Iran Update: November 09, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei’s growing prominence in US-Iran negotiations indicates that Iran will likely maintain its maximalist demands, including recognized control of the Strait of Hormuz and the maintenance of its nuclear program.
• Rezaei has publicly insisted that Iran will only “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz once the United States meets Iran’s seven conditions. Rezaei’s public comments suggest that he is unwilling to “reopen” the strait in a way that would deprive Iran of control over the waterway, however.
• Rezaei is also unlikely to agree to significant concessions regarding Iran's nuclear program, although he may be willing to discuss nuclear issues after the United States acquiesces to Iranian demands.
• Iran is likely trying to secure Russian air defense systems due to ongoing concerns about its ability to defend against a potential resumption of US strikes. Russia very likely cannot provide Iran with such systems at this time given its own constraints, however. Iran's push for Russian air defense systems suggests that Iranian air defense capabilities remain degraded following US-Israeli strikes on Iran between 2024 and 2026.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi appears to be intensifying his efforts to constrain Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' ability to operate in Iraq. Zaydi has reportedly threatened to arrest militia members if they intervene in a potential US-Iran conflict on Iran's behalf. The Iraqi government has also taken action to disrupt Iranian-backed Iraqi financial networks in recent days.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi actors possibly attacked the Emirati-owned Khor Mor gas field in Iraqi Kurdistan on November 8 to deter Zaydi from taking additional actions targeting the militias' revenue channels and ability to operate.
• Recent US airstrikes on Qeshm Island reportedly targeted Iranian radar installations, missile launchers, and mine-laying systems, likely in an effort to degrade Iran's ability to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

Toplines

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei’s growing prominence in US-Iran negotiations indicates that Iran will likely maintain its maximalist demands, including control of the Strait of Hormuz and the maintenance of its nuclear program. The Turkish intelligence chief claimed on November 9 that Rezaei and US Vice President JD Vance will meet in Qatar "next week.”^[i] Rezaei’s meeting with Vance would signal that Rezaei is playing a larger role in negotiations, given that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf have led negotiations with US officials thus far.[ii] The regime’s English-language media outlet denied that Rezaei will meet with Vance and emphasized that Iran has no intention to negotiate with the United States until the United States meets Iran’s seven conditions (see below).[iii] Tabnak, a hardline Iranian outlet affiliated with Rezaei, circulated the reports of Rezaei’s potential meeting with Vance without denying them, however.[iv] Rezaei is a hardline regime veteran and senior military strategist to Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who appointed Rezaei as SNSC secretary on August 9.[v] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Rezaei is aligned with the anti-concessions regime faction, which is willing to engage in talks with the United States but refuses to make meaningful concessions.[vi]

Rezaei has publicly insisted that Iran will only “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz once the United States meets Iran’s seven conditions. Rezaei’s public comments suggest that he is unwilling to “reopen” the strait in a way that would deprive Iran of control over the waterway, however. Rezaei announced on September 19 that Iran had communicated seven non-negotiable conditions for beginning talks with the United States, including an immediate end to the US naval blockade, the unfreezing of all Iranian assets, and a full ceasefire across all fronts.[vii] Rezaei reiterated on November 5 that Iran will not enter negotiations or “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz until the United States accepts Iran’s conditions.[viii] It is unclear what Rezaei means by “reopening” the strait. Iranian officials have repeatedly described an “open” strait as one that remains under Iranian management and previously sought to use the ambiguous language of the July 2026 US-Iran memorandum of understanding to enforce Iranian control over the strait. Rezaei has also emphasized the strategic value of the Strait of Hormuz in public comments, describing it as "more important than dozens of atomic bombs” and a source of “enormous national wealth.”^[ix] These comments suggest that Rezaei views the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic national asset beyond being a source of leverage in negotiations with the United States and that Rezaei would be unwilling to permanently give up Iranian control over the strait.

Rezaei is also unlikely to agree to significant concessions regarding Iran's nuclear program, although he may be willing to discuss nuclear issues after the United States acquiesces to Iranian demands. The New York Times, citing two Iranian officials and a US official, reported on November 5 that Rezaei has privately shown “more openness to discussing” Iran’s nuclear program than what his public comments suggest.[x] Rezaei’s potential willingness to discuss nuclear topics does not mean that he is prepared to make any concessions on Iran’s nuclear program, however. Rezaei’s public comments on Iran’s nuclear program have been uncompromising. He has emphasized that “not a single gram of enriched uranium will be removed from Iran” and implied that Iran could change its nuclear doctrine if war resumes.^[xi] Rezaei may be signaling his “openness to discussing” nuclear issues with the United States as a way to delay potential strikes on Iran by prolonging negotiations, a tactic that the regime has used repeatedly in the past.[xii] This assessment is based on the assumption that Rezaei’s public statements about Iran only being willing to begin negotiations once the United States has met Iran’s seven conditions are accurate.

A regime-affiliated journalist published details of a reported Qatari proposal on November 8. Iran is unlikely to accept the proposal given that it contradicts Iran’s current position that the United States must first meet Iran’s seven conditions before nuclear talks are held. The compromise stipulates that Iran would limit its enrichment to 3.67 percent and domestically dilute its highly enriched uranium.[xiii] Iran would also “open” the Strait of Hormuz after allowing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to enter Iran. Iran has repeatedly refused to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect damaged Iranian nuclear sites following the June 2025 and Spring 2026 wars. The United States would lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports and unfreeze some Iranian assets in exchange, according to the journalist. Iran would likely not be satisfied with only these two US concessions, given that it has sought numerous other demands such as sanctions relief.

Recent US airstrikes on Qeshm Island reportedly targeted Iranian radar installations, missile launchers, and mine-laying systems, likely in an effort to degrade Iran's ability to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[xiv] Iranian attacks on commercial vessels reached a monthly high in October. CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Iranian forces may have partially reconstituted their anti-ship strike and tracking capabilities during a pause in US strikes prior to the uptick in Iranian attacks.[xv] The United States conducted similar strikes on Iranian military assets used to attack shipping in August and September that degraded Iran’s ability to target ships.[xvi] Iranian units were subsequently forced to adopt suboptimal tactical adaptations to continue their operations against civilian vessels, such as using rockets to launch naval mines and using fast attack craft to identify ships.[xvii]

Iran is likely trying to secure Russian air defense systems due to ongoing concerns about its ability to defend against a potential resumption of US strikes. Russia very likely cannot provide Iran with such systems at this time given its own constraints, however. The Telegraph, citing a senior Iranian official, reported on November 6 that SNSC Secretary Mohsen Rezaei conveyed a message from Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to Russian President Vladimir Putin during their meeting on November 5 that emphasized Iran's request for Russian S-400 air defense systems.[xviii] Iran has sought S-400s from Russia for several years.[xix] The official added that Iran is "optimistic" about receiving the systems but did not provide any evidence to substantiate Iran’s "optimism."[xx] Russia is unlikely to divert critical systems like the S-400 away from its war effort against Ukraine, particularly given that Ukrainian forces have made them priority targets.[xxi] Russia's willingness to provide such systems to Iran is also unclear. Russia rejected an Iranian request to purchase S-400s in 2019 due to concerns that the sale would exacerbate tensions in the Middle East.[xxii]

Iran's push for Russian air defense systems suggests that Iranian air defense capabilities remain degraded following US-Israeli strikes on Iran between 2024 and 2026. Israel destroyed the engagement radar of an Iranian S-300 system in April 2024 and rendered Iran's three remaining S-300 systems inoperable in October 2024.[xxiii] An S-300 battery requires engagement radars, command-and-control centers, fire-control units, and launchers to operate as a functional surface-to-air missile system.[xxiv] Iran subsequently displayed a modified S-300 system with a reportedly "new, Iranian-designed" radar in February 2025.[xxv] A Belgium-based military outlet assessed that Iran's use of indigenous radars in its S-300 systems would create "interoperability constraints and potential gaps in data link compatibility," however, which could undermine their effectiveness in Iran's broader air defense network.[xxvi] Iran has also sought to domestically develop air defense systems but these systems, such as the Bavar 373, proved largely ineffective during the June 2025 and Spring 2026 wars.[xxvii] Iran almost certainly views the S-400 as a potential means to address these vulnerabilities in its air defense network. The S-400's contribution to Iran's air defense capabilities would rely heavily on how many systems Russia could supply and whether Iran could effectively integrate them into its existing air defense network.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi appears to be intensifying his efforts to constrain Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' ability to operate in Iraq. Iraqi media reported on November 9 that Zaydi threatened to arrest militia members if they intervene in a potential US-Iran conflict on Iran's behalf.[xxviii] Zaydi's threat comes after he reportedly granted Iraqi Army commanders permission to pursue militia "violations" without waiting for his approval, according to an Iraqi official speaking to Saudi-owned media on November 6.[xxix] Allowing Iraqi Army commanders to act independently could enable army units to respond more quickly to indicators of militia attack preparations. Iraqi authorities also separately arrested three 15th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade members on November 6 for attempting to transport 35 rockets from Latifiyah, south of Baghdad, to Babil Province.[xxx] The 15th PMF Brigade managed militia logistics hubs in Ninewa Province in March and April in support of militia attacks on US and foreign targets in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxxi] These arrests followed the Iraqi government's reported deployment of four Iraqi Army brigades to Basra Province in late October to prevent militia attacks on Kuwait if the United States attacks Iran.[xxxii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iraqi militias would likely respond to US strikes on Iran by attacking US interests in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, and neighboring countries.[xxxiii]  

The Iraqi government has also taken action to disrupt Iranian-backed Iraqi financial networks in recent days. Zaydi cancelled the contracts of three companies operating at Mosul International Airport on November 7 due to the companies' ties to unspecified armed groups.[xxxiv] This decision came after the Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission began an investigation on November 4 into Kataib Hezbollah’s manipulation of government contracts to serve the militia’s financial interests.[xxxv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah have long siphoned money from Iraqi government contracts that the militias secured using shell companies.[xxxvi]

These efforts to disrupt the militias' financial networks could further exacerbate the militias' financial difficulties amid Iran's reported suspension of funding for militias in Iraq.[xxxvii] Five Iraqi militia sources told US-funded regional media on November 5 that Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leaders have not paid most of their fighters for two months.[xxxviii] The sources told US-funded regional media that the militia leaders justified the suspension of payments as a “temporary measure to provide funds to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.”[xxxix] Iran has reportedly suspended funding for unspecified militias in Iraq due to Iran’s increasing economic difficulties caused by US constraints on Iran's maritime and overland trade.[xl] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have likely had to increasingly rely on alternative revenue-generation channels, such as siphoning money from Iraqi government contracts, to pay fighters' salaries, in response to Iran’s suspension of funding. Zaydi's efforts to disrupt these alternative revenue streams could therefore exacerbate the militias' financial difficulties and pose a threat to their ability to operate. 

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors possibly attacked the Emirati-owned Khor Mor gas field in Iraqi Kurdistan on November 8 to deter Zaydi from taking additional actions targeting the militias' revenue channels and ability to operate.[xli] Iraqi security officials told Western media on November 8 that unknown actors launched the attack from areas east of Tuz Khurmatu, Salah al Din Province.[xlii] The attack came after Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Mujahid al Aasaf implicitly threatened to target the Khor Mor gas field in a November 7 statement.[xliii] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors operating in Tuz Khurmatu have repeatedly attacked the Khor Mor gas field since 2023.[xliv] These actors may calculate that attacking a large, Emirati-owned gas plant could deter Zaydi from continuing his efforts to constrain militia activity by discouraging foreign investment in Iraq's oil and gas sector. Zaydi has made attracting foreign investment in Iraq a priority.[xlv]

US and Partner Military Operations

See topline section.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

See topline section.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline section.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Saudi media reported on November 8 that the Iraqi Judicial Investigation Office had issued an arrest warrant for the son of Kataib Hezbollah's secretary general in July 2026.[xlvi] Unspecified actors leaked a copy of an arrest warrant for Hussein al Hamidawi, whose whereabouts are unknown. The leak notably comes as Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has threatened to arrest militia leaders if they participate in a renewed conflict between the United States and Iran.[xlvii] The timing of the leak suggests that it aims to demonstrate Zaydi's commitment to follow through on his threats to arrest militia leaders. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have successfully pressured the Iraqi government to release detained militia members on several occasions in the past, however.[xlviii]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to attempt to advance in central Jawf Governorate and northwestern Marib Governorate, likely to set conditions to try to recapture Jawf Governorate's capital, al Hazm.[xlix] A Yemeni government-aligned military source told a Marib-based independent Yemeni journalist that Yemeni government-aligned forces expelled Houthi fighters from their remaining positions in the Jabal Dahida mountain range on November 9.[l] Yemeni government-aligned forces have been advancing along the mountain range in recent days, likely in an effort to deprive the Houthis of elevated terrain from which they could engage advancing Yemeni government-aligned forces.[li] An independent Yemeni journalist reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces separately engaged Houthi fighters near the Mas military camp, which is located approximately 50 kilometers south of al Hazm in northwestern Marib Governorate on November 9.[lii] Yemeni government-aligned forces previously advanced in northwestern Marib Governorate to Wadi Halhalan on November 6.[liii]

Yemeni government-aligned forces continued to repel Houthi attempted advances in northeastern Lahij Governorate. A DC-based Yemen analyst reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled Houthi fighters attempting to advance to Gharib in al Maqatirah District, which is a town that sits along the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC), on November 9.[liv] The Houthis are likely continuing to attempt to advance southeast through al Maqatirah District in order to seize sections of the GLOC to help set conditions for the Houthis to besiege or capture Aden City in the future.[lv] Forces affiliated with the Southern Giants Brigades separately reportedly recaptured al Majza on November 9.[lvi] The Houthis have infiltrated areas surrounding al Majza in recent days, likely to divert Yemeni government-aligned forces defending positions along the Taiz-Aden GLOC.[lvii]

Yemeni government-aligned forces separately regained territory in northwestern Lahij Governorate. An independent Yemeni journalist reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured Jabal al Kab, which is located near the Jabal Kahbub mountain range, on November 9.[lviii] Jabal Kahbub and Jabal Kab are part of a low mountain range that offers advantageous terrain for spotting and firing on enemy forces on the southern coastal plain. Government-aligned forces’ control over this mountain range protects other government-aligned forces on the plain.[lix]

Saudi Arabia targeted Houthi ballistic missile manufacturing facilities on November 9, likely to degrade the Houthis' ability to strike Saudi targets. Saudi Joint Forces Command Spokesperson Major General Turki al Maliki announced that Saudi Arabia struck three ballistic missile production facilities that manufacture missile components, solid fuel, and electronics, in Houthi-controlled Sanaa Governorate on November 9.[lx] Saudi Arabia previously targeted Houthi ballistic missile storage sites and launch platforms in Sanaa Governorate on October 25.[lxi]

Saudi Arabia separately struck Hudaydah International Airport on November 9, according to Houthi media.[lxii] An Iranian flight transporting Iranian advisers and military aid previously landed at Hudaydah International Airport in July 2026 after Saudi strikes on Sanaa International Airport prevented the plan from landing in Sanaa.[lxiii] It is possible that Saudi Arabia struck Hudaydah Airport on November 9 to prevent the Houthis from receiving additional military supplies or Iranian or Axis of Resistance advisors via the airport.

The Houthis likely struck Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline on November 9.[lxiv] The Saudi Energy Ministry announced on November 9 that an unspecified actor struck a portion of the East-West Pipeline in Medina Province with unspecified projectiles.[lxv] The ministry added that the strike caused minor damage and did not disrupt the pipeline’s operations.[lxvi] The Houthis have not claimed responsibility for the strike at the time of this writing. The Houthis have targeted and struck the East-West Pipeline on multiple occasions in recent months, however.[lxvii] A previous Houthi attack on the East-West Pipeline in September 2026 forced Saudi authorities to close the pipeline for approximately 11 days to conduct emergency repairs.[lxviii] Saudi Civil Defense separately issued early warning alerts in Riyadh on November 9.[lxix] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi critical infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi demands, which include lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[lxx]

Syria is reportedly sending additional military forces to Saudi Arabia amid reports that Syria is considering joining the Mecca Pact Defense Alliance. A Syrian official told the Associated Press on November 9 that Syria will send 600 special forces soldiers to Saudi Arabia in the coming week.[lxxi] This report follows a report from November 6 that Syria had begun sending military advisers to Saudi Arabia pursuant to the November 4 Saudi-Syrian defense cooperation deal, which includes advisory support, training, and the exchange of military expertise between the two countries.[lxxii] Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani emphasized on November 9 that Syria will not send troops into Yemen and that Syria will only provide defensive military support to Saudi Arabia.[lxxiii]

Two Syrian officials separately told the Associated Press on November 9 that Syria has decided to join the Mecca Pact but has not publicly acknowledged the decision.[lxxiv] Regional officials speaking to the Associated Press on November 9 stated that Syria has not decided to join the pact and that talks with Saudi Arabia are ongoing, however.[lxxv] Shaibani previously stated on October 31 that Syria has held ”some” negotiations about joining the Mecca Pact and that Syria would support organizations that defend regional security, likely referring to the Mecca Pact, even if Syria is not a member.[lxxvi]