Iran Update, December 18, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources speaking to Reuters expressed relative optimism about the progress on Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government. A Western source and a Kurdish source added that an extension of the March 10 integration agreement’s December 31 deadline is probably imminent. One SDF source characterized the most recent proposal from the government to the SDF as “the closest” the two sides have been to a deal.[i] The Syrian transitional government reportedly recently sent a new integration proposal to the SDF ahead of the December 31 deadline for SDF integration.[ii] Unspecified Western, Syrian, and Kurdish officials told Reuters on November 18 that the proposal “expressed openness” to integrating the SDF as three main divisions, along with some smaller brigades, under the condition that the SDF ”cedes" some of its command structure and opens its territory to other Syrian army units.[iii] The Reuters report was unclear on what ”cedes” means in the context of a command structure, but it appears to imply some degree of subordination. The transitional government’s recent proposal resembles an October 2025 verbal, US-brokered agreement on SDF integration that included a stipulation for three divisions and other independent brigades.[iv]

Several sources said that the proposal is unlikely to produce a comprehensive breakthrough and that any agreement reached before the end of the year will fall short of fully integrating the SDF into the Ministry of Defense (MoD), however.[v] The reported contents of the transitional government’s recent proposal to the SDF still do not address core political disagreements between the transitional government and SDF, such as decentralization, Kurdish constitutional rights, and control of oil fields in northeast Syria, which have stalled integration talks since March 2025.[vi] Neither the Syrian transitional government nor the SDF has officially commented on the status of negotiations at the time of this writing. A separate Western source told Reuters that negotiators will extend the March 10 agreement’s year-end deadline to “save face.”[vii] A Kurdish official involved in the March 10 integration negotiations similarly indicated on December 15 that negotiators would extend the agreement’s deadline.[viii]

Turkish and Saudi media have corroborated and expanded on details discussed in the Reuters report. A Turkish analyst reported on December 17 that the Syrian government submitted a “final” 13-point proposal to integrate the SDF.[ix] The journalist stated that the proposal would reorganize the SDF into three Syrian army divisions, deploy additional government forces to northeastern Syria, and place the SDF under MoD authority.[x] SDF sources separately told Saudi media on December 18 that they received a Syrian government proposal calling for the integration of three SDF divisions into the MoD.[xi] Placing the three SDF divisions under the MoD would be consistent with the Reuters reporting that the latest government proposal required that the SDF "cedes“ some of its command structure to the MoD, assuming cedes implies subordination.  The SDF sources added that an SDF delegation will travel to Damascus “soon” to discuss several outstanding military integration items, including the future of female SDF units, specific SDF commanders in the MoD, and the SDF’s internal security forces.[xii] Saudi media also reported that the Syrian government and SDF agreed to complete negotiations on the military and security aspects of the March 10 agreement this year, but will postpone negotiations on unaddressed political questions, such as decentralization and the constitution, until next year.[xiii] A pro-government Syrian source suggested that these political questions were impeding ongoing negotiations, however.[xiv]   Reuters, Saudi, and Turkish media’s reports on the details of the Syrian government’s proposal to the SDF, however, contradict a December 17 claim by Syria in Transition (SIT) that the government’s proposal closely resembled the SDF’s ideal outcome for integration negotiations and would preserve SDF autonomy. [xv]  SIT’s reported terms of the Syrian government proposal violate several redlines articulated by the Syrian and Turkish governments.

Turkey appears to have dropped its opposition to certain aspects of the most recent proposal in recent days after US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack visited Ankara and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is heavily involved in Turkey’s Syria policy. CTP-ISW has therefore adjusted its December 17 assessment that the Turkish government is the “main impediment” to an agreement at this time.[xvi] The Turkish government has repeatedly threatened military action against the SDF, and Fidan—as recently as December 6—demanded that the SDF integrate into the Syrian army as individuals, not as divisions.[xvii] Fidan’s rejection of the three-division integration, which had been originally suggested in October 2025, indicated that Turkey—not the SDF—was the main impediment to negotiations. Fidan met with Barrack on December 16 to discuss the SDF integration into the Syrian army, after which Fidan immediately changed his position.[xviii] Fidan said on December 17 that Turkey would not resort to military action against the SDF and that he is ”optimistic” about the integration negotiations.[xix] This change in official Syrian government position, combined with increased optimism from Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources about the negotiations, suggests that Turkey has dropped its opposition to the most recent proposal after the Barrack visit.

Israel conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting several Hezbollah military sites across Lebanon, including a training facility and weapons depots, on December 18, which marks its most extensive wave of airstrikes in recent months.[xx] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on December 18 that it struck Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon that the group used to train its fighters, store weapons, and conduct military operations.[xxi] Israel reportedly struck the Qaalat Jabbour training complex near Medioun, Western Bekaa District, which is one of Hezbollah’s main training complexes that houses barracks, warfare simulation complexes, and shooting ranges.[xxii] Israel previously struck the complex in January 2024.[xxiii] The IDF also announced that it killed a Hezbollah fighter in Taybeh, southern Lebanon, on December 18.[xxiv]

These Israeli strikes focused on targets that the IDF has regularly struck and do not represent an inflection in target selection change at this time, despite the larger wave of strikes. The IDF has regularly conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters, weapons, and infrastructure since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in order to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution and remove any threat to northern Israeli towns.[xxv] Israel previously expanded its targets to include Hezbollah‘s communications network and senior leadership before it launched its large-scale ground and air operation in October 2024.[xxvi] An informed source told Saudi media on December 18 that Israel informed the United States that it does not have a deadline for launching an operation against Hezbollah and that the option of an expanded operation is ”on the table.”[xxvii] The United States is reportedly under the impression that Israel has removed the deadline to give Lebanese authorities ”room to maneuver” while keeping the ”threat of using military force in place,” according to a Saudi media report on December 18.[xxviii] The Saudi media report also stated that the Israeli government is urging northern Israeli citizens to return to their towns despite military activity in the region.[xxix] Israel previously evacuated northern Israeli communities along the Israel-Lebanon border in October 2023 as the likelihood of escalation and its cross-border engagements with Hezbollah intensified.[xxx] There has been no Israeli reservist call-up since early November 2025.[xxxi] The December 18 Israeli strikes occurred on the eve of the ceasefire monitoring committee meeting, during which Israeli and Lebanese officials will hold their second round of direct talks.[xxxii]

Iranian media have described the merger of Baluch militant groups in southeastern Iran under the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) as a “symbolic” rebranding of Jaish al Adl aimed at broadening their support base.[xxxiii] Four Baloch organizations in Sistan and Baluchistan in southeastern Iran announced on December 10 that they have unified under one coalition: the MPF.[xxxiv]  Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media and hardliner outlets stated that the formation of this group is an attempt by Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi organization that operates in southeastern Iran, to “hide [its] record full of terror" and survive after incurring "heavy losses" in recent IRGC counterterrorism operations.[xxxv] IRGC-media stated that the new group was "a combination of the same old elements.” Jaish al Adl is almost certainly the most active group in MPF and appears to be the strongest member of the coalition.  

The following groups merged to form the MPF:   

• Jaish al Adl – The successor to former Sistan and Baluchistan-based Salafi Jihadi Sunni Baloch militant organization Jundallah, which disintegrated in 2012 after the Iranian regime executed its former leader Abdul Malik Rigi in 2010.[xxxvi] Jaish al Adl has historically stated that its objectives are to protect the rights of Sunni Muslims in Iran and establish an independent Baloch state.[xxxvii] Salahoddin Farooghi has commanded Jaish al Adl since its establishment in 2012.[xxxviii] Jaish al Adl operates in three districts across Sistan and Baluchistan Province. IRGC-affiliated media reported that Jaish al Adl has an intelligence branch focused on assassinating Sunni leaders within the Iranian regime.[xxxix] Jaish al Adl reportedly uses guerrilla tactics, ambush methods, and remotely controlled IEDs and land mines in their attacks.[xl] One UN member state told the United Nations that Jaish al Adl has tactical ties to Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham Khorasan Province (ISIS-KP). The member state alleged that ISIS-KP previously provided suicide bombers to Jaish al Adl for its April 2024 attack on Iranian military sites in Rask and Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xli]
• Jaish al Nasr – A militant organization that splintered from Jundallah in 2010 after Abdul Malik Rigi’s execution following a dispute.[xlii] Jaish al Nasr reintegrated with Jaish al Adl in 2016 after the Iranian regime assassinated former Jaish al Nasr leader Abdul Rauf Rigi in Dalbandin, Pakistan, in 2014, according to Iranian and regional media.[xliii]
• Pada Baloch Movement – An anti-Iranian regime Baloch group established in 2017. CTP-ISW has not observed any recent recorded militant activity by this group.[xliv]
• Mohammad Rasul Allah Group – An anti-Iranian regime Baloch group established in the mid-70s.[xlv] CTP-ISW has not observed any recent recorded militant activity by this group.

Iranian media is likely framing the MPF as a “rebranding” of Jaish al Adl, at least partly in an effort to discourage Iranian Baloch public support for the group. Several Iranian media outlets have accused Jaish al Adl of killing Baloch and other Iranian civilians in its previous attacks.[xlvi] The MPF stated on December 10 in its new charter that it seeks “deep political change” in Iran. The MPF called on Baloch Muslims and all “freedom-seeking” Iranians to conduct “civil actions,” such as displaying MPF flags, sharing the MPF’s charter, and writing anti-regime slogans in public areas, to demonstrate their solidarity with the organization.[xlvii] The MPF has published footage of its new coalition flag in various locations across Sistan and Baluchistan and Shiraz provinces.

Key Takeaways

• Syrian Transitional Government Negotiations with the SDF: Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources speaking to Reuters expressed relative optimism about the progress on Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration negotiations between the SDF and Syrian government. A Western source and a Kurdish source added that an extension of the March 10 integration agreement’s December 31 deadline is probably imminent.
• Turkey’s Position on SDF Integration: Turkey appears to have dropped its opposition to certain aspects of the most recent proposal to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense in recent days after US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack visited Ankara and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is heavily involved in Turkish Syria policy. CTP-ISW has therefore adjusted its December 17 assessment that the Turkish government is the “main impediment” to an agreement at this time.
• Israeli Airstrikes in Lebanon: Israel conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting several Hezbollah military sites across Lebanon, including a training facility and weapons depots, on December 18, which marks its most extensive wave of airstrikes in recent months. These Israeli strikes focused on targets that the IDF has regularly struck and do not represent an inflection in target selection change at this time, despite the larger wave of strikes.
• Anti-Regime Militancy in Iran: Iranian media has described the merger of Baluch militant groups in southeastern Iran under the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) as a “symbolic” rebranding of Jaish al Adl aimed at broadening their support base, likely at least partly in an effort to discourage Iranian Baloch public support for the group.

Iran

The Iranian regime has failed to address Iran’s worsening economic situation. Economic issues in Iran have previously incited major protests. The Iranian rial hit a record low on December 18 and traded at 1,313,000 rials to one US dollar.[xlviii] The devaluation demonstrates the regime’s inability to stabilize the currency market following the reinstatement of UN Security Council snapback sanctions in September 2025.[xlix] Iranian newspaper Jomhouri Eslami warned on December 18 that the “rapid” devaluation of the Iranian currency will push society into “the abyss of despair and disintegration.”[l] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also announced on December 18 that the parliament will hold a public oversight session on December 23 to review government efforts to preserve purchasing power, manage currency fluctuations, and implement a ration card program.[li]

The devaluation of the Iranian rial comes amid energy shortages that have put further pressure on the Iranian economy. Iran has faced recurring electricity shortages and blackouts, natural gas shortfalls, and water shortages that have disrupted household consumption and industrial activity in recent months.[lii] Pezeshkian stated on December 18 that the government may impose energy consumption restrictions in some areas during the winter if authorities fail to manage the energy crisis “properly.”[liii] Energy shortages in Iran have historically triggered protests and strikes.[liv] Iranian officials also recently increased gasoline prices through a multi-tiered pricing system on December 13.[lv] Similar gas price increases sparked large protests in 2019.[lvi]

Iran also faces a budget deficit and—reportedly—shrinking foreign exchange reserves, which may hinder Iran’s ability to import basic goods. Iranian Executives of Construction Party Head Hossein Marashi warned in an op-ed on December 11 that “tactical and superficial” reforms are no longer sufficient.[lvii] Marashi added that the government cannot even pay roughly $200 million to unload ships waiting at ports in southern Iran.[lviii] Iran’s limited ability to import goods could affect the Iranian public’s access to basic goods. Marashi warned that a food supplcould trigger unrest and that the danger is “serious and very close.”[lix] Pezeshkian stated in August 2025 that Iran funds many institutions and foundations that “have no output,” and questioned why the government pays them when it cannot provide for people’s livelihoods.[lx] Pezeshkian did not name specific institutions, but Iran previously increased budget allocations for religious and ideological organizations, including large funding hikes for IRGC-affiliated sociocultural bodies, the Islamic Propaganda Organization, and al Mustafa International University.[lxi]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) is attempting to portray itself as a viable US partner to counter the Houthis and other US-designated terror groups in Yemen. STC Representative to the United States and United Nations Ahmed Atef told Fox News on December 17 that the STC is prepared to be a “frontline partner” with the United States to fight the Houthis, al Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen.[lxii] Atef emphasized that the STC has rejected negotiations with the Houthis and will work with northern Yemeni groups to expel the Houthis from Sanaa.[lxiii] Yemeni security and military sources told Emirati media on December 18 that the Houthis are preparing to launch attacks targeting STC-controlled territory in southern Yemen.[lxiv] These sources may be trying to garner international support, particularly from the United States, by framing Houthi operations as imminent. Atef also stated that the STC has the potential to be a US economic partner and that the STC aims to open its oil sector and other industries to US investment.[lxv] The STC likely seeks US recognition and support to legitimize its efforts to form an independent state in southern Yemen and complicate Saudi efforts to push the STC out of newly gained territory in eastern Yemen. The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt and al Mahra Governorate and successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[lxvi] The United States has continued to support a unified Yemen under the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), which is recognized by the United Nations.[lxvii]

Saudi Arabia is reportedly preparing to use military force to expel STC forces from the recently seized territory in eastern Yemen. The Guardian reported on December 18 that around 20,000 Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) fighters have gathered in al Wadiah and al Abr districts in the Hadramawt Governorate, near the Saudi-Yemeni border.[lxviii] Saudi Arabia reportedly warned the STC that it may attack STC forces.[lxix] Yemeni President Rashad al Alimi met with Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman on December 17 to discuss the continued need to expel STC forces from the Hadramawt and Mahra Governorates.[lxx] A Yemen analyst shared footage on December 17 reportedly showing the STC deploying tanks, artillery, and other military vehicles to the Hadramawt and Mahra Governorates.[lxxi]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon have resumed discussions on several components of the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah after months of stalled progress. US, French, Saudi, and Lebanese officials met in Paris on December 18 to discuss multiple parts of the US disarmament proposal, including international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the implementation of the LAF’s Hezbollah disarmament plan, and border demarcation between Lebanon and Syria.[lxxii] French Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux announced that the officials agreed to hold an international conference in Paris in February 2026 that aims to secure international support for the LAF.[lxxiii] The LAF support conference was supposed to be held by the end of 2025, but the participants have repeatedly delayed it due to international frustrations over the LAF’s lack of progress on its disarmament plan.[lxxiv] Lebanese media reported in October 2025 that Saudi Arabia has reportedly grown frustrated with the LAF‘s “slowness,“ causing its "initial enthusiasm“ over the LAF conference to turn to caution.[lxxv] The officials at the December 18 Paris meeting also agreed to document the LAF’s disarmament efforts more ”seriously” and “with evidence” as well as strengthen the ceasefire monitoring committee.[lxxvi]

Hezbollah continues to pursue civilian reconstruction efforts to maintain its position as an alternative social welfare provider to the Lebanese government and sustain its Shia support base. Hezbollah announced on December 18 that it is constructing a residential complex in Hermel, eastern Lebanon, for displaced Syrian and Lebanese civilians.[lxxvii] There are approximately 64,000 Lebanese and 1 million Syrians civilians who are displaced in Lebanon as of October 2025.[lxxviii] The complex will include 228 housing units, shops, sanitary facilities, maintenance workshops, access to electricity and water, and freelance job opportunities.[lxxix] An unspecified Hezbollah official told Saudi media that Hezbollah launched the project because the Lebanese government lacks a clear policy on the issue of displaced people in Lebanon.[lxxx] Hezbollah has historically exploited the Lebanese government’s inability to provide social services to establish its own parallel social welfare network and consolidate popular support among Lebanese Shia communities.[lxxxi]