Iran Update, January 31, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. ISW-CTP will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Note: CTP-ISW will publish updates on January 31 and February 1, providing analysis about developments in Iran and Syria. We will resume full coverage on Monday, February 2.

Iran may be attempting to deter a possible US strike by moving forces and conducting a live-fire naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said on January 30 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy will hold a two-day live-fire naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz starting on February 1.[i] CENTCOM urged the IRGC to conduct the exercise in a “safe and professional” manner and to avoid placing international maritime navigation at “unnecessary risk.”[ii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on X on January 31 that freedom of navigation and the safe passage of commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz are vital for Iran and its neighbors and claimed that ”outside forces in the region” have historically fueled escalation.[iii] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated outlet Defa Press claimed on January 29 that the IRGC Navy deployed “hundreds of fast, missile-launching, and support vessels in close proximity” to the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier.[iv] Commercially available satellite imagery from January 27 also showed the IRGC Navy’s “Shahid Bagheri” drone carrier about six kilometers off the coast of Bandar Abbas in the Strait of Hormuz.[v] These naval deployments and the upcoming exercise are notable because Iran did not employ its naval forces during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. A policy analyst close to the regime stated on January 31 that the “naval-missile” exercise in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf aims to deter any possibility of a naval blockade by demonstrating Iran’s military resolve to counter it.[vi]

US President Donald Trump’s push for Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to adopt a more “flexible” approach towards the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reportedly contributed to Shara’s acceptance of a more conciliatory January 31 ceasefire and integration agreement.[vii] Trump and Shara spoke on January 27 and discussed the Syrian government’s ceasefire with the SDF, after which Trump described the situation in Syria as “working out very well.”[viii] Unspecified sources told regional media on January 30 that Trump encouraged Shara to be ”more flexible” in a recent call.[ix] The SDF and Syrian government were in the process of finalizing an agreement to integrate SDF’s military and security forces, administrative structures, and remaining SDF-held territory into the Syrian state when Trump and Shara spoke. The two parties announced the new agreement on January 30 after Trump and Shara’s January 27 call.[x]  

Trump’s ability to persuade Shara to exercise restraint indicates that the United States retains significant leverage over the Syrian government. The January 30 agreement required significant SDF concessions, but it is a far more conciliatory deal than the Syrian government would likely offer without any pressure. The Syrian government has sought a highly centralized system of governance since its formation in December 2024 and appeared close to achieving that objective militarily by causing the collapse of the SDF on January 17 and 18, 2025. The new agreement requires the SDF to integrate into security services, but does allow the SDF to form four brigades solely comprised of former SDF fighters in northern Syria.[xi] The Syrian government initially proposed that all SDF fighters must be fully integrated on an “individual basis” into existing Syrian army units in a January 18 agreement.[xii] The new agreement also dictates that the Syrian army will not enter Hasakah and Qamishli cities, likely in an attempt to avoid possible intercommunal violence from abusive army units.[xiii] Avoiding harm to Kurdish communities was a stated US objective that Trump explicitly referred to in his January 19 call with Shara, according to the readout. Shara also likely decided to temporarily halt the Syrian government offensive on SDF territory in northeastern Syria after a phone call with US President Donald Trump on January 19.[xiv]

The Syrian army has reportedly begun to withdraw from Hasakah and Kobani frontlines ahead of the expected deployment of Interior Ministry forces to Hasakah Province cities on February 2. ^xix CTP-ISW has not observed any military engagements between SDF and Syrian government forces since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on January 30. A French analyst, citing local journalists and Kurdish media, reported that the Syrian army has withdrawn from positions along the Hasakah Province and Kobani frontlines.[xv] Kurdish media also reported that Syrian army units withdrew from positions along the outskirts of Hasakah City towards Shaddadi on January 31, which would corroborate Syrian officials’ statements that the Syrian army will not enter Hasakah or Qamishli cities.[xvi] Units from at least 10 Syrian army divisions have operated along the Hasakah frontlines since the Syrian army advanced into the province on January 18.[xvii]

Syrian government and Kurdish officials have continued to express their commitment to the January 30 ceasefire and integration agreement. A Syrian Foreign Ministry official told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on January 31 that the agreement is expected to be implemented within a month, but that the Syrian government is “not rushing” and will prioritize “peaceful solutions” and “political” means while overseeing the implementation of the agreement.[xviii] Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) officials also praised the agreement for de-escalating and decreasing the risk of another Syrian civil war on January 30 and 31.[xix] The officials added that they will continue to advocate for core Kurdish demands as participants within the Syrian state.[xx] Senior PYD member Aldar Khalil said on January 31 that the PYD will continue its political and legal struggle in the Syrian government, the People’s Assembly, the government, and the constitutional committee.[xxi] Khalil‘s remarks are consistent with those of Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) Foreign Affairs Co-Chair Ilham Ahmed on January 30, who promised that Kurdish officials would continue to advocate for core Kurdish demands as participants within the Syrian state.[xxii] SDF and AANES officials had long supported decentralization and demanded it as a condition to integrate into the Syrian state.[xxiii] They have now acceded to Shara’s demands to integrate the SDF and AANES into the state without decentralization.[xxiv]

Unaddressed issues in the ceasefire may lead to future delays or renewed conflict down the line, despite both parties' commitments to upholding the agreement and avoiding war, however. There is no publicly available full text of the ceasefire agreement at this time, only public announcements that articulate a few vague elements of the ceasefire.[xxv] The January 30 agreement includes eight clauses that describe the integration of the SDF’s military and security forces, AANES’s administrative structures, and remaining SDF-held territory in Hasakah and Aleppo provinces into the Syrian state.[xxvi] Interior Ministry forces will enter Hasakah and Qamishli cities on February 2 for a ”specific period,” but no party has commented on how long forces that are from the region will retain a security presence in these cities after the SDF-affiliated Asayish integrates into local forces.[xxvii] The agreement text that both the SDF and Syrian government released similarly did not address the future of control over border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields in northern Syria. Syrian government officials have separately maintained that the state would take over all Syrian border crossings, but SDF officials have not acknowledged this decision at the time of writing this.[xxviii] A Syrian journalist reported on January 31 that the government will assume control of Qamishli Airport and the Semalka Crossing on February 4.[xxix]  Ilham Ahmed also said during a January 30 press conference that the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) will form a brigade in the Syrian army, but Al Monitor reported on January 30 that the Syrian government rejected the formation of a women’s brigade in the latest rounds of talks.[xxx] The Syrian government and the SDF’s fundamentally different interpretations of the March 10 Agreement led to a ten-month delay, which resulted in the January 2026 government offensive to compel the SDF to integrate. The SDF and Kurdish officials will presumably continue negotiations to iron out remaining details in the agreement, but misunderstandings or key issues could delay the agreement’s implementation or, worse, lead to its breakdown in the coming weeks.

The Syrian Defense Ministry recently arrested some Syrian military personnel, including a relatively senior officer, for crimes and failure to follow orders. These arrests represent nascent steps by the ministry to uphold the chain of command and Syrian laws. The Syrian Defense Ministry arrested 72nd Division Military Security head Wissam Abdul Rahman (aka Abu Jamal al Shami) on January 30 for his failure to follow orders to stop operations by his forces east of the Euphrates River during an unspecified ceasefire in January 2025.[xxxi] The 72nd Division consists of units from multiple opposition militias, including Sultan Mehmed Faith Division, Ahrar al Sham, Sultan Murad Division, and Liwa al Waqqas.[xxxii] Syrian military security and police in Raqqa Province separately arrested Rami al Dahsh, a Syrian army soldier, for cutting the braid of a female Kurdish fighter.[xxxiii] These arrests will need to be expanded upon to ensure adequate command-and-control and adherence to the law, but the arrests represent some willingness on the part of the Syrian government to respond to abuses and insubordinate officers.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Naval Activity: Iran may be attempting to deter a possible US strike by moving forces and conducting a live-fire naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said on January 30 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy will hold a two-day live-fire naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz starting on February 1. A policy analyst close to the regime stated on January 31 that the exercise in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf aims to deter any possibility of a naval blockade by demonstrating Iran’s military resolve to counter it.
• US-Syria Relations: US President Donald Trump’s push for Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to adopt a more “flexible” approach towards the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reportedly contributed to Shara’s acceptance of a more conciliatory January 31 ceasefire and integration agreement. Trump’s ability to persuade Shara to exercise restraint indicates that the United States retains significant leverage over the Syrian government. The January 30 agreement required significant SDF concessions, but it is a far more conciliatory deal than the Syrian government would likely offer without any pressure.
• Ceasefire in Northeastern Syria: The Syrian army has reportedly begun to withdraw from Hasakah and Kobani frontlines ahead of the expected deployment of Interior Ministry forces to Hasakah Province cities on February 2. Unaddressed issues in the ceasefire may lead to future delays or renewed conflict down the line, despite both parties' commitments to upholding the agreement and avoiding war, however. The SDF and Kurdish officials will presumably continue negotiations to iron out remaining details in the agreement, but misunderstandings or key issues could delay the agreement’s implementation or, worse, lead to its breakdown in the coming weeks.

Iran

Gas leaks likely caused two separate explosions in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, and Kian Shahr in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, on January 31.[xxxiv] Local officials stated that gas leaks led to the two explosions, which killed at least one person and injured 14 others in Bandar Abbas, and killed five people and injured two in Ahvaz.[xxxv] The IRGC Navy refuted alleged reports that a drone attack on IRGC Navy facilities in Hormozgan Province caused an explosion in Bandar Abbas.[xxxvi] IRGC-affiliated media also denied social media reports that any drone strike killed IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri.[xxxvii] Two Israeli officials told Reuters on January 31 that Israel has had no involvement in either explosion.[xxxviii]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.  

Syria

The Syrian government appointed Marwan al Ali, a former Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated official who oversaw HTS’s crackdown on al Qaeda-affiliated groups and fighters, as the head of internal security in Hasakah Province amid the Syrian government’s integration of Kurdish areas in northeastern Syria.[xxxix] Ali (also known as Abu Muhjan al Hasakawi), who is from Qamishli, served as the Director of Criminal Investigations at the Interior Ministry in the current Syrian government.[xl] Ali was a ”senior security official” in HTS-controlled Idlib Province, and he reportedly oversaw HTS‘s ”manhunt operations,” and later oversaw the group’s offensive against al Qaeda-affiliated Hurras al Din, according to a French analyst.[xli] HTS detained him for four months between 2023 and 2024 as part of HTS’s campaign targeting senior HTS leaders, such as Abu Maria al Qahtani, as part of a crackdown on alleged US collaborators.[xlii]

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.  

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