Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 27, 2026

Data Cutoff: 02:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran may be attempting to maximize the effects of its limited capacity to launch large missile salvos at Israel by launching small missile salvos throughout the day to impose psychological effects on Israeli civilians by consistently forcing them to take shelter and keeping the country under constant alert. Iran is spreading out its launches throughout the day, often pausing for several hours between launches. Spreading out ballistic missile launches over a long period of time presumably increases the number of times per day that Israeli civilians must seek shelter.
• Such a strategy is suboptimal and likely reflects the US-Israeli combined force’s degradation of Iran’s ability to launch large-scale missile attacks. The combined force’s degradation of Iran’s missile capabilities has prevented Iran from consistently launching large-scale missile attacks against Israel during the current conflict, however.
• Iran has increasingly used cluster munitions in its attacks on Israel during the war, which likely reflects Iran’s inability to meaningfully threaten discrete military targets in Israel and efforts to inflict psychological effects on Israeli civilians.
• Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27. The Ukrainian Presidential Office reported that Ukraine will help Saudi Arabia with air defenses under the agreement, which also outlines the foundations for further contacts and includes technological cooperation and investments.
• The combined force has continued to disrupt Iran’s ability to launch missile attacks, including by disrupting Iranian efforts to regain access to missile launchers in underground bases. US Central Command (CENTCOM) published footage on March 27 showing that it struck bulldozers and loaders that Iran was likely using to try to clear debris and reopen tunnel entrances to underground facilities.
• The IDF struck Iranian nuclear infrastructure on March 27, including sites involved in plutonium production and the uranium fuel cycle. The IDF struck the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility in Arak, Markazi Province, following repeated Iranian attempts to restore the site following IDF strikes on the site during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. The IDF also struck the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant in Yazd Province.

Toplines:

Iran may be attempting to maximize the effects of its limited capacity to launch large missile salvos at Israel by launching small missile salvos throughout the day to impose psychological effects on Israeli civilians by consistently forcing them to take shelter and keeping the country under constant alert. Iran has launched between five and 11 missile barrages at Israel per day over the past week.[i] The IDF reported on March 27 that Iran has launched about 10 missiles at Israel per day, which suggests that each Iranian barrage has consisted of either a single missile or a small number of missiles.[ii] Iran is spreading out its launches throughout the day, often pausing for several hours between launches. Ballistic missiles take about 10 minutes to reach Israel once launched from Iran.[iii] Spreading out ballistic missile launches over a long period of time presumably increases the number of times per day that Israeli civilians must seek shelter.

Such a strategy is suboptimal and likely reflects the US-Israeli combined force’s degradation of Iran’s ability to launch large-scale missile attacks. Iran has long sought to overwhelm Israeli air defenses through large missile and drone strike packages.[iv] Iran launched hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles and one-way attack drones targeting Israel in April and October 2024, for example.[v] The combined force’s degradation of Iran’s missile capabilities has prevented Iran from consistently launching large-scale missile attacks against Israel during the current conflict, however. The combined force has struck missile launchers, missile storage facilities, and dropped heavy munitions on hardened Iranian missile bases during the war.[vi] Iran could be launching smaller salvos due to its depleted missile stockpile. The United States assesses ”with certainty” that the combined force has destroyed about a third of Iran’s missile stockpile and assesses that the combined force has likely ”damaged, destroyed, or buried” another third of Iran’s missile stockpile, according to five people familiar with US intelligence speaking to Reuters on March 27.[vii] The decline could also reflect a deliberate Iranian strategy to protect missile launchers from combined force airstrikes by only fielding a small number of launchers at a time. The IDF has destroyed or rendered inoperable around 330 out of Iran’s 470 missile launchers.[viii] An Israeli OSINT account posted footage of an Iranian missile launch from the Yazd Missile Base on March 27.[ix] The combined force struck the base several hours later, which highlights how the combined force is patrolling Iranian airspace and striking targets as they appear.[x]

The combined force’s degradation of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities has likely caused the rate of Iranian fire at Israel to steadily decline since the start of the war on February 28. The current average of 10 missiles per day is a significant decrease from the volume of daily Iranian missile fire targeting Israel in the first week of the war.[xi] Iran fired around 90 missiles targeting Israel on February 28 and 60 missiles on March 1, for example.[xii] The rate of Iranian fire reduced to an average of 20 missiles per day over the subsequent four days of the war.[xiii] An average of 10 missiles per day in the campaign’s fourth week is consistent with US military assessments that Iranian missile fire has reduced by around 90 percent since the beginning of the campaign.[xiv] Other factors may also be contributing to the decline in Iranian fire, such as reported desertions among Iranian missile crews.[xv]

Iran has increasingly used cluster munitions in its attacks on Israel during the war, which likely reflects Iran’s inability to meaningfully threaten discrete military targets in Israel and efforts to inflict psychological effects on Israeli civilians. Cluster munitions disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage. Many of the Iranian missile attacks that have caused damage and casualties in Israel have involved missiles with cluster munition warheads. The IDF said on March 10 that around 50 percent of the missiles that Iran was firing at Israel contained cluster munition warheads.[xvi] This percentage has since increased to around 70 percent.[xvii] Iran launched a cluster munition on March 27 that dispersed over central Israel.[xviii]

Hezbollah may be pursuing a similar strategy through its increasing rocket and drone attacks targeting Israeli towns. Hezbollah is currently conducting a campaign intended to impose costs on Israel for its involvement in the war against Iran and its operations in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has conducted an increasing number of attacks targeting Israeli forces or positions and Israeli towns since joining the war on March 1 (see graph below). Hezbollah claimed 48 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern and central Israel on March 26, for example.[xix] This marks the highest number of attacks that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period in the conflict.[xx] Hezbollah may be attempting to achieve a similar effect as Iran by sending Israelis to shelters throughout the day and disrupting normal life. Israelis along the northern border are often given 15 seconds of warning or less to take shelter.[xxi] It is unclear if Hezbollah is coordinating with Iran to achieve this effect. Hezbollah has coordinated its fire with Iran in at least one instance during the war.[xxii]

US President Donald Trump announced on March 26 that the United States will refrain from attacking Iranian energy plants until April 6 at the Iranian regime’s request.[xxiii] Trump had originally set a five-day deadline for Iran to reach a deal with the United States that was set to expire on March 27. Trump said that talks with Iran are “ongoing” and “going very well.”[xxiv] The United States sent a proposal to Iran through Pakistan on March 24. Iranian state media reported on March 26 that Iran rejected the proposal and is awaiting the United States’ response.[xxvi] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on March 26 that “some concrete progress has been made” toward an agreement with Iran.[xxvii]

NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW’s March 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:

Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27. The Ukrainian Presidential Office reported that Ukraine will help Saudi Arabia with air defenses under the agreement, which also outlines the foundations for further contacts and includes technological cooperation and investments.[xxviii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the agreement ahead of further talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud. Zelensky stated that such cooperation can be mutually beneficial as Saudi Arabia has "something that Ukraine is interested in."[xxix] Zelensky and al Saud discussed possible energy cooperation. Zelensky also met with Ukrainian military experts who have been supporting air defense operations in Saudi Arabia for over a week (since at least March 20) and discussed additional measures to support Saudi Arabia's air defense operations.[xxx] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to counter Iranian strikes, as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.[xxxi]

US-Israeli Campaign

The combined force has continued to disrupt Iran’s ability to launch missile attacks, including by disrupting Iranian efforts to regain access to missile launchers in underground bases. The combined force struck the Mount Sofeh Missile Base in Esfahan Province and the Yazd Missile Base in Yazd Province on March 27.[xxxii] The combined force struck the Yazd Missile Base after a missile was launched from the base earlier in the day.[xxxiii] The combined force has struck the Yazd Missile Base at least five times since the beginning of the war.[xxxiv] The repeated targeting of the Yazd Missile Base, as well as other Iranian missile bases, suggests that there are entrances and exits to these bases that the combined force has not struck..[xxxv] CNN reported on March 20 that the combined force had struck around 77 percent of known tunnel entrances to underground missile facilities to prevent Iranian forces’ access to launchers in these facilities.[xxxvi] The combined force has disrupted Iranian efforts to reopen tunnel entrances that the combined force previously struck. US Central Command (CENTCOM) published footage on March 27 showing that it struck bulldozers and loaders that Iran was likely using to try to clear debris and reopen tunnel entrances to underground facilities.[xxxvii]

The IDF separately struck a base used for training soldiers and storing missiles, a ballistic missile components production site, and a site used for producing weapons batteries in Tehran Province on March 27.[xxxviii]

The combined force struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Headquarters in Tehran Province and likely struck an IRGC Aerospace Force base in Lar, Fars Province, on March 26 and 27.[xxxix] Iranian media claimed that the combined force struck a local market in Lar.[xl] An IRGC Aerospace Force base is located approximately 1,300 feet south of the claimed location, however.[xli] The IRGC Aerospace Force oversees Iran’s ballistic missile and drone arsenals and operates Iran’s missile and drone forces.[xlii]

The IDF struck Iranian nuclear infrastructure on March 27, including sites involved in plutonium production and the uranium fuel cycle.[xliii] The IDF struck the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility in Arak, Markazi Province, following repeated Iranian attempts to restore the site following IDF strikes on the site during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[xliv] Heavy water reactors produce plutonium as a byproduct, which can be used to develop nuclear weapons.[xlv] Israeli strikes previously damaged the reactor’s containment dome and associated infrastructure.[xlvi] Iran began construction of the heavy water reactor in 1997, but the reactor never became operational.[xlvii] Iran agreed to redesign the facility to alleviate international concerns about possible plutonium production as part of the 2015 nuclear deal.[xlviii] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran stated on March 27 that the strike on the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility caused no casualties and posed no risk of contamination to nearby communities.[xlix] The IDF issued an evacuation notice for the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility before striking the site.[l] The IDF also struck the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant in Yazd Province, which is Iran’s sole facility for processing mined uranium into raw materials that are used in uranium enrichment.[li] The Ardakan facility processes uranium ore from the Saghand mine in Yazd Province into uranium concentrate.[lii] CTP-ISW did not observe strikes on the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant during the 12-Day War.

The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran. The IDF struck an air defense systems production site in eastern Tehran Province on March 26.[liii] CENTCOM separately published footage on March 27 showing strikes on an Iranian radar in an unspecified location.[liv]

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian defense industrial targets across Iran to degrade Iran’s missile and drone production capabilities. The IDF has struck over 1,000 Iranian weapons production sites during the war thus far.[lv] CTP-ISW has observed an uptick in strikes on defense industrial sites in recent days. Part of the combined force’s effort has involved disrupting Iran’s ability to manufacture munitions that Iran could use to threaten international shipping. The IDF struck an anti-ship missile and naval mine manufacturing facility in Yazd Province on March 27.[lvi] The IDF also struck two facilities in Tehran that manufactured anti-ship cruise missiles on March 25.[lvii] The combined force is also striking likely defense industrial targets in eastern Iran. The combined force reportedly struck targets in an industrial town near Nishapour, Khorasan Razavi Province, on March 26.[lviii] The combined force has gradually swept across Iran from west to east and is now striking some of its furthest targets of the campaign.

The combined force struck several Iranian steel plants on March 27. The IDF struck the Mobarekeh Steel Company south of Mobarekeh, Esfahan Province, and the Khuzestan Steel Company near Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[lix] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the Mobarekeh and Khuzestan steel factories are partially owned by the IRGC and that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz ordered the strikes on the factories.[lx] The United States sanctioned Mobarakeh Steel Company in 2018 for providing material support to an IRGC-affiliated organization.[lxi] The correspondent added that the strikes on the factories are “expected to cause major damage” to the Iranian economy.[lxii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that Iran will exact a “heavy price” for the IDF’s strikes on the Mobarekeh and Khuzestan steel factories.[lxiii] The combined force also reportedly struck the Saba Steel Plant near Zarrinshahr, Esfahan Province.[lxiv]

The combined force reportedly killed an IRGC Aerospace Force commander at an IRGC missile base in western Iran. OSINT accounts circulated footage on March 27 of a funeral for an IRGC Aerospace Force commander, Colonel Nouraldin Gholipour, who reportedly died in combined force airstrikes targeting the IRGC Aerospace Force Imam Ali Missile Base in Khorramabad, Lorestan Province.[lxv] An analyst from the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies confirmed damage to the Imam Ali Missile Base on March 1 and assessed that B-2 bombers dropped bunker buster munitions on the base.[lxvi]

An OSINT account posted satellite imagery on March 27 that shows damage from combined force strikes to multiple buildings at the Esfahan Province Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Special Units Headquarters in Esfahan City on March 23.[lxvii] The LEC is Iran’s national police force and the regime’s first line of defense against civil unrest. The combined force also struck the Esfahan LEC Criminal Investigation Department, according to the OSINT account’s analysis of satellite imagery from March 23.[lxviii] The combined force has continuously struck Iranian internal security targets throughout the war.

Iranian Response

Iran continued to attack Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates on March 27. Iran launched 28 drones and six ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia between 2:00 PM ET on March 26 and 2:00 PM ET on March 27.[lxix] The Bahrain Defense Force said on March 27 that it intercepted 12 drones.[lxx] The Kuwaiti Army stated on March 27 that four Iranian drones struck the unfinished Mubarak al Kabir Port on Bubiyan Island and the Shuwaikh Port, causing material damage.[lxxi] An Iranian cruise missile also struck the Mubarak al Kabir Port on March 27.[lxxii] Iranian state media claimed on March 27 that the IRGC Navy conducted a drone and missile attack targeting US-Israeli “gathering centers” on Bubiyan Island.[lxxiii] The Emirati Defense Ministry stated that it intercepted nine drones and six ballistic missiles on March 27.[lxxiv]

The IRGC announced on March 27 that it prevented three container ships belonging to various countries from passing through the Strait of Hormuz.[lxxv] MarineTraffic data confirms that two Chinese container ships, the CSCL Indian Ocean and CSCL Arctic Ocean, turned around near Larak Island on March 27.[lxxvi] Commercially available maritime data shows that the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged SAPHIRA turned around further away from Larak Island on March 27. Maritime intelligence company Lloyd’s List reported on March 23 that over 20 vessels had taken a “Tehran-approved route” through the Strait of Hormuz, passing by Larak Island for the IRGC to verify their vessel details.[lxxvii] Lloyd’s List reported that at least two vessels paid Iran a fee in exchange for safe passage through the strait.[lxxviii] The IRGC reiterated on March 27 that the Strait of Hormuz is closed to ships going to and coming from the United States, Israel, or their allies.[lxxix]

The UAE is reportedly willing to deploy its navy to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and is encouraging other Gulf countries to join a multinational maritime task force to protect shipping in the Strait.[lxxx] Sources familiar with the situation told the Financial Times on March 27 that senior Emirati Minister Sultan al Jaber has discussed this initiative with US Vice President JD Vance.[lxxxi] The Financial Times reported that Bahrain is the only other Gulf country that has expressed interest in joining a potential maritime task force and is working with the UAE on a UN Security Council Resolution to provide a potential task force with a mandate.[lxxxii] The UAE has reportedly approached Saudi Arabia and other unspecified international partners about the task force.[lxxxiii]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 99 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli communities, between 2:00 PM ET on March 26 and 2:00 PM ET on March 27.[lxxxiv] This marks the highest number of attacks that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the group joined the war on March 1. Fifty-seven percent of these claimed attacks targeted Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah launched anti-tank guided missiles, drones, and rockets at Israeli forces attempting to advance into al Biyyadah, Tyre District.[lxxxv] Hezbollah also claimed that it launched 36 rocket attacks, 12 drone attacks, and two mortar attacks targeting Israeli positions, forces, and communities in northern Israel.[lxxxvi]

An OSINT analyst posted unverified photos on March 27 of fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones that Hezbollah has reportedly fired in southern Lebanon.[lxxxvii] The drones reportedly failed to explode.[lxxxviii] CTP-ISW is unable to verify the authenticity of the photos. Hezbollah posted FPV drone footage of an attack targeting an Israeli tank in Houla, southern Lebanon, on March 25.[lxxxix]

The IDF 91st Division continued to operate in Khiam, southern Lebanon, on March 27. The 84th Givati Brigade identified a Hezbollah tunnel underneath a church in Khiam that the IDF said it had previously cleared in December 2024.[xc] The IDF said that Hezbollah had created new tunnel shafts in the months during the ceasefire.[xci] Israeli naval commandos also raided a school in Khiam and seized weapons stored there, including anti-tank guided missiles and mines.[xcii] Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces in close combat in Khiam on March 26 but has only claimed three attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khiam since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff.[xciii] Hezbollah has claimed high rates of attacks defending Khiam in recent days.[xciv] The decline in Hezbollah defensive attacks since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff suggests that the IDF may have pushed Hezbollah fighters out of the town or that Hezbollah has decided to prioritize other defensive operations.

The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon on March 27.[xcv] The IDF warned residents of Beirut’s southern suburbs that Israeli aircraft were going to launch a round of airstrikes imminently in the area on March 27.[xcvi]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The US-Israeli combined force continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks against US interests and Israel. The combined force struck a 13th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade base in al Qaim District, Anbar Province, on March 27.[xcvii] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[xcviii] The 13th PMF brigade is closely linked to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[xcix]

Iranian Internal Security

Iranian security forces continued to arrest dozens of individuals on charges of espionage. Security forces arrested several individuals in Golestan, West Azerbaijan, Kerman, Esfahan, Ilam, Kermanshah, and Semnan provinces on March 26 and 27.[c]

Iranian regime media reported that security forces arrested individuals for organizing “street riots” and disrupting pro-regime gatherings. This report is the first Iranian state media report that CTP-ISW has observed since the start of the war that has acknowledged opposition activity against the regime. Mehr News reported on March 27 that the IRGC Ground Forces Amir ol Momenin Provincial Unit arrested five individuals for “organizing street riots and creating insecurity” and 15 individuals for attempting to disrupt nightly pro-regime gatherings in Ilam Province.[ci] Regime media has consistently reported arrests of individuals accused of communicating with “hostile networks” and spying for the United States and Israel. This report marks the first time that CTP-ISW has observed regime media reporting the arrests of individuals for engaging in anti-regime activity since the start of the war, however.[cii] It is notable that Mehr News published this report given that it is contrary to the regime’s interests to admit that any type of anti-regime activity is taking place.