Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 5, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump appears to have extended the deadline for Iran to stop attacking shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to 8:00 PM ET on April 7 amid discussions with Iranian officials. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said on April 5 that Iran would continue attacking shipping through the Strait, however.
• US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that US forces on April 4 completed the rescue of both F-15E crewmembers after Iran shot down their aircraft on April 2 during a combat mission.
• US forces successfully established a makeshift airstrip very close to a major Iranian city, successfully extracted all of its personnel during the rescue operation, and the combined force has continued to strike targets in Iran.
• The combined force has continued to strike operational components of the program even as it targets production facilities for engines, guidance systems, and other components and research and development facilities, including a missile launcher reportedly for a Haj Qassem missile, which has a maximum range of 1,400 km.
• The IDF is continuing to target Iranian tunnel entrances in order to prevent Iranian forces from using tunnels to conceal missile sites.
• Iran has slightly altered its strike packages targeting Gulf states to include more cruise missiles, but it is unclear whether this represents experimentation with new tactics, an effort to manage the remaining missile reserves, or something else.
• Hezbollah published footage on April 4 and 5 that Hezbollah claimed shows first-person view (FPV) drone attacks conducted on March 25 against an Israeli vehicle and two Israeli Merkava tanks in southern Lebanon.
• Hezbollah claimed to have launched anti-ship cruise missiles at an Israeli warship located 68 nautical miles off the coast of Lebanon on April 5 for the first time since the start of the war.
• The IDF estimated that Hezbollah can maintain a fire rate of 200 rockets and drone launches per day at Israel for an additional five months. Hezbollah rocket and drone attacks do not appear to be achieving the desired effect of altering Israel's decision-making in conducting airstrikes against Iran, however.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to blame Kuwait for attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure, likely in an attempt to obfuscate responsibility for these attacks to a domestic Iraqi audience.

Toplines

US President Donald Trump appears to have extended the deadline for Iran to stop attacking shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to 8:00 PM ET on April 7 amid discussions with Iranian officials.[i] Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said on April 5 that Iran would continue attacking shipping through the Strait, however.[ii] Trump had previously set the deadline for Monday, April 6, following a prior extension.[iii] Trump threatened to attack energy infrastructure and bridges in the event Iran persists in attacking shipping after his deadline.[iv] Mojtaba said on April 5 that Iranian forces would continue to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[v] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on April 5 to discuss Pakistan’s mediation efforts between Iran and the United States.[vi] Media readouts did not disclose if Iran agreed to any negotiations, however.[vii]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that US forces on April 4 successfully completed the rescue of both F-15E crewmembers after Iran shot down their aircraft on April 2 during a combat mission.[viii] CENTCOM had not previously acknowledged the earlier rescue of the F-15E pilot, which occurred on April 3.[ix] US special operations forces successfully secured the F-15E weapons system officer (WSO) on April 4.[x] US officials told Western media that the WSO survived after evading capture for 36 hours, but he is seriously wounded and now receiving medical treatment in Kuwait.[xi] The rescue operation resulted in an unspecified number of Iranian casualties.[xii] US forces destroyed two transport aircraft and multiple MH-6 Little Birds that they could not extract from Iran after the rescue operation.[xiii] US President Donald Trump stated that the recoveries involved two US “raids” and noted that in the second operation, US forces spent seven hours over Iran.[xiv] Trump also announced he will hold a press conference in the Oval Office at 1:00 p.m. on April 6.[xv]

Iranian regime media is falsely characterizing the shootdown of the F-15E and subsequent downing of an A-10 attack aircraft during rescue operations as a US defeat.[xvi] US forces successfully established a makeshift airstrip very close to a major Iranian city, successfully extracted all of its personnel, and the combined force has continued to strike targets in Iran.[xvii] An Iranian military spokesperson said that Iranian forces ”thwarted” the rescue attempt, even though US forces recovered all personnel in Iran, and all personnel are alive.[xviii] Iranian regime media argued that US forces would not have struggled to get MC‑130 aircraft off the ground if Iranian air defense systems had truly been neutralized.[xix] The MC-130s were unable to get off the ground because their nose gear got stuck in the sand, not because of any Iranian action.[xx]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is continuing to target Iranian tunnel entrances in order to prevent Iranian forces from using tunnels to conceal missile sites. The head of the Israeli Air Intelligence Group stated on April 5 that Israel must expend “large resources” to prevent Iranian forces from hiding in mountainous areas.[xxi] The official added that the IDF blocks the tunnel entrances to prevent Iranian forces from entering or exiting the tunnels.[xxii] Iran buries important missile sites underneath mountains and in tunnels to conceal the sites and to make it difficult for airstrikes to damage them.[xxiii]

Iran has slightly altered its strike packages to include more cruise missiles. Iran has previously not used cruise missiles at the rate it did on April 5, but it is unclear whether this represents experimentation with new tactics, an effort to manage the remaining missile reserves, or something else. Iran launched four cruise missiles at Kuwait, two at Qatar, and one each at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.[xxiv]

US-Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to strike operational components of the program even as it targets production facilities for engines, guidance systems, and other components and research and development facilities. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account on X and Kurdish media reported on April 5 that the combined force struck a missile launcher in Kamyaran, Kurdistan Province.[xxv] A defense analyst stated that the launcher appeared to be for a Haj Qassem missile, which is a medium-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of 1,400 km.[xxvi] An OSINT account on X and anti-regime media reported on April 5 that the combined force struck a missile launcher inside a warehouse in Farashband, Fars Province.[xxvii]

The combined force continued to strike Iranian internal security forces. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the Ahvaz International Airport in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[xxviii] It is unclear what the target of the strikes was. The 51st Hazrat-e Hojjat Independent Armored Brigade is based near the airport and operates under the Karbala Operational Base in Ahvaz.[xxix] OSINT accounts on X reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the IRGC Ground Forces 14th Imam Hossein Division and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Provincial headquarters in Esfahan, Esfahan Province.[xxx] The Imam Hossein Division operates under the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base in Esfahan, which the combined force struck on March 8.[xxxi]

The combined force has continued its decapitation campaign against Iranian military officials. The combined force killed IRGC Brigadier General Mostafa Azizi on April 5.[xxxii] IRGC-affiliated media reported on April 5 that Azizi served in the IRGC Navy’s 3rd Imam Hossein Naval District in Khuzestan Province.[xxxiii] The 3rd Imam Hossein Naval District controls the northwestern Persian Gulf and Khuzestan’s maritime borders and coastal waters, and includes key naval infrastructure such as the Arvand Naval Base and associated surface combat brigades.[xxxiv] The IDF separately killed Mohammad Reza Ashrafi Ghahi in Tehran Province.[xxxv] The IDF reported that Ashrafi Ghahi served as the head of commerce in the IRGC Oil Headquarters and managed oil sales that generated billions of dollars annually.[xxxvi] Iranian media reported on April 5 that the combined force killed Artesh Air Defense Academy Commander Brigadier General Masoud Zare during recent strikes.[xxxvii] US President Donald Trump stated on Truth Social on April 4 that “many of Iran’s military leaders” were killed in a large strike in Tehran Province.[xxxviii] An OSINT reported that the video Trump shared shows explosions from strikes in northern Tehran conducted on April 3.[xxxix]

Anti-regime media reported on April 5 that Iran’s Bank Sepah experienced another major computer network disruption that reportedly prevented the bank from paying IRGC personnel and regime military officials.[xl] The combined force previously struck a Bank Sepah building on March 11, in which Bank Sepah said that the strike destroyed the building and disrupted in-person and online services.[xli] Bank Sepah is responsible for paying IRGC and Artesh personnel.[xlii] Repeated disruptions are notable because they could interfere with the regime’s ability to pay military personnel, which could exacerbate the challenges the regime is facing with desertions.

Iranian Response

Iran has launched at least five missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on April 4.[xliii]  An Israeli military correspondent reported on April 5 that an Iranian ballistic missile hit an open area in Neot Hovav Industrial Zone, southern Israel.[xliv] An Iranian missile also directly hit a residential building in Haifa on April 5, causing extensive damage to the building and seriously wounding one person.[xlv]

The IRGC claimed on April 5 that it targeted “US-linked oil and gas infrastructure” in the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait.[xlvi] Falling debris from a missile interception ignited three fires at a Borouge company petrochemicals plant in al Ruwais, UAE, on April 5.[xlvii] Debris from intercepted Iranian projectiles also hit an unspecified container vessel at the Khor Fakkan Port, Sharjah Emirate, igniting a fire and injuring four crew members.[xlviii] Iranian drones hit several Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (GPIC) units in Sitra, Bahrain, according to Bahrani state media on April 5.[xlix] An Iranian drone separately struck a Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) storage tank in Sitra on April 5, igniting a fire.[l] Iran previously struck the refinery on March 5.[li] The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry also said on April 5 that Iranian drones hit two power generation and water desalination facilities, a Kuwaiti Ministries Complex building, an Oil Ministry building, and several Kuwait Petroleum Corporation-affiliated “operational facilities.”[lii]

A top Iranian official suggested that the Axis of Resistance will threaten shipping in the Bab al Mandeb. This statement is probably designed to deter future US action. Former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati stated on X on April 5 that the “unified command” of the Axis of Resistance views Bab el Mandeb the same way it views the Strait of Hormuz.[liii] Velayati warned that the flow of global energy and global trade could be disrupted “with a single signal.”[liv] IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim previously warned on March 25 of a “new front” in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, the southern entrance to the Red Sea off the Yemeni coast.[lv] Velayati’s statement suggests that Iran is framing the Bab el Mandeb as part of its coercive regional deterrent posture and is coordinating with the Houthis, but it does not mean that Iran alone controls Houthi decision-making. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Houthis likely aim to help deter further US escalation against Iran and the wider Axis of Resistance, but they are unlikely to expand attacks in ways that would jeopardize their domestic position.[lvi]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 40 attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 4 and 2:00 PM ET on April 5.[lvii] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel.[lviii] An Israeli journalist reported on April 5 that Hezbollah rockets struck Deir al Asad, northern Israel, injuring at least six individuals.[lix] Hezbollah drones also struck a home in Shomrat, northern Israel, on April 5.[lx]

Hezbollah used an anti-ship cruise missile targeting an Israeli warship for the first time in this conflict. Hezbollah claimed that it launched anti-ship cruise missiles targeting an Israeli warship located 68 nautical miles off the coast of Lebanon on April 5.[lxi] This attack marks the first time that Hezbollah has used an anti-ship cruise missile in an attack against Israel.[lxii] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel estimates that the ship was damaged.[lxiii]

Hezbollah used first-person view (FPV) drones in multiple attacks in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah published footage on April 4 and 5 that Hezbollah claimed shows FPV drone attacks conducted on March 25 against an Israeli vehicle and two Israeli Merkava tanks in southern Lebanon.[lxiv] The FPV drones used in the two attacks were likely not fiber-optic FPV drones. Hezbollah previously claimed six FPV drone attacks against IDF armored vehicles between March 31 and April 3.[lxv]

The IDF reported on April 5 that Hezbollah has conducted at least 165 rocket attacks that fell inside or near United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) positions in southern Lebanon.[lxvi] The IDF stated that Hezbollah exploits its close proximity to UNIFIL positions and outposts to ”advance terrorist actions against [Israel].”[lxvii] UNIFIL operates 29 positions across southern Lebanon.[lxviii] UNIFIL has not commented on this Israeli report at the time of this writing.

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and affiliated sites across Lebanon. The IDF has struck over 3,500 Hezbollah targets, including hundreds of command centers, weapon depots, and rocket and missile launchers, in Lebanon since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[lxix] The IDF struck Hezbollah headquarters and two Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations in Beirut on April 5.[lxx] The Amana Fuel Company is owned by Hezbollah, operates a network of gas stations in Lebanon, and manages Hezbollah’s fuel supplies.[lxxi] The United States sanctioned the Amana Fuel Company in February 2020 for its role in supporting Hezbollah.[lxxii] The IDF has struck over 15 Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations since the start of Israel's campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[lxxiii]

Multiple IDF divisions are continuing ground operations across southern Lebanon. The IDF 91st Territorial Division, including the 8th Armored Brigade (Res.), has continued to expand its focused ground operations in southern Lebanon. The division’s soldiers engaged with and killed several Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon, as well as located several Hezbollah weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and ammunition.[lxxiv] The IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) has similarly continued to expand the IDF’s security zone and located various military equipment and weapons, including surface-to-surface rockets and launchers, explosive charges, ATGMs, and military vests, in southern Lebanon.[lxxv] The IDF 146th Reserve Division, including the 226th Paratrooper Brigade and 213th Artillery Brigade, has killed over 90 Hezbollah fighters since March 2.[lxxvi]  IDF officials have reaffirmed that the IDF will continue to hold territory in southern Lebanon until the direct threat of Hezbollah is removed.[lxxvii] IDF officials also reiterated that disarming Hezbollah is an ongoing goal of Israel’s current campaign in Lebanon.[lxxviii]

Israeli media reported on April 4 that the IDF acknowledged that it overestimated the level to which Israel degraded Hezbollah during the Fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict and noted that the IDF is compiling an updated estimate of Hezbollah’s capabilities.[lxxix] The IDF’s updated estimates indicated that Hezbollah is prepared for a prolonged campaign and is operating a strategic campaign to be able to sustain its daily attacks against Israel.[lxxx] The IDF estimated that Hezbollah is capable of maintaining a fire rate of 200 launches, including rockets and drones, per day at Israel for an additional five months.[lxxxi] Hezbollah’s rocket and drone attacks do not appear to be affecting Israeli strategic calculations at this time. The IDF noted that Hezbollah maintains hundreds of launchers, most of which are located north of the Litani River in civilian areas, which makes it difficult for the Israeli Air Force to locate and destroy them.[lxxxii]  The IDF has identified ”significant cracks” in Hezbollah’s command and control structure, specifically between Hezbollah’s central leadership in Beirut and Hezbollah forces operating on the ground in southern Lebanon.[lxxxiii] Security sources told Israeli media on April 4 that the IDF has Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem ”in [their] sights” and noted that the IDF ”will not hesitate to act as soon as the operational opportunity arises.”[lxxxiv] Israeli media also reported on April 4 that there is a decline in morale among Hezbollah fighters, noting that Hezbollah reservists have failed to report to duty and some operatives have fled to the north to avoid direct confrontation with IDF forces.[lxxxv]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

The Houthis claimed that they launched a ballistic missile and several drones targeting Ben Gurion Airport, central Israel, and unspecified “vital [IDF] military targets” in southern Israel on April 4.[lxxxvi] The Houthis noted that they conducted their operation in coordination with Iran and Hezbollah.[lxxxvii] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of impacts at Ben Gurion Airport at the time of this writing. This attack marks the seventh time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[lxxxviii] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the Houthis‘ involvement in the war thus far appears calibrated to try to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.[lxxxix]

The US-Israeli combined force struck positions held by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib al Tayyar al Risali for the third time in this conflict.[xc] The combined force repeatedly struck 31st Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade sites in Salah al Din Province on April 4 and 5.[xci] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib al Tayyar al Risali controls the 31st PMF Brigade.[xcii]

The combined force separately struck Badr Organization-controlled PMF Brigade sites in Salah al Din Province on April 5.[xciii]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on April 4 that it conducted 19 drone attacks against “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region.[xciv] Likely front group Kataib Sarkhat al Quds also claimed on April 4 that it attacked unspecified US interests in Kuwait.[xcv] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab also claimed on April 4 that it conducted two “air attacks” targeting unspecified US and Israeli interests in Bahrain and northern Iraq with “appropriate weapons.”[xcvi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to blame Kuwait for attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure, likely in an attempt to obfuscate responsibility for these attacks to a domestic Iraqi audience. Unspecified actors also launched six drones targeting a China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)-operated oil field in Maysan Province on April 4, igniting a fire.[xcvii] ThNo group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have repeatedly attacked other foreign-operated energy sites in Iraq since the start of the conflict, however.[xcviii] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds attempted to obfuscate militia responsibility for the attacks on Iraqi energy infrastructure by blaming the Kuwaiti government and the Kurdistan Regional Government in an April 4 statement.[xcix] This statement will not fool Western governments, the Iraqi government, or others, but the Iraqi groups still need to answer to a popular domestic constituency.