Iran Update, February 1, 2026

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Iranian regime officials have continued to observe and respond to ongoing discussions in Western media about US concerns about a protracted conflict in the Middle East, likely as part of its effort to try to deter the United States from attacking Iran.  Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on February 1 that a US attack on Iran would lead to a regional war.[i] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also stated on February 1 that if the United States attacks Iran, the conflict will extend to the region and Iran will target all US bases.[ii] Iran previously conducted a missile attack in June 2025 targeting al Udeid Airbase in Qatar, which is a key US facility in the region, in retaliation for the US strikes on the Iranian nuclear program during the Israel-Iran War.[iii] These statements are likely a response to recent media reports that the United States does not want a wider regional war.[iv] Iran is likely threatening to get its regional partners involved and expand a potential conflict in order to try to deter a US attack against Iran.  

Iranian officials are continuing to discuss the possibility of US and Iranian strikes with other regional countries, likely as part of a diplomatic effort to avoid a US strike. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council of Iran (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran on January 31.[v] Thani indicated Qatar’s support for decreasing regional tensions and emphasized strengthening regional security and stability via peaceful efforts. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi also separately spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on January 31. Sisi noted that Cairo is continuing its efforts to restart negotiations between Iran and the United States.[vi]

The Gulf states have reportedly warned the United States that Iran’s missile program could cause significant damage to US interests in the region, according to two Western officials speaking to Washington Post.[vii] The Washington Post reported on February 1 that a Gulf assessment concluded that several key elements of Iran’s missile program remain intact, including short-range ballistic missiles and their launchers and some elements of its missile production system. The Gulf assessment also noted the Iranian regime has rebuilt its other, unspecified capabilities that were likely damaged in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. A former Iranian diplomat told the Washington Post that Iran has doubled its missile production since the war and has made significant progress in repairing launchers damaged during the war.[viii] The diplomat noted that the regime has deployed some launchers into Iran’s mountainous regions in an attempt to make it more difficult for the United States or Israel to destroy these launchers.

The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s January 30 agreement takes steps to satisfy key US objectives in Syria. Al Majalla, a Saudi-owned, UK-based media outlet, published the full text of the January 30 agreement on February 1 (see full list of clauses below).[ix] The January 30 agreement satisfies several key US policy goals, including the protection of Kurdish areas and better coordination for the protection of detention facilities holding Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham fighters in SDF-controlled territory.[x] US President Donald Trump and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack have repeatedly articulated these goals in calls and public statements since at least the beginning of government operations against the SDF in mid-January 2026.[xi] The agreement also provides for four SDF brigades--three in a division in Hasakah and another in Kobani.[xii] The SDF will also propose several candidates for key positions in the Syrian government, such as Azad Simi Jia Kobani for assistant defense minister.[xiii] Kobani is close to SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and has previously collaborated with US forces as part of the counter-ISIS mission.[xiv] The appointment of an SDF commander who has a close relationship with US partners to the position of assistantdefense minister would further enhance US-Syria counter-ISIS coordination and improve the Syrian government’s partnership with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. 

The agreement, according to al Majalla, includes fourteen clauses and four unspecified phases that will occur over one month, as well as a fifth phase that will result in a permanent agreement:[xv]

1. The SDF and Syrian Government declared a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire and agreed to stop arrests related to recent fighting. The SDF will continue to protect detention facilities holding ISIS fighters, and the Syrian government pledged to provide full logistical support for the ongoing US-led detainee relocation process.[xvi]
2. The SDF will withdraw its forces from Hasakah and Qamishli cities to agreed-upon bases, while the Syrian army will withdraw its forces near Hasakah City to al Shadaddi.[xvii]
3. The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) agreed to form a three-brigade army division in Hasakah Province made up of SDF fighters.[xviii]
4. The MoD will integrate SDF forces in Kobani into one brigade subordinate to an unspecified parent division in Aleppo Province.[xix]
5. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) will dispatch “15 vehicles” to both Hasakah and Qamishli cities to enhance security and begin the process of integrating SDF internal security forces into the MoI.
6. The SDF will submit proposals to appoint local officials, including the governor of Hasakah Province, the assistant minister of defense, and Hasakah Province’s deputy director of security. The Syrian government has already appointed a new Hasakah Province director of security.[xx]
7. The Syrian government will take over vital infrastructure from the SDF, including key oil fields in Hasakah Province and the Qamishli Airport.[xxi]
8. The Syrian government will deploy a team from the Land Border Authority to the Semalka and Nusaybin border crossings in SDF territory to register civilian employees and prevent the smuggling of foreign fighters and weapons at the crossings.[xxii]
9. The Syrian government will take over all civilian institutions in Hasakah Province and integrate the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) into Syrian state institutions.[xxiii]
10. The Syrian MoD will prevent its forces from entering Kurdish majority towns and cities.[xxiv]
11. The Syrian government will validate all school, university, and institutional certificates issued by the AANES.[xxv]
12. The Syrian government will provide licenses to all local and cultural organizations and media institutions in accordance with the regulations of the relevant ministries.[xxvi]
13. The Syrian Ministry of Education and the SDF will discuss the educational curriculum for the Kurdish community.[xxvii]
14. The Syrian government will ensure the return of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their respective cities and villages (including Afrin, Sheikh Maqsoud, and Ras al Ayn) and appoint local officials to those areas.[xxviii] Turkish-backed offensives against the SDF since 2018 forcibly displaced Kurds from Afrin and Ras al Ayn, and the more recent January 2026 Syrian government offensive displaced people across Aleppo, Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez Zor Provinces.[xxix]

The Syrian government and SDF took steps to implement the January 30 agreement on February 1 and began coordinating transfers of control and deconfliction. The Syrian MoI prepared on February 1 to deploy its forces to the cities of Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani on February 2.[xxx] Aleppo Province Internal Security Commander Colonel Mohammad Abdul Ghani visited the SDF internal security (known as Asayish) headquarters in Kobani City, Aleppo Province, on February 1, where he and his Asayish counterparts discussed the mechanism to enable MoI General Security Service (GSS) forces to enter the city.[xxxi] A pro-government Deir ez Zor-based source reported that Hasakah Province Internal Security Commander Brigadier General Marwan al Ali met Asayish leaders in Hasakah City on February 1 to discuss the GSS’s upcoming entry into the city and arranged a second meeting in Qamishli City to discuss the topic.[xxxii] Ali also reportedly met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Qamishli on February 1.[xxxiii] The SDF will reportedly impose a daytime curfew on February 2 in areas where the MoI plans to deploy, likely as a security measure to prevent Kurdish fighters who reject the agreement from spoiling it.[xxxiv] 

SDF leadership likely convinced the Women's Protection Unit (YPJ) to comply with the January 30 agreement even though the agreement functionally eliminates the YPJ in its current form. There appears to be some confusion or disagreement over whether the YPJ will integrate into Syrian security forces, and the YPJ could reverse its position in the coming days, however. The YPJ reportedly announced on February 1 that it disagreed with the SDF’s implementation of the January 30 agreement, but said the agreement was needed to “prevent massacres.”[xxxv] The YPJ said it will comply with the agreement and join new SDF brigades, though Al Monitor reported on January 30 that the Syrian government rejected forming a women’s brigade.[xxxvi] The specific details of the January 30 agreement, as reported by a Saudi-owned, UK-based media outlet on January 31, also made no mention of integrating the YPJ into the four brigades that will be composed solely of former SDF fighters in northern Syria.[xxxvii]

There are other indications that senior SDF leadership may be convincing more hardline pro-SDF entities to moderate their positions. A pro-SDF social media channel that had previously likened the MoD to ISIS has expressed its support for the January 30 agreement and has shifted its rhetoric in a way that will likely ease Kurdish tensions with the Syrian government.[xxxviii] The channel, titled “We are all SDF,” urged Hasakah and Qamishli City residents on January 31 to comply with the January 30 agreement and not to interfere with the MoI’s upcoming deployment to the areas.[xxxix] The channel’s statement also called on residents to reject calls by members of the Kurdish community to take to the streets to sabotage the agreement.[xl] This recent change in rhetoric from a prominent pro-SDF channel can help to ease tensions between Kurds and the Syrian government and prevent the spoiling of the January 30 agreement by Kurdish fighters dissatisfied with the terms of the agreement.

The SDF’s February 1 nominees for key posts in the Syrian government are close allies of SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and have experience collaborating with US forces. Two of the three nominees have a strong relationship with Abdi and have previously worked with the US-led coalition. The nominees are:

• Noureddine al Ahmad, former SDF public relations officer, as the Hasakah Province governor. The SDF proposed Noureddine al Ahmad, the former SDF public relations officer, as its candidate to become Hasakah Province governor to the Syrian government on January 31, and Ahmad claimed that the government approved his nomination the next day.[xli] A government source told Syrian media that no decision had been made to appoint Ahmad on February 1, however.[xlii] Ahmad has good relationships with the US-led coalition, has close ties to Abdie, and has experience mediating between Kurdish and Arab communities, all of which make him an ideal candidate for Hasakah Province governor.[xliii]
• Azad Simi Jia Kobani, SDF intelligence chief, as the Syrian assistant defense minister. The SDF also reportedly proposed SDF intelligence chief Azad Simi Jia Kobani for the position of Syrian AssistantDefense Minister, who is also reportedly close to Abdi.[xliv] Kobani has previously collaborated with US forces during counter-ISIS operations in northeastern Syria. Kobani’s relationship with US forces could help the United States engage with some elements of the defense ministry in the coming months and years.[xlv]
• Siamand Afrin, unspecified SDF commander, as the Hasakah Province deputy director of security. Afrin would be the deputy of Internal Security Commander Brigadier General Marwan al Ali. Syrian media also reported that the SDF proposed SDF commander Siamand Afrin for the position of Hasakah Province deputy director of security.[xlvi] A Syrian government source confirmed that the Syrian government received the SDF’s proposed names, but stressed that the Syrian government is still in the “nomination stage” and that no decision has been issued to appoint anyone yet.[xlvii]

Pro-government sources and other analysts have highlighted that many of the SDF’s proposed candidates are former Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) members and singled out Kobani, especially for his involvement in terrorist attacks in Turkey.[xlviii] The majority of high-ranking SDF members, including Abdi himself, are former PKK members who have conducted insurgent activity in Turkey.[xlix] Any decision to reject SDF nominees on the basis of their PKK past would result in the disqualification of the most experienced and capable SDF leaders who could help guide the integration.

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s Efforts to Deter a US Attack: Iranian regime officials have continued to observe and respond to ongoing discussions in Western media about US concerns about a protracted conflict in the Middle East, likely as part of its effort to try to deter the United States from attacking Iran. Iranian officials are also continuing to discuss the possibility of US and Iranian strikes with other regional countries, likely as part of a diplomatic effort to avoid a US strike.
• Iranian Missile Program: The Gulf states have reportedly warned the United States that Iran’s missile program could cause significant damage to US interests in the region, according to two Western officials speaking to Washington Post.
• Syrian Government-SDF Agreement: The Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s January 30 agreement takes steps to satisfy key US objectives in Syria. The Syrian government and SDF took steps to implement the January 30 agreement on February 1 and began coordinating transfers of control and deconfliction.
• Internal SDF Deliberations: SDF leadership may have convinced the Women's Protection Unit (YPJ) to comply with the January 30 agreement even though the agreement functionally eliminates the YPJ in its current form. There appears to be some confusion or disagreement over whether the YPJ will integrate into Syrian security forces, and the YPJ could reverse its position in the coming days, however. There are other indications that senior SDF leadership may be convincing more hardline pro-SDF entities to moderate their positions.
• SDF Leadership Nominations: The SDF’s February 1 nominees for key posts in the Syrian government are close allies of SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and have experience collaborating with US forces.

Iran

The Iranian regime has continued to downplay the number of civilians it killed during the recent nationwide protests. The Office of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian shared a list of 2,986 protesters on February 1 whom the regime killed during the recent protests in Iran.[l] Western media outlets have previously reported protester death toll estimates to be between 2,000 and 20,000.[li] The death toll reported by Western media outlets far surpasses the approximately 1,500 protesters who were killed in 2019 and the approximately 550 protesters who were killed during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement.[lii]

An unidentified Iranian official told Reuters on February 1 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval forces have “no plan” to carry out live-fire exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, a day after US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported the IRGC Navy would hold a two-day exercise beginning on February 1.[liii]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

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