Iran Update, December 26, 2025

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Today’s Iran Update covers data between 2:00 PM ET on December 24, 2025, and 2:00 PM ET on December 26, 2025, as CTP-ISW did not publish an Iran Update on December 25 in observance of the Christmas holiday.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) seized a “foreign” tanker near Gheshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz on December 24. The IRGC claimed the tanker was smuggling four million liters of oil.[i] The IRGC Navy also detained 16 non-Iranian crew members, according to local judicial authorities in Hormozgan Province on December 26.[ii]  Neither the IRGC nor Iranian media has disclosed the name of the tanker or the nationality of its crew members. CTP-ISW is unable to confirm the incident or verify the name of the tanker using commercially available maritime tracking data at this time.

It is possible that Iran seized the tanker in response to recent US seizures of tankers in the Caribbean Sea. The US Coast Guard seized a reported ghost fleet tanker, the Bella 1, in an unspecified location in the Atlantic Ocean on December 25 after a five-day pursuit through the Caribbean.[iii] An attributed IRGC X account posted the following Islamic verse: ”throw the enemy’s stone back in the same direction it was thrown from, because evil is repelled only by evil” on December 24, around the same time as the IRGC Navy’s seizure of the tanker near Gheshm Island.[iv] The same account quoted the following Quranic verse at the same time of the seizure of the oil tanker Talara on November 14: “So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you.[v] US special operations forces intercepted a shipment of military-related equipment from China to Iran in the Indian Ocean at some point in November 2025.[vi] It is unclear if the IRGC statement or the Talara seizure on November 14 was in response to this seizure. The seizure of the Talara also followed an unspecified explosion on the M/V Falcon in the Red Sea in October.[vii] The non-profit United Against Nuclear Iran reported that the Falcon was an Iranian shadow fleet vessel that transports illicit Iranian oil.[viii] The United States has also seized three oil tankers near Venezuela in December 2025.[ix]

Iran announced on December 21 the deployment of Artesh Naval flotillas to escort commercial vessels, amid Iranian concern over US tanker seizures. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei and the Embassy in Caracas called the US seizure of oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 an act of “piracy.”[x] The Skipper has historically transported illicit Iranian oil.[xi] Artesh Navy Commander Admiral Shahram Irani announced on December 21 that the Artesh Navy deployed the 103rd and 104th flotillas on overseas missions and added that one of the fleets will be “tasked with escorting commercial ships.”[xii] CTP-ISW cannot determine the composition of the Artesh 103rd and 104th flotillas as of the time of writing.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly demanding major concessions from the United States if the militias agree to US demands to disarm. These concessions would not support US policy objectives in Iraq. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source told Iraqi media on December 26 that unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Iraqi federal government have outlined a nine-point “roadmap” that addresses the military and political role of militias in Iraq.[xiii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias similarly told regional media on December 23 they would be willing to “normalize relations” with the United States if the United States removed sanctions on unidentified militia leaders, committed not to strike the militias, scheduled a final withdrawal from Iraq, and removed US opposition to unspecified aspects of militia involvement in the formation of the next Iraqi government.[xiv] These concessions come after repeated US demands that Iraq disarm the militias and reduce Iranian influence in the Iraqi government. [xv]The rumored concessions that Iraqi militias are demanding of the United States would undermine the stated US policy objective in Iraq, which is to reduce Iranian influence in the Iraqi military and government.[xvi]

It is unclear which Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are involved in the creation of this reported counterproposal, as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are divided over the issue of disarmament.[xvii] Some members of the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee--a coordinating body consisting of several of the militias--have called in recent days for militias to disarm and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state.[xviii]  There are three blocs within the committee. The first bloc, which includes militias Kataib Imam al Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, accepts disarmament.[xix] The second, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, is attempting to obfuscate the relationship between the state and the militias.[xx] The third and most hardline group, which includes Kataib Hezbollah, is outright refusing disarmament.[xxi] The Shia Coordination Framework also stated on December 22 in which it expressed support for disarming Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and restricting weapons to the Iraqi state.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are the political wings of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.

Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadegh made comments on December 26 that are consistent with Iran’s reported efforts to push its partner militias in Iraq to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement.[xxiii] Sadegh acknowledged on December 26 the capacity of Iraqi militias to make independent decisions about disarmament but noted that Iran has unspecified concerns about the consequences of any decision by the militias.[xxiv]  Amwaj media noted on November 3 that Iran would consider supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) while pushing its larger partner militias in Iraq to focus on politics.[xxv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[xxvi] CTP-ISW assessed on November 4 that Iran may decide to build a large cadre of ideological militias over which Iran has strong control that would supplement pro-Iranian political parties in the Iraqi federal government while avoiding sanctions on Iraq.[xxvii]

Recent Syrian government operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) are coordinated with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which enables US forces to target mid- and low-ranking ISIS commanders throughout Syria. US forces were previously unable to target ISIS commanders throughout Syria during Assad’s rule and were limited to isolated high-profile raids against Islamic State “caliphs.” Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) security forces, in coordination with the Global Coalition, conducted separate raids on December 24 and 25 across Rif Dimashq Province that arrested the ISIS “governor” of Damascus Province, killed the ISIS “governor” of Houran (Daraa) Province, and arrested an ISIS cell leader, respectively.[xxviii] “Houran Province” refers to a region of southwest Syria that includes Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra provinces.[xxix] MoI security forces separately arrested three ISIS fighters in Afrin, Aleppo Province, on December 25.[xxx] The MoI’s recent joint counter-ISIS operations with the Global Coalition follow US airstrikes that struck more than 70 ISIS sites across the government-controlled central Syrian desert on December 19 and 20.[xxxi] The United States conducted the strikes in response to an ISIS-inspired insider attack that killed two US soldiers and a US civilian interpreter in Palmyra, Homs Province, on December 13.[xxxii] US and MoI forces also previously destroyed 15 ISIS weapon caches in Rif Dimashq Province in November 2025.[xxxiii] The recent joint MoI–Global Coalition counter-ISIS operations in Rif Dimashq highlight the Syrian government’s value as a counter-ISIS partner, since US forces could not operate in Syrian government territory or support counter-ISIS operations there before Assad fell in December 2024 due to Assad’s hostility toward the United States and the high risks involved in operating deep inside Assad-held territory.[xxxiv] Assad’s fall and US cooperation with the new Syrian government now allow US forces the opportunity to disrupt ISIS reconstitution through coordinated ground raids and airstrikes.  

Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, an ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group, claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Alawite Mosque in a Homs City Alawite neighborhood on December 26.[xxxv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely attacked this target to reignite the Sunni-Alawite sectarian strife that has recently occurred in Homs City. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically aligned with ISIS that seeks to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, Kurds, and Shia.[xxxvi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s December 16 IED attack on an Alawite Mosque in Homs City’s Alawite neighborhood of Wadi Dahab killed at least eight people and wounded 21 others.[xxxvii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah claimed it conducted the attack ”in cooperation” with another unspecified Salafi-jihadi group.[xxxviii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah previously warned on December 16 that it would conduct a “major” attack.[xxxix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s December 26 posts, which claimed responsibility for the attack, exaggerated the attack’s casualty figures, denied that the attack targeted Sunnis, and vowed to increase the group’s attacks against minorities to further spread fear.[xl] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah previously claimed it assassinated an Alawite man in Wadi Dahab, Homs City, in April 2025.[xli] Homs City and specifically Alawite majority neighborhoods, including Wadi Dahab, have consistently been the site of sectarian violence between Alawites and Sunnis since the fall of Assad in December 2024.[xlii] A previous murder of a Sunni Bedouin couple on the outskirts of Homs City in November 2025 triggered an isolated sectarian fighting between Sunnis and Alawites in Western Homs City after the killer wrote sectarian slogans in the couple’s blood on the walls of their house.[xliii] Syrian government authorities later revealed the killer was a relative of the couple who intended to rob them, but the incident demonstrated that Sunni–Alawite relations in Homs City remain extremely fragile.[xliv] A Syrian human rights organization reported in May 2025 that unknown actors have specifically targeted Alawites in Western Homs City in numerous sectarian attacks since the beginning of 2025.[xlv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely intended for its IED attack to capitalize on fragile Sunni-Alawite relations with the goal of igniting sectarian fighting in Homs City that would enable it to recruit from disaffected Sunnis in the area. 

This is the first attack Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has claimed since July 2025 and is the group’s most significant attack since it claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing targeting a church in Rif Dimashq Province in June 2025.[xlvi] It remains unclear if Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s decision not to claim attacks from July to December 2025 represents an effort to conceal its activity or if the group was unable to operate due to government scrutiny. Sarya Ansar al Sunnah previously claimed on December 6 that its activity has “recently significantly declined” due to the Syrian security forces’ “arrest and persecution” campaigns in collaboration with the Global Coalition, which suggests that it was unable to operate if it is being truthful.[xlvii] This attack demonstrates that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah still controls a covert network capable of major attacks in Homs City, regardless of whether the group deliberately concealed its activity or if government forces prevented active military operations.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia may be reaching a compromise designed to restrain the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) after its recent gains in eastern Yemen. The Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry blamed the STC for causing “unjustified escalation” when it launched its offensive into eastern Yemen and reiterated its demands for STC withdrawal in a December 25 statement.[xlviii] Saudi Arabia also recognized the “just” southern Yemeni cause in the statement.[xlix] Saudi Arabia then conducted an airstrike targeting the STC near Wadi Nahb, Ghayl bin Yamin District, Hadramawt Governorate, on December 26 after the STC engaged fighters loyal to Amr bin Habrish, a former leader of the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA) who is currently in Riyadh.[l] The Saudi strike caused no casualties, but it was the first Saudi airstrike targeting STC positions since the STC offensive began in early December.[li] The STC condemned the strike, but its patron, the UAE, said that it welcomed Saudi efforts to support security and stability in Yemen.[lii] The UAE did not acknowledge the airstrike in its message, though it would almost certainly have been aware of the strike before the message’s publication.[liii] The UAE’s decision to make no comment on the airstrike suggests that it will not support the STC in a standoff with Saudi Arabia and that the UAE seeks to reach a compromise that will prevent a further weakening of the anti-Houthi coalition.

Key Takeaways

• Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Tanker Seizure: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) seized a “foreign” tanker near Gheshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz on December 24. The IRGC claimed the tanker was smuggling four million liters of oil. It is possible that Iran seized the tanker in response to recent US seizures of tankers in the Caribbean Sea.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militia Disarmament: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly demanding major concessions from the United States if the militias agree to US demands to disarm. These concessions would not support US policy objectives in Iraq.
• Syrian State-Global Coalition Counterterrorism Efforts: Recent Syrian government operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) are coordinated with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which enables US forces to target mid- and low-ranking ISIS commanders throughout Syria. US forces were previously unable to target ISIS commanders throughout Syria during Assad’s rule and were limited to isolated high-profile raids against Islamic State “caliphs.”
• Saraya Ansar al Sunnah Attacks in Syria: Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, an ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group, claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Alawite Mosque in a Homs City Alawite neighborhood on December 26. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah likely attacked this target in order to reignite the Sunni-Alawite sectarian strife that has recently occurred in Homs City.
• Saudi-UAE Deliberations in Yemen: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia may be reaching a compromise designed to restrain the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) after its recent gains in eastern Yemen. The Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry blamed the STC for causing “unjustified escalation” when it launched its offensive into eastern Yemen and reiterated its demands for STC withdrawal in a December 25 statement.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) killed a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Unit 840 operative in a targeted airstrike in Ansariyeh, southwestern Lebanon, on December 25.[liv] Unit 840 is an elite, covert IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for conducting assassinations, kidnappings, and clandestine operations abroad.[lv] The IDF said that the senior operative, Hassan Mahmoud Marshad al Jawhari, had helped advance and execute Unit 840 operations against Israel from Syria and Lebanon.[lvi] Israeli media reported on December 25 that Jawhari was a highly skilled intelligence operative who had resided in Lebanon and Syria since at least September 2024.[lvii]