Iran Update, December 3, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-C TP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened on December 3 to attack US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya in response to Savaya’s “blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.”[i] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to attack Savaya due to the potential repercussions that such an action would have on the militias’ domestic political efforts, however. Kaabi threatened that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would “shove a rock down [Savaya’s] mouth” if the United States does not stop his "interference.“[ii] Kaabi also suggested that the Iraqi federal government has adopted “timid and silent stances” toward Savaya.[iii] Iraqi media reported on December 2 that Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions.[iv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are the political wings of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. CTP-ISW assessed on December 2 that the exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions would be unlikely to curb Iranian influence within the Iraqi government because Iraqi political parties often appoint loyalists to act as proxies for them in key government institutions.[v] Savaya has also made several comments in recent weeks that may have upset Kaabi, including Savaya’s statement that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the drone attack that targeted the Emirati-operated Khor Mor Gas Field in Sulaymaniyah Province on November 26.[vi] CTP-ISW similarly continues to assess that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted the attack to try to deter Iraqi Kurdish political parties from working against Iranian-backed Iraqi parties in the government formation process.[vii]

An attack by Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba or other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Savaya would likely harm militia interests regarding the ongoing Iraqi government formation process. Government formation is important for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias because it determines the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests in the country.[viii] An Iraqi militia attack against Savaya could cause some Iraqi parties to decide not to align with Iranian-backed parties if the parties’ affiliated militias dragged Iraq into a conflict with the United States, for example. Militia operations that trigger US action in Iraq are generally unpopular domestically.[ix]

The Shia Coordination Framework’s internal divisions over the selection of the next prime minister are likely due, in part, to US pressure on the framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership. Framework sources told Iraqi media on December 3 that the framework did not reach an agreement on the next prime minister during a framework meeting on December 2.[x] Internal divisions and disputes reportedly caused tension among framework parties during the meeting. Iraqi media has noted that the framework is considering a variety of individuals for the premiership, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, and Iraqi National Intelligence Service head Hamid al Shatri.[xi] Iraqi media reported on December 1 that the framework is seeking a “consensus candidate” for prime minister who does not face objections from framework parties or any “regional or international forces influential in Iraqi politics,” which suggests that the framework is trying to balance pressure from Iran and the United States regarding government formation.[xii] Iran and the United States have historically exerted major influence in Iraqi government formation, particularly in the selection of prime ministers.[xiii] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in the Iraqi government and previously expressed concern about powerful Iranian-backed parties that ran in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xiv]

US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq has previously divided the framework. Iraqi media reported in August 2025 that framework members are divided into two “camps” regarding US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi state security service primarily composed of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xv] The first camp supports challenging US objections to the PMF, while the second camp is concerned about the threat of US sanctions and strikes targeting Iraq.[xvi] The United States has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders if the Iraqi federal government does not dissolve the PMF.[xvii] CTP-ISW assessed in August that framework members with armed groups in the PMF likely support strengthening the institution.[xviii] Iraqi media also reported in October 2025 that unspecified framework parties were in a “political rush” to receive US support prior to the November 2025 elections, which highlights how framework parties vary in their degree of willingness to work with the United States.[xix]

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on December 2 that Iran likely sought Russian assistance in 2024 to develop laser-based conventional military systems rather than laser technology for nuclear weapons testing.[xx] The Institute’s assessment comes after the Financial Times reported on November 19 that a group of Iranian scientists traveled to Russia in November 2024 to visit a Russian military laser technology company.[xxi] A former CIA analyst told the Financial Times that Iran may have been seeking “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test.”[xxii] The Institute stated that Iran already has the equipment and expertise necessary to conduct such a validation test without using laser-based diagnostic systems.[xxiii] The Institute assessed that the Iranian delegation was, instead, likely seeking Russian assistance to advance Iran’s anti-drone and anti-ballistic missile systems.[xxiv]

Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years. Israel has conducted a series of drone attacks on Iran in recent years, including a drone strike on a centrifuge manufacturing facility in Karaj, Alborz Province, in 2021, a strike that destroyed a drone manufacturing facility in Kermanshah Province in 2022, and a drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan in 2023.[xxv] These attacks may have driven Iran to seek to develop laser-based anti-drone systems, which cost significantly less than traditional air defense systems.[xxvi] Israel also used small drones in June 2025 to kill Iranian nuclear scientists and destroy Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which may further drive Iran to develop its anti-drone capabilities.[xxvii] US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on December 3 that it has launched a one-way attack drone force in the Middle East, which highlights how drones will continue to play a large role in future conflicts in the region.[xxviii] Russia may be able to share knowledge about laser-based anti-drone systems with Iran given that Russia has developed such systems to counter Ukrainian drone strikes.[xxix] Russia unveiled a truck-mounted anti-drone laser system in October 2025, for example, that can detect, track, and destroy small drones by damaging onboard sensors, wiring, and batteries and causing the drone to crash.[xxx] Iran would likely prioritize laser-based anti-drone systems over laser-based anti-ballistic missile systems in the near future given that the latter requires much more energy than the former.[xxxi] Most existing laser-based air defense systems, such as the Israeli Iron Beam, can shoot down small drones, rockets, and other systems, but currently do not have the capability to shoot down ballistic missiles.[xxxii]

Iraqi Joint Operations Command Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Qais al Muhammadawi announced on November 26 that all forces under the US-led International Coalition in Iraq are now in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as part of the US withdrawal from Iraq. Muhammadawi caveated that four or five individuals remain in Baghdad to manage unspecified diplomatic and logistical tasks.[xxxiii] The US forces in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region do not appear to include the 250 to 350 “military advisors and support personnel” who remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Syria.[xxxiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxxv] A US official told Reuters in September 2025 that the United States planned to reduce its military presence from 2,500 personnel to less than 2,000 and redeploy the majority of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[xxxvi] Muhammadawi added that a joint committee will negotiate with the United States between January and June 2026 to draft a memorandum of understanding that addresses the future US presence in Iraq and future US-Iraq security cooperation.[xxxvii] The committee will include Muhammadawi, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Abdul Amir Yarallah, Peshmerga Affairs Ministry Secretary General Bakhtiar Mohammad, and several other unspecified individuals.[xxxviii]  

Israel and Lebanon sent diplomatic representatives to hold direct talks at a ceasefire monitoring committee meeting on December 3 amid warnings that Israel may soon launch a new operation targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon.[xxxix] Former Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Simon Karam and Israeli National Security Council Senior Director for Foreign Policy Uri Rasnick led the Lebanese and Israeli delegations, respectively, during the committee meeting in Naqoura.[xl] The November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon established the committee, which includes representatives from the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon, and the United Nations, to monitor Israel and Hezbollah’s compliance with the ceasefire.[xli] Western sources told Lebanese media that the Israeli and Lebanese representatives discussed Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israeli strikes in Lebanon, and the potential for economic cooperation in southern Lebanon to build trust between Israel and Lebanon during the committee meeting.[xlii] The Israeli-Lebanese talks mark a positive step for dialogue between the two countries—which have not directly engaged in talks since 1983—particularly amid recent Israeli warnings that Israel is preparing to potentially increase its operations in Lebanon due to frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xliii] An unspecified source told Lebanese media that Lebanese officials left the meeting with the impression that Israel will allow the LAF “a chance to do its job,” in reference to Hezbollah disarmament.[xliv] Neither Lebanon nor Israel has changed its position on key outstanding issues, however. An informed source told Lebanese media that the December 3 ceasefire monitoring committee meeting did not address the issue of the LAF searching private property, which Israel has demanded that the LAF do.[xlv] An Israeli Channel 13 journalist reported on November 28 that the LAF has until US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus leaves Beirut on December 6 to demonstrate to Israel that it has made unspecified progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xlvi] Israeli state broadcaster Kan described on December 2 a “significant [Israeli] escalation” in Lebanon as “inevitable.”[xlvii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Militia Threatens US Envoy: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened on December 3 to attack US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya in response to Savaya’s “blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.” Iraqi media reported on December 2 that Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are unlikely to attack Savaya due to the potential repercussions that such an action would have on the militias’ domestic political efforts, particularly the ongoing Iraqi government formation process.
• Iranian Anti-Drone Capabilities: The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on December 2 that Iran likely sought Russian assistance in 2024 to develop laser-based conventional military systems rather than laser technology for nuclear weapons testing. The Institute assessed that the Iranian delegation was likely seeking Russian assistance to advance Iran’s anti-drone and anti-ballistic missile systems. Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years.
• US Withdrawal from Iraq: Iraqi Joint Operations Command Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Qais al Muhammadawi announced on November 26 that all forces under the US-led International Coalition in Iraq are now in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as part of the US withdrawal from Iraq. 250 to 350 “military advisors and support personnel” remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Syria.
• Israel-Lebanon Relations: Israel and Lebanon sent diplomatic representatives to hold direct talks at a ceasefire monitoring committee meeting on December 3. The Israeli-Lebanese talks mark a positive step for dialogue between the two countries—which have not directly engaged in talks since 1983—particularly amid recent Israeli warnings that Israel is preparing to potentially increase its operations in Lebanon due to frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.

Iran

NOTE: The following text will also appear in the December 4 edition of CTP’s Africa File.

Iranian officials have met with several African counterparts over the last week to discuss greater defense and economic ties. Iranian Director General for African Affairs Akbar Khosravinejad met with the three foreign ministers of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—in Burkina Faso on November 28.[xlviii] The officials discussed ways to expand cooperation broadly. Iran has increased cooperation with the AES since the anti-Western bloc formed in 2023, and Iranian officials have met with their Sahelian counterparts on numerous occasions.[xlix] Iran has signed various agreements with Burkina Faso and Niger on energy, finance, health, industry, mining, and engineering, although CTP has observed little implementation.[l]

The Iranian deputy foreign minister for economic diplomacy led an Iranian delegation to Uganda on December 2, marking at least the second Iranian delegation to Uganda in 2025.[li] Iranian media emphasized that the trip aimed to strengthen economic ties and specifically noted that the two sides discussed bilateral relations, preparations for the upcoming joint economic and technical commission, and sectoral meetings with Ugandan business leaders to expand trade and investment ties.[lii] Iran and Uganda have a decades-long partnership rooted in anti-colonial political allyship and agricultural ties.[liii] The previous three Iranian presidents visited Uganda during their terms, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has visited Iran several times.[liv]

Iran seeks to bolster partnerships with African countries as part of its continued effort to break its international isolation, including through growing its geopolitical influence and increasing trade, hard currency acquisition, and access to natural resources, such as uranium, to mitigate sanctions. Iran has used defense ties as a foundation to strengthen partnerships, including its pursuit of Red Sea and uranium access. Iran has sent Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021.[lv] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) rejected an Iranian request for a naval base or dual-use port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in exchange for continued aid and a helicopter-carrying ship.[lvi] The Nigerien junta similarly turned down an Iranian offer of drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for uranium yellowcake in 2024.[lvii] CTP also assessed that Iran likely aimed to secure access to Zimbabwe’s rich uranium deposits through increased defense engagement with Zimbabwe in 2024.[lviii]

Iran has used internal oppression and regime security assistance to bolster its partnerships with some African states, including Burkina Faso. The Iranian Law Enforcement commander visited Burkina Faso and Ethiopia in May.[lix] CTP previously assessed that this visit was likely part of a broader Iranian effort to build partnerships and simultaneously open new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams.[lx] Uganda’s authoritarian regime could be open to similar support, especially as aging President Yoweri Museveni considers passing power to his son.[lxi]

Iran has separately sought to expand trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives in Africa, in line with its latest moves in Uganda. Iran held the Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit in April 2025, where it signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms.[lxii] Iran has previously struggled to follow through on aspirational cooperation goals with African countries, but Iranian officials explicitly reorganized the 2025 summit to focus on four priority sectors—mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment—to ensure the summit remained “outcome-driven.”[lxiii] Greater bilateral trade with Africa helps Iran increase its capital inflows to prevent economic collapse under Western sanctions and normalizes economic cooperation with non-Western countries despite sanctions. Iran-Africa trade remains a tiny portion of its overall gross domestic product, however, and CTP has previously assessed that increased trade with Africa will not solve the problems that underlie Iran’s economic instability.[lxiv]

Iraq

Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani’s office reportedly said on December 2 that Sistani will not interfere in the selection of the next Iraqi prime minister in response to an unspecified message from the Shia Coordination Framework to Sistani.[lxv] Sistani is Iraq’s highest religious figure and has intervened in Iraqi politics on several occasions. Sistani’s views guided the United States’ efforts to form and transfer sovereignty to a new Iraqi government following the United States’ removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003.[lxvi] Sistani also publicly supported the resignation of former Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi during the 2019 Iraqi Tishreen protests.[lxvii] Sistani largely abstained from publicly interfering in the 2021 Iraqi elections until Iranian-backed militias engaged followers of Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr in September 2022.[lxviii] Sistani sent private messages to Sadr that reportedly caused Sadr to instruct his followers to stand down.[lxix] Sistani’s reported statement on December 2 pledging non-interference in the selection of a prime minister does not mean that he will not choose to interfere at a later time, as he reportedly did in 2021.

Syria

The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) seized several improvised explosive devices (IED) and other munitions from an ISIS safe house in Rif Dimashq Province on December 3. Counter-ISIS forces have recently dismantled ISIS IED manufacturing sites in Rif Dimashq Province.[lxx] The GSS seized four IEDs, two firearm suppressors, explosive materials, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), small arms, and a large quantity of ammunition from an ISIS safe house in Kanaker, about 30 kilometers south of Damascus City, on December 3.[lxxi] Images of the four IEDs suggest that ISIS fighters or the supplier of the IEDs possess a reasonable degree of technical skill in the production of IEDs, given the weapons’ construction and uniform design.[lxxii] The GSS also arrested three ISIS fighters during the raid.[lxxiii] The GSS raid in Kanaker follows several recent US and Syrian operations targeting ISIS cells and IED manufacturing equipment around Rif Dimashq Province in November 2025. US and Syrian forces destroyed over 15 ISIS weapons caches in Rif Dimashq Province between November 24 and 27.[lxxiv] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that US and Syrian forces destroyed over 130 mortars and rockets, multiple assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank mines, and materials for manufacturing IEDs during the Rif Dimashq raids.[lxxv] The GSS previously dismantled a roadside IED workshop in an unspecified area of Rif Dimashq Province around November 8 and 9 as part of a “preemptive” country-wide counter-ISIS operation before Syria joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS on November 10.[lxxvi]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Hezbollah is likely continuing to smuggle weapons from Syria to Lebanon that the group could use to defend against a possible Israeli operation. Syrian forces interdicted a shipment of 1,250 landmines equipped with detonators and arrested four smugglers in Yabroud, Rif Dimashq Province, on December 2.[lxxvii] Syrian forces also seized a weapons shipment containing Russian RPG-29s near al Qusayr, Homs Province, on December 3.[lxxviii] Both shipments were likely intended for Hezbollah given the types of munitions seized and Hezbollah’s historical use of smuggling routes through both al Qusayr and Yabroud. The types of weapons that the Syrian forces seized suggest that Hezbollah continues to attempt to smuggle munitions that the group could use to confront a possible Israeli ground operation in Lebanon. Hezbollah heavily used landmines across Lebanon during previous rounds of conflict with Israel, including the most recent conflict in fall 2024, to attack Israeli forces advancing into Lebanese territory.[lxxix] Hezbollah has also historically used RPG-29s to defend against Israeli incursions into Lebanon.[lxxx] Israeli officials have stated that Hezbollah’s use of RPG-29s was a leading cause of IDF casualties during the 2006 War because these weapons were able to penetrate Merkava tank armor on multiple occasions.[lxxxi]