Iran Update, January 27, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

The Iranian regime’s ongoing crackdown is exacerbating the economic collapse that spurred the Winter 2026 protests. The crackdown will therefore fail to address the underlying causes of the protests and could create more grievances that drive future protests. The Iranian regime's ongoing securitization measures, which include a costly and prolonged internet shutdown, are accelerating Iran's economic collapse. The country’s economic collapse was the initial trigger for these demonstrations in late December 2025.[i] The crackdown’s economic consequences have struck individual Iranians and businesses alike. The Iranian rial again fell to an all-time low on January 27 (see graphic below), and the price of basic goods has increased 60 percent since mid-December.[ii] The internet shutdown costs the regime about $37 million USD daily.[iii] Iranian online businesses, which are a major part of Iran’s digital economy and generate $1 billion USD annually, have incurred at least $2 million USD in losses daily during the shutdown.[iv] The shutdown has lasted 20 days and is the third-longest internet shutdown globally in history, according to regional media.[v] The regime has made only isolated efforts to compensate businesses, such as by announcing an eight-stage compensation plan for online businesses on January 27.[vi] It is unclear how the government intends to pay for this or future compensation packages, given that the regime is already struggling to generate government revenue. The regime’s challenges in generating revenue have also contributed to protester grievances because the challenges have forced the regime to raise taxes.[vii] The regime’s response prioritizes securitization over addressing root economic causes, which makes future protests more likely.[viii]

The regime’s decision to persist with its crackdown indicates that the regime continues to fear protests and understands that protests only temporarily stopped due to the widespread securitization and fear caused by the regime’s extreme violence.[ix] The violent crackdown may slow or stop protests temporarily, but it will not stop protests from occurring again in the future. This violence will temporarily deter people from protesting, but anger and frustration with the regime remain. Anecdotal reports from protester funerals and other commemorations in recent weeks indicate that Iranians continue to detest the regime and could protest if security pressure were lifted.[x] The regime has killed thousands of protesters, and security forces have arrested 41,880 people—more than double the number arrested in the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[xi] Iranian judiciary officials have meanwhile threatened to show “no leniency” towards the arrested protesters.[xii] The internet shutdown demonstrates that the regime recognizes the fundamental reality that the unrest remains an existential threat due to the widespread nature of frustration at the economic situation and anger at the extreme violence the regime employed.[xiii]

The internet shutdown is also liable to contribute to political grievances. The long-lasting internet shutdown has stripped the Iranian people of long-running modern conveniences that they have become accustomed to, including access to an internet-based economy and the ability to communicate relatively easily. The continued imposition of the shutdown will likely continue to aggravate the Iranian people and can create the conditions that can lead to further uprisings. Many Egyptians during the 2011 Tahrir Square protests—according to one study, as many as 27.5% of protesters—only became active protesters after the internet shutdown, for example.[xiv]

Pro-government Syrian media reported that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian government reached a new “understanding” on January 27 to deploy Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces to Hasakah Province, which would be a tangible step towards the civil integration of the province into the Syrian state. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria official Ilham Ahmed in Damascus on December 17, reportedly along with US and French mediators.[xv]  Unspecified sources told a Turkey-based, pro-government Syrian media outlet that Shara and Abdi agreed to a ceasefire on all fronts and to the deployment of MoI forces to Hasakah City, Qamishli, and other unspecified areas.[xvi] A January 20 agreement between Shara and Abdi had banned government forces from entering Hasakah City, Qamishli, and Kurdish-majority towns and villages.[xvii] The sources said that the agreement will be announced and implemented within the next few days.[xviii] Neither the Syrian government nor the SDF has officially acknowledged the ”understanding” as described by the aforementioned Syrian outlet’s sources, but the outlet has access to and consistently cites Syrian government officials and those with knowledge of the negotiations with the SDF. Shara spoke with US President Donald Trump after he met with Abdi on January 27.[xix] Trump told reporters after his call with Shara that he is ”very happy about” the situation in Syria and that it is”working out very well.”[xx]  An anti-SDF, Deir ez Zor-based source alleged on January 27 that SDF-affiliated internal security forces asked fighters for initial registration information for those who seek to work under the Syrian state‘s Interior Ministry.[xxi]

The deployment of MoI forces, which is a gendarmerie that has already deployed to secure most of government-controlled northeastern Syria, would represent a significant step towards the civil integration of the area into the state that the SDF has largely refused to indulge thus far.[xxii] Shara initially gave Abdi four days (later extended by an additional 15 days) to consult with SDF leaders and secure their agreement to Shara’s terms for the integration of the SDF and present a practical plan for the integration of the remaining SDF-held territory into the Syrian state.[xxiii] SDF fighters will reportedly remain deployed to their current positions as part of the new ”understanding,” which suggests that Shara and Abdi have not yet agreed upon a clear mechanism to integrate SDF fighters into state security services.[xxiv] Some hardline elements within the SDF’s leadership may pressure Abdi to reject Shara’s terms for the SDF’s integration, given how Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-aligned leaders have subverted and delayed previous rounds of negotiations.[xxv]

Other non-SDF Kurdish political factions are pressuring Abdi to disregard the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Syrian media reported that the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political parties that does not include the PYD, urged Abdi to avoid any future “catastrophic” military conflicts with the Syrian government and prioritize negotiations and dialogue during a meeting in Hasakah on January 25.[xxvi] The KNC reportedly holds the SDF and PYD ”responsible” for the conflict in the northeast, according to unspecified sources.[xxvii] The PYD is the KNC’s political rival. The KNC’s request that Abdi disregard pressure from the PYD, and therefore the YPG, to reject Shara’s agreements is notable given that the KNC unified with the PYD and other Kurdish political parties in April 2025 to call for a unified entity that would administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[xxviii] The KNC has historically aligned itself with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and its president, Masoud Barzani.[xxix] Barzani has emerged as a key interlocutor between Shara and Abdi, who has largely urged restraint and dialogue from both sides.[xxx]

CTP-ISW continues to assess that the SDF’s leadership may fracture over a decision to agree to Shara’s terms for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state, which would risk instigating serious conflict between government forces and Kurdish fighters. Abdi and Shara may come to an agreement that ends the immediate fighting in northeastern Syria and creates a plan to integrate SDF fighters into state security services, but CTP-ISW is considering that hardliners within the SDF may contribute to future instability within Syria in the following two ways:

1. One scenario would involve an insurgency by hardline YPG elements who decide to resume attacks or launch an insurgency against the Syrian government, even if Abdi and other more moderate SDF leaders formally accept Shara’s terms. A senior PKK leader recently called on Kurdish fighters to ”do whatever is necessary” to respond to the war that the Syrian government has launched to remove the “will and status” of the Kurdish people.[xxxi] A suicide attack targeting Syrian government forces that the SDF recently claimed on January 26 indicates that hardline, ideological fighters remain present along frontlines.[xxxii] These fighters are unlikely to accept their own integration into the Syrian state.
   
   This insurgency would likely be slightly more violent and a greater threat to the government than the pro-Assad insurgency that the Syrian government has faced in western Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. Pro-Assad insurgents have formed small groups and intermittently targeted government forces, though the vast majority of these attacks are ineffective. Pro-Assad groups lack unity and widespread public support. Many Alawites do not support Assad’s return. The YPG has better positioned itself as the defender of the Kurdish people over the last decade and may have greater support relative to pro-Assad groups. The YPG is also a relatively unified organization.
2. A second scenario would entail the formation of a widespread Kurdish insurgency that is not restricted to hardline YPG fighters and includes many nominally unaffiliated Kurds in northeastern Syria. YPG fighters would still form the core of the insurgency’s leadership in this scenario. The Syrian government is currently deliberately undermining the SDF and YPG by introducing limited Kurdish rights and conducting outreach to Kurdish notables, which is likely designed to politically subvert the SDF and YPG to prevent future military resistance. Shara has used similar strategies of political subversion to prevent possible adversaries from resisting him militarily (described below).[xxxiii]

Either of the two above scenarios could contribute to a most dangerous course of action in which either Shara or Abdi decides that neither party can move forward with a peaceful agreement to integrate the SDF. A scenario in which Syrian government forces advance into Kurdish areas and confront both Kurdish fighters and civilians could lead to another catastrophic round of communal-based violence. This scenario would also make it extraordinarily difficult for the US forces present in Syria to successfully move ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq and increase force protection requirements for US forces.  

Shara is likely meeting with Kurdish officials from northern Syria in an effort to prevent or mitigate widespread fighting from breaking out between government forces and Kurdish fighters or civilians who are not aligned with the YPG. Shara met with 15 Kurdish notables and community figures from Kobani in Tabqa, Raqqa Province, on an unspecified date after the government seized the city on January 17, according to Kurdish sources.[xxxiv] Shara reiterated that his state would protect Kurdish rights, and the leaders reportedly left the meeting “reassured.”[xxxv] Some of the Kurdish community figures that Shara met with are close to the SDF leadership, while other figures present at the meeting oppose the SDF.[xxxvi] Syrian government forces have surrounded Kobani since January 19 and have continued to engage SDF-affiliated fighters in the Kobani countryside each day, which has increased the risk of violence between the majority Arab Syrian army forces, local Arab tribes, remaining SDF-affiliated fighters, and Kurdish civilians in the area. CTP-ISW has not observed reports that locals in Kobani have armed themselves, but the presence of government forces outside of cities with significant Kurdish populations since January 19 has led many Kurdish residents in Hasakah City, Qamishli, and the Kurdish rural areas near both cities to arm themselves and form local “popular battalions” to defend against any government incursions.[xxxvii] Residents of Kobani have described government forces’ surrounding the city as reminiscent of ISIS’s siege on Kobani in 2014, which is an analogy that may drive some residents to take action to defend the city.[xxxviii] This analogy also implicitly reinforces the idea that the YPG is the sole capable defender of the Kurdish people due to the YPG’s pivotal role in the 2014 Siege of Kobani by ISIS.

Shara’s outreach to Kurdish notables also likely aims to align influential figures from Kobani with the Syrian government and politically weaken the SDF- or YPG-affiliated factions that are currently fighting the government. Such an effort would be consistent with Shara’s historical strategies to co-opt other civil and military groups during the Syrian civil war as the leader of Jabhat al Nusra and later Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). HTS used a combination of incentives, agreements, and repression to politically undermine factions and councils in Idlib Province and draw them into HTS’s sphere of influence between 2020 and 2024, for example.[xxxix] Shara later employed a similar strategy to suppress the Daraa-based Eighth Brigade in April 2025 after it attempted to resist government control by first politically undermining the group in southern Daraa, which enabled Shara’s government to destroy the group without a fight.[xl] Efforts to liaise with and build trust with Kurdish notables may seek to weaken the influence of Kurdish hardliners, such as some fighters and leaders within the YPG, among other influential Kurdish contingents. Shara reportedly criticized the SDF’s leadership for prioritizing territorial acquisition over Kurdish rights, which appears to be an attempt to drive a wedge between Kurdish leaders and the SDF.[xli] The Syrian government has repeatedly blamed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-aligned leaders for subverting and delaying previous rounds of negotiations.

The Syrian government is experiencing some initial challenges in managing al Hol internally displaced persons camp (IDP), partially due to undisciplined and ineffective Ministry of Defense (MoD) units and insufficient training to control the camp. These challenges can be remedied in time, and the Syrian government appears to be learning from some mistakes and correcting its procedures accordingly.  Local Syrian sources reported that some camp residents have made multiple escape attempts from al Hol camp in Hasakah Province since Syrian government forces took control of the camp from the SDF on January 20.[xlii] Only one of these escape attempts on January 25 succeeded, however.[xliii] The al Hol camp is the largest IDP camp in Syria and currently contains 14,500 Syrians, 3,700 Iraqis, and 6,000 third-country nationals, some of whom are ISIS supporters.[xliv] A pro-government Syrian source reported that some foreign and ”Arab” women (presumably referring to non-Syrian Arab women) attempted to escape on January 26.[xlv] These individuals are far more likely to be ISIS supporters compared to the camp’s 14,500 Syrians because the foreigners traveled to Syria in the middle of a brutal civil war. ISIS women in al Hol are ardent ISIS supporters who actively support the group by recruiting children and others in the camp.[xlvi]  

ISIS families and their supporters have attempted several escape attempts in recent days. An Egyptian member of the 82nd Division, which contains foreign fighters from al Qaeda-affiliated Ansar al Tawhid  successfully smuggled Egyptian and Chechen ISIS families from the camp on January 25.[xlvii] Syrian General Security Service (GSS) forces killed the 82nd Division member on January 26.[xlviii] A local Syrian source reported that dozens of ISIS-affiliated families attempted a separate escape from al Hol on January 26 by cutting the camp’s perimeter fence, but GSS forces caught them before they could escape.[xlix] The GSS first deployed to al Hol IDP camp on January 21 after “many” detainees escaped from the camp when the MoD took control of the camp, according to the camp’s director.[l]

GSS and the Syrian government appear to be learning from these early failures and near failures. The deployment of the GSS to al Hol is a positive step; the GSS is a relatively effective and well-disciplined force that has performed well in counterinsurgency efforts against Assadist insurgents in western Syria after the Defense Ministry’s forces massacred Alawites there in March 2025.[li] The GSS deployed additional forces and began monitoring the camps with drones on January 27 in response to the escape attempts by ISIS-affiliated detainees.[lii] The chaotic and uncoordinated nature of the Syrian government takeover of northeastern Syria, coupled with the SDF collapse, has forced the GSS to relearn lessons that the United States and its SDF partners have previously learned. The SDF spent years developing counter-ISIS operations in al Hol, and the United States provided the SDF with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor the camp, capabilities the GSS currently lacks.[liii]

The Syrian government began recruiting and training internal security personnel from provinces it has seized from the SDF to bolster security in newly captured areas. The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) began recruitment of GSS forces in Raqqa, Deir ez Zor, and Hasakah provinces on January 21.[liv]  The MoI transported the new GSS recruits to an academy in Damascus City, where they began a two-month training course on January 26. The recruits will return to their respective provinces after training.[lv] The GSS deployed units to Deir ez Zor, Aleppo, and Raqqa provinces on January 19 in an effort to establish basic security in the area, which will prevent looting and other criminal activity and reduce the risk of score settling.[lvi]

The MoI has also begun settling the status of SDF fighters in territory the Syrian government captured from the SDF. The MoI opened centers for SDF fighters to settle their status with the Syrian government and hand over their weapons in Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces on January 25 and in Aleppo Province on January 27.[lvii] Most SDF fighters who settled their status with the government were reportedly Arabs who surrendered after the SDF’s Arab contingent collapsed during the MoD’s January 16 offensive.[lviii] This settlement process resembles a previously successful government program to settle the status of Assad regime conscripts, which required fighters to surrender weapons and register their details in exchange for a temporary card that allowed them to return to civilian life and provided protection from arbitrary arrest.[lix] Previous Assadist conscript settlement efforts did not result in conscripts being systematically targeted after they settled their status. Former SDF fighters at settlement centers in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces told pro-government media that authorities treated them well and did not harass them after they settled their status on January 27.[lx]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Regime Stability: The Iranian regime’s ongoing crackdown is exacerbating the economic collapse that spurred the Winter 2026 protests. The crackdown will therefore fail to address the underlying causes of the protests and could create more grievances that drive future protests. The regime’s decision to persist with its crackdown indicates that the regime continues to fear protests and understands that protests only temporarily stopped due to the widespread securitization and fear caused by the regime’s extreme violence.
• Government-SDF Conflict: Pro-government Syrian media reported that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian government reached a new “understanding” on January 27 to deploy Interior Ministry forces to Hasakah Province, which would be a tangible step towards the civil integration of the province into the Syrian state. CTP-ISW continues to assess that the SDF’s leadership may fracture over a decision to agree to Shara’s terms for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state, which would risk instigating serious conflict between government forces and Kurdish fighters.
• Political Subversion of the SDF: The Syrian government is currently politically undermining hardline SDF and YPG positions by introducing limited Kurdish rights and conducting outreach to Kurdish notables, which is likely designed to politically subvert the SDF and YPG to prevent future military resistance. Shara has used similar strategies of political subversion to prevent possible adversaries from resisting him militarily. Shara outreach to Kurdish notables from northern Syria also likely aims prevent or mitigate widespread resistance by the SDF and YPG against government forces.
• Syrian IDP Camp Security: The Syrian government is experiencing some initial challenges in managing al Hol internally displaced persons camp (IDP), partially due to undisciplined and ineffective Defense Ministry units and insufficient training to control the camp. These challenges can be remedied in time, and the Syrian government appears to be learning from some mistakes and correcting its procedures accordingly. The chaotic and uncoordinated nature of the Syrian government takeover of northeastern Syria, coupled with the SDF collapse, has almost certainly forced the Interior Ministry to relearn lessons about guarding these facilities that the United States and its SDF partners have previously learned.

Iran

The Iranian regime announced several appointments to military and security positions on January 27, which indicates that the regime may have been dissatisfied with the incumbents’ performances during the January 2026 protests. The regime made the following appointments on January 27:

• Brigadier General Jafar Motamed replaced Rear Admiral Mehdi Khajeh Amiri as Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics deputy coordinator.[lxi] The defense ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements. Coordination deputies in Iran serve in a similar capacity to the chief of staff of a formation in the US military.
• Brigadier General Hossein Maroufi was appointed as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) Cultural, Social, and Media Affairs deputy.[lxii] Maroufi has an extensive military background and previously held positions within the IRGC Ground Forces in Sistan and Baluchistan, Golestan, and Kerman provinces. He also previously served as Basij deputy coordinator. The United States sanctioned Maroufi in December 2022 for his role in the regime’s violent suppression of the 2019 and 2022 protest waves.[lxiii]
• Iranian Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) head Peyman Jebelli appointed Ahmad Pahlavanian as IRIB deputy speaker and appointed former IRIB deputy speaker Ali Bakhshizadeh as an adviser.[lxiv] Pahlavanian has previously held several media-related positions, including Qom Central Radio and Television director general. The new appointments within IRIB follow a January 18 cyberattack on IRIB that aired footage of Reza Pahlavi, son of former Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, calling on Iranian security forces to side with the public, as well as images of anti-government protests in Tehran.[lxv]

All three positions contribute to the regime’s ability and capacity to repress the protests, and the previous incumbents were likely involved in supporting the crackdown on the January 2026 protests. The timing of these appointments suggests that their replacement may have been related to the regime’s ongoing crackdown.  It is unclear why the regime may have been dissatisfied with the incumbents, but some Iranian officials did not comply with orders to enforce the shutdown. The IranCell Communications Services Company Board of Directors replaced CEO Alireza Rafiei with Mohammad Hossein Soleimani on January 18, reportedly accusing Rafiei of “treason” after he was “delaying orders to cut connectivity.”[lxvi]

Iraq

Ongoing disputes between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) over the presidency likely contributed to the Iraqi parliament’s postponement of its scheduled session to elect the new Iraqi president.[lxvii] Parliament Speaker Haibat al Halbousi said on January 27 that both the KDP and the PUK submitted requests to postpone the session.[lxviii] Halbousi added that he decided to postpone the session due to a lack of quorum.[lxix] At least 218 parliamentarians, or two-thirds of parliament, must be present during the session to elect the president, but only 85 attended the January 27 session.[lxx] The postponement comes as the KDP and its rival, the PUK, have been negotiating over which party will hold the presidency.[lxxi] 

This postponement will likely delay government formation. Parliament must elect a president via a simple majority with two-thirds of parliamentarians present by January 28, in accordance with the Iraqi constitution.[lxxii] It is unclear when parliament will hold the next session to elect the president. The newly elected president is responsible for selecting the prime minister-designate from the largest parliamentary bloc to form a government.[lxxiii] The Shia Coordination Framework, which is the largest parliamentary bloc, nominated State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as prime minister-designate on January 24.[lxxiv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Disputes between the KDP and the PUK over the presidency partly contributed to delays in government formation following the 2021 elections.[lxxv]

Three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened on January 26 to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran, which is likely part of an effort to deter a potential US attack on Iran, as CTP-ISW assessed on January 26.[lxxvi] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Bureau member Firas al Yasser told Shafaq News on January 26 that the militia is ready to respond to any US attack on Iran.[lxxvii] Likely Kataib Hezbollah front group Alwiya Waad al Haq released a statement on January 26 in which it threatened to target US embassies and interests in the region.[lxxviii] The Badr Organization’s Ideological Guidance Office also announced on January 26 its support for Iran “in the face of American-Israeli arrogance.”[lxxix] The threats from these three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are consistent with similar threats from other members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, including Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah, that have threatened to intervene if the United States attacks Iran.[lxxx] CTP-ISW assessed on January 26 that Axis of Resistance groups are likely threatening to get involved and expand a potential conflict to try to deter a US attack against Iran.[lxxxi] Iraqi groups face domestic constraints that may limit their ability to retaliate if the United States attacks Iran, however. Militia operations that trigger US action in Iraq are generally unpopular domestically, and some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be hesitant to intervene because of the possible repercussions on their domestic political efforts, such as the ongoing Iraqi government formation process.[lxxxii]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.