Iran Update, January 21, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

The Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) leadership may fracture over a decision to agree to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara's terms for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state, which would risk instigating serious conflict between government forces and Kurdish fighters. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara provided a major concession to SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in a “mutual understanding” on January 20 by granting Abdi four days to consult with SDF leaders and secure their agreement to Shara’s terms, which include the integration of the SDF and its remaining territory into the Syrian state.[i] Some hardline elements within the SDF’s leadership may pressure Abdi to reject Shara’s terms for the SDF’s integration, given how Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-aligned leaders have subverted and delayed previous rounds of negotiations under which the Syrian government offered far more favorable terms to the SDF.[ii]

CTP-ISW assesses that the most likely course of action entails Abdi and a subset of more moderate SDF leaders agreeing to Shara’s terms, while some hardline SDF leaders refuse to capitulate and continue to fight. Abdi may be able to rally enough support for a new agreement to integrate the SDF and avoid further bloodshed among some SDF leaders, but there have been no indications that hardline SDF leaders have softened their positions. The Qandil-based PKK leadership appears to be encouraging Kurds in Syria to resist the Syrian government offensive, which is likely influencing hardline People’s Protection Units (YPG) leaders’ decision-making. Senior PKK official Murat Karayilan released a statement to Kurdish media on January 20, in which he claimed that Turkey, Hayat Tahrir al Sham, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have launched a joint “war” on Kurds in Syria that seeks to “redesign the region” so that Kurdish people do not have “will and status.”[iii] Such inflammatory language undermines moderate positions. Karyilan encouraged Syrian Kurds to ”do whatever is necessary.”[iv]

CTP-ISW continues to assess that some hardline SDF elements could decide to resume attacks against the government or launch a Kurdish insurgency at any point, even if Abdi and other SDF leaders formally accept Shara’s terms. Karayilan advised Syrian Kurds to “organize yourselves” and “determine the appropriate path and method” to respond to Syrian government attacks, but added that Kurds should “not rush.”[v] Hardline SDF leaders may interpret such a remark as a call to launch an insurgency campaign against the Syrian government, even if Abdi and other leaders agree to Shara’s terms and the government assumes control over Kurdish-majority areas. These hardliners could wait to launch an insurgency for an opportune moment rather than beginning operations immediately after Abdi announces that the SDF accepts the deal. These leaders previously refused Abdi’s orders to stop fighting in Aleppo City in early January, which created the conditions for the current government offensive.[vi] Any campaign or attacks could also involve fighters who are not Syrian and do not answer to Abdi. Kurdish media have circulated reports on January 21 that fighters from Iraqi Kurdistan have arrived in Hasakah, allegedly to support the SDF’s fight against the Syrian government.[vii]

Both Abdi and Shara will need to maintain significant oversight and pressure on their own forces in order to ensure that SDF hardliners’ possible refusal to capitulate does not spark widespread fighting that further destabilizes northern Syria. Maintaining this oversight and control over their forces will be extraordinarily difficult. Abdi will need to exert enormous pressure on the YPG and other hardline factions within the SDF to exercise restraint, given their possible motivations to fight the Syrian government, as noted above. The Syrian government’s offensive on northeastern Syria has created extremely chaotic conditions on the ground, in which relatively small-scale attacks or violations can spiral into the resumption of intense fighting between Kurdish and government forces. Shara has pledged to keep his forces outside of Kurdish towns and villages but has deployed divisions to the northeast containing abusive militias that have previously launched unsanctioned attacks on minority communities, including Kurds, and significantly destabilized the situation by doing so.[viii] Syrian and Kurdish media have already accused Syrian government forces of abusing Kurdish female fighters captured during the offensive.[ix] Shara, for his part, will need to ensure that his forces maintain discipline in response to attacks from hardline SDF fighters or cells. A series of coordinated attacks that Alawite insurgents launched on government positions on the Syrian coast in March 2025 triggered violent reprisals from Syrian security forces and non-government militias that do not answer to the government’s orders.[x]

The most dangerous scenario would involve either Shara or Abdi deciding that neither party can move forward with a peaceful agreement to integrate the SDF. Any combination of the factors described above could lead Shara or Abdi to this conclusion. The Syrian army will likely enter Hasakah City, Qamishli, and other Kurdish towns and villages in the absence of an agreement after the four-day ceasefire expires. A scenario in which Syrian government forces advance into Kurdish areas and confront both Kurdish fighters and civilians could lead to another catastrophic round of communal-based violence. This scenario would also make it extraordinarily difficult for the US forces present in Syria to successfully move ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq and increase force protection requirements for US forces.

Direct Turkish intervention in northeastern Syria could disrupt efforts Shara and Abdi make towards peace. Various senior US officials have engaged the Turkish president to discuss Syria in recent days.  The United States has continued to engage with Turkey since the Syrian government began its offensive in northeastern Syria. US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on January 20.[xi] US President Donald Trump also discussed the fighting in northeastern Syria during a “fruitful” phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on January 21.[xii] Erdogan later told Turkish parliamentarians that he hopes that the SDF’s integration can be solved ”without any more bloodshed,” but that any SDF provocation would be a ”suicide attempt.”[xiii] CTP-ISW has not observed Turkish ground forces participating in or supporting the Syrian ground offensive, though Turkey may be providing limited air support.[xiv]

Syria Mapping Note: CTP-ISW recoded all data under the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army layer as the Syrian Transitional Government layer. We also recoded all data under the SNA-SDF Contested layer as Syrian Government-SDF Contested. The coalition of pro-Turkish Syrian opposition militias known as the Syrian National Army (SNA) has largely been incorporated into Syrian state entities and Syrian security services as of January 26, 2026. The Turkey-based Syrian Interim Government and its military force, the SNA, formally dissolved into the Syrian transitional government in January 2025.[xv]

CTP-ISW assesses that the SNA’s military units have been nearly if not completely subsumed into the Syrian transitional government, though these units’ structures and economic networks may remain relatively unchanged.[xvi] The Syrian transitional government bears full security and administrative responsibilities over the northern Aleppo countryside that the SNA formerly controlled. Many SNA units formerly active in this area have now been incorporated into Syrian army divisions and internal security services.[xvii] Syrian government security services also operate across the “Peace Spring” region, and the Syrian government controls the Tal Abyad and Ras al Ain border crossings.[xviii] Turkey still maintains military positions within formerly SNA-coded territory.[xix]

Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces continued to advance and consolidate control over positions that the SDF recently abandoned, but also to set future military conditions for renewed offensive operations if the current ceasefire fails. All recently confirmed MoD advances into SDF territory since the January 20 ceasefire went into effect occurred in areas the SDF had reportedly already withdrawn from. Local sources reported that MoD forces advanced into three villages near Jabal Abdulaziz in western Hasakah Province on January 20 without SDF resistance, indicating that the SDF had abandoned those positions.[xx] Local sources separately reported that the MoD continued to advance on Kobani, northern Aleppo Province, taking control of at least five villages north of the Qara Qozak Bridge without SDF resistance on January 21.[xxi] The MoD also advanced from Tal Hamis to Tal Brak in Hasakah Province after the SDF withdrew from its positions there on January 21.[xxii] The MoD advance on Tal Brak cut off the main SDF supply road between Hasakah City and Qamishli City, which may disrupt the SDF’s ability to reinforce Hasakah City from Qamishli if the current ceasefire fails. The MoD's uncontested advances in SDF territory indicates that the MoD is exploiting the ceasefire period to shape future battles against the SDF by securing key terrain and disrupting SDF lines of communication in preparation for renewed hostilities should the ceasefire collapse.

The US transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq can mitigate some of the very grave risks that dangerous and uncoordinated handovers of detention facilities present to US and Syrian counter-ISIS efforts. A successful transfer of all or most of the ISIS detainees will take longer than the 72 hours remaining in the ceasefire, however. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on January 21 that US forces moved 150 fighters from a Hasakah facility to an unspecified “secure facility” in Iraq.[xxiii] The United States may transfer up to 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraqi-controlled facilities, according to CENTCOM.[xxiv] ISIS detention facilities in northeastern Syria hold an estimated 8,500 ISIS fighters in total.[xxv] The government's sudden offensive against the SDF in northern Syria caused a chaotic SDF withdrawal that has prevented an organized handover of SDF security responsibilities, including the SDF's control of ISIS detention facilities, but also internally displaced persons (IDP) camps that house ISIS supporters. Government-SDF fighting at Shaddadi Prison resulted in the breakout of as many as 200 ”low-level” ISIS fighters into the surrounding area on January 19, though the Syrian government claimed that only 120 fighters were released.[xxvi]

US forces transferred ISIS fighters from the al Sinaa facility in the Ghuwayran area of Hasakah City on January 21, according to Western and Syrian media.[xxvii] This facility was at particular risk due to its proximity to possible fighting around Hasakah City, but also because it is not a purpose-built prison facility.[xxviii] ISIS previously attacked this facility in 2022, which enabled nearly 100 fighters (but possibly many more) to escape the facility.[xxix] The SDF has made improvements to the facility since 2022, but keeping ISIS fighters in the facility while the conflict continues near Hasakah would be extremely risky. A BBC Salafi-jihadi analyst noted on January 21 that high-profile Islamic State (IS) supporters circulated a call to action from IS leadership to mobilize support for detainees in Syrian IDP camps and detention facilities, including the Ghuwayran facility.[xxx]

The success of US efforts to ensure that the government offensive does not inflict lasting harm on US counter-ISIS objectives in northeastern Syria is conditional upon stable conditions on the ground and securing other at-risk facilities, such as IDP camps that house ISIS supporters. US efforts to transfer up to 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq may extend beyond the remaining three days of the government-SDF ceasefire, and a premature resumption of SDF-government fighting risks seriously disrupting US operations. CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper spoke with Shara on January 21 to discuss the importance of Syrian government forces adhering to the ceasefire with the SDF to support the detainee’s transfer to Iraq.[xxxi] Cooper shared an expectation with Shara that Syrian forces would not take any steps to interfere with the mission.[xxxii]

The lack of appropriately trained security forces to oversee IDP camps, such as al Hol and al Roj, also presents a serious threat to counter-ISIS efforts in northern Syria. Certain sections of al Hol camp are functionally under ISIS control.[xxxiii] Al Hol’s director said that camp detainees attacked administrative offices after the SDF withdrew from the camp on January 20.[xxxiv] The Syrian government accused the SDF of withdrawing from the camp with no coordination.[xxxv] The camp director said that “many” detainees escaped from al Hol in the chaos as the Syrian army advanced on the camp, consisting of mostly Syrian IS-linked men and some foreign fighters.[xxxvi] Dozens of suspected IS wives also escaped.[xxxvii] IS supporters online have reportedly urged sympathizers to travel to the al Hol area to provide shelter and transportation for escaped IS detainees.[xxxviii] Syrian Interior Ministry forces received al Hol camp from the Syrian army on January 21.[xxxix] The Interior Ministry is Syria’s primary counter-ISIS force, but it is not clear how well internal security forces will be able to reassert control over al Hol and manage the camp from now on without significant training to do so, given that the Syrian government assumed control of the camp with very little warning. The United States previously trained security forces at al Hol.

The United States’ transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq comes as the Iraqi federal government continues to take steps to prevent instability in Syria from spreading into Iraq. Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein and US Charge d’Affaires Joshua Harris almost certainty discussed the transfer of ISIS detainees during their meeting in Baghdad on January 21.[xl] The US announcement also follows phone calls between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and both Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi on January 20 and 21, respectively.[xli] Iraqi government officials remain concerned that instability in Syria will cause the threat of ISIS to spill over into Iraq.[xlii] An unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leader told Iraqi media on January 20 that the Iraqi federal government is considering a proposal by the framework leader to send a security delegation to Damascus to discuss Iraq-Syria border security.[xliii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs.

Iraqi officials, specifically Sudani, and security forces have recently taken steps to enhance border security, likely due to this spillover concern. Sudani inspected the readiness of military units along the Iraqi border on January 21.[xliv] Sudani chaired a security meeting at the Iraqi Army 7th Infantry Division Headquarters in al Qaim, western Anbar Province, which included Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir Shammari, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Yarallah, and other Iraqi military figures.[xlv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah commands several Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigades that control the al Qaim border crossing.[xlvi] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of Sudani.[xlvii] Sudani also attended a security briefing at the Sixth Region Border Forces Command Headquarters in Sinjar District, Ninewa Province, on January 21.[xlviii] The PMF 74th Brigade, which operates under the Ninewa Operations Command, reinforced its presence in Sinjar District on January 21.[xlix] The PMF Ninewa Operational Commander is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[l] A security source additionally told Iraqi militia-affiliated media on January 21 that the PMF 75th Brigade mobilized eight regiments at the Rabia border crossing in Ninewa Province.[li]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are blaming the United States for the instability in Syria, which the Iraqi actors believe could spread to Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Iraqi Resistance Collective claimed that US “agencies and interests” are legitimate targets due to the United States’ “incitement of the al Jolani terrorist gangs” and the release of ISIS detainees from Syrian prisons.[lii] A Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated parliamentarian called the US transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq a “violation of sovereignty” in a January 21 statement.[liii] The parliamentarian claimed that the United States has abandoned the SDF to Jabhat al Nusra, which refers to the Syrian government.[liv] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors tend to consider Shara and the Syrian government to be “terrorists” due to Shara’s past with al Qaeda in Iraq.[lv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai said on January 21 that Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada would support [Syrian] Kurds if ”terrorism violates their security and dignity.”[lvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias share some overlapping objectives with Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, such as concerns about Turkish presence in Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also worked with the PKK-linked Sinjar Resistance Units in Sinjar District, which may explain Walai’s statement.[lvii]

Some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elements do not approve of the regime’s internet shutdown. An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel said that the Iranian regime’s decision to maintain the internet shutdown is counterproductive to Iran’s “national security interest” because the shutdown has fueled public resentment.[lviii] The account is run by IRGC "fans," so it is likely not speaking directly for IRGC commanders but may be speaking on behalf of some IRGC elements. Iranians have had some access to some domestic sites and messaging platforms for the past few days, according to a regime cybersecurity spokesperson. The IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel highlighted on January 20 how this limited access is not enough to resolve the shutdown’s negative economic impact on the Iranian “digital middle class.”[lix] A Tehran shopkeeper separately told Western media on January 20 that their business had gone down by 90 percent because of the internet shutdown and the protests, and noted that the limited internet access has not alleviated these effects.[lx] Iranian Internet monitor NetBlocks estimates that the country-wide internet shutdowns cost over $37 million USD per day.[lxi] The Telegram channel’s concern is consistent with CTP-ISW's independent and ongoing assessment that the regime is unlikely to address the underlying economic factors that triggered the recent protest movement and is rather fueling these economic drivers, which makes it possible that protests could resume.[lxii]

This is not the first time that this Telegram channel has criticized the regime’s internet shutdown. CTP-ISW observed that the channel published and then quickly removed a message on January 19, which criticized the Iranian government for the mixed signals it has given on lifting internet restrictions.[lxiii] The channel’s January 19 post voiced an opinion that contradicts the regime’s official position.[lxiv] Regime officials previously announced that it would ”gradually” lift the internet shutdown when, in reality, the regime’s plan will make international internet and messaging platforms only accessible to vetted and trusted individuals.[lxv] Regime officials have also given different information on the plan‘s timeline, with some officials stating that the regime is implementing this plan and others stating that the internet would not be restored until the end of the 40-day mourning period.[lxvi] It is unclear why the Telegram channel deleted its first post criticizing the regime, but later posted and did not delete a similar critique. The Telegram channel may have felt more comfortable publishing criticism of the regime‘s internet shutdown on January 21 compared to January 19, or Iran’s deteriorating socio-economic situation may have reached a point that IRGC elements felt obliged to speak out. These two conclusions are not mutually exclusive.

The IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel's criticism of the regime’s internet shutdown could be an indication of the IRGC’s parochial economic interests in restoring the internet. The internet shutdown has almost certainly disproportionately affected the regime’s security apparatus and the IRGC writ large since their commercial and business work relies heavily on having access to international websites.[lxvii] The IRGC is heavily involved in the Iranian economy. The regime’s plan to relax the internet shutdown allows regime members to access the internet, but would not allow most Iranians to access the internet. This plan indicates that the regime seeks to allow regime insiders to benefit from internet access while still being able to control the narrative within Iran and use repressive measures despite the shutdown’s economic costs for the average Iranian.[lxviii]

The Iranian regime reportedly acknowledged on January 20 the first reported Artesh casualty of the recent protests. The Artesh is Iran's conventional military, in contrast to the IRGC, which is an ideological institution. US-based human rights activists reported on January 20 that Iranian regime-linked outlets stated that First Lieutenant Amin Salimi was shot and killed “while on mission” in Khavaran neighborhood, eastern Tehran, on January 10, which is when protests peaked.[lxix] The regime did not provide any details about Salimi‘s assignment, which makes it unclear what role he might have played in the protests. Salimi’s collar insignia indicates that he served in an Artesh electronic warfare unit, though the regime could have digitally altered the collar insignia. An Artesh electronic warfare unit would probably be responsible for supporting communications disruption efforts, including internet shutdown.[lxx] The Artesh previously issued a statement on January 10 in which it vowed to protect national interests, strategic infrastructure, and public property.[lxxi] Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami also noted on January 14 that security forces, including the Law Enforcement Command, Basij, and Artesh, ”neutralized the enemy‘s plot“ during the protests.[lxxii]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi intentionally obscured the violent reality of the regime’s crackdown on protests, in which the regime killed thousands of protesters and arrested thousands more, in a January 20 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal.[lxxiii] Araghchi may have also published this op-ed in an attempt to dissuade the United States from taking any punitive actions against the regime. Araghchi reiterated the regime’s talking point that the protests began peacefully but that ”foreign and domestic terrorist[s]” then attacked police officers and civilians.[lxxiv] Araghchi claimed that the regime had to respond to the ”terrorists” to protect its citizens facing ”horrors.”[lxxv] There is substantial evidence that the regime killed civilians intentionally, and many eyewitnesses have reported that the government forces indiscriminately fired into crowds of protesters.[lxxvi] The regime has engaged in an unprecedented level of brutality against the protesters, with death toll estimates ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 dead and around 19,000 arrested.[lxxvii] The regime also instituted a nationwide internet shutdown, which suggests that it was trying to hide its brutal crackdown on protesters.[lxxviii] A regime trying to argue that ”terrorists” caused the killing would presumably want footage of the ”terrorists” broadcast to the world. Araghchi blamed ”Israel and its proxies in the White House” for causing the protests and for trying to provoke the United States into striking Iran.[lxxix]

Key Takeaways

• Internal SDF Decision-Making: The Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) leadership may fracture over a decision to agree to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara's terms for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state, which would risk instigating serious conflict between government forces and Kurdish fighters. CTP-ISW assesses that the most likely course of action entails Abdi and a subset of more moderate SDF leaders agreeing to Shara’s terms while some hardline SDF leaders refuse to capitulate and continue to fight, which would lead to an insurgency. The most dangerous scenario would involve either Shara or Abdi deciding that neither party can move forward with a peaceful agreement to integrate the SDF, which could lead to widespread violence without any obvious or quick off-ramps.
• Syrian Government Offensive in Northeastern Syria: Syrian Ministry of Defense forces continued to advance and consolidate control over positions that the SDF recently abandoned, but also to set future military conditions for renewed offensive operations if the current ceasefire fails.
• The Status of Syrian ISIS Detention Facilities and IDP Camps: The US transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq can mitigate some of the very grave risks that dangerous and uncoordinated handovers of detention facilities present to US and Syrian counter-ISIS efforts. A successful transfer of all or most of the ISIS detainees will take longer than the 72 hours remaining in the ceasefire, however.
• Iraqi Border Security Concerns: The United States’ transfer of ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq comes as the Iraqi federal government continues to take steps to prevent instability in Syria from spreading into Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are blaming the United States for the instability in Syria, which the Iraqi actors believe could spread to Iraq.
• Criticism of the Iranian Regime’s Securitization: Some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) elements do not approve of the regime’s internet shutdown. An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel said that the Iranian regime’s decision to maintain the internet shutdown is counterproductive to Iran’s “national security interest” because the shutdown has fueled public resentment.
• Iranian Security Forces’ Protest Casualties: The Iranian regime reportedly acknowledged on January 20 the first reported Artesh casualty of the recent protests.
• Iranian Information Operation: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi intentionally obscured the violent reality of the regime’s crackdown on protests, in which the regime killed thousands of protesters and arrested thousands more, in a January 20 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. Araghchi may have also published this op-ed in an attempt to dissuade the United States from taking any punitive actions against the regime.

Iran

The Iranian regime continues to conduct counterterrorism operations in southeastern Iran, where it faces internal threats from anti-regime armed groups. The Iranian Intelligence Ministry announced on January 21 that IRGC Quds Headquarters and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers killed a leader of Ansar al Furqan (a Salafi-jihadi group linked to al Qaeda) and arrested 11 members of the group in three joint operations near Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[lxxx] The Ministry claimed that the fighters were preparing to conduct ”terrorist operations.”[lxxxi] The Iranian security forces also seized a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), two Kalashnikov rifles, six pistols, improvised explosive device (IED) equipment, and ammunition.[lxxxii] Ansar al Furqan spokesperson Nasrallah Baloch denied on January 21 that the Iranian regime arrested its fighters and killed one of its leaders, adding that the group is “prepared to punish” the regime.[lxxxiii] Ansar al Furqan has previously conducted attacks targeting Iranian security forces, such as its December 16 attack on an Iranian checkpoint in Kerman Province that killed at least 16 Iranian intelligence and LEC personnel.[lxxxiv]

Iraq

The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) claimed on January 21 that Iran conducted a ballistic missile and drone attack targeting the PAK’s Kurdistan National Army Unit in Koya District, Erbil City.[lxxxv] The PAK said that the attack killed one of its members and injured another.[lxxxvi] Iraqi media reported that a drone and a ballistic missile separately struck the site, while a second drone crashed at the site but did not explode.[lxxxvii] CTP-ISW did not observe any reports of a ballistic missile impact in Erbil City, which would have been widely reported in Kurdish media. Iran both threatened to escalate against and shelled anti-regime Kurdish militant groups operating in Iraqi Kurdistan during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement.[lxxxviii]

The Karkh Criminal Court in Baghdad City sentenced the unidentified killer of Iraqi Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa Mashhadani to death and life imprisonment on January 21.[lxxxix] The Karkh Criminal Court did not name Mashhadani’s killer.[xc] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi actors assassinated Mashhadani in the al Dhubat neighborhood, Tarmiyah District, on October 14, 2025.[xci] Mashhadani continuously advocated for the removal of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Tarmiyah, where Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have long maintained a presence.[xcii]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.