Iran Update, December 2, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iran and key US adversaries likely shared tactical and technological lessons on December 2 as part of a five-day military exercise in Iran.  Iran is holding the “Sahand 2025” counterterrorism exercise at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces’ Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in East Azerbaijan Province from December 1 to 5.[i] Iran faces security threats along its northwestern border near East Azerbaijan Province from Kurdish groups, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK).[ii] All ten members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia, Belarus, and China, sent military delegations to participate in the exercise.[iii] The SCO has historically emphasized counterterrorism as a key goal of the institution.[iv] Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Oman, and Iraq also attended as observers.[v] IRGC-affiliated media published photos of Iranian forces using first-person view (FPV) drones during the exercise, which are widely used by both Russia and Ukraine and have changed the character of the modern battlefield.[vi] These drones, when employed at scale, can ”perform a wide array of functions but have been particularly transformative in creating a nearly-transparent battlefield.”[vii] This transparency has applications outside of conventional warfare, as seen in Ukraine. Drones could be employed in Iran to assist counter-insurgency operations in border regions or to help suppress protests, for example.

Iraqi media reported on December 2 that US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions.[viii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Unspecified Iraqi political sources told Iraqi media on December 2 that the framework may change its government formation strategy in response to US pressure.[ix] A framework member confirmed that the framework discussed its response to Savaya on December 1.[x] The framework is reportedly trying to find a “consensus candidate” for prime minister who is acceptable to the framework and any “regional or international forces influential in Iraqi politics,” which suggests that it is trying to balance Iranian and US pressures regarding government formation.[xi] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence within the Iraqi government and previously expressed concern about powerful Iran-aligned parties that ran in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xii]

The exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions is unlikely to curb Iran’s influence within Iraqi government institutions, however. Many Iraqi political parties appoint loyalists to senior civil service positions, known as “special grades,” within key ministries to act as a proxy for the party.[xiii] These “special grades” include director-general and deputy minister and enable the Iranian-backed parties to divert state resources for their benefit.[xiv]  Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties could use the ”special grades” system to retain control of key ministerial roles even if their publicly affiliated candidates were barred from senior ministry roles. These parties could also promote long-time ”special grade” officials loyal to them while still claiming that the appointments are ”technocratic.” Either method would be difficult to detect without an in-depth, detailed understanding of the internal workings of Iraqi ministries. 

The Suwayda National Guard conducted several politically motivated arrests and killings of prominent Druze individuals in Suwayda Province on November 28, likely as part of an effort by the Suwayda Autonomous Government to discourage dissent and to consolidate political control. The Suwayda National Guard arrested ten individuals on November 28 and accused them of participating in a “conspiracy” in coordination with the Syrian transitional government to conduct attacks in Suwayda Province.[xv] A media figure close to Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri reinforced the accusations on November 28 by claiming that the individuals planned to kidnap Suwayda Autonomous Government leaders, use car bombs, and attack public areas with improvised explosive devices.[xvi] The Suwayda National Guard arrested Sheikh Raed al Matni, Sheikh Maher al Falout, prominent Druze businessman Assem Abu Fakhr, Gandhi Abu Fakhr, and three relatives of transitional government-allied Laith al Balous, among others.[xvii] Suwayda National Guard members recorded themselves torturing Sheikh Matni on November 29 and forcibly shaving his moustache and beard, which hold religious significance for the Druze.[xviii]  The Suwayda National Guard reportedly delivered Matni’s body, which showed visible signs of torture, to the entrance of the Suwayda City hospital on December 2.[xix] Sheikh Matni helped form the Suwayda Military Council in February 2025, which was a Druze militia that fought transitional government forces during the intercommunal violence in Suwayda in July 2025.[xx] Some Syrian and Turkish media reports claim that Matni had a close relationship with Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al Hijri, but that the relationship deteriorated after Matni opposed Hijri’s formation of the Suwayda National Guard in August 2025.[xxi] A separate pro-government Syrian source claimed the Suwayda National Guard arrested Matni for proposing a negotiated settlement with the Syrian transitional government.[xxii] The Suwayda National Guard also tortured and killed Sheikh Falout and businessman Assem Abu Fakhr.[xxiii] The National Guard’s arrest, torture, and reported killing of prominent locals who may have challenged the Suwayda Autonomous Government likely aims to deter dissent by increasing the perceived cost of opposition to its rule. The autonomous government may weaponize the allegations of a Damascus-sponsored coup against the Suwayda government to justify additional repressive measures in the name of community security.

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan presented a plan for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that aligns with the SDF leadership’s federalized vision for Syria as the March 10 agreement’s December 31 deadline approaches. Imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan presented a detailed plan to Turkish parliament members involved in the PKK disarmament process on November 24 that calls for the SDF to join the Syrian military but maintain its own internal security structures.[xxiv] This statement marks the first time that Ocalan has explicitly called for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian military but retain its internal security forces. Ocalan stated in February 2025 that ”all [PKK] groups must lay [down] their arms,” which Turkish officials took to mean that the SDF would be pressured into disarming and integrating into the Syrian transitional government under the MoD.[xxv] This belief is based on the Turkish government’s conflation between the PKK, the SDF, and the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which dominates the SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from the SDF in February 2025 but rejected Ocalan’s call to disarm and argued that it “is only for the PKK [and is not] related to us in Syria.”[xxvi]  Ocalan’s newly articulated vision more closely aligns with Abdi’s demand for a decentralized Syrian state and for the SDF to retain local security control in northeastern Syria.[xxvii] Abdi said on November 24 that the SDF seeks a ”decentralized Syria” that allows local populations in northeastern Syria to elect their own military, administrative, and security representatives.[xxviii]

Both the SDF and the Syrian government have refused to concede their fundamental negotiating positions, which would require them to change their views on the centralization of state power as the year-end March agreement deadline approaches. The Syrian transitional government insists that a central authority should rule Syria through appointed governors and views SDF decentralization as a path toward secession.[xxix] The SDF views decentralization as a way to secure local authority over regional affairs and sees the government’s push to concentrate power in Damascus as an attempt to impose autocratic rule.[xxx] The Syrian government and the SDF hold opposing, zero-sum positions on centralization, and their dispute risks renewed conflict in Syria if neither side compromises.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Military Cooperation with US Adversaries: Iran and key US adversaries likely shared tactical and technological lessons on December 2 as part of a five-day military exercise in Iran. IRGC-affiliated media published photos of Iranian forces using first-person view drones during the exercise, which are widely used by both Russia and Ukraine and have changed the character of the modern battlefield.
• Iraqi Government Formation: Iraqi media reported on December 2 that US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya is pressuring the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian-backed candidates from the premiership and key ministerial positions. The exclusion of certain candidates who are publicly aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or parties from key ministerial positions is unlikely to curb Iran’s influence within Iraqi government institutions, however.
• Suwayda Political Consolidation: The anti-Syrian government Suwayda National Guard conducted several politically motivated arrests and killings of prominent Druze individuals in Suwayda Province on November 28, likely as part of an effort by the anti-Syrian government Suwayda Autonomous Government to discourage dissent and to consolidate political control.
• Syrian Democratic Forces’ Integration: Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan presented a plan for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration into the Syrian Ministry of Defense that aligns with the SDF leadership’s federalized vision for Syria as the March 10 agreement’s December 31 deadline approaches. Both the SDF and the Syrian government have refused to concede their fundamental negotiating positions, which would require them to change their views on the centralization of state power. The lack of compromise increases the risk for renewed conflict in the short term.

Iran

The Iranian Armed Forces announced new Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Artesh appointments on December 2 amid Iran’s broader efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership after the Israel-Iran War.

• Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi appointed Brigadier General Bahador Khajehvand as the new commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Northeastern Regional Headquarters.[xxxi] The Northeastern Regional Headquarters is one of the five Artesh Ground Forces' regional headquarters.[xxxii] Khajehvand replaced Brigadier General Sirous Amanollahi.[xxxiii] Khajehvand most recently served as the 58th Zolfaghar Division commander in Shahrud, Semnan Province.[xxxiv]
• Jahanshahi appointed Amanollahi as the new Artesh Ground Forces Operations deputy.[xxxv] Amanollahi most recently served as the Artesh Ground Forces Northeastern Regional Headquarters commander. He also served as the commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Northwestern Regional Headquarters from 2023 to 2024. Amanollahi notably commanded the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade from approximately 2016 to 2019, when Jahanshahi was the Coordination Deputy of the Artesh Ground Forces.[xxxvi] He was also the deputy commander of the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade from early 2011 to 2016. The 65th Brigade is one of the most specialized forces within the Artesh Ground Forces and was deployed to Syria during the Syrian Civil War.[xxxvii] The Iranian Armed Forces have historically promoted commanders from the 65th Brigade. The regime promoted Brigadier General Nozar Nemati, who oversaw this brigade’s deployment to Syria, to Artesh Ground Forces coordination deputy and deputy commander in October 2016 and January 2017, respectively.[xxxviii]
• IRGC Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami appointed Brigadier General Esmali Khalilzadeh as the new deputy commander of the Hamzeh Sayyid ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces.[xxxix] Karami also appointed Brigadier General Yadollah Abroshan as the new commander of the Shahid Boroujerdi headquarters and Colonel Mansour Abdollahzadeh as the new commander of the Northwest Combat Medical Center.[xl]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese media recirculated Israeli media reports that warned that Israel would escalate its operations in Lebanon soon.[xli] Hezbollah-aligned media reported on December 2 that the Israel Defense Forces has started to prepare for “large-scale attacks” in Lebanon “in the near future,” citing Israeli state broadcaster Kan.[xlii] Lebanese media also reported, citing unspecified Israeli media, that “things will not be the same after the [Pope Leo XIV’s] visit,” referencing potential future Israeli operations in Lebanon.[xliii] Lebanese media separately reported on December 2 that Lebanon has received “warning messages” that Israel may escalate its operations in Lebanon after the Pope’s visit to Lebanon.[xliv] The Pope concluded his official visit to Lebanon on December 2.[xlv]