Iran Update, January 12, 2026

The Critical Threats P roject (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. ISW-CTP will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

CTP-ISW has recorded significantly less protest activity across Iran since January 8.[i] We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. CTP-ISW recorded 14 protests across six provinces on January 12, compared to 156 protests across 27 provinces on January 8.[ii] CTP-ISW recorded protests primarily in large cities, such as Tehran, Mashhad, and Karaj, on January 12.[iii] The Iranian regime has historically struggled to suppress unrest in less populated and rural areas more than in urban areas and it would therefore be surprising if protests continued to take place in large cities and not in smaller towns and villages.[iv] Iranians are also likely able to access tools like Starlink satellites more readily in urban areas and use these tools to share videos of protests with foreign media.[v] The regime’s internet shutdown therefore likely explains, at least partially, the decrease in recorded protest activity since January 8.[vi]

There are several indications that protests continue to take place in areas where we did not record protests on January 12. Fox News’s chief foreign correspondent reported on January 12 that he was able to contact a source in Esfahan who confirmed that protests continue to take place in the city.[vii] CTP-ISW has not recorded protests in Esfahan since January 9, which suggests that protesters in Esfahan have been unable to share videos of protests due to the internet shutdown. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency separately updated its security personnel death count on January 12 from 114 to 121.[viii] Tasnim recorded seven additional security personnel deaths in Fars Province on January 12, which suggests that protests, or at least the regime’s crackdown on anti-regime dissidents, have continued to take place in this province. CTP-ISW last reported a protest in Fars Province on January 10.[ix] Tasnim’s death count likely does not account for the full scale of security personnel deaths, given that CTP-ISW has recorded three security personnel deaths in Tehran Province, while Tasnim has not reported any deaths in this province.[x]

It is possible that the rate of protest activity across Iran has decreased due to the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests. A Norway-based human rights group reported on January 11 that the regime has killed at least 544 people and arrested more than 10,681 people since the beginning of the protests on December 28.[xi] Some estimates suggest that the protester death count is in the thousands. CTP-ISW has recorded 83 incidents across 24 provinces of security forces shooting live ammunition at protesters since December 28.[xii] Hospitals and medical centers in Iran have also reported being overwhelmed by the number of wounded protesters. The regime’s brutality could discourage some individuals from participating in the protests and thereby reduce the rate of protests.[xiii]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media threatened on January 12 to deploy more IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress protests.[xiv] The threat indicates that the regime continues to perceive protests as a significant threat to its stability, which is consistent with our assessment that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded. AFGS-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised the ability of the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade to “confront terrorists in any situation,” suggesting that the IRGC could deploy these units to suppress protests.[xv] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly described protesters as “terrorists.” The Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces, is considered the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[xvi] Brigadier General Amanollah Goshtasbi has commanded this base since March 2025.[xvii] The United States sanctioned Goshtasbi for his role in suppressing and killing Baloch citizens during the Mahsa Amini movement while serving as the IRGC Ground Forces Salman Corps commander in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xviii] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought in Syria to defend the Assad regime in 2015 and suppressed protests in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement.[xix] Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Feizollahi has commanded the Saberin Special Forces Brigade since June 2023.[xx] Feizollahi previously commanded the IRGC Ground Forces Ansar-e Rasoul Special Forces unit and reportedly ordered forces to shoot directly at protesters in Javanroud, Kermanshah Province, in November 2022.[xxi]

IRGC Ground Forces units have already deployed to several locations in western Iran, which suggests that the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij may be struggling to contain protests in these provinces. The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division deployed to suppress protests in Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province, on January 8.[xxii] The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division operates under the IRGC Ground Forces Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Hamedan provinces.[xxiii] IRGC Ground Forces Command Brigadier General Mohammad Karami recently appointed Brigadier General Mohsen Najaf Karimi as the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base commander in November 2025.[xxiv] The United Kingdom and European Union sanctioned Karimi for perpetrating serious human rights violations in his role as commander of the IRGC Ruhollah Corps in Markazi Province during the regime’s crackdown on the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests.[xxv] A Kurdish human rights organization separately reported a “large deployment” of IRGC forces to Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 10.[xxvi] It is possible that the IRGC forces in Bukan operate under the Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base given that this base is headquartered in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province.[xxvii] A BBC Persian journalist additionally circulated unverified reports of IRGC deployments in Ilam Province on January 8.[xxviii] IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 12 that protesters killed IRGC Colonel Mehdi Rahimi in Ilam City, Ilam Province, which could corroborate the recent reports of IRGC deployments in Ilam.[xxix]

The Iranian regime is likely encouraging pro-regime demonstrations as a counter-protest tactic to broadcast public support for the regime, discredit the protest movement, and possibly even directly confront protesters in the streets. The regime called on the Iranian people on January 12 to participate in pro-regime protests.[xxx] IRGC-affiliated media reported that pro-regime protesters demonstrated in at least 13 cities, including Tehran.[xxxi] Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian attended a pro-regime rally in Tehran on January 12.[xxxii] The call for regime supporters to take to the streets inherently creates a risk that anti-regime protesters will encounter pro-regime supporters, many of whom are likely members of Iranian security institutions, such as the Basij.[xxxiii] The regime is almost certainly aware of this risk and may seek to frame any engagements between pro- and anti-regime protesters as an attack by protesters on civilians and perpetuate its narrative that anti-regime protesters are “terrorists” and “rioters.” The presence of additional security members in public areas could also help the regime quickly quell protests and prevent them from becoming large-scale demonstrations. The regime lastly likely seeks to use the pro-regime rallies to demonstrate that it maintains public support and to retain its legitimacy.

The Masoud Pezeshkian administration has expressed willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States in an effort to de-escalate tensions with the United States amid Iranian concerns about potential US strikes on Iran. CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has softened its red lines for negotiations with the United States. Two sources “with knowledge” told Axios on January 12 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi recently contacted US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in an effort to “de-escalate” tensions with the United States or “buy more time” before potential US military action against Iran.[xxxiv] Araghchi and Witkoff discussed the possibility of meeting “in the coming days,” according to the sources.[xxxv] Trump confirmed on January 11 that Iran reached out to the United States to propose negotiations for a nuclear deal.[xxxvi] The Axios report comes after Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and Araghchi in Tehran on January 10.[xxxvii] Political insiders in Tehran told UK-based Amwaj Media on January 12 that Albusaidi may have relayed a message from the Trump administration during his visit.[xxxviii] Oman has historically served as a mediator between Iran and the United States. The Pezeshkian administration’s efforts to de-escalate tensions with the United States come as Trump has warned that the United States could intervene in the ongoing protests. Trump stated on January 11 that the United States is “looking at” options to support Iranian protesters.[xxxix] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 12 that Trump is weighing diplomacy against military strikes but currently “favors” using military action against Iran.[xl] Iran has refused to negotiate its ability to enrich uranium, support the Axis of Resistance, and develop its ballistic missile program in negotiations with the United States.[xli] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran is willing to make concessions on these issues.

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reached a ceasefire on January 10 after government forces captured Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo City. Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces, including armored units, advanced into Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo City on January 9 and secured the neighborhood on January 10 after engaging SDF-affiliated internal security forces, known as the Asayish.[xlii] The SDF then conducted five drone attacks targeting civilian infrastructure, including a government building, in Aleppo City on January 10 after the MoD captured Sheikh Maqsoud.[xliii] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi announced that the SDF agreed to an internationally-mediated ceasefire on January 10 that requires Asayish forces to withdraw from Aleppo City to SDF-controlled territory in northeastern Syria.[xliv] Local Syrian sources reported that the last Asayish fighters withdrew from Sheikh Maqsoud to SDF-controlled Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, on January 10.[xlv] The fighting between Syrian government forces and the SDF began on January 6, and Sheikh Maqsoud was the last Kurdish neighborhood under Asayish control after the MoD captured the majority of the Ashrafiyeh and Bani Zaid neighborhoods on January 8.[xlvi]  

Syrian government forces’ capture of Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo City and the Asayish’s withdrawal from the city will prevent the implementation of certain parts of the April 1 agreement. The April 1 agreement is a 14-point agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF that stipulates the integration of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud into Aleppo City’s municipality, as well as the integration of the Asayish into local police forces.[xlvii] The agreement was never fully implemented and significant episodes of fighting have broken out between government forces and the Asayish since April 2025.[xlviii] The agreement would have allowed the Asayish to effectively continue to police its own communities, but the Asayish will no longer be able to do so given its forced withdrawal from Aleppo City. The Asayish’s possession of heavy weapons violated the April 1 agreement, which required the SDF to remove such weapons from Aleppo City.[xlix]

The ongoing risk of new bouts of conflict between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF along eastern Aleppo frontlines underscores the need for the Syrian government and SDF to implement previous agreements. Syrian media reported that the MoD and SDF sent reinforcements to their respective positions along frontlines near Deir Hafer and Tishreen Dam on January 11 following the Asayish’s withdrawal from Aleppo City on January 10.[l] The MoD claimed that it observed the SDF moving fighters and heavy equipment toward frontlines in Deir Hafer.[li] The SDF denied the MoD’s claim, and a local source observed SDF convoys transferring civilians to Deir Hafer on the same day, likely after evacuating Aleppo City.[lii] A military source told Syrian state media that the MoD deployed additional reinforcements, including armored units and heavy artillery, to SDF-MoD frontlines near Deir Hafer on January 12.[liii] The SDF and MoD separately engaged each other with drones near Tishreen Dam on January 11.[liv] Sporadic bouts of fighting have erupted between the Syrian government and SDF near Tishreen Dam and Deir Hafer in recent months, though these frontlines have remained relatively unchanged. Tensions along these frontlines are unlikely to ease until both the Syrian government and SDF take meaningful steps to fully integrate the SDF into the Syrian state and security apparatus.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Protests: CTP-ISW has recorded significantly less protest activity across Iran since January 8. We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. The regime’s internet shutdown likely explains, at least partially, the decrease in recorded protest activity since January 8. It is possible that the rate of protest activity across Iran has also decreased due to the regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests.
• Regime Crackdown: Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media threatened on January 12 to deploy more IRGC Ground Forces units and specialized forces to suppress protests. The threat indicates that the regime continues to perceive protests as a significant threat to its stability, which is consistent with our assessment that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded. IRGC Ground Forces units have already deployed to several locations in western Iran, which suggests that the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij may be struggling to contain protests in these provinces.
• US-Iran Negotiations: The Masoud Pezeshkian administration has expressed willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States in an effort to de-escalate tensions with the United States amid Iranian concerns about potential US strikes on Iran. CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has softened its red lines for negotiations with the United States.
• SDF-Government Conflict in Aleppo: The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reached a ceasefire on January 10 after government forces captured Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo City. Syrian government forces’ capture of Kurdish-controlled neighborhoods in Aleppo City and the Asayish’s withdrawal from the city will prevent the implementation of certain parts of the April 1 agreement.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facade group Liwa al Imam al Khamenei threatened on January 10 to attack the US Embassy in Baghdad and US interests in the Middle East due to the United States’ support for the ongoing anti-regime protests in Iran.[lv] This threat is likely a response to recent reports in Western media that US President Donald Trump is considering various options to intervene in the ongoing protests.[lvi] This group’s affiliation is unknown, but Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have used facade groups in the past to threaten and attack US forces in Iraq and Syria.[lvii]

Syria

US Central Command (CENTCOM) and Jordan struck dozens of Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) targets in Syrian government territory on January 10 as part of their recent counter-ISIS operation.[lviii] CENTCOM targeted ISIS infrastructure, smuggling routes, and weapons depots throughout the Syrian Central Desert near Palmyra, Homs Province, and Deir ez Zor and Suwayda provinces.[lix] CENTCOM stated that the January 10 strikes were a continuation of recent CENTCOM strikes against ISIS in December 2025, which CENTCOM conducted in response to an ISIS-inspired insider attack that killed two US soldiers and a US civilian interpreter in Palmyra on December 13.[lx] US airstrikes on ISIS positions in government-controlled territory in recent weeks illustrate how US-Syrian counter-ISIS cooperation enables the United States to deny ISIS sanctuary in government-controlled territory.[lxi] ISIS previously used Assad-held areas west of the Euphrates River as a sanctuary largely free from persistent US interference.[lxii] The United Kingdom and France also recently struck ISIS weapons and explosives sites in Palmyra on January 4.[lxiii]

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon