Iran Update, November 11, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• The US Department of Justice indicted three members of an Iranian-supported Kataib Hezbollah front group on November 10 for their involvement in nearly 20 attacks or plots in Europe and the United States, including an attempted attack on the Royal Air Force (RAF) base in Fairford in September 2026.
• The front group's pattern of activity suggests that its operations are part of an Iranian effort to compel Israel and the United States to halt attacks on Iran.
• Ansar al Furqan, a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group, at least partially merged into the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups that has conducted several anti-regime operations in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in recent months. The MPF claimed that the merger would unite Baloch armed groups and increase the effectiveness of anti-regime operati

Toplines

The US Department of Justice indicted three members of an Iranian-supported Kataib Hezbollah front group on November 10 for their involvement in nearly 20 attacks or plots in Europe and the United States, including an attempted attack on the Royal Air Force (RAF) base in Fairford in September 2026.[i] The three individuals conducted numerous attacks in Europe between March and May 2026 as part of the group known as Harakat Ashab al Yamin al Islamiya.[ii] The Justice Department described Harakat Ashab al Yamin al Islamiya as a front group for Kataib Hezbollah and the IRGC.[iii] Both Iran and the Iraqi militias have historically used front groups to provide plausible deniability and obfuscate their involvement in attacks and other activity.[iv] The Justice Department indicted senior Kataib Hezbollah commander Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawoud al Saadi in May 2026 for his direction of Harakat Ashab al Yamin al Islamiya‘s attacks.[v] Saadi more recently organized the plot targeting RAF Fairford from prison in New York.[vi] UK authorities thwarted a plot to attack US bombers stationed at the base with small explosive drones on September 27, which led the United States to relocate the bombers from the base.[vii]

The front group's pattern of activity suggests that its operations are part of an Iranian effort to compel Israel and the United States to halt attacks on Iran. The front group targeted and attempted to target numerous Jewish sites in Europe and the United States in March and April 2026, including synagogues.[viii] The attacks likely aimed to retaliate against US-Israeli strikes in Iran by spreading terror and fear among US and European Jewish communities, thereby increasing the pressure on both countries to end the strike campaign. Such a strategy may reflect Iran’s recognition that previous direct Iranian attacks on Israeli soil failed to compel Israeli decisionmakers to avoid taking action against Iran.[ix]

Limited US strikes on Iran in August and September, as well as reports that the United States was considering renewed strikes on Iran, may have motivated the cell’s shift from Jewish-affiliated targets to US military targets.[x]  The group paused attacks on any targets after Saadi was sentenced in the United States in May 2026. The Justice Department noted that the three men began to plan the RAF Fairford attack in August.[xi] UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham told the House of Commons in mid-October that the IRGC ”almost certainly” directed the plot.[xii] Attacks on US bases that support US operations, such as RAF Fairford, are likely intended to deter future US attacks on Iran. Iranian officials have increasingly issued threats against US bases in Europe amid expectations that the United States could imminently strike Iran again. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei warned Arabic-language media on November 11 that Iran would target distant US bases in the event of any new attack, for example.[xiii] It is not clear if Rezaei is threatening to conduct direct missile or drone attacks against such bases or referring to sabotage. Several US bases in Europe lie within the range of Iran’s existing missiles.[xiv] The Wall Street Journal reported on November 10 that US forces relocated multiple tankers from the RAF Mildenhall Base to Germany and other countries due to an imminent threat from Iran, citing people familiar with the matter.[xv]

Ansar al Furqan, a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group, has at least partially merged into the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups that has conducted several operations in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in recent months.[xvi] The MPF claimed that the merger would unite Baloch armed groups and increase the effectiveness of anti-regime operations.[xvii] Jaish al Adl and several other Baloch militant groups formed the MPF in December 2025 to fight against the regime and increase coordination among anti-regime groups in southeastern Iran.[xviii] Ansar al Furqan did not publicly join the MPF when the coalition formed and continued to operate independently. MPF Spokesperson Mahmoud Baloch announced on November 11 that Ansar al Furqan had merged into the MPF after unspecified Baloch figures mediated between the groups.[xix]  It is unclear at this time how fully Ansar al Furqan has merged into the MPF. An anti-regime Baloch media outlet subsequently reported that Ansar al Furqan spokesperson Molavi Nasrollah Baloch confirmed the full merger.[xx] An alleged direct statement from Ansar al Furqan alternatively suggested that only a small number of its fighters chose to join the MPF on their own initiative and that Ansar al Furqan’s foundational structure and principal divisions remain intact.[xxi] The discrepancies in reporting about Ansar al Furqan‘s decision to join the MPF may reflect internal splits within the group, although available reporting does not identify the defectors or explain why they joined the MPF. This merger comes amid an uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran in recent months.[xxii]

Ansar al Furqan and the MPF share the common objective to overthrow the Iranian regime, which may explain in part Ansar al Furqan’s decision to join the MPF at this time. Ansar al Furqan called the MPF fighters its “brothers” and expressed support for their anti-regime struggle, which indicates that the groups share a common enemy despite their ideological differences.[xxiii] The MPF’s charter identifies "deep political change" in Iran as its central objective and frames its struggle around the regime’s oppression of Baloch citizens and other Iranians.[xxiv] The MPF has explicitly called for the overthrow of the Velayat-e Faqih [the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist] system, but the coalition has not advocated for Baloch independence or autonomy.[xxv] The MPF contains Salafi-jihadi groups, such as Jaish al Adl, but the coalition itself has not expressed Salafi-jihadi views.  Ansar al Furqan also seeks the regime’s collapse but frames its campaign as jihad and emphasizes the role of religious scholars in its leadership.[xxvi] Ansar al Furqan has used sectarian terms to refer to the Iranian regime and Shia groups, whereas the MPF promotes cooperation among Iranians across ideological divisions.[xxvii]  Shared objectives to collapse the regime may have encouraged some fighters to join the MPF, while strict ideological adherence may have compelled other Ansar al Furqan fighters to remain independent. Ideological differences between Ansar al Furqan and the MPF could lead to disagreements over rhetoric, recruitment, or ideology that could limit the feasibility of the partnership.

The Ansar al Furqan fighters who joined the MPF may increase the coalition’s capabilities through additional manpower and combat experience. It is unclear how many Ansar al Furqan fighters have joined the MPF, however. Ansar al Furqan has conducted some tactically sophisticated attacks, including a large-scale attack against a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) checkpoint in Fahraj, Kerman Province, in December 2025.[xxviii] The MPF has already demonstrated the ability to conduct complex operations across southeastern Iran, including a nine-hour engagement in Saravan in September and a combined improvised explosive device (IED) and small-arms attack in Jalgh in October.[xxix]  The impacts of Ansar al Furqan’s merger on the MPF’s capabilities will also depend on the extent to which the MPF incorporates these fighters into the MPF’s command structures.

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline section.
Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

See topline section.
Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to engage Houthi fighters in northwestern Lahij Governorate. Houthi forces reportedly advanced into the town of al Majza, Lahij Governorate, on November 11, according to an independent Yemeni journalist.[xxx] Yemeni government-aligned media separately reported that Saudi airstrikes targeted Houthi reinforcements that deployed to al Majza on November 11.[xxxi] Yemeni government-aligned forces previously recaptured al Majza from Houthi forces on November 8 after Houthi forces advanced to the town on November 3.[xxxii] The Houthis’ advance to al Majza suggests that Houthi forces may be trying to approach the Mokha-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), which is approximately 40 kilometers southwest of al Majza.[xxxiii] The Houthis could attempt to outflank and isolate government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coastal front by advancing toward the Mokha-Aden GLOC, which supplies government forces operating on that front.

An editor at an anti-Houthi Aden-based media outlet reported on November 11 that government-aligned forces, including the Southern Giants Brigades, Homeland Shield Forces, National Resistance Forces, and Salafist and local units, outnumber and outmatch Houthi forces in Lahij Governorate but lack the coordination mechanisms needed to conduct effective defensive or offensive operations.^[xxxiv] The absence of a unified command structure prevents these units from coordinating defensive operations or reinforcing isolated positions, which allows Houthi forces to concentrate attacks against fragmented government-aligned units and advance despite their material disadvantages, according to the editor.[xxxv] These divisions reflect broader rivalries among Saudi-backed and formerly UAE-backed military formations, whose competing political objectives and independent command structures have prevented the Yemeni government from establishing a unified military command across Yemen.[xxxvi]

Saudi airstrikes separately targeted a Houthi vehicle convoy that was likely preparing to deploy in preparation for a Houthi offensive operation in Lahij Governorate.[xxxvii] An independent Yemeni journalist reported on November 11 that likely Saudi airstrikes destroyed a Houthi vehicle column, including a "communications jamming vehicle," in al Shamayatayn District, Taiz Governorate, which is located directly to the northwest of Houthi-Yemeni government frontlines in Lahij Governorate.[xxxviii] The Houthis likely planned to deploy the electronic warfare system to aid ongoing offensive operations against Yemeni government-aligned forces in Lahij Governorate. The Houthis previously employed electronic warfare systems during the Houthi offensive on the Red Sea coastal plain in September in order to issue withdrawal orders to Yemeni government-aligned frontline units, which set conditions for the Houthi capture of the Red Sea coast.[xxxix]

The Houthis fired three ballistic missiles at Marib City on November 10, which may have targeted Yemeni government leadership visiting the city. Multiple Yemeni sources reported that three Houthi ballistic missiles struck Marib while senior government officials including two members of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) were visiting.[xl] It is unclear if the Houthis were targeting these officials or other Yemeni military targets. The Houthis have previously attacked Marib City with ballistic missiles in order to degrade Yemeni government-aligned staging areas.[xli] 

Yemeni security forces separately disabled two roadside IEDs on the Marib-al Abr Road placed by unspecified actors.[xlii]  Local and regional media reported that perpetrators were targeting the PLC members.[xliii] The Houthis have previously conducted IED attacks against Yemeni government-aligned forces across Yemen, but it remains unclear if the group was responsible for laying the IEDs in Marib.[xliv]

The Houthis claimed to attack King Khalid International Airport and Saudi energy infrastructure with cruise missiles and drones on November 11.[xlv] Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on November 11 that the Houthis struck King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and an oil pumping station in Yanbu on November 11.[xlvi] Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki separately announced on November 11 that Saudi air defenses intercepted three Houthi cruise missiles near Riyadh, one Houthi drone over Mecca Province, and one Houthi drone over southern Saudi Arabia.[xlvii] The Houthis denied that the group launched a drone over Mecca Province, however.[xlviii] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[xlix]