Iran Update, June 16, 2023

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Note: CTP will not publish an Iran update on June 19 for the Juneteenth holiday. CTP will resume publication on June 20.

Key Takeaways

1). Iran may have directed its Iraqi proxies to deescalate their rhetoric against US forces in Iraq. This is consistent with one of CTP’s hypotheses, which is that Iran is threatening attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria to build leverage in the nuclear negotiations.

2). Iran and Syria coordinated their policy positions ahead of the next round of Astana talks.

3). Iran and Russia discussed Caspian Sea and Volga River transportation routes on June 16. The expansion of these routes could support Iran's transfer of military equipment to Russia.

4). Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stressed Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela’s common struggle against “imperialism and domination” on his trip to Latin America between June 12-16, suggesting that Iran may seek to incorporate these countries into its Axis of Resistance.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iran and Syria coordinated their policy positions ahead of the next round of Astana talks. The deputy foreign ministers of Iran, Russia, Syria, and Turkey will meet in Astana, Kazakhstan on June 20 and 21 to negotiate Syrian-Turkish normalization.[i] Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Special Affairs Ali Asghar Khaji spoke with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Ayman Soussan about rapprochement efforts in Damascus on June 12.[ii] Soussan will be Syria’s representative to the quadripartite meeting.[iii] Syrian and Iranian state media messaged their unified position ahead of the quadripartite meeting.[iv]

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iran may have directed its Iraqi proxies to deescalate their rhetoric against US forces in Iraq. This is consistent with one of CTP’s hypotheses, which is that Iran is threatening attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria to build leverage in the nuclear negotiations.[v] A post from a Kataib Hezbollah (KH)-backed Telegram channel circulated reporting on June 5 that the United States threatened to target and kill Iraqi proxy leadership if they threaten US interests in Iraq. The post prompted several Iranian-backed proxies—including three new militias—to announce a campaign to attack and expel US forces from Iraq.[vi] IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel Sabreen News released a statement on June 14 claiming that a decision to stop military action is “a tactic, not a strategy” in peace or in war.[viii] The proxies shifting their messaging to Iraqi audiences allows Iran to pursue its objective of expelling the United States from the Middle East without conducting attacks that would undermine nuclear negotiations.[ix]

Iranian Domestic Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iran and Russia discussed Caspian Sea and Volga River transportation routes on June 16. The expansion of these routes could support Iran's transfer of military equipment to Russia. The expansion of these routes could support Iran's transfer of military equipment to Russia. Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash discussed Caspian Sea and Volga River transportation routes with Russian presidential aide Igor Levitin on the sidelines of the 26^th International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, Russia on June 16.[x]  Iran has attached importance to developing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a transit route connecting Russia and Central Asia to the Persian Gulf via Iran, to bolster Iran’s economy in recent years. The Biden administration published a map on June 9 showing Iranian drone transfers from Iran to Russia through the Caspian Sea.[xi] High-ranking Israeli officials have separately expressed concern that Russia is providing Iran with Western weapons captured in Ukraine in exchange for Iran supplying Russia with drones.[xii]

Mehrdad Bazrpash previously served as an advisor to former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[xiii] He additionally served as a deputy of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, an economic conglomerate with extensive influence in Iran’s manufacturing and construction sectors.[xiv]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stressed Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela’s common struggle against “imperialism and domination” on his trip to Latin America between June 12-16, suggesting that Iran may seek to incorporate these countries into its Axis of Resistance. Raisi stated that the world order “will turn in favor of the resistance movement and independent countries” during a joint press conference with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in Managua, Nicaragua on June 15.[xv] Raisi separately stated on June 16 that Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela share the Islamic Revolution’s goals of attaining independence and freedom.[xvi] Iranian and Latin American officials have previously expressed a desire to jointly resist common enemies, such as the United States. Supreme Leader Military Advisor Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi stated in January 2022 that Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela were “increasing their links to the Axis of Resistance.”[xvii] Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro separately called for the formation of a united front against the US and Israel and stated that Venezuela is part of the Axis of Resistance during his visit to Tehran in June 2022.[xviii]