Iran Update Evening Special Report, April 11, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

 The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran and the United States have fundamentally different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations, which will generate friction. Iran seeks an all-encompassing agreement that will end the threat of war with the United States, while the United States seeks a much narrower agreement centered on the current war. The US delegation, led by US Vice President JD Vance and including US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to be pursuing a narrow, issue-specific negotiation focused on de-escalatory mechanisms around the Strait of Hormuz, and reportedly secondary matters like detainees.
• Iran is using the existence of an unknown number of naval mines it laid in the Strait of Hormuz to force ships to use Iranian territorial waters to traverse the Strait, which enables Iran to shakedown these ships for fees while the ships are in Iranian territorial waters. This protection racket is illegal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Iran likely designed its threatening behavior and its shakedowns to disrupt the global economy, which Iran calculates will enable it to extract concessions from the United States. Iran warned merchant ships that mines could exist in a “hazardous area” that covers 1,394 sq km of the Strait, including the normal traffic separation scheme (shipping lanes) that ships use to transit the Strait.
• The current ceasefire will provide Iran an opportunity to reorganize its missile force and recover from the temporary disruption wrought to the missile force during constant US and Israeli operations. Consistent US and Israeli operations over Iran had suppressed Iran’s missile force by preventing Iran from digging out launchers, disrupting command-and-control, and creating pervasive fear in military units that made them unwilling or unable to conduct attacks, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei continues to recover from severe facial and leg injuries that he sustained in the February 28 strike on the supreme leader’s compound in Tehran Province. Three unspecified individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle told Reuters on April 11 that the strike disfigured Mojtaba’s face and injured one or both of his legs.
• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran to reconstitute some of its degraded air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is preparing to deliver man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran within the coming weeks, according to three sources familiar with recent US intelligence assessments.

Toplines

Iran and the United States have fundamentally different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations, which will generate friction. Iran seeks an all-encompassing agreement that will end the threat of war with the United States, while the United States seeks a much narrower agreement centered on the current war. The US delegation, led by US Vice President JD Vance and including US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to be pursuing a narrow, issue-specific negotiation focused on de-escalatory mechanisms around the Strait of Hormuz, and reportedly secondary matters like detainees.[i] The Iranian delegation is explicitly framing the talks as leverage for a broader reset in the US-Iran relationship.[ii] Iranian demands include sovereignty claims over the Strait of Hormuz, compensation for war damages, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and a region-wide ceasefire across the “Axis of Resistance,” which creates an imbalance in expectations that sets the talks up for deadlock.[iii] Two people briefed on negotiations told the Financial Times that the April 11 negotiations have reached a ”stalemate” over the main sticking point — the status of the Strait of Hormuz.[iv]

The composition of Iran’s at least 70-person delegation, headed by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, underscores Iran’s wide-ranging negotiating intentions.[v] The large and heavily securitized team blends diplomats, parliamentarians, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-adjacent figures, and high-level economic technocrats, indicating that Iran is pressing a long list of demands across a range of issue areas.[vi] The inclusion of the Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati and economic specialists points to a focus on sanctions architecture, frozen assets, and alternative financial mechanisms, suggesting preparation for prolonged economic and strategic bargaining rather than confidence-building compromise.[vii]

The unusually large size of the Iranian delegation likely also reflects internal divisions and deep mutual distrust among regime power centers, rather than a unified negotiating strategy. There was reportedly infighting between the regime factions before the negotiations.[viii] Ghalibaf and Araghchi reportedly clashed with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi over Vahidi’s effort to insert longtime IRGC affiliate and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr into the talks, despite Zolghadr’s lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations.[ix] An IRGC-affiliated media outlet reported on their English language X account that Zolghadr was in the delegation in Islamabad, along with Defense Council Secretary IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, but Iranian Persian-language media did not disclose if Zolghadr was present.[x] The presence of overlapping political, security, and economic actors suggests a need for constant internal monitoring.[xi]

Iran is using the existence of an unknown number of naval mines it laid in the Strait of Hormuz to force ships to use Iranian territorial waters to traverse the Strait, which enables Iran to shakedown these ships for fees while the ships are in Iranian territorial waters. Iran likely designed its threatening behavior and its shakedowns to disrupt the global economy, which Iran calculates will enable it to extract concessions from the United States.  Iran warned merchant ships that mines could exist in a “hazardous area” that covers 1,394 sq km of the Strait, including the normal traffic separation scheme (shipping lanes) that ships use to transit the Strait. Ships seeking to avoid the Iranian-declared hazardous area must transit Iranian territorial waters.[xii] Iran then shakes down these merchant ships by extracting “protection fees.”[xiii] These “protection” fees protect ships from Iranian attacks. This protection racket is illegal under maritime law. No state bordering a strait is permitted to restrict traffic or extract fees under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.[xiv] Unspecified US officials told the New York Times on April 11 that Iran laid its mines—of which there are reportedly fewer than a dozen, according to a previous March 23 report—” haphazardly,” which has prevented Iran from locating or removing them. These mines may or may not be in the 1,394 sq km “hazardous area.”

The threat of mines also enables Iran to keep the price of oil and shipping insurance as high as possible for as long as possible without conducting attacks that would cause the ceasefire to collapse. Iran may calculate that the high price of oil and shipping insurance would cause the United States to cave on some of Iran’s demands.

The United States is attempting to undermine Iran’s ability to use the threat of mines in the “hazardous area” by using US Navy destroyers to prove that the normal traffic separation scheme is safe and viable for traffic. Iran can only use the threat of mines to keep these costs high if the fear of mines persists. US President Donald Trump said on April 11 that the United States is “starting the process of clearing out” the strait.[xv] Arleigh Burke-Class destroyers USS Frank E. Peterson and USS Michael Murphy transited the Strait to clear the Strait of naval mines.[xvi] US CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper said that the US Navy will share the route of safe passage with civilian shipping as soon as possible.[xvii] Such a move would undermine Iran’s threats and badly damage its leverage in negotiations. The Qatari Transport Ministry announced later on April 11 that it will resume operations ”for all types of maritime vessels and ships” between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM local time on April 12.[xviii]

The current ceasefire will provide Iran an opportunity to reorganize its missile force and recover from the temporary disruption wrought to the missile force during constant US and Israeli operations. Consistent US and Israeli operations over Iran had suppressed Iran’s missile force by preventing Iran from digging out launchers, disrupting command-and-control, and creating pervasive fear in military units that made them unwilling or unable to conduct attacks, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.[xix] Such effects are temporary, however, and the ceasefire provides Iran and opportunity to reorganize itself for more coordinated missile attacks. This is especially notable because Iran still retains roughly 1,000 of the 2,500 medium-range ballistic missiles it had before the war and well under 50% of its one-way attack drones.[xx]

The US-Israeli air campaign has nonetheless severely degraded elements of Iran’s ballistic missile program, which is a system of systems that relies on many complicated and bespoke components to function. These components cannot be easily replaced. The air campaign targeted the critical capabilities of Iran’s ballistic missile program to prevent the missile forces from executing their campaign design.[xxi] The US-Israeli campaign, for example, targeted Iranian missile fuel production, missile guidance systems, steel production that could be used for ballistic missiles, ball bearing factories (which are key for inertial guidance systems on Iranian missiles), and other key components.[xxii] Such assets are not easily replaced, and when and if Iran expends its remaining missiles, it will struggle to replace them rapidly. This will play into Iranian strike package decisions if the war resumes.

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei continues to recover from severe facial and leg injuries that he sustained in the February 28 strike on the supreme leader’s compound in Tehran Province. Three unspecified individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle told Reuters on April 11 that the strike disfigured Mojtaba’s face and injured one or both of his legs.[xxiii] The sources added that Mojtaba remains “mentally sharp” and continues to participate in major decisions, including war and negotiations with the United States, through audio conferences with senior Iranian officials.[xxiv] It is notable that the sources noted that the strikes disfigured his face--which implies at least some degree of head injuries--and felt it necessary to note he remains ”mentally sharp” in that context. Mojtaba has not appeared in public or in any new images or videos since his March 8 appointment as supreme leader.[xxv] The regime has circulated only older footage of him and has issued written statements.[xxvi] Iranian state television described Mojtaba as a “janbaz,” which is a term for those wounded in war.[xxvii]  The reporting from individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle is consistent with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks on March 13 that Mojtaba is “wounded and likely disfigured.”[xxviii]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran to reconstitute some of its degraded air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is preparing to deliver man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran within the coming weeks, according to three sources familiar with recent US intelligence assessments.[xxix] Two of the sources told CNN that the PRC is attempting to route the shipments through third-party countries to obfuscate their route and origin.[xxx] The upcoming transfer may be the result of two-year-long negotiations between Iran and the PRC over Iran’s acquisition of MANPADS and other weaponry, including anti-ship cruise missiles.[xxxi] These negotiations ”accelerated sharply” after the 12-Day War, and Iran and the PRC were still discussing the issue as of February 24, according to Reuters.[xxxii] The PRC Embassy in Washington denied that the PRC has provided weapons to any party in the conflict.[xxxiii] Tehran has similarly sought to acquire MANPADS from Russia in the lead-up to the recent conflict.[xxxiv]

Iran may be eager to use the current cessation of hostilities in preparation for possible renewed US or Israeli strikes should negotiations fail. The combined force has degraded Iranian air defenses and established air superiority over Iran, but new systems could present a threat to the combined force aircraft, particularly those flying at low altitudes. US aircraft have flown at low altitudes over several areas of southern Iran during the conflict, which suggests that the combined force severely suppressed or destroyed local Iranian anti-air capabilities, including MANPADS, in those areas.[xxxv] Iran could use these systems to attempt to bolster defenses around Iranian naval assets along the Persian Gulf coast amid combined force efforts to limit the Iranian threat to international shipping. Iran reportedly deployed MANPADS to reinforce its defenses on Kharg Island in late March, for example.[xxxvi] MANPADS alone cannot replace the damage inflicted upon Iranian integrated air defense systems by US and Israeli strikes during this conflict and previous rounds of strikes in 2024, however.[xxxvii]

The PRC’s reported preparations to send Iran MANPADS underscore the nature of the PRC’s military partnership with Iran. The PRC has historically limited its support with Iran due to its close economic ties to the Gulf and has shown a willingness to bolster Iran’s capabilities without risking direct entanglement in Iran’s conflicts in the region.[xxxviii] The PRC is one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears to be willing to sell military equipment to Iran; however, as also seen through the recent near-agreement to transfer PRC anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.[xxxix] The PRC is also a key partner helping Iran to reconstitute its missile program and has likely continued this support by sending missile fuel precursor even during the conflict.[xl] Iranian officials may also seek the PRC to fulfill previous agreements that it has made with Iran, particularly regarding dual-use technologies to help Iran rebuild after the war. US officials recently accused the PRC’s largest chipmaker, SMIC, of sending chipmaking technology to the Iranian military for nearly a year, for example.[xli]

US-Israeli Air Campaign

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on April 10 that Airbus satellite imagery from April 8 shows projectile impacts on an anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) position near the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in Bushehr Province.[xlii] The Institute added that AAA positions were located roughly 230 to 360 feet from the perimeter of the BNPP and about one mile from the operating reactor.[xliii] The Institute added that the strike destroyed two AAA systems and collapsed an unidentified structure, with debris visible around both impact sites.[xliv] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously reported on April 4 that Iran informed it that a projectile struck near the BNPP.[xlv] A projectile fragment reportedly killed one member of the site’s physical protection staff, and shockwaves and fragments damaged a building on site. The Institute assessed that the strike likely targeted a military position adjacent to the nuclear facility rather than the reactor itself.[xlvi]

Iranian Response

Iran fired a single drone targeting Bahrain on April 11.[xlvii] The decline of Iranian fire on Gulf states over the past few days likely reflects Iranian adherence to the April 7 ceasefire. CTP-ISW has not observed any other Iranian fire targeting Gulf states since CTP-ISW‘s last data cut off on April 10. Iran also only attacked one Gulf state on April 10.[xlviii]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 26 attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on April 10 and 2:00 PM ET on April 11.[xlix] Hezbollah claimed 16 attacks against Israeli forces operating in the Bint Jbeil District, southeastern Lebanon.[l] Hezbollah claimed seven attacks specifically targeting Israeli forces with rocket, mortar, and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attacks operating near the al Israq school, which is located between Ainata and Bint Jbeil.[li] An Israeli journalist confirmed that Israeli units directly engaged Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbeil on April 9, after the IDF recently isolated the town.[lii] Bint Jbeil is operationally significant because it is located at the nexus of multiple main roads in southeastern Lebanon, including the Tebnine-Bint Jbeil Road, that the IDF could use to advance north. Bint Jbeil is also symbolically significant to Hezbollah. Former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah proclaimed ”victory” in Bint Jbeil after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.[liii] Hezbollah has also previously fought the IDF at Bint Jbeil in previous conflicts, including in 2006 and in the October 7 War.[liv]

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 36 attacks targeting IDF infrastructure and Israeli communities in northern and southern Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 10 and 2:00 PM ET on April 11.[lv] Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Hezbollah launched around 40 rockets at northern Israeli communities on April 11.[lvi] Hezbollah claimed that it launched five rocket barrages targeting Kiryat Shmona.[lvii]  An Israeli journalist reported that two Hezbollah rockets struck Kiryat Shmona without causing any casualties on April 10.[lviii] The journalist reported that Kiryat Shmona residents did not receive a warning before the Hezbollah rocket impacts.[lix] The IDF reported on April 11 that an initial investigation indicated that the early warning system failed to detect the Hezbollah rocket launches and thus failed to issue an alert before the Hezbollah rocket impacts.[lx] The Israeli journalist also reported multiple Hezbollah rocket and drone launches targeting Safed, Shlomi, and Karmiel, all in northern Israel.[lxi] The journalist reported that all the reported Hezbollah projectiles caused no casualties.[lxii] At least one Hezbollah drone did hit a residence in Shlomi, causing damage, however.[lxiii]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on April 11 that the IDF had created a “security zone” in southern Lebanon.[lxiv] Netanyahu stated that the IDF security zone extends between eight and ten kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[lxv] It is unclear if the IDF’s ”security zone” meets the doctrinal definition of control, which is ”a tactical mission task in which a unit maintains physical influence over an assigned area. By controlling an area, units prevent its use by an enemy force or create conditions necessary for friendly operations.”[lxvi] An unspecified senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on March 22 that the IDF’s objective for the ”security zone” is to push Hezbollah forces back to limit their ability to fire ATGMs targeting northern Israeli towns and remove the threat of a coordinated Hezbollah cross-border infiltration into northern Israel.[lxvii]

The IDF has continued to conduct air and ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters across southern Lebanon. The IAF said that it attacked over 200 Hezbollah infrastructure targets, including rocket launchers, in Lebanon in the past 24 hours.[lxviii]

The IDF reported that two IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade (146th Reserve Division) soldiers were “moderately wounded” in a direct engagement with Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon on April 9.[lxix] The 35th Paratrooper Brigade soldiers called in an airstrike that killed the Hezbollah fighters.[lxx] The IDF reported that the 35th Paratrooper Brigade seized multiple weapons caches, which included anti-tank guided missiles and explosives, in an operation between April 10 and 11.[lxxi]

Israeli and Lebanese officials have agreed to meet in Washington on April 14 to hold direct negotiations. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s Office announced on April 11 that Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Nada Hamadeh Moawad and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter had a direct phone call to discuss preparations for direct negotiations in Washington.[lxxii] The officials determined that the negotiations would occur on April 14 at the US State Department in Washington, DC, to discuss a ceasefire.[lxxiii] Israeli and Lebanese officials have voiced differing positions on whether Israel will continue operations in Lebanon during the negotiations, however. AFP reported on April 11 that Leiter told Moawad during the phone call that Israel is "refusing to discuss a cease-fire with the terrorist organization Hezbollah” even while negotiations with Lebanon are underway.[lxxiv] A Lebanese source familiar with the details told Israeli media that Lebanon’s government plans to ask for a ceasefire first, before demilitarization efforts.[lxxv] They will also ask for US military assistance to demilitarize Hezbollah and a US economic package for Lebanon’s reconstruction.[lxxvi] Two informed sources told Axios on April 11 that both the Lebanese government and the United States have asked Israel to ”pause” its operations in Lebanon before the negotiations begin on April 14.[lxxvii] The IDF has limited its strikes in Beirut and Beirut’s southern suburbs in recent days, possibly in response to US requests. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on April 11 that the IDF has not conducted strikes in Beirut or Beirut’s southern suburbs in the past 48 hours.[lxxviii] CTP-ISW has not observed any reported Israeli strikes in Beirut or its suburbs since April 8, despite the IDF issuing an evacuation order for Beirut’s southern Suburbs on April 9.[lxxix]

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced that he has postponed a planned trip to Washington, DC, “in light of the current internal circumstances.”[lxxx] A Saudi journalist reported that Salam was due to meet with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on April 16.[lxxxi] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam ordered the Lebanese Armed Forces on April 9 to immediately enforce the Lebanese state’s monopoly over weapons in Beirut.[lxxxii] Lebanese media reported that the LAF deployed units, including soldiers from its Commando Regiment, to secure the Government Palace and begin patrols in Beirut. These Lebanese government efforts to restrict weaponry to the state come amid unverified reports that Hezbollah may have been preparing to launch a ”coup” against the Lebanese government and seize government buildings in recent days.[lxxxiii] The reports claim that the IDF airstrikes in Beirut and its southern suburbs on April 8 disrupted the alleged coup.[lxxxiv] The IDF said that the IDF strikes on April 8 killed at least 180 Hezbollah members.[lxxxv]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched three drones targeting a US security convoy, including diplomatic and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel, that was transporting previously kidnapped US journalist Shelly Kittelson to Baghdad International Airport from the Green Zone in Baghdad on April 8, according to unspecified sources speaking to regional media on April 11.[lxxxvi] This follows the US State Department confirmation on April 9 and 10 that Iraqi militias ambushed a convoy of US diplomatic personnel on April 8.[lxxxvii] No Iraqi militia has taken responsibility at the time of this writing. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah kidnapped Kittelson on March 31 and then released her on April 7 in exchange for the Iraqi government releasing an unspecified number of Kataib Hezbollah members.[lxxxviii]

Intra-Regime Dynamics
Iranian media named Iran’s negotiating team and identified Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the Defense Council secretary.[lxxxix] Iranian media have not reported Ahmadian’s appointment to the position. Ahmadian replaced Ali Shamkhani, who was killed by the combined force on the first day of the war on February 28.[xc] The Defense Council is Iran’s highest national security decision-making body’s sub-council on strategic defense, which the SNSC established in August 2025 to streamline decision-making during wartime.[xci] Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Ahmadian to the Defense Council in August 2025 as one of his representatives.[xcii]