-2026-10-14/

[xxxvi] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state/05-influence-over-military-and-security ; https://www.dw dot com/en/lebanons-hezbollah-rejects-disarmament-warns-of-civil-war/a-73730563

[xxxvii] https://www.mtv dot com.lb/News/محليات/1740351/السلاح-لم-يك-ن-يوم-ا-للتحرير--- ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/13825 ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/322739-fadlallah-hits-back-at-bassil-says-he-lacks-loyalty ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-pivot-to-fpv-drones-requires-israeli-overmatch/

[xxxviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-pivot-to-fpv-drones-requires-israeli-overmatch/

[xxxix] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5332025-طهران-لم-تطلب-تدخّل-حزب-الله-في-حال-تجدد-الحرب-مع-واشنطن ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5333116-حزب-الله-يتعهد-مجدداً-عدم-التدخل-إسناداً-لطهران

[xl] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-26-2026/

[xli] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5333909-هل-تكبح-ضغوط-بيئة-حزب-الله-مشاركته-بالحرب؟ ; https://www.middleeasteye dot net/news/hezbollahs-nawaf-moussawi-only-force-can-compel-israel-leave-lebanon ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-readies-new-regional-war-with-funds-iran-sources-say-2026-10-26/   

[xlii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-26-2026/

[xliii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-26-2026/

[xliv] https://t.me/mehrnews/432138

[xlv] https://t.me/mehrnews/432138

[xlvi] https://iranwire dot com/fa/news-1/160332; https://zagros24 dot net/farsi/حمله-نیروهای-پژاک-به-دو-پایگاه-سپاه-در-س/

[xlvii] https://iranwire dot com/fa/news-1/160332; https://zagros24 dot net/farsi/حمله-نیروهای-پژاک-به-دو-پایگاه-سپاه-در-س/

[xlviii] https://t.me/mehrnews/431106; https://t.me/farsna/474092

[xlix] https://iranwire dot com/fa/news-1/160332

[l] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-31-2026/

[li] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2122312457548865978

[lii] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2122312457548865978

[liii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-11-2026/ ; https://t.me/army21ye/3948

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