Iran Update, January 28, 2026

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

President Donald Trump condemned on January 27 the Shia Coordination Framework’s nomination of State of Law Coalition head and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as prime minister designate.[i] It is unclear if the framework will insist on Maliki’s nomination or bow to US pressure against Maliki. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Trump stated on January 27 that Iraq experienced “poverty and total chaos” when Maliki was prime minister between 2006 and 2014.[ii] Trump threatened that the United States “will no longer help Iraq” if Maliki becomes prime minister again but did not provide further details.[iii] Maliki, as well as many Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, condemned Trump’s statement as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.[iv] Three framework sources told Iraqi media on January 28 that multiple unspecified framework leaders held bilateral and small group meetings to “formulate an initial position” regarding Trump’s statement prior to an official framework meeting later on January 28.[v] One group of unspecified framework leaders wants to move forward with Maliki’s nomination, while the other group is concerned about the potential loss of international support or Iraq’s “isolation,” according to the framework sources.[vi] It is unclear which framework members are in each group, but Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali, National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim, and former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi all originally opposed Maliki’s nomination as prime minister designate.[vii] Trump’s statement on January 27 is reportedly not the first time the United States has expressed its opposition to another term for Maliki. The United States sent a message to the framework via embassy channels that caused “sharp internal debate” and “physical friction” between unspecified framework leaders during a meeting on January 24, according to a senior framework official speaking to Iraqi media.[viii] The message reportedly included calls to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and exclude them from Iraqi government formation while noting that the United States views Maliki’s previous terms “in a negative light.”[ix] A Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-affiliated journalist reported on January 28 that the January 24 US message did not “veto” Maliki’s nomination but highlighted unspecified risks if the framework selected Maliki.[x] The framework ultimately pushed through Maliki via a majority vote, despite objections from at least Khazali, Hakim, and Abadi.[xi]

Current Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani probably seeks for the framework to nominate him as prime minister designate amid US opposition to Maliki. Unspecified informed political sources told Iraqi media on January 28 that Sudani had expected the United States’ rejection of Maliki as part of his plan to sabotage Maliki’s chances of obtaining the premiership.[xii] CTP-ISW assessed on January 13 that Sudani probably withdrew from the premiership race to sabotage Maliki’s chances of obtaining the position.[xiii] Sudani reportedly conditioned his withdrawal on Maliki receiving the approval of all framework leaders, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr, and unspecified Kurdish and Sunni political parties.[xiv] Maliki failed to meet these conditions and the spokesperson of Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition announced on January 25 the coalition’s support for Maliki, but it is possible that Sudani was still counting on the United States opposing Maliki even when he withdrew from the premiership race and his coalition later announced its support for Maliki.[xv] The coalition’s spokesperson, after announcing the coalition’s support for Maliki, stated that the coalition would form a parliamentary coordinating committee to “unify positions and visions” with the next Iraqi government.[xvi] CTP-ISW assessed on January 26 that Maliki may have offered Sudani political spoils to persuade Sudani to forgo the premiership.[xvii] Sudani could view these potential spoils as a back-up option in case Maliki becomes prime minister, but Sudani would presumably prefer to serve a second term as prime minister instead. It is unclear if the framework would select Sudani for the premiership even if Maliki is rejected, however. An unidentified framework source rejected on January 28 the notion that Sudani would become prime minister if the framework retracts Maliki’s nomination and claimed that the framework would choose a new or “compromise candidate.”[xviii] Iraq analyst Sajad Jiyad reported on January 28 that Iran told the framework to select either Sudani or Maliki for the premiership, however.[xix]

CTP-ISW continues to assess that framework parties and Sunni parties opposed to Maliki could attempt to block the presidential election in order to try to delay or prevent Maliki from becoming prime minister. An Asaib Ahl al Haq political bureau member acknowledged in an interview that Khazali does not support Maliki but would if a “broad national consensus” supports Maliki.[xx] It is unclear what this Asaib Ahl al Haq member means by “broad national consensus.” Several Sunni political parties also oppose Maliki. The Progress Party, which was the best performing Sunni party in the 2025 parliamentary elections, announced on January 28 that it would not participate in a government “led by personalities that return Iraqis to the memory of sectarian conflicts,” in reference to Maliki.[xxi] Maliki pursued sectarian and authoritarian policies while in office that led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).[xxii] The Sunni National Political Council similarly warned the framework in a statement on January 24 about the “deep political, security, and economic crises” that occurred under Maliki’s leadership.[xxiii] Multiple Sunni parties, including the Progress Party, formed the Sunni National Political Council in November 2025 to unify their political efforts and positions on key issues.[xxiv] Two of the council’s five parties, the Azm Alliance and the National Determination Alliance, issued statements on January 24 and 25 in support of Maliki.[xxv] Two smaller Sunni parties on the council have not issued statements regarding Maliki’s nomination, which suggests that they agree with the council’s statement rejecting Maliki. These parties could join an effort by Khazali and other framework members opposed to Maliki to block the presidential election. Parliament must elect a president by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum before the newly elected president selects the prime minister designate to form a government.[xxvi] The framework blocked the 2022 presidential election by preventing the quorum in order to prevent Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr from forming a government without Iranian-backed parties.[xxvii] Ongoing disputes between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) over the presidency likely contributed to the Iraqi parliament’s postponement of its scheduled session to elect the new Iraqi president on January 27.[xxviii]

The Iranian regime is very unlikely to accede to the United States’ demands regarding nuclear negotiations despite US pressure on the regime to agree to a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on January 28 that a “massive armada” is heading toward Iran and urged Iran to “make a deal,” warning that a potential US attack on Iran would be “far worse” than the United States’ attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.[xxix] Unspecified officials told the New York Times on January 28 that US-Iran talks have made no progress over the past week and that there are no indications that Iran plans to accede to President Trump’s demands.[xxx] The United States has demanded that Iran cease uranium enrichment, limit the range and size of its ballistic missile stockpile, and cease support for the Axis of Resistance.[xxxi] Iran has historically relied on its ballistic missile program and the Axis of Resistance as its main forms of deterrence and defense against Israel and the United States and Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that Iran will not negotiate on these issues.[xxxii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on January 28 that Iran welcomes a “mutually beneficial, fair, and equitable” nuclear deal that ensures Iran’s right to “peaceful nuclear technology,” which is a reference to uranium enrichment.[xxxiii] Araghchi’s remark indicates that Iran has not softened its position on domestic uranium enrichment. Araghchi’s emphasis on a “nuclear” deal also suggests that Iran will not accede to broader demands that extend beyond the nuclear issue.

The Iranian regime has offered incentives for conscripts, possibly to try to increase the size of the Iranian armed forces amid reports of some security forces members’ disaffection with the regime’s brutal crackdown on the recent protests. The Law Enforcement Command’s (LEC) Public Service Organization announced on January 28 that it is reducing mandatory service time, allowing deployment delays, assigning recruits to units based on skill sets, and forgiving absences from mandatory service.[xxxiv] The LEC oversees Iran’s nationwide mandatory conscription system.[xxxv] The announcement of incentives for conscripts comes amid reports of some security forces opposing the regime’s crackdown on the recent protests.  A senior LEC officer from an unspecified Kurdish city in northwestern Iran told TIME on January 9 that his family had urged him to leave the LEC and that he opposed having to use live fire against protesters.[xxxvi] Anti-regime media, citing unspecified sources in Iran, similarly reported on January 22 that many LEC members are “unhappy with the situation” and are being forced to go to work under threat.[xxxvii] Iranian authorities previously arrested “dozens” of security forces in Kermanshah Province who refused to fire on protesters, according to a Norway-based human rights group on January 8.[xxxviii] The regime could be trying to increase the size of its armed forces in order to compensate for security forces members who could be reticent to use lethal force or could defect in future waves of domestic unrest.

The status of the reported January 27 Syrian government–Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreement remains unclear, but a momentary halt in fighting in northeastern Syria on January 28 suggests that diplomatic efforts to end the conflict have progressed. Engagements between Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and SDF forces along the Kobani and Qamishli axes largely ceased from dawn until midday Syria time on January 28.[xxxix] Local sources reported MoD drone strikes near Rumalyn, Hasakah Province, and sporadic MoD-SDF engagements near Ras al Ayn, Hasakah Province, in the afternoon on January 28, however.[xl] The cessation of large-scale fighting and MoD advances in northeastern Syria on January 28 follows a Syrian media report on January 27 that the Syrian government and SDF agreed to a ceasefire on all front lines and the deployment of Syrian internal security forces to Hasakah City, Qamishli, and other unspecified areas.[xli] The January 27 report claimed that the Syrian government and the SDF would announce and implement the agreement by January 29, but neither the Syrian government nor the SDF has commented on the reported agreement at the time of this writing.[xlii]

The Syrian MoD has reportedly employed Turkish drones and weapons systems in its offensive against the SDF. The MoD likely received these systems as part of a previous Turkish-Syrian security agreement. A spokesperson for the SDF’s People’s Protection Units (YPG) told Western media on January 27 that the Syrian MoD has utilized Turkish drones and armored vehicles during its offensive against the SDF.[xliii] The SDF has reported multiple Turkish drone strikes on its positions since MoD-SDF fighting began on January 12, but it is unclear whether the Turkish or Syrian military operated those drones.[xliv] The YPG spokesperson added that the Turkish military has limited its drone strikes on SDF positions to rural areas, which supports CTP-ISW's previous assessment that the Turkish military has provided the MoD with limited air support during its offensive.[xlv] Turkey has denied its involvement in the MoD’s offensive, however.[xlvi] The Syrian MoD likely received Turkish military equipment, including drones, as part of the August 2025 security agreement between Turkey and Syria, which provided Turkish training, technical support, and military equipment to the MoD.[xlvii] The Turkish Chief of Staff discussed developments in Syria with his Syrian counterpart in a phone call on January 28.[xlviii]

Key Takeaways

• US Rejection of Nouri al Maliki for the Iraqi Premiership: US President Donald Trump condemned on January 27 the Shia Coordination Framework’s nomination of State of Law Coalition head and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as prime minister designate. It is unclear if the framework will insist on Maliki’s nomination or bow to US pressure against Maliki.
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The Iranian regime is very unlikely to accede to the United States’ demands regarding nuclear negotiations despite US pressure on the regime to agree to a nuclear deal. US President Donald Trump stated on January 28 that a “massive armada” is heading toward Iran and urged Iran to “make a deal,” warning that a potential US attack on Iran would be “far worse” than the United States’ attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.
• Iranian Regime Security Forces: The Iranian regime has offered incentives for conscripts, possibly to try to increase the size of the Iranian armed forces amid reports of some security forces members’ disaffection with the regime’s brutal crackdown on the recent protests. The Law Enforcement Command’s (LEC) Public Service Organization announced on January 28 that it is reducing mandatory service time, allowing deployment delays, assigning recruits to units based on skill sets, and forgiving absences from mandatory service.
• Syrian Government-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Ceasefire: The status of the reported January 27 Syrian government–Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreement remains unclear, but a momentary halt in fighting in northeastern Syria on January 28 suggests that diplomatic efforts to end the conflict have progressed. The Syrian MoD has reportedly employed Turkish drones and weapons systems in its offensive against the SDF. The MoD likely received these systems as part of a previous Turkish-Syrian security agreement.

Iran

The Iranian regime is cracking down on Iranian medical professionals who treated injured protesters. Anti-regime media reported on January 27 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Intelligence Organization arrested a doctor at a hospital in Gorgan, Golestan Province, for treating injured protesters and objecting to security forces’ use of the hospital’s roof to shoot at protesters, citing unspecified sources.[xlix] Iranian security forces targeted multiple hospitals, such as the Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam Province, during the protests to prevent doctors from treating injured protesters, arrest wounded protesters, and pressure medical professionals to prioritize treating injured security forces.[l] The regime has also pressured medical personnel to align with the regime’s narrative about the protests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated during a meeting with Iranian medical professionals on January 21 that “convincing” the medical community about the regime’s narrative about the protests will “reduce tensions and control social consequences.”[li] The regime likely seeks to prevent medical professionals from sharing information about the true scale of the regime’s violent crackdown on the protests. Two senior Iranian Health Ministry officials recently told TIME on January 25 that 30,000 individuals may have been killed on January 8 and 9.[lii]

The regime continued to reshuffle media personnel on January 28. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) appointed Hamed Fatehi Poladi as the Lorestan Province IRIB Director General on January 28.[liii] IRIB is a regime mouthpiece that the regime uses to disseminate propaganda.[liv] Poladi replaced Alireza Shiravi. Poladi’s appointment as the Lorestan Province IRIB Director General is notable given that Lorestan Province witnessed the sixth most protest activity by province between December 28, 2025, and January 13, 2026, according to CTP-ISW’s data. Poladi’s replacement comes after IRIB head Peyman Jebelli appointed Ahmad Pahlavanian as IRIB deputy speaker and appointed former IRIB deputy speaker Ali Bakhshizadeh as an adviser on January 27.[lv] CTP-ISW assessed on January 27 that the appointment of new individuals to these positions indicates that the regime may be dissatisfied with the incumbents’ performances during the recent protests.[lvi]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Russian President Vladmir Putin, and other senior Syrian and Russian officials met in Moscow on January 28.[lvii] Shara’s engagement with Russia is likely part of his ongoing effort to balance Syria’s relationships with foreign powers and diversify Syria’s economic and defense partnerships.[lviii] Shara and Putin discussed the presence of Russian forces in Syria, bilateral economic cooperation, and their “views” on the current situation in Syria.[lix] Russian forces maintain a presence at the Tartous Naval Facility and the Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, which Russia has long used for Russian flights to Africa.[lx]  Putin expressed support for the Syrian government’s seizure of areas east of the Euphrates River and called the government’s control over these areas “an important step.”[lxi] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate head Admiral Igor Kostyukov, and several other senior Syrian and Russian political and defense officials attended the meeting.[lxii] Syrian and Russian defense officials have consistently met over the past six months to discuss Russia’s military presence in Syria and possible training and expertise that Russia could offer the Syrian military.[lxiii] The timing of Shara’s visit to Moscow is notable given the ongoing conflict in northern Syria, which caused the Russian military to abandon its only base in northeastern Syria.[lxiv]

Shara's engagement with Putin reflects his broader international engagement strategy in which he seeks to balance Syria’s relations with foreign powers. The current Russia-Syria relationship consists of mutually beneficial arrangements and understandings that have developed since the fall of the Assad regime.[lxv] The Syrian government has proven increasingly willing to engage directly with Russia since spring 2025 on economic, military, and political issues that are advantageous to Syria.[lxvi] Russia and Syria have reportedly discussed Russian deployments to southern Syria, for example.[lxvii] Israel reportedly vetoed this proposal, however.[lxviii] Shara and his government are poised to strengthen relations with Russia in order to achieve mutually beneficial objectives in the absence of international pressure to cut ties with Russia. Shara has also sought to enhance Syria’s relations with Ukraine despite his frequent meetings with Russian officials and efforts to enhance Syrian-Russian relations.[lxix] Syria has received both Russian and Ukrainian grain shipments, which further underscore Shara’s efforts to balance foreign powers.[lxx] Shara has similarly sought to advance Syria's ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) while balancing the Syrian army’s integration of Uyghur fighters into its ranks, which the PRC opposes.[lxxi]

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.