Iran Update, July 29, 2025

The Critical Thre ats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

NOTE: CTP-ISW will publish the Iran Update Monday through Friday starting on July 25, 2025. CTP-ISW will resume seven-day coverage of the region should conditions warrant it and will notify our readers if we resume seven-day coverage.

Media affiliated with Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati published an op-ed on July 29 framing moderates and pragmatic hardliners in Iran as necessary for national unity following the 12-day Israel-Iran War.[i] The article emphasized the importance of national unity and stated that a "reformist, moderate or transformational force must be strengthened" to establish and maintain such unity.[ii] The article stated that this “force“ does not seek to overthrow the existing system but is focused on gradual changes to improve societal conditions.[iii] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that ascendant moderates and pragmatic hardliners in the Iranian regime appear to be trying to reshape Iran’s domestic and foreign policy in the post-war period.[iv] The article stated that this approach has the "closest and most positive connection“ with national solidarity."[v] The article stated that the moderates and pragmatic hardliners, which include moderate Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, pragmatic hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Velayati, were the most successful at bolstering national unity during the war.[vi]  The article criticized other "political forces,” including reformists and ultra-hardliners.[vii] Reformist outlet Ensaf News claimed on July 25 that ultra-hardliners have become marginalized and sidelined by all three branches of government as moderates and pragmatic hardliners seek to exert more political influence in the regime.[viii]

The article emphasized the importance of "achieving social satisfaction."[ix] This statement aligns with the views of moderates and pragmatic hardliners, who emphasize social reform. Velayati stated on July 21 that preserving national cohesion may require “revising social policies” and prioritizing public satisfaction.[x] He also warned that “outdated methods” no longer suit Iranian society.[xi] Pezeshkian similarly stated on July 22 that solving problems requires dialogue, "not confrontation."[xii]

Nour News published an op-ed on July 29 calling on the Iranian regime to alter its internal and external strategy following the 12-day Israel-Iran War.[xiii] Nour News has historically been affiliated with the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) broadly, but has recently aligned itself increasingly with the former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani. The article emphasized that Iran's threat environment has changed following the war and urged Iran to "rearrange the country's decision-making system."[xiv] This appears to be a reaction to the convoluted Iranian decision-making process, which functioned poorly during the war. The article stated that Iran needs to adjust to counter hybrid threats that target Iran's soft and hard power. The article stated that Iran needs to integrate "public confidence and social capital" into the national security framework.[xv] This statement echoes a statement from Shamkhani on June 28 calling on regime officials to resolve "disputes" with the Iranian population through "mutual understanding."[xvi]

The article stated that Iran must shift from a reactive posture to a preemptive posture that focuses on future threats.[xvii] The article proposed the creation of a "Strategic Command Center" with ”cross-sectoral authority” to coordinate between the "security, economic, and diplomatic centers" and develop rapid responses to evolving threats.[xviii] The center would  ”eliminate parallel institutions, improve transparency, and reduce inter-organizational frictions.” Iran’s defense establishment is comprised of the following entities, but none of them fulfill all of the roles outlined in this proposal:[xix]

• Supreme National Security Council: responsible for determining Iran's defense and national security policies per the supreme leader’s guidance.[xx] The supreme leader approves SNSC decisions, but during the war, the supreme leader was out of touch with his principal subordinates.[xxi]
• Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS): responsible for crafting strategic guidance and military policy, and is similar to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. It does not have operational responsibility.
• Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters: a parallel organization to the AFGS and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.
• Ministry of Defense: responsible for managing the Iranian military-industrial base and arms acquisitions and sales.

Iran has continued its efforts to assess damage at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on July 28 that Iran has access to the northernmost tunnel entrance at the ENTC.[xxii] The Institute reported that there has been minimal to no activity at the other tunnel entrances.[xxiii] Western media previously reported that US and Israeli strikes blocked tunnel entrances to an underground complex at the ENTC that stores part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.[xxiv] The Institute assessed on June 24 that US strikes collapsed all four tunnel entrances at the ENTC.[xxv] It remains unclear whether Iranian personnel can enter the northernmost tunnel itself and if the buried nuclear material is accessible via this tunnel. Senior US and Israeli officials have stated they will resume strikes on Iran if they detect any Iranian efforts to resume activities at the nuclear facilities or extract the buried nuclear material.[xxvi]

Satellite imagery captured on July 25 shows Iran has constructed new roads at Fordow. One of the roads extends along the impact points of the US GBU-57 bunker buster bombs, and the other appears approximately 700 meters to the east. Iran is likely building these roads in order to allow construction and excavation vehicles access to the strike location to assess damage and begin repairs.

Iranian Parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Commission members urged President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration on July 28 to prioritize national defense, strengthen internal security, and realign foreign policy.[xxvii] Parliamentarians called for allocating more budget to defensive capabilities in the next Persian calendar year (March 2025 to March 2026) and reinforcing border security in the northeast and southeast.[xxviii] The emphasis on southeastern border security follows an uptick in anti-regime attacks in the region since December 2023, mainly by Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[xxix] The committee members also demanded upgrades to the military communications infrastructure.[xxx] Parliamentarians also urged stronger ties with China.[xxxi] This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran is trying to strengthen military and defense cooperation with China following the Israel-Iran War.[xxxii] The committee members also called for a reassessment of relations with certain countries, especially Azerbaijan.[xxxiii] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of cooperating with Israel, particularly during the 12-day war.[xxxiv] These demands come as Parliament has taken a more active role in recent weeks and is now pushing the Pezeshkian administration for a more assertive security and foreign policy agenda.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani held several meetings with Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors over the past several weeks to discuss efforts that would preserve and strengthen members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance in Iraq. “High-ranking” Iraqi political sources told an Emirati outlet that Ghaani told four unspecified Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders to instruct Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) commanders and members to use self-restraint during a meeting in Baghdad on July 27.[xxxv] The PMF is an Iraqi state service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that nominally report to the Iraqi prime minister but report to Iran.[xxxvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted attacks on Israeli, US, Iraqi, and other foreign targets during and after the Israel-Iran Twelve Days War, though it is unclear if these attacks were sanctioned by Iran.[xxxvii] The militias did not claim any of the attacks. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted approximately 40 drone attacks on Israel between June 12 and 24.[xxxviii]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani claimed in a July 29 interview with the Associated Press that Iraqi federal government “security operations” thwarted 29 unspecified attacks by “armed groups” during the Israel-Iran War, which is likely a reference to attacks by Iraqi militias. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted periodic attacks on foreign-owned oil fields in the weeks following the Israel-Iran ceasefire went into effect on June 24.[xxxix] Al Araby al Jadeed reported on July 28 that Ghaani condemned unilateral Iraqi militia actions, which is a reference to likely militia drone attacks that targeted oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan in mid-July.[xl]  

Iran is likely seeking to preserve the strength of its Iraqi partners in the Axis of Resistance in the wake of two years of conflict, which has severely weakened Iran and several other members of the Axis. Iran and members of the Axis of Resistance have been severely weakened by fighting with Israel over the past two and a half years. Iran’s partners in Iraq have not suffered the same military defeat but have been rendered unwilling to wage an open campaign against the United States and Israel for now. Ghaani and other Iranian strategic leaders probably recognize that Israeli or US attacks against the Iraqi militias could provide openings for anti-Iranian Iraqis to undermine and contain Iran’s penetration of the Iraqi state. Ghaani warned unidentified Iraqi politicians and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders of “impending” Israeli attacks on militia facilities and headquarters during an earlier visit to Baghdad on July 15, according to informed sources speaking to al Araby al Jadeed.[xli] Ghaani has historically met with Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia groups in Iraq at critical junction points to exert Iranian control over armed factions and prevent retaliation from the United States or Israel. Ghaani also reportedly urged Iraqi federal government officials to address unspecified “internal issues” and subvert Israeli infiltration of state agencies.[xlii] Israeli intelligence and covert operations have been instrumental in enabling Israeli military operations against Iranian and Iranian-backed military targets over the past two years. Iranian officials have expressed continued concern regarding Israeli infiltration.[xliii]

Key Takeaways

1. Nour News published an op-ed on July 29 calling on the Iranian regime to alter its internal and external strategy following the 12-day Israel-Iran War. The article emphasized that Iran's threat environment has changed following the war and urged Iran to "rearrange the country's decision-making system."
2. Media affiliated with Iranian Supreme Leader's International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati published an op-ed on July 29 framing moderates and pragmatic hardliners in Iran as necessary for national unity following the 12-day Israel-Iran War.
3. Iran has continued its efforts to assess damage at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on July 28 that Iran has established access to the northernmost tunnel entrance at the ENTC. Satellite imagery captured on July 25 shows Iran has constructed new roads at Fordow.
4. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani held several meetings with Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors over the past several weeks to discuss efforts which would preserve and strengthen members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance in Iraq. Iran is likely seeking to preserve the strength of its Iraqi partners in the Axis of Resistance in the wake of two years of conflict which has severely weakened Iran and several other members of the Axis.

Iran

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered remarks on July 29 and honored those who died in the 12-Day War.[xliv] Khamenei claimed that the war demonstrated Iran’s “power, determination, endurance, and strength” and that the “Islamic Republic” showed the world the “unparalleled strength” of its system.[xlv] Khamenei claimed that the regime has overcome repeated crises, including war, coups, and unrest, over the past 45 years.[xlvi] Khamenei dismissed Western concerns over “nuclear and human rights issues” as pretexts for Western criticism of Iran’s religion and scientific progress.[xlvii]

Amwaj Media reported on July 29 that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to be preparing to run in Iran’s 2028 presidential election.[xlviii]  Media close to Ahmadinejad reported that local political groups supporting Ahmadinejad gathered in Tehran on July 10 as part of the “first nationwide meeting” of his supporters under an “organizational campaign.”[xlix] Amwaj reported that Ahmadinejad reportedly told his supporters he would “win the presidency” if he chose to run, described the Pezeshkian administration as “weak,” and claimed he has “no real rival.”[l] Amwaj, citing a pro-reform journalist, assessed that Ahmadinejad’s rally represents a political comeback and described the Tehran gathering as a meeting of his campaign staff.[li] The report claimed Ahmadinejad is “taking advantage of the post-war environment” following the 12-Day War to launch his effort.[lii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that preexisting fissures within the regime have widened, as moderate and hardliner figures seek to capitalize on the postwar environment to expand their influence and challenge hardliner dominance.[liii]

Iran’s inflation rate rose to its highest level in two years, according to an Iranian government-run statistics center report published on July 29.[liv] The report assessed that the price of bread and cereals increased by 16.6 percent, cooking oil increased by 7.3 percent, and meat increased by 5.9 percent in July. This comes amid drinking water and electricity shortages in Iran.[lv] The Iranian regime is particularly concerned about stabilizing the price of basic goods, as increased prices demonstrate the regime’s inability to effectively provide for the Iranian people. The cost of basic goods has been a frequent flashpoint that has led to protests against the regime in the past.[lvi] Economic-related protests have the potential to escalate into anti-regime protests, as demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2019.[lvii]

Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani claimed that the US presence in Iraq incentivizes Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to maintain their arms, which ignores the reality that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly refused to surrender their arms until the return of the hidden Imam.[lviii] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[lix] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would very likely remain armed whether or not US forces remain in Iraq, however. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari stated on July 5 that the weapons of the “Iraqi resistance” will only be handed over to the “Imam Mahdi,” not following the withdrawal of US forces.[lx] Imam Mahdi is the twelfth and final Imam in Shia Islam, who, according to Twelver Shia, is in hiding and will reveal himself in the future.

Sudani also signaled that he is open to further security and economic cooperation with the United States during the July 29 interview.[lxi] He stated that the United States and Iraq will meet to “arrange the bilateral security relationship” by the end of 2025.[lxii] Sudani‘s stated aim to maintain a security relationship with the United States contradicts Iranian-backed Shia actors‘ demands to end all security cooperation with the United States. Sudani added that he aims to secure US investment in the oil, gas, and artificial intelligence sectors.[lxiii] This interview follows the Iraqi government signing contracts with two US energy companies on July 22 and 15.[lxiv]

Syria

Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) fighters in northern Syria are reportedly experiencing salary delays and cuts, in part due to corruption.[lxv] The salary shortfalls likely contribute to poor discipline among lower echelons in the new Syrian army.[lxvi] A Syrian news outlet reported that the Syrian government only paid half of the salaries for elements of four divisions, predominantly consisting of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army fighters (SNA).[lxvii] The source said that the soldiers are only receiving between $100 and $150 once every two months instead of each month due to delays.[lxviii] These salary shortfalls are a nationwide trend impacting Suwayda and Deir ez Zor provinces as well, but the salary shortfalls are exacerbated by corrupt commanders, who are forcing soldiers to hand over their salaries.[lxix] Some of the repurposed salaries are being sent to former SNA fighters, though dismissed SNA fighters have denied that they have received the informal payments.[lxx]

Corruption and salary shortfalls are likely contributing to discipline issues in the new Syrian army because the soldiers are unlikely to follow orders from commanders who do not adhere to discipline or military order. These soldiers are also more likely to loot or engage in criminal activity to supplement their truncated income. Commanders set the expectations and discipline in military units, and units frequently take their commander’s lead. Some corrupt commanders set the example for their subordinates that military discipline and order are not required. The government noted in its report on the March 2025 Coastal Violence that soldiers failed to listen to their commanders’ orders along the coast, and some of the units deployed on the coast in March 2025 were from the SNA.[lxxi] This illustrates a lack of military discipline that could be exacerbated by corruption. These corrupt officers also skim their soldiers’ pay, which encourages soldiers to supplement their income by looting or engaging in criminal activity.[lxxii] Syrian MoD forces looted civilian homes in western Suwayda countryside, for example.[lxxiii]  The failure to pay forces can create a self-reinforcing cycle in which forces exploit poor security for personal gain, thereby discouraging communities to cooperate with the transitional government and further degrading long-term stability in Syria.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reaffirmed its commitment to integrate under Damascus’s control but remains distrustful due to the Syrian government’s recent treatment of minorities and integration of armed groups that previously committed atrocities against Kurds. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi did not change the SDF’s demands for integration into Syria ahead of upcoming negotiations with the Syrian transitional government on July 29.[lxxiv] The SDF and the transitional government signed a document in March 2025 outlining four guiding principles for integrating the SDF into the Syrian MoD, but have not made further progress discussing the means by which to accomplish this.[lxxv] Abdi said in the interview that the SDF will implement all provisions of the March 10 agreement by year’s end, reaffirmed support for a unified Syria with “one army and one flag,” and noted that integration mechanisms with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) will be finalized in an upcoming Paris meeting.[lxxvi] Abdi also confirmed that Kurdish political parties accepted the SDF’s proposals to Damascus but remain concerned about integration into the MoD without constitutional guarantees for Kurdish identity and implied concerns for the Kurds after recent events on the Syrian coast and Suwayda.[lxxvii] Abdi also reiterated the SDF‘s demand to reflag its forces and integrate into the Syrian MoD without breaking apart its existing units.[lxxviii]

The Syrian transitional government has continuously applied a double standard to the SDF’s integration into the MoD by imposing conditions on it that it has not required of other armed factions.[lxxix] The transitional government has previously integrated elements of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), which were reflagged and integrated as blocs, while demanding that the SDF fully dissolve before being integrated.[lxxx] These SNA units nominally exist as divisions under the Syrian MoD, but SNA forces effectively operate under their old command structures. Some SNA factions integrated into the MoD have committed documented atrocities against Kurdish civilians in northern Syria and continue to espouse ethno-nationalist rhetoric hostile to Kurdish identity.[lxxxi] The success of future SDF integration into the MoD will likely depend on the Syrian government’s willingness to offer constitutional guarantees that address longstanding Kurdish concerns over identity and security.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and infrastructure since the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. The IDF announced on July 29 that the IDF has conducted airstrikes on 597 Hezbollah targets and has conducted “hundreds” of ground operations in Lebanon since November 2024.[lxxxii] The IDF said that it killed at least 234 Hezbollah fighters during these operations.[lxxxiii] The IDF also destroyed a significant amount of Hezbollah weapons and command sites during these operations, including approximately 90 rocket launch platforms, 20 command headquarters, 40 infrastructure facilities, 5 weapons production sites, and 3 Radwan training camps.[lxxxiv] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s special operations forces unit that is designed to conduct offensive ground operations into Israel.[lxxxv] A senior IDF Northern Command official said that the IDF has achieved a third of its “war achievements” against Hezbollah since the November 2024 ceasefire.[lxxxvi] The IDF stated that IDF operations in Lebanon aimed to remove the threat of cross-border fire, target senior Hezbollah leaders, and set conditions to return displaced Israelis to their homes.[lxxxvii] The senior official said that Israeli operations post the November 2024 ceasefire have focused on targeting Hezbollah weapons depots, obstructing and delaying its ability to rebuild its forces, and eliminating its fighters who have attempted to return to their positions near the Israel-Lebanon border.[lxxxviii]