Iran Update, October 9, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly captured Perim Island and recaptured areas around the Bab al Mandeb Strait from Houthi forces on October 9, which reduces Houthi access to territory nearest the Bab al Mandeb and international shipping lanes.
• Yemeni government-aligned forces have continued to stall Houthi advances in central Taiz Governorate on October 9 amid Houthi efforts to encircle and capture Taiz City.
• The Houthi campaign targeting Saudi critical infrastructure aims to impose increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia in an effort to compel Saudi Arabia to accept Houthi demands and end Saudi operations in Yemen.
• Saudi Arabia struck Houthi ballistic missile infrastructure in Yemen as part of an effort to degrade Houthi capabilities central to the group’s strike campaign against Saudi Arabia.

Toplines

Yemeni government-aligned forces reportedly captured Perim Island and recaptured areas around the Bab al Mandeb Strait from Houthi forces on October 9, which reduces Houthi access to territory nearest the Bab al Mandeb and international shipping lanes.  Government-aligned forces, including the Southern Giants Brigade and Homeland Shield Forces, secured al Aradi, which is located along a peninsula that juts out into the Bab al Mandeb in Lahij Governorate, and reportedly seized Perim Island on October 9, according to anti-Houthi Yemeni sources and geolocated footage.[i] Unverified reports previously indicated that some Houthi forces were operating in al Aradi on October 6.[ii] A DC-based Yemen analyst reported on October 9 that Yemeni government-aligned forces are continuing to clear al Aradi and the Bab al Mandeb area of remaining Houthi pockets in the area.[iii] Yemeni government advances on Perim Island follow government-aligned forces’ seizure of Jabal Kahbub, which is strategic high ground that overlooks both al Aradi and Perim Island on October 8.[iv] The capture of Jabal Kahbub may have enabled government forces to recapture both areas.[v]

Yemeni government control over Perim Island and al Aradi denies the Houthis key positions near the Bab al Mandeb, though the Houthis retain significant territory along the Red Sea coast that can facilitate Houthi attacks on international shipping. Houthi positions on Perim Island, which is located within the Bab al Mandeb, and in al Aradi, which is approximately 16 kilometers from the center of the waterway, would enable the Houthis to use a broader range of weapons systems to threaten shipping in the Bab al Mandeb, including artillery.[vi] Positions on Perim Island also placed the Houthis in range to use tactical weapons systems, such as tactical drones, against vessels transiting the waterway.[vii] Government control over territory close to the Bab al Mandeb does not limit the Houthis’ abilities to target international shipping from other positions along the Red Sea coast, however, including from the Hanish Islands or from positions near Mokha.

Yemeni government-aligned forces have continued to stall Houthi advances in central Taiz Governorate amid Houthi efforts to encircle and capture Taiz City. The Houthis effectively encircled Taiz City on October 6 and have continued efforts to seize territory to consolidate the encirclement.[viii] Geolocated footage indicates that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured al Misrakh, Taiz Governorate, on October 9 after Houthi forces briefly captured and occupied the town.[ix] Geolocated footage and anti-Houthi media reports from October 8 and October 9 also indicate that Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces continue to engage each other near Jabal Habashi, which lies 15 kilometers south of Taiz City.[x] Houthi control over the Jabal Habashi area would represent a complete encirclement of Taiz City, given the Houthis’ recent capture of al Misrakh.[xi] The Houthis’ effective encirclement of Taiz City will likely continue to constrain Yemeni government-aligned forces’ ability to hold terrain in areas such as Jabal Habashi and al Misrakh by restricting Yemeni government-aligned forces’ capability to reinforce and resupply frontline positions in the remaining Yemeni government-controlled territory.

The Houthi campaign targeting Saudi critical infrastructure aims to impose increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia in an effort to compel Saudi Arabia to accept Houthi demands and end Saudi operations in Yemen. The Saudi Civil Aviation authority reported that the Houthis conducted two ballistic missile attacks targeting the King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 8. The attack killed three Saudi civilians, injured multiple other civilians, and damaged a plane.[xii] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted other Saudi airports in recent days, including in Jizan and Najran, and have continued to warn international airlines to avoid Saudi airports and airspace.^[xiii] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree warned on October 9 that only Houthi-approved airlines would be allowed to land in Riyadh for ”humanitarian” purposes.[xiv] The Houthis have also targeted Saudi oil infrastructure as part of their campaign in order to impose increasing pressure on the Saudi economy.[xv] Houthi spokesperson Omar al Buakhiti reiterated Houthi warnings on October 8 to Saudi oil industry employees to evacuate oil sites.[xvi] The Houthis will likely continue to conduct attacks on Saudi critical infrastructure in the coming days given that the Houthis have not yet achieved their objectives, which include ending Saudi support for the Yemeni government counteroffensive, lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, paying war reparations and civil servant salaries, and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.

The Houthis have also threatened Saudi Arabia’s international partners in order to isolate Saudi Arabia and prevent Saudi partners from supporting operations against the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has increasingly relied on support from partners, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Turkey, to defend against Houthi attacks and support Saudi operations against the Houthis in Yemen.[xvii] Saudi Arabia announced on October 5 that Pakistan and Turkey are taking “practical measures” to defend Saudi Arabia pursuant to the Mecca Pact requirements.[xviii] Pakistani and regional officials told Reuters on October 2 that Pakistan and Turkey have supplied military aid to Saudi Arabia to combat the Houthis in Yemen. Houthi officials, including Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi, have warned Turkey and Pakistan against supporting Saudi Arabia.[xix]

Saudi Arabia struck Houthi ballistic missile infrastructure in Yemen as part of an effort to degrade Houthi capabilities central to the group’s strike campaign against Saudi Arabia. Saudi coalition spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki announced on September 9 that coalition aircraft destroyed three Houthi ballistic missile launchers in Yemen.[xx] Saudi media reported on September 9 that Saudi aircraft targeted Houthi missile launch sites, missile depots, and a radar station in Sanaa Governorate.[xxi] Saudi Arabia also reportedly struck Houthi military fortifications and weapons depots in Amran Governorate.[xxii] Houthi missile sites, depots, and radar equipment in Sanaa and Amran governorates lie far north from active frontlines, which suggests that the Houthis use these positions to attack Saudi Arabia rather than government forces to the south. Saudi Arabia targeted Houthi missile launch sites and military infrastructure in northern Houthi-controlled Saada and Amran governorates in 2018 and 2021 in order to prevent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.[xxiii] Houthi media also reported that Saudi airstrikes targeted communications infrastructure in Saada and Sanaa governorates on October 9.[xxiv] These strikes may have been intended to degrade the Houthis’ ability to attack Saudi Arabia given their concentration in northwestern Yemen.

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report. 

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy threatened on October 9 to attack vessels “anywhere in the region” that attempt to pass through “unauthorized“ passages in and out of the Strait of Hormuz, likely as part of an effort to deter shipping companies from violating Iranian procedures.^[xxv] The Iranian threat suggests that Iran will attack vessels that pass through non-Iranian approved routes regardless of whether these vessels remain in the Strait of Hormuz.  Iran likely aims to intimidate shipping companies into abiding by Iranian transit regulations by suggesting that ships that transit safely through the Strait of Hormuz are still under threat. Iran likely struck a tanker about 51 nautical miles off Qatar’s northern coast in the Persian Gulf with ”multiple projectiles” on October 8.^[xxvi] It is unclear if this tanker had previously transited the strait along an ”unauthorized” route. Iranian efforts to intimidate vessels and shipping companies aim to compel shipping companies to comply with Iranian regulations for the strait and legitimize Iranian “control“ over the strait. Iranian attacks on vessels also aim to increase pressure on the United States by disrupting international shipping and raising oil prices.

Iran has continued to attack vessels attempting to transit through the strait’s ”southern route,” which passes through Omani waters. The IRGC Navy claimed to attack the Vietnamese-flagged tanker NV SUNSHINE as it transited the Strait of Hormuz through Omani waters on October 9, for example.^[xxvii] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported an attack on a vessel about 13 nautical miles west of Al Jazeera, UAE, that may refer to the NV SUNSHINE.[xxviii]

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report. 

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s meetings with the leaders of littoral Caspian Sea and Caucasian states on October 8 highlight the regime’s efforts to mitigate the effects of the US economic campaign against Iran. Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on the sidelines of the Caspian Sea Environmental Summit in Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan, on October 8 to discuss expanding trade and countering Western “unilateralism.”[xxix] Pezeshkian likely spoke to these leaders about expanding Iran’s ability to import goods from littoral Caspian Sea and Caucasian states in order to offset the impact of US sanctions and the naval blockade on Iran. Iran has used the Caspian Sea and overland transit routes to try to offset reduced maritime trade caused by the US blockade on Iranian ports, particularly in trade with Russia.[xxx] Iran also relies on countries such as Armenia and Azerbaijan to import goods via rail and roadways.[xxxi] Pezeshkian’s likely attempts to expand Iran’s trade routes via land come as the United States’ economic campaign has constricted Iran’s options to import goods via air and sea in recent months.[xxxii] 

Iranian regime security forces participated in a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) counterterrorism exercise on October 7 and 8.[xxxiii] Regime media reported on October 7 that IRGC Ground Forces participated in the exercise in Minsk, Belarus, involving 14 SCO member countries, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia.^[xxxiv] IRGC-affiliated media published footage of regime security forces simulating raids on insurgent positions.[xxxv] Iran has previously participated in similar exercises, such as the Sahand exercise in 2025.[xxxvi] This latest exercise comes amid an increase in militant activity in southeastern Iran.[xxxvii] IRGC-affiliated media reported that Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) fighters, which is a Baloch, anti-regime group, detonated an improvised explosive device that killed a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) social deputy chief in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 9.[xxxviii] IRGC-affiliated media separately reported that an unknown gunman killed an LEC officer in Faryab, Kerman Province, on October 9.[xxxix]    

Lebanon

The European Union (EU) is preparing to approve a multinational military support mission that will assist Lebanese military and security forces in strengthening internal and border security. European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas announced during a joint press conference with Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji on October 8 that the EU is expected to formally establish a three-year military support mission to Lebanon on October 12.[xl] Kallas said that the EU mission will train and advise the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to strengthen Lebanese border and internal security measures.[xli] An EU official told Saudi media on October 9 that the mission's initial contingent will include at least 100 French, Italian, and Spanish military personnel and deploy to Beirut no later than December 25, 2026.[xlii] The official clarified that the EU military personnel will not deploy in southern Lebanon.[xliii]

Non-combat advisory support from professional multinational military personnel could most directly challenge Hezbollah's reconstitution efforts by strengthening Lebanese security forces' discipline and readiness to interdict Hezbollah smuggling. The EU support mission's declared focus on strengthening Lebanese internal and border security could support the production of cadres of highly professional LAF and ISF units that are willing and able to disrupt Hezbollah's weapons and funding shipments.[xliv] The Lebanese government will be unable to permanently dismantle Hezbollah so long as the LAF is unwilling or unable to fully implement the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[xlv] Kallas added that Lebanon must implement economic reforms and achieve progress in disarming Hezbollah under the framework agreement in tandem with the EU support mission.[xlvi]

The EU support mission comes amid ongoing Lebanese security forces' efforts to strengthen internal security and disrupt Hezbollah's smuggling and reconstitution activities. A Lebanese security source told Saudi media on October 9 that security forces arrested two Hezbollah members who were transporting 500 kilograms of high explosives along the Beirut-Damascus Highway at Dahr al Baydar, Baabda District.[xlvii] Hezbollah would likely have used these explosive materials to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IED), which the group has repeatedly used to attack Israeli forces in southern Lebanon in recent months.[xlviii] The LAF also interdicted a shipment of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and 24 kilograms of high explosives entering Lebanon from Syria in the vicinity of Qasr, Hermel District, on October 9.[xlix] Qasr lies along a major Hezbollah smuggling route between Syria and the Bekaa Valley, although it is unclear whether Hezbollah was responsible for the shipment.[l]

Iraq

Unspecified Iraqi militias are reportedly only relinquishing some of their weapons to the Iraqi government through the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is consistent with militias' recent efforts to circumvent disarmament. An Iraqi security official told UAE-based media on October 9 that three Iraqi militias that agreed to disarm have only relinquished some heavy and "specialized" weapons, along with militia bases, to the PMF.[li] The official did not specify which militias have relinquished weapons to the PMF. The official claimed that the PMF has begun to integrate some militia fighters into PMF units that are entirely separate from their original militia affiliations, as part of the government's efforts to incorporate fighters into Iraq's state security apparatus.[lii] Iraqi militias have attempted to circumvent Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi's disarmament initiatives in recent weeks by forming new Iranian-backed breakaway militias, attempting to condition disarmament on additional political demands, andpons while integrating into the PMF.[liii]

Iraqi militias' forfeiture of weapons and incorporation into the PMF would not inherently satisfy US expectations for militia disarmament. The PMF consists of numerous militias that control their own brigades and answer to Iran, rather than the Iraqi prime minister.[liv] CTP-ISW previously assessed on October 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' extensive infiltration of the PMF renders it very likely that militias surrendering their weapons to the PMF would retain access to these arms.[lv]

Iran conducted its first drone attack targeting Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq since the US formally withdrew from Iraq on September 30. Iraqi media and independent open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts reported on October 8 that Iran fired two drones targeting a camp belonging to the Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan, an Iranian Kurdish anti-regime group based in Iraq, near Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan.[lvi] Iranian Consul-General in Erbil Faramarz Asadi told Kurdish media on October 8 that Iran considers anti-regime Kurdish groups in Iraq to constitute ”American interests and targets,” and claimed that US intelligence and security personnel remain in Iraqi Kurdistan following the withdrawal on September 30.[lvii] Faramarz’s remarks indicate that Iran will use unsubstantiated claims of US presence in Iraq as pretexts for future attacks on Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq. Iran has repeatedly attacked Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraq in recent months because the Iranian regime views these groups as a threat to regime control over Kurdish areas within Iran.[lviii]

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.