Iran Update, July 5, 2025

Iran Update Special Report, July 5, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

An unspecified high-ranking Iranian official cited by Amwaj Media on July 4 reported that Iran plans to resume indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the conditions that Iran will reportedly present would require unspecified guarantees that the US would not strike Iran.[i] Such a guarantee would be inconsistent with the Trump administration’s stated position on future strikes on Iran’s facilities. The unspecified Iranian official told Amwaj that Iran is seeking a guarantee in negotiations that the United States will not conduct any additional strikes on Iran.”[ii] The official added that “a lack of confidence and ...  mistrust” with the US following the Israel-Iran Twelve Day War are core obstacles to future negotiations.[iii] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi stated on July 3 that the United States will have to “convince“ Iran that it will not use force before Iran agrees to engage in talks.[iv] US President Donald Trump has previously suggested that the United States could strike Iran if Iran attempted to rebuild its nuclear program, but he said on July 4 that Iran wished to resume negotiations.[v] Trump noted that the negotiations would not be successful unless Iran agrees to inspections and zero enrichment.[vi] Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected US demands for zero enrichment and recently ended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Trump has warned that the United States would not allow Iran to restart its nuclear program in a new location in Iran.

European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections.[vii] These concerns understate the significant challenges Iran’s nuclear program faces in terms of Israeli penetration and weaponization.  Three unspecified European officials cited by The Washington Post assessed that US strikes on Iran have likely strengthened hardline Iranian leaders’ belief that Iran must develop a nuclear weapon to deter future foreign intervention.[viii] A former European diplomat suggested that Iran would attempt to develop a nuclear weapon “as secretly as possible.”[ix]  The IAEA did not have access to all Iranian facilities before the strikes, including multiple facilities associated with the pre-2003 Iranian nuclear weapons program.[x] Israeli intelligence has consistently provided exclusive information about Iran’s nuclear program that the IAEA has not provided (at least publicly).[xi] For example, Israeli intelligence--not the IAEA--revealed that Iran was using computer modelling for research at Parchin Military Complex, a site that is linked to the nuclear program and that the IAEA has had difficulty accessing in the past.[xii] Computer modelling can be used to model different nuclear weapon designs before producing an arsenal. Israeli intelligence, not IAEA inspections, drove Israeli concerns about Iranian weaponization and the Israeli decision to strike. The loss of IAEA inspections in Iran will certainly decrease the availability of open-source information on Iran’s nuclear program, but it is far from clear that the loss of these inspections would make it possible for Iran to build a weapon in secret.

Iran also faces challenges if it tries to weaponize because Iran will need large-scale production facilities to build a nuclear arsenal. Iran, if it chooses to weaponize, will almost certainly pursue a nuclear arsenal instead of a single nuclear weapon, as CTP-ISW has long assessed.[xiii] The development of a nuclear arsenal would require extensive rebuilding of Iranian facilities amid a major counterintelligence campaign that will undoubtedly create friction within the nuclear program. The scale of the facilities and time required for their development would make it very difficult for Iran to weaponize in secret.  There are also additional challenges associated with miniaturizing a weapon so that it can be used on a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, rather than deploying the weapon as a bomb. Any Iranian progress to weaponize will presumably be slowed by major Iranian counterintelligence investigations within the program, which could make it more difficult for surviving Iranian nuclear scientists to do their work.

Key Takeaways

• An unspecified Iranian official reported that Iran plans to resume indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the conditions that Iran will reportedly present would require unspecified guarantees that the US would not strike Iran. Such a guarantee would be inconsistent with the Trump administration’s stated position on future strikes on Iran’s facilities.
• European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections. These concerns understate the significant challenges Iran’s nuclear program faces in terms of Israeli penetration and weaponization.
• Iranian officials emphasized the importance of Azerbaijani airspace to successful Israeli operations in northern Iran and near Tehran. This discussion within the Iranian information space is indicative of Iran's long-standing concerns about perceived Azerbaijan-Israel cooperation and the threat it poses to Iranian security.
• Sources familiar with deliberations claimed that Hezbollah is conducting a review of its strategy in Lebanon. This rethink is probably driven by Hezbollah‘s losses in the October 7 War and regional changes since October 7 and does not represent a fundamental change in Hezbollah’s strategic aims.

Iranian media reported on July 6 that Shahid Madani International Airport in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, resumed operations after 23 days following Israel’s strikes during the 12-day war.[xiv] Iranian media released footage on June 30 showing repair work at the Iranian Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase (TAB). Israeli aircraft struck the base with multiple bombs. The base is co-located with the civilian airport.[xv] The restoration of Tabriz Airport likely reflects Iran’s need to repair critical infrastructure rather than an indication that Iran is prioritizing its ability to launch fighter aircraft from the base..[xvi] Israeli airstrikes on runways and taxiways enable Israeli air superiority by inhibiting Iran’s ability to launch aircraft to defend against Israeli operations. Iranian aircraft like the MiG-29s and F-5s stationed at the base are unlikely to challenge Israeli air superiority, however, because neither can detect Israeli F-35s.

Iranian officials emphasized the importance of Azerbaijani airspace to successful Israeli operations in northern Iran and near Tehran. Iranian officials and regime-linked media continue to emphasize the vulnerability of airspace over northwestern Iran. Hardline media outlet Kayhan claimed on June 29 that most Israeli strikes on Tehran and Alborz Provinces originated from the direction of the Caspian Sea and “utilized Azerbaijani airspace,” and warned that Iran must find a solution “to avoid similar future situations.”[xvii] An Iranian international relations professor claimed on July 2 that Israeli drones have a maximum range of 1,000 km, which “clearly shows they came from Azerbaijan, not Israel.”[xviii] He also claimed that Israeli drones that crashed in Iran were identical to drones Azerbaijan used in the Karabakh war and argued that Israel and Azerbaijan had jointly produced the drones.[xix] This discussion within the Iranian information space is indicative of Iran's long-standing concerns about perceived Azerbaijan-Israel cooperation and the threat it poses to Iranian security. IRGC-affiliated media in February 2025 called the Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance a direct threat to Iranian national security and warned that Israel uses Azerbaijani territory for intelligence operations and exploiting ethnic tensions inside Iran.[xx]

The Kurdistan Regional Government said that an unspecified group “linked” to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of launched one-way attack drones at an unspecified site near Erbil.[xxi]  CTP-ISW assessed on July 4 that likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched a one-way drone attack targeting Erbil International Airport in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan Region.[xxii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias who nominally report to the Iraqi prime minister.[xxiii] Iraqi media reported on July 3 that US forces co-located at Erbil International Airport shot down at least one drone near Erbil International Airport.[xxiv]

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted multiple one-way drone attacks targeting US positions across Iraq between June 12 and 24.[xxv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not claimed any attacks during this period, which suggests that the militias may suffer from a lack of discipline among lower-ranking fighters who attempted to independently launch drone attacks targeting US forces in Iraq. Militia leadership may also allow fighters to conduct attacks without publicly sanctioning them.

Sources familiar with deliberations cited by Reuters on July 4 claimed that Hezbollah is conducting a review of its strategy in Lebanon.[xxvi] This rethink is probably driven by Hezbollah‘s losses in the October 7 War and regional changes since October 7 and does not represent a fundamental change in Hezbollah’s strategic aims. An anonymous official familiar with Hezbollah’s internal deliberations reported that Hezbollah has formed small working groups since November 2024 to discuss the group’s leadership, structure, political role, social and development work, and weapons stockpile. A separate, unspecified source reported that Hezbollah is considering scaling back its role as an armed faction without disarming completely. Sources cited by Reuters suggested that Hezbollah has identified its large weapons arsenal as a liability. These sources reported that Hezbollah has turned over “a number” of weapons depots in southern Lebanon already and is considering turning over additional depots across Lebanon in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The IDF has remained in five “key” strategic positions in southern Lebanon since February 2025 to support Israeli operations to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution in southern Lebanon under the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire.[xxvii] The sources noted that Hezbollah would keep light arms and anti-tank missiles to resist future attacks. Hezbollah used these systems in addition to drones and mortars to launch attacks into northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024.

Hezbollah may prioritize the development and maintenance of its light arms and anti-tank missiles because these systems are far easier to acquire and maintain compared to expensive, advanced missiles, some of which were built in Syria and Iran. Israeli operations in Lebanon showed that Hezbollah’s missile systems were insufficient to seriously alter Israeli decision-making and operations.[xxviii] The Israeli campaign also badly weakened Hezbollah’s ground forces and killed many key leaders.[xxix]  This setback would have been less grievous had Syria‘s Assad regime not collapsed in December 2024. Hezbollah long used Syria as its primary supply route and connection with Iran, and the loss of Assad meant that Hezbollah could not as easily reconstitute itself.[xxx] Iran’s losses in the 12-Day Israel-Iran War also mean that Iran will need to prioritize rebuilding Iranian missile stockpiles and other assets, constraining Iran’s ability to fund Hezbollah.

The Israeli campaign in Lebanon, the fall of Syria, and the Israel-Iran War have rapidly altered Hezbollah’s strategic picture and appear to be prompting a rethink, even if the group’s overall goals have not changed. Hezbollah could seek to decrease its stocks of missiles to secure Israeli withdrawal and then use the space provided by an Israeli withdrawal to rebuild its power in southern Lebanon, for example. Hezbollah’s main deterrent concepts against Israel—missile fire, drone attacks, and cross-border fire—all failed to deter Israel and thus require an overhaul. It does not follow that Hezbollah will rebuild itself in the same way it built itself before the October 7 War, and a future Hezbollah could use different operational concepts in pursuit of its pre-existing strategic aim of destroying the Israeli state.

Hezbollah’s rethink is an expected response as it attempts to learn, evolve, and survive as an organization, and is not a reflection of changing Hezbollah's strategic objectives. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has reiterated fundamental Hezbollah positions, like its unique status in Lebanon that enables it to retain its weapons to fight Israel, for example.[xxxi] Qassem also threatened to resume attacks on Israeli forces if they failed to withdraw from southern Lebanon by February 2025, but has not followed through on those threats.[xxxii] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Hezbollah is likely reticent to resume attacks while it attempts to rebuild and reconstitute its forces.[xxxiii] Hezbollah‘s reported deliberations are consistent with this assessment because Hezbollah is seeking to use political levers to secure Israeli withdrawal, rather than military attacks. Hezbollah’s rethink would enable Hezbollah to identify and implement lessons learned from its war with Israel and account for resource constraints.