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The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Iran has shown little willingness to concede to US demands on the missile program, regional proxy network, and nuclear capabilities. These three items form the long-standing pillars of Iranian defense strategy, and changing them would require a long strategic rethink in Tehran. The United States and Iran are in talks to attempt to avert US military action against Iran. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated in a press conference in Istanbul on January 30 that the Iranian regime is ready to resume talks with the United States if negotiations are “fair and equitable,” but it will not be bullied into negotiations nor give up its missiles and defense capabilities.[i] This comes as the United States recently relayed its demands for a deal to Iran.[ii] Three of these demands, which the United States proposed to Iran in the first round of nuclear negotiations in early 2025, require Iran to halt its missile and nuclear programs and its support for regional proxies. Iranian officials do not believe that conceding to these demands would resolve US-Iran tensions, even if they decided to accept the demands, according to a political analyst close to the regime on January 22.[iii] The same analyst, along with an Iranian political scientist, confirmed on January 22 and 23 that the United States introduced a fourth demand: Iran’s recognition of the State of Israel, a condition that is entirely antithetical to the beliefs of the Islamic Republic under Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the ideology he espouses.[iv] Iranian officials have demonstrated an unwillingness to concede on any of these US demands, even amid several diplomatic meetings Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian held with intermediary countries on January 30 to encourage them to convince the United States to not conduct military action against Iran.[v]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary (SNSC) Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on January 30 to discuss current developments and bilateral economic ties, according to Iranian and Russian media.[vi]  Larijani’s visit to Russia comes amid a flurry of diplomatic efforts by Iranian officials to avert US military action against Iran.[vii] Larijani leads Iran’s highest national security decision-making body and played a central role in orchestrating the regime’s brutal protest crackdown in December 2025 and January 2026, for which the US Treasury sanctioned Larijani on January 15.[viii]

The Syrian government has compelled moderate Kurdish leaders to drop their opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s model of state centralization. Kurdish officials in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) had long supported decentralization and demanded it as a condition to integrate into the Syrian state. They have now acceded to Shara’s demands to integrate the SDF and AANES into the state without decentralization. The Syrian government forced the SDF to capitulate to integrate into the state through diplomatic and political engagements with Arab tribal leaders and US, French, and Iraqi Kurdish mediators, and a large-scale military operation to seize SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria. The Syrian government and SDF agreed on January 30 to integrate SDF’s military and security forces, administrative structures, and remaining SDF-held territory in Hasakah and Aleppo provinces into the Syrian state.[ix] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said in an interview with Kurdish media on January 30 that his main goal for the agreement was to ”stop the war and protect the rights of Kurdish people” during recent talks with the Syrian government.[x] Moderate SDF leaders, including SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and AANES Foreign Affairs Co-Chair Ilham Ahmed, have acknowledged that the SDF and AANES will abide by the agreement, which the Syrian government and the SDF will begin to implement on February 2.[xi]  Several integration agreements and ceasefires between the Syrian government and SDF have failed in the ten months since both parties agreed to integrate the SDF into the state on March 10, 2025.[xii]

The SDF and AANES agreed to dissolve into Syrian security and administrative structures. The agreement integrates the SDF into the Syrian army as four brigades comprised of SDF fighters that will operate in northern Syria.[xiii] Three of these SDF brigades will form a division in the northeast, possibly alongside other non-SDF brigades.[xiv] SDF fighters will form another brigade that operates in the Kobani area as part of an existing Aleppo-based Syrian division.[xv] The new brigades will be rebuilt from entirely new SDF-manned units rather than reflagged SDF units. The Syrian army maintains four Aleppo-based divisions: the 60th, 72nd, 76th, and 80th divisions.[xvi] These divisions consist of a mix of Hayat Tahrir al Sham fighters and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army factions that have participated in Turkish offensives targeting the Kurds.[xvii] Contingents of each of these units have fought against SDF-affiliated fighters on the Kobani frontlines within the past week.[xviii]

The SDF may have made a significant concession on its demand to retain its structures within the Syrian army and integrate as a ”bloc,” which SDF leaders have been refusing because it leaves Kurdish areas without a reliable defense force of their own.[xix] Syrian government officials told Syrian and Western media that SDF fighters would join these four brigades as “individuals,” suggesting that the Syrian government will not re-flag existing SDF units as brigades, battalions, or regiments in the new army.[xx] It is unclear at this time what the command structure of these units will look like—including how officers will be selected for the new units—or how the Syrian army will form new units out of existing SDF units and factions. The integration of SDF-affiliated forces into specific brigades may allow for these units to retain certain characteristics of former SDF units, depending on how these brigades are formed. A previous SDF-government agreement from October 2025 allowed the SDF three full divisions.[xxi]

Syrian internal security forces will also enter Hasakah and Qamishli cities for a “specific period” in order to secure the area and assume control over government institutions while SDF-affiliated internal security forces prepare to the join state security services.[xxii] Interior Ministry forces will enter Hasakah and Qamishli cities on February 2 and begin taking steps to secure the area. Syrian state media reported that the state will take over “all civilian and governmental institutions, crossings, and ports.”[xxiii] Ilham Ahmed said that all employees in local institutions would be from the area, including guards at border crossings.[xxiv] AANES officials and employees in Hasakah will retain their positions and eventually be integrated into Syrian state administrative structures.[xxv] AANES employees in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have also retained their positions in the days since the Syrian government gained control over Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces.[xxvi]

Several indicators suggest that hardline SDF leaders may refuse to abide by the SDF’s new agreement to integrate, which risks instigating new conflict between government forces and Kurdish fighters as the agreement is implemented. Ilham Ahmed cited the danger that some may reject or break the agreement during her press conference.[xxvii] She noted that ”different circles” are not in favor of the SDF’s agreement with the Syrian government and may ”work against it.”[xxviii] CTP-ISW continues to assess that hardliners within the SDF may contribute to future instability within Syria, even though Abdi and Shara have come to an agreement that ends the immediate fighting in northeastern Syria and creates a plan to integrate SDF fighters into state security services.[xxix] One scenario would involve an insurgency by hardline People's Protection Units (YPG) or other Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-aligned elements who refuse to join Syrian defense and security forces and decide to resume attacks against the Syrian government.[xxx] Several SDF-affiliated fighters have ignored previous ceasefires mandated by SDF leadership and attacked Syrian government forces in recent weeks.[xxxi] The government used attacks by these spoilers to justify additional advances against the SDF.

Kurdish leaders such as Ilham Ahmed have not yet acknowledged any SDF efforts to address hardliners who may threaten the implementation of the deal or mitigate the risks that they pose. An unspecified Syrian government source told a DC-based, Syria-focused analyst that Interior Ministry forces are entering Hasakah and Qamishli on February 2 in order to provide time for “opponents” of the agreement to evacuate.[xxxii] The departure of ”opponents” of the agreement may refer to the possible voluntary withdrawal of cadres from the area or to an internal SDF decision to force certain hardline commanders and fighters to withdraw from the area. A January 18 agreement between Abdi and Shara (that Abdi later reneged on) specified that the SDF commit to removing non-Syrian leaders and PKK fighters from Syrian territory.[xxxiii] CTP-ISW has not yet observed evidence that SDF leaders are forcing certain elements to withdraw from Syria.

The SDF and Syrian government’s ceasefire and integration agreement does offer a pathway toward the stabilization of northern Syria that will address certain US policy goals in the wake of the government offensive, even if some SDF-affiliated fighters do not abide by its terms. The Syrian government’s offensive into northeastern Syria created conditions for a possible scenario in which Syrian government forces would have advanced into Kurdish areas and confronted both Kurdish fighters and civilians, possibly leading to another catastrophic round of communal-based violence.[xxxiv] This scenario would have also made it extraordinarily difficult for US forces present in Syria to successfully move ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq, while also increasing force protection requirements for US forces. 

The January 30 agreement does not address core Kurdish demands for constitutional rights for Kurds and a decentralized governance system, and high-ranking Kurdish officials have indicated that they will continue to advocate for core Kurdish demands using political means from within the Syrian state. One of the impediments to any progress in negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government over the past year has been both sides’ fundamentally conflicting visions for the future of the Syrian state since the fall of the Assad regime. Shara has sought a unitary and highly centralized state.[xxxv] The Kurdish population’s well-founded fears of the Syrian central government after years of oppression under both Bashar and Hafez al Assad and extreme violence at the hands of the figures who now form the government have caused the SDF to be very hesitant to cede power back to Damascus unless more devolution of power occurs. [xxxvi] The SDF, therefore, sought a decentralized federal system that made no substantial changes to the present SDF governance model for the areas under SDF control.[xxxvii] This system would feature ostensibly representative local leaders, though in practice, many would have probably been drawn from the ranks of the SDF.[xxxviii] AANES officials will retain their positions in both the northeast and Kobani regions and may be able to functionally retain a degree of local autonomy, but will defer to the Syrian government-appointed Aleppo governor and newly appointed Hasakah governor.[xxxix] The Syrian government has also taken several steps in recent days to implement aspects of Shara’s Decree No. 13, including naturalizing Kurdish citizens stripped of their citizenship under the Assad regime and permitting Kurdish language instruction in schools.[xl] These liberties are not represented in the Syrian constitution, however, as Syrian Kurds have demanded since the fall of the regime.[xli] The Kurds seek constitutional protections because they perceive that the government could easily revoke a decree.

The Syrian government may have compelled moderate SDF leaders to give up on efforts to resist integration into the Syrian state, but Ilham Ahmed indicated that SDF officials will continue to advocate for core Kurdish demands within the state.[xlii]  Ahmed said in a press conference on January 30 that the SDF’s “armed resistance will come to an end with the implementation of this agreement.“[xliii] Ahmed said that "our work" now shifts to a different phase characterized by ”legal” and ”political” struggle.[xliv] The Kurdish delegation that Kurdish political parties formed in April 2025 to advocate for decentralization from the government will visit  Damascus to discuss Kurdish constitutional rights in the constitution.[xlv]

The SDF’s planned integration into the Syrian state will create less chaotic conditions and enable a smoother handover of counter-Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) responsibilities and facilities to the Syrian government relative to the chaotic situation caused by the government’s full assault on SDF-held areas in mid-January 2026.  US forces began to transfer ISIS detainees to Iraq on January 21 after several uncoordinated handovers of ISIS detention centers to the Syrian government by the SDF resulted in the escape of detainees.[xlvi]  The United States has transferred fewer than 600 of about 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq as of January 30.[xlvii] The ceasefire agreement will certainly create less chaotic conditions that will make the transfer of detainees less dangerous, but the agreement may further reduce Iraqi officials’ urgency to accept the detainees.  Iraqi officials reportedly asked the United States to slow the rate of transfers to allow for negotiations with other countries about the repatriation of their ISIS-affiliated nationals.[xlviii]

A more organized handover will reduce the risk that ISIS reconstitutes itself at all or that ISIS detainees escape from custody and reinvigorate the organization, but building the counter-ISIS capacity of Syrian government forces will still take time. ISIS fighters killed two General Security Service personnel in Deir ez Zor Province on January 29, which was the organization’s first attack since the start of the Syrian government’s offensive against the SDF on January 12.[xlix] The Syrian government has the know-how and capabilities it needs to implement a counter-ISIS campaign in northeastern Syria, and the government’s campaign may be more capable than SDF counter-ISIS efforts once the government establishes itself in northeastern Syria. But transfers of control are by definition challenging and complex even under the best circumstances. Commanders executing a planned transfer of control, or relief-in-place, would conduct reconnaissance of an area to familiarize themselves with the tactical situation, including the areas they will occupy, the way that the enemy is arrayed, and the disposition of the unit currently occupying the area.[l] Many Syrian Army and Interior Ministry commanders deployed to Deir ez Zor and other areas in northeastern Syria will be local to those areas, but they will likely be returning from internal exile and therefore not familiar with the current tactical situation. The Syrian government will need to familiarize itself with the tactical situation that the SDF was intimately familiar with, given its decade of experience fighting ISIS in the area, to successfully operate in the newly-seized ISIS support zones and to secure ISIS detention facilities.

This process will be iterative and will take time, regardless of the Syrian military’s institutional capability to take on the counter-ISIS fight. The current government efforts to control al Hol illustrate this reality. The Syrian military declared the area around al Hol internally displaced persons (IDP) camp to be a closed security zone on January 30 in order to enhance the control of security forces over the area after seizing the camp on January 20.[li]  The Syrian government has experienced some initial challenges in managing al Hol, partially due to undisciplined and ineffective Ministry of Defense units and insufficient training to control the camp.[lii] The government has established new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to rectify earlier mistakes, though it would certainly be able to learn from the SDF or US forces that previously controlled the camp. The Syrian government reportedly aims to close al Hol and al Roj IDP camps in Hasakah Province by the end of 2026.[liii]

State of Law Coalition head and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki appears to be attempting to preserve his nomination as prime minister-designate amid US and domestic opposition. Maliki discussed government formation with US Charge d’Affaires Joshua Harris on January 30, likely in an attempt to assuage US concerns over another Maliki premiership.[liv] The United States has recently expressed its opposition to Maliki in multiple ways, including a message to the Shia Coordination Framework via embassy channels that noted that the United States views Maliki’s previous terms between 2006 and 2014 “in a negative light” and implied the United States opposed him.[lv] US President Donald Trump reiterated the US position on January 27 when he stated that Iraq experienced “poverty and total chaos” under Maliki and threatened that the United States “will no longer help Iraq” if Maliki becomes prime minister.[lvi] Multiple unspecified framework leaders reportedly held bilateral and small group meetings to “formulate an initial position” on Trump’s statement prior to an official framework meeting later on January 28.[lvii] One group of unspecified framework leaders wants to move forward with Maliki’s nomination, while the other group is concerned about the potential loss of international support or Iraq’s “isolation,” according to three unspecified framework sources speaking to Iraqi media on January 28.[lviii] The framework has not announced any official reversal of Maliki’s nomination or indicated a plan to do so at the time of this writing.

Maliki also met with Iranian-backed Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council head Faiq Zaidan on January 29, likely to confirm Zaidan’s support for a Maliki premiership.[lix] Zaidan stated during the meeting that the Iraqi judiciary rejects foreign interference in Iraqi affairs, in reference to Trump’s statement about Maliki.[lx] Iraq analyst Sajad Jiyad reported on January 28 that National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim and Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali had attempted to encourage current Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to compete with Maliki for the premiership after Sudani had withdrawn from the race on January 13, but Sudani had refused to do so without the support of most framework members and Zaidan.[lxi] Khazali and Hakim have led the framework opposition to Maliki.[lxii] CTP-ISW assessed on January 28, however, that Sudani still probably seeks the framework to nominate him as prime minister after the US opposition to Maliki.[lxiii]

A State of Law parliamentarian threatened Parliament Speaker and Progress Party member Hebet al Halbousi’s position if the Progress Party does not support Maliki for the premiership.[lxiv] This parliamentarian's threat indicates that Maliki may be concerned that opposition to him could delay his formation of a government. State of Law parliamentarian Othman al Shaibani threatened on January 30 that Halbousi could lose his position “if the political dispute over Halbousi’s performance and his commitment to previous understandings continues.”[lxv] Shaibani said that State of Law had supported Hebet al Halbousi’s nomination for speaker after the Progress Party head and cousin of Hebet al Halbousi, Mohammad al Halbousi, received Maliki’s blessing.[lxvi]

Shaibani’s comments are consistent with CTP-ISW's January 26 assessment that Maliki may have offered the Azm Alliance spoils to back him. Shaibani implied that the Sunni Azm Alliance could fill the speaker position.[lxvii] The National Sunni Political Council, which includes the Progress Party, the Azm Alliance, and the National Decision Alliance, released a statement on January 24 warning the framework against appointing Maliki as prime minister.[lxviii] The Azm Alliance and the National Decision Alliance have since issued statements supporting Maliki, and one Azm Alliance member said that Mohammad al Halbousi led the drafting of that statement.[lxix]  The Progress Party released another statement on January 28 that implied that the party will not participate in a government led by Maliki.[lxx] Shaibani’s remark that the Azm Alliance could fill the speakership, coupled with the Azm Alliance’s subversion of the Halbousis and rapid reversal to support Maliki, strongly indicates that Maliki offered Azm the speakership specifically.[lxxi]

There is no public agreement between State of Law and the Progress Party, so it is not clear what Shaibani’s reference to an “understanding” between Maliki and Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi refers to.[lxxii] It is unlikely, however, that Mohammad al Halbousi promised Maliki the premiership in exchange for State of Law’s support for Hebet al Halbousi’s nomination as speaker, given Maliki’s history of driving instability in Iraq. Maliki pursued sectarian and authoritarian policies while in office that led to the rise of ISIS in Iraq.[lxxiii] Shaibani‘s comments are almost certainly retaliation for the Progress Party‘s opposition to Maliki.[lxxiv]

CTP-ISW continues to assess that framework parties and Sunni parties opposed to Maliki could attempt to block the presidential election in order to try to delay or prevent Maliki from becoming prime minister. Parliament must elect a president by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum before the newly elected president selects the prime minister designate to form a government.[lxxv] The framework blocked the 2022 presidential election by preventing the quorum in order to prevent Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr from forming a government without Iranian-backed parties.[lxxvi] Ongoing disputes between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) over the presidency likely contributed to the Iraqi parliament’s postponement of its scheduled session to elect the new Iraqi president on January 27.[lxxvii]

Key Takeaways

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran has shown little willingness to concede to US demands on the missile program, regional proxy network, and nuclear capabilities. These three items form the long-standing pillars of Iranian defense strategy, and changing them would require a long strategic rethink in Tehran.
• Iranian-Russian Cooperation: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary (SNSC) Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on January 30 to discuss current developments and bilateral economic ties, according to Iranian and Russian media. Larijani’s visit to Russia comes amid a flurry of diplomatic efforts by Iranian officials to avert US military action against Iran.
• Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Integration into the Syrian State: The Syrian government has compelled moderate Kurdish leaders to drop their opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s model of state centralization. Several indicators suggest that hardline SDF leaders may refuse to abide by the SDF’s new agreement to integrate, which risks instigating new conflict between government forces and Kurdish fighters as the agreement is implemented.
• Nouri al Maliki’s Aims for the Iraqi Premiership: State of Law Coalition head and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki appears to be attempting to preserve his nomination as prime minister-designate amid US and domestic opposition. A State of Law parliamentarian threatened Parliament Speaker and Progress Party member Hebet al Halbousi’s position if the Progress Party does not support Maliki for the premiership.

Iran

The US Treasury Department sanctioned additional Iranian officials on January 30 for the regime’s violent protest crackdown.[lxxviii] The United States sanctioned Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization head Majid Khademi.[lxxix] Momeni oversees the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), which played a significant role in the regime’s violent crackdown on protesters.[lxxx] The United States also sanctioned the IRGC commanders responsible for Tehran, Gilan, and Hamdan provinces and the LEC’s Kermanshah Province commander.[lxxxi] The US Treasury Department stated that security forces in Gilan Province killed “hundreds of demonstrators” and fired live ammunition at unarmed activists.[lxxxii] Treasury added that the number of demonstrators killed in Tehran Province “overwhelmed local medical services.”[lxxxiii] The United States also sanctioned prominent “businessman and sanctions evader” Babak Zanjani and two digital asset exchanges associated with him for processing funds linked to the IRGC.[lxxxiv]  The US Treasury Department previously sanctioned the ”architects of the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators” on January 15, which included Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) head Ali Larijani, who was ”responsible for coordinating the response to the protests on behalf of the Supreme Leader of Iran.”[lxxxv]

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on January 29 that Iran is trying to fortify the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) in preparation for possible US strikes.[lxxxvi] The Institute reported on January 29 that increased vehicle activity on the road leading to the tunnel entrances of the ENTC.[lxxxvii] The Institute assessed that the vehicle activity appears to be related to re-burying the middle and southernmost entrances with soil, which could indicate efforts to protect against future military strikes.[lxxxviii] The Institute added that these efforts, in combination with efforts at the Mount Kolang Gaz La (Pickaxe Mountain) and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at the Natanz Nuclear Facility, indicate that Iran has prioritized ”recovering and preserving assets related to uranium enrichment rather than uranium conversion.”[lxxxix]

Iraq

The former secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah, Hashem al Haidari, threatened on January 28 to attack US embassies and bases in the Middle East, which is almost certainty a part of continued efforts by Axis of Resistance members to deter a US attack on Iran.[xc]  Haidari threatened on January 28 that millions of ”lovers of martyrdom, sacrifice, and jihad"—possibly an illusion to suicide bombers—would attack every US target in the Middle East if Iran gave Kataib Hezbollah the signal to do so.[xci] CTP-ISW assessed on January 26 that Axis of Resistance groups are likely threatening to expand a potential conflict between Iran and the United States to try to deter a US attack against Iran.[xcii] Haidari’s threat follows three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatening on January 26 to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran.[xciii]

Iraq Border Forces Commander Lieutenant General Mohammad Abdul Wahab Sukkar discussed border security and bilateral cooperation with Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Koudarzi in Wasit Province, Iraq, on January 30.[xciv] Several Iraqi Border Forces officers, including Sukkar’s key subordinate commanders from the Iraqi 1st, 3rd, and 4th Border Region Commands and their Iranian counterparts, also attended the meeting.[xcv] Koudarzi praised the Iraqi Border Forces Command’s security measures and fortifications along the Iraq-Iran border.[xcvi] The Iranian regime has long been concerned about cross-border Kurdish militant activity.[xcvii] Iranian officials met with Iraqi officials to discuss border security multiple times during the recent protest wave in Iran.[xcviii] CTP-ISW observed an uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran during the protest wave and assessed that anti-regime groups may have been exploiting instability caused by the protests to conduct militant activity.[xcix] Iran has also historically accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations in Iran.[c]

Syria

See the topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

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