Iran Update Evening Special Report, May 22, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

Key Takeaways:

• The US-Iran negotiations have reportedly made “slight progress,” but Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz remain the two key sticking points in negotiations. It is unclear from public reporting where specifically “progress” was made.
• Iran has launched an information operation to frame its protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz as a legitimate maritime security service. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy claimed on May 22 that 35 vessels transited the strait in the past 24 hours after obtaining Iranian ”permission” and ”security.” This “security“ is effectively protection from attacks by Iranian forces, which is the only force that has threatened shipping in the Strait of Hormuz since February 2026.
• The war cannot end in a way that secures US and allied interests until Iran abandons its effort to control the strait. Recognition or compliance with Iranian transit rules would allow the regime to achieve de facto control over the strait.

Toplines

The US-Iran negotiations have reportedly made “slight progress,” but Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz remain the two key sticking points in negotiations. It is unclear from public reporting where specifically “progress” was made. An unspecified senior Iranian source told Reuters that both sides have narrowed gaps between their demands, but that Iran's uranium enrichment and the Strait of Hormuz remain sticking points.[i] An unspecified Pakistani diplomatic source told Saudi news media outlet Al Hadath that the main obstacle in the talks remains how to handle Iran’s HEU, and that closing gaps will not be easy because both sides maintain “high demands.”[ii] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio similarly stated that talks show "slight progress" but stressed again that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon or remain in control of the Strait of Hormuz.[iii] Iran has not signaled willingness to meet US demands to secure its HEU stockpile out of Iran, and there is a broad consensus in Tehran that Iran must retain control over the strait.[iv] US officials have called an outcome wherein Iran continues to control the strait ”unfeasible.”[v] Rubio warned that the president has "other options" if negotiations fail.[vi]

Iran has launched an information operation to frame its protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz as a legitimate maritime security service. Iran's conduct toward commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz is a protection racket, which is a coercive extortion scheme in which an actor creates or threatens danger and then demands payment or compliance in exchange for protection from that danger. The New York Times reported on May 21 that Iran and Oman have discussed a system to charge vessels fees for maritime “services” rather than tolls for passage.[vii] Iran likely seeks Omani support to legitimize its efforts to extend control over the entire strait. Iran‘s current “control“ scheme makes territorial claims that infringe upon Emirati and Omani sovereignty.[viii] The inclusion of Oman and not the UAE is notable in this context because Omani participation would legitimize Iranian efforts while still extending Iranian claims of sovereignty over Emirati territorial waters. The New York Times reported on May 21 that Oman initially rejected a partnership with Iran but added that Omani officials are now signaling willingness to use Oman's influence with Gulf neighbors and the United States to support the proposed fee system.[ix] A fee and control system under which Iran and Oman control the strait together would still infringe upon Emirati sovereignty. Iran has claimed that its fee is in part for “security“ or “insurance“ for vessels that transit the strait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy claimed on May 22 that 35 vessels transited the strait in the past 24 hours after obtaining Iranian ”permission” and ”security.” This “security“ is effectively protection from attacks by Iranian forces, which is the only force that has threatened shipping in the Strait of Hormuz since February 2026. The US Navy, by comparison, is imposing a blockade upon Iranian ports--not the Strait of Hormuz. Commercial vessels only require such security guarantees to transit the strait because Iran has created insecurity through attacks, threats, and restrictions on international shipping. Iran now seeks to require vessels to secure Iranian permission and pay fees in exchange for protection from Iranian attacks or denial of passage. Bloomberg reported that vessels dealing with Iran’s new Persian Gulf Strait Authority have sometimes received payment requests of up to $2 million for safe passage, though Reuters reported on May 20 that most ships pay around $150,000.[x] 

Iran’s neighbors and the United States continue to reject Iranian efforts to normalize control over the strait. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE wrote in a statement to the International Maritime Organization that Iran appears to be attempting “to control traffic” through the strait by forcing vessels to use a route within its territorial waters.[xi] The statement warned that any recognition of Iran’s proposed route or the PGSA would set “a dangerous precedent.”[xii]  

The war cannot end in a way that secures US and allied interests until Iran abandons its effort to control the strait. Recognition or compliance with Iranian transit rules would allow the regime to achieve de facto control over the strait. Iran’s promise not to attack vessels would not secure freedom of navigation if the regime requires ships to obtain permits, pay fees, or coordinate with IRGC Navy forces. Full freedom of navigation through the strait, therefore, remains a necessary condition for any durable end to the war. CTP-ISW has assessed that Iranian leaders are positioning Iran to emerge from the war in a stronger strategic position, with veto power over access to the strait.[xiii] Iran is therefore not aiming to just ”survive” the war.

Maritime Developments

See topline section.

US-Israeli Air Campaign

Nothing significant to report.

Iran Internal Dynamics

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Other Axis of Resistance Activity

The Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework has reportedly decided to form an Iraqi federal government committee to investigate recent likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[xiv]  Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched six drones targeting the UAE from May 17 to 19, including a drone that struck the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant.[xv] Saudi Arabia also reported on May 17 that it intercepted three drones launched from Iraq.[xvi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted numerous drone attacks targeting the Gulf countries prior to the start of the ceasefire on April 7.[xvii] A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on May 22 that the Iraqi federal government committee will include unspecified security specialists and representatives from the Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs ministries. The committee will reportedly consist of one team that will review evidence, including the drone flight paths, in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while the other team investigates within Iraq in order to identify the responsible actors.[xviii]

The Deputy Head of the Executive Council of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Hussein al Saidi, rejected on May 22 the disarmament of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and any integration of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the Iraqi security establishment.[xix] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba controls PMF brigades.[xx] Iranian-backed groups like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba often respond to directives from Tehran, not Baghdad, even though they have forces in the PMF. Saadi referenced “talk” about merging the PMF, the Federal Police, and the Rapid Response Forces into a “Federal Security Ministry” and called this a “purely American project.”[xxi] The Federal Police and Rapid Response Forces operate under the Interior Ministry.[xxii] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq, including via militia disarmament, since early 2025. The United States has redoubled its efforts in recent months due to militia attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war.[xxiii]

Saidi’s statement comes amid reports that an Iraqi committee comprised of Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaidi, and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is close to finalizing an “executive plan” to disarm the Iraqi militias.[xxiv] A senior Iraqi political official told Asharq al Awsat on May 9 that the plan involves the confiscation of militias’ medium and heavy weapons, as well as the restructuring of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) but did not provide further details about the plan.[xxv] Saadi said that Iraqi officials that insist on integrating the PMF into the security establishment will “pay the price” politically.[xxvi] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi also called disarmament a “red line” on May 6.[xxvii] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Kataib Hezbollah also reportedly reject disarmament.[xxviii] These militias and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have, both historically and during the war, been the most kinetically active and are more subordinate to Iran than other Iraqi militias.[xxix]

The Iraqi federal government’s efforts to disarm the militias also come after Iran has separately pressured its Iraqi partners to stop all kinetic activity, likely to avoid US financial pressure against Iraq that negatively impacts Iran.[xxx] Iran hopes to benefit by increasing Iranian-backed Iraqi political control of the Iraqi government. Unidentified informed sources told Iraqi media on May 5 that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned about “real dangers” that could result in a loss of unspecified military privileges and discussed the need for an “alternative plan” regarding militia disarmament during meetings with unspecified militias and framework leaders in Baghdad on April 18.[xxxi] Ghaani reportedly proposed a militia disarmament plan that seeks to avoid provoking the United States by ending the kinetic role of some militias, while simultaneously consolidating CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran could decide to build a new, loyal cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that would supplement the political activity of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.[xxxii] US financial pressure on Iraq, such as the US Treasury Department’s reported decision to halt shipments of Iraqi export oil revenue to Iraq, heavily impacts Iran due to Iran’s use of the Iraqi economy for sanctions evasion and to help fund the Axis of Resistance.[xxxiii]