Houthis’ Potential Impact on Africa; DRC Commences Anti-FDLR Ops: Africa File, April 2, 2026

To receive the weekly Africa File or triweekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Key Takeaways:

• Red Sea. The Houthis have entered the Iran war but have not joined Iran’s regional economic warfare campaign, indicating a restrained approach that aims to avoid major regional escalation in the Red Sea. The Houthis still retain the capabilities to follow through on a limited regional attack campaign, which would further cripple the global economy and could involve targets in the Horn of Africa, and Houthi networks in the Horn of Africa could be key in supporting any such campaign.
• Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) took control of South West state and ousted the state president after a weekslong political dispute. The FGS’s takeover is unlikely to lead to a significant weakening Ethiopia’s military presence in South West—despite Ethiopia’s ties with the former state president—or collapse of counterterrorism operations against al Shabaab.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Congolese army (FARDC) launched military operations against an anti-Rwandan government rebel group in the eastern DRC, advancing its Washington Peace Accords obligations. Close personal ties between the FARDC and the group will likely undermine the upcoming campaign without greater US diplomatic pressure, however.
• Burundi. A large explosion at a Burundian army (FDNB) weapons depot in Bujumbura, which is Burundi’s biggest city and lies across the border from the DRC, could affect the Burundian army’s operations in the eastern DRC against M23.
• China. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a major critical minerals agreement. The DRC has tried to weaken PRC dominance over its mineral sector in recent years, and the new deal likely reflects the DRC’s strategy to balance its external partnerships and maintain partner diversity, so it does not become similarly reliant on its growing partnership with the United States.
• Nigeria. Nigerian forces have successfully slowed the Islamic State West Africa Province’s recent offensive, likely with support from US military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support.

Figure 1. Africa File, April 2, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Red Sea

Author: Liam Karr

The Houthis have entered the Iran war but have not joined Iran’s regional economic warfare campaign, indicating a restrained approach that aims to avoid major regional escalation. The Houthis have conducted several attacks targeting southern Israel since March 27, marking the group’s first involvement in the war. The Houthis launched ballistic missile attacks at Israel on March 27 and April 1, as well as a drone attack on March 28.[1] Israeli air defense systems intercepted all three attacks, which resulted in no injuries.[2]

Strikes on Israel are the Houthis’ most conservative and lowest-risk option to enter the war. Multiple analysts have noted that attacks on Israel are low risk because they symbolically demonstrate involvement in the war while minimizing the risk of entanglement with Gulf states or international retaliation from the United States or Europe.[3] Previous Houthi campaigns since 2023 have reinforced that attacks on Israel will not trigger US and wider international involvement. The United States ended its monthslong air campaign against the Houthis in May 2025 in exchange for the Houthis ceasing attacks on US vessels. The Houthis continued carrying out missile and drone strikes on Israel throughout 2025, however, even after it had drawn down and eventually ceased its Red Sea campaign. Attacks on Israel also drew retaliatory Israeli strikes on Yemen that further rallied popular support for the Houthis.[4]

The Houthis still retain the capabilities to follow through on a limited regional attack campaign, however, and Houthi networks in the Horn of Africa could be key in supporting any such offensive. The Houthis have the capabilities to expand strikes to target Gulf energy infrastructure or Red Sea shipping should Iran pressure the group to take stronger action. The Houthis regularly used drones and missiles to target energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from 2015 until the 2022 ceasefire.[5] The Houthis then shifted their focus to attacking Israel and Red Sea shipping in response to the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. The Houthis conducted several major drone and missile attacks on Israel and a few smaller attacks in the Red Sea throughout mid-2025 despite the damage US forces inflicted in early 2025, before voluntarily slowing and eventually halting attacks in relation to the US-brokered ceasefire in Gaza.[6]

Israeli, US, and partner operations have degraded already weakened Houthi capabilities and supply chains, however, which could undermine the Houthis’ ability to sustain a regional attack campaign. US and Israeli strikes in Yemen in 2025 degraded Houthi military infrastructure and killed several senior commanders and experts in missile and drone units.[7] The combined force has repeatedly targeted Bandar Abbas, Iran, which is the origin point of the smuggling routes to the Houthis since the beginning of the Iran war in 2026.[8] Yemeni coast guard forces had already intensified counter-smuggling operations since mid-2025, resulting in several major seizures and continued pressure since the beginning of the Iran war.[9] The Houthis have increasingly shifted away from smuggling completed weapons toward components to support domestic weapons production in recent years, but domestic production still requires importing these vital missile and drone components.[10] These inputs are critical, as anonymous Houthi officials told the Associated Press that the group’s missile stockpiles are running low after sustaining years of operations since October 2023, although it still had large drone stockpiles.[11]

The Houthis and Iran have been increasingly involved in illicit networks linking Yemen and Somalia, however, which function both as an alternative supply line and a revenue generation source. The Houthis have long been involved to varying degrees in the Gulf of Aden smuggling network, in which small arms and light weapons are regularly trafficked between northern Somalia and Yemen, often from the latter to the former.[12] UN experts reported in 2025, however, that Somalia has increasingly become a transit hub for Houthi weapons shipments and has “several smuggling routes” to Yemeni ports.[13] The UN, United States, and others have also warned about growing logistic ties between the Houthis and al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab since 2024, with the two groups cooperating on weapons smuggling, technical training, operational tactics, and logistic support.[14] Houthi involvement in the illicit network writ large, as well as its growing bilateral ties with al Shabaab, help the Houthis generate significant revenue and bypass sanctions.[15]

Figure 2. Houthi Smuggling Networks

Source: Liam Karr.

The Houthis have also cultivated secondary supply networks through other Horn of Africa states. Djibouti has played a growing role in smuggling weapons to the Houthis since 2023, as the loosening of UN inspections on shipments to Houthi-controlled parts has enabled more weapons to be smuggled in civilian commercial shipments.[16] The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies cited a Yemeni official in 2024 report who said that Eritrea and Sudan have also become nodes to move Iranian weapons and fighters to Yemen.[17] Yemeni forces claimed in late 2025 that they had previously intercepted weapons shipments and Houthi fighters arriving from Sudan, where some Islamist segments within the Sudanese Armed Forces have long-standing links to Iran and have spoken out in support of Iran since the beginning of the Iran war.[18]

These networks could become increasingly important for logistics or even direct support for a campaign in the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb Strait. Yemeni officials claimed that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps officials arrived in Yemen via “the Horn of Africa” in the days before they entered the war in March 2026.[19] UN reports have claimed that Houthi links with al Shabaab are part of a Houthi strategy to evaluate options to carry out maritime attacks from the Somali coast and “wield increasing influence in the region.”[20] A UN report in February 2025 claimed that al Shabaab had offered to increase piracy operations within the Gulf of Aden—specifically targeting cargo ships, disrupting ship movement, and collecting ransoms—in exchange for weapons and training from the Houthis.[21]

A regional Houthi campaign in the Gulf states or Red Sea would further cripple the global economy and could involve targets in the Horn of Africa. A Gulf or Red Sea attack campaign, even if limited, would further increase global shipping and energy costs. Saudi Arabia has rerouted a significant portion of its oil exports to the Red Sea port of Yanbu via the East–West pipeline in response to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi oil exports have reached nearly 70 percent of its prewar output, with most barrels from Yanbu going south through the Bab el Mandeb Strait to Asia.[22] The Bab el Mandeb was already a busy oil trade corridor, and energy consultants have warned that the closure of the strait would “very likely” cause oil prices to surpass more than $150 per barrel, which is more than double the prewar cost, in the following months.[23] The Red Sea and its two entrances—the Suez Canal and Bab el Mandeb—also account for nine to 12 percent of global trade and 25 to 30 percent of global container trade, which includes energy supplies, grain, electronics, and more.[24] Shipping firms previously responded to Houthi attacks by routing ships around Africa’s southern tip at the Cape of Good Hope, which significantly increases shipping costs and timelines.[25] Major carriers, including Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, and CMA CGM, have already announced that they began rerouting vessels along this alternative route to avoid the Red Sea.[26]

Houthi Red Sea attacks and the resulting international response could involve US and allied positions in the Horn of Africa. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti lies less than 100 miles from the Yemeni coast and hosts more than 4,000 US personnel who support counterterrorism and maritime security initiatives in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Several outlets and analysts have cited flight tracking info showing flights from US bases hosting US Airborne and Special Forces units to Djibouti in late March.[27] The nearby Chabelley Airfield in Djibouti hosts drones that can cover most of Somalia and can reach Yemen.[28] CTP has previously assessed that Djiboutian support for Palestine and Djibouti’s refusal to allow US bases to target the Houthis decreased Houthi incentives to target US installations in Djibouti, however.[29]

Figure 3. Competition in the Greater Red Sea Area

Source: Liam Karr.

CTP has also previously assessed that the Houthis could target Emirati or Israeli military positions in the de facto independent Somaliland region as part of a Red Sea attack campaign.[30] The UAE has upgraded military facilities in the Somaliland port city of Berbera in recent years.[31] Israel has discussed basing options with Somaliland officials since recognizing Somaliland in December 2025, leading Houthi leader Abdul Malik al Houthi to warn that any Israeli assets in Somaliland would be considered legitimate military targets.[32]

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) took control of South West state, ousting state president Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed (Laftagareen). FGS forces and allied militias captured Baidoa—the de facto South West state capital—on March 30 after two weeks of clashes with South West state forces.^[33] FGS-aligned forces began the campaign to seize key towns on March 14.^[34] The FGS redeployed Somali National Army forces—including Turkish-trained Gorgor units—to South West to directly partake in the offensive, allowing FGS forces to make significant gains and advance on Baidoa.^[35] South West officials accused FGS forces of using Turkish- and Egyptian-supplied weapons in the offensive, including Turkish drones, although CTP could not corroborate these claims.^[36]

The FGS deposed Laftagareen and have begun a transition process. Laftagareen fled to Kenya on March 30 after the FGS reportedly guaranteed his safe passage and subsequently resigned.^[37] The FGS sent officials to South West to oversee a political transition in alleged collaboration with South West officials, although the FGS appointed Somali Deputy Prime Minister Jibril Abdirashid as the interim state president despite Laftagareen having appointed the South West finance minister as his replacement.^[38] The FGS announced that it will allow most South West officials to retain office during the transition as the FGS plans state elections and establishes a new state government.^[39] The FGS decided to launch the campaign to oust Laftagareen after he disapproved of the FGS’s new constitution delaying planned 2026 elections until 2027 and extending Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term.^[40] South West had formalized its alignment against the FGS when it cut ties with the FGS on March 17.^[41]

The FGS’s takeover of South West is a missed opportunity for the leading national opposition coalition to strengthen its position, although an election standoff with parallel political processes and political violence is still likely. South West’s alignment against the FGS meant that only three states—Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and North East—and the Banadir capital region were supportive of the FGS’s constitutional and electoral reforms. A potential partnership with South West would have bolstered the Somali Future Council (SFC), a national opposition coalition consisting of Jubbaland and Puntland states and prominent federal politicians, including two former Somali presidents.

Figure 4. Somali States Align Against Mogadishu

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo.

The SFC has not deviated from its opposition to the FGS’s constitutional and electoral reforms since the FGS’s takeover of South West, however. The SFC condemned the takeover and demanded that the FGS return to dialogue with South West under the state constitution and long-standing interim federal constitution.^[42] The SFC has previously threatened to hold parallel political processes if dialogue with the FGS does not progress, and the most recent talks broke down in late February.^[43] Election disputes have frequently sparked political violence, with factions clashing in Mogadishu—the Somali capital—in 2021 and the FGS clashing with Jubbaland in 2020, 2024, and 2025.^[44]

The FGS’s takeover is unlikely to lead to a significant weakening of Ethiopia’s military presence in South West or collapse counterterrorism operations against al Shabaab in the short-term. Ethiopia had strong ties with Laftagareen due to its interest in creating an al Shabaab buffer zone in South West and refused to endorse Mohamud’s efforts to replace him.^[45] Ethiopia did not use its several thousand troops in South West to back Laftagareen against FGS forces, however, indicating that Ethiopia wants to preserve relations with the FGS to maintain its presence in South West.^[46] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that Ethiopia brokered the agreement in which the FGS guaranteed Laftagareen’s safe passage from Baidoa.^[47]

FGS forces have partially consolidated control in South West and continued counterterrorism operations against al Shabaab. The FGS increased pressure on al Shabaab to support its offensive against the South West state government, reopening a key road into Baidoa after it had reportedly been closed for several years due to insecurity.^[48] FGS and international partner forces have also conducted several operations against al Shabaab in Lower Shabelle region since March 27, reportedly killing dozens of militants.^[49] Somali Minister of Defense Ahmed Moalim Fiqi stated that FGS forces are planning to advance further south from Barawe—the de jure South West state capital—toward al Shabaab’s headquarters in Jubbaland.^[50] South West state forces have largely halted resistance against the FGS since the initial FGS advance into Baidoa.^[51] The FGS has taken steps to establish an interim government in alleged collaboration with South West officials.^[52]

Isolated violence—including political violence—could still distract from counterterrorism operations, however. The Somali outlet Somali Guardian reported that some South West state units have regrouped in localities outside of Baidoa and that the FGS is planning further operations against them.^[53] Somali outlets and the analyst Rashid Abdi have also reported looting in Baidoa and clashes between different armed factions.^[54]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Authors: Yale Ford and Claire Schreder

The Congolese army (FARDC) launched military operations against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), advancing its Washington Peace Accords obligations. The FARDC officially launched operations against the FDLR on March 30.[55] General Jacques Ychaligonza, the FARDC deputy chief of staff in charge of operations and intelligence, who is leading the operations, said that the FARDC would seek to disarm FDLR fighters peacefully but had trained and mobilized three battalions to combat uncooperative militants.[56] Ychaligonza said that the FARDC would use a military camp in Kisangani as a site to detain captured FDLR fighters, before repatriating them to Rwanda under international supervision.[57] Rwanda’s Tutsi-dominated government views the FDLR as a threat due to the DRC’s use of the group as an anti-Rwandan proxy, the FDLR’s ties to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the group’s racist, anti-Tutsi ideology. Rwanda has deployed thousands of troops to the eastern DRC and backed the M23 rebellion under a security policy that it frames as “defensive” in nature to counter threats from the FDLR and other groups in recent years.

The campaign is key to the US-brokered peace framework agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The security component of the peace agreement centers on a dual-sided plan for the Congolese government to launch operations against the FDLR as the Rwandan army (RDF) “lifts its defensive measures,” meaning a withdrawal of Rwandan troops and military equipment from eastern DRC.[58] The initial timeline set in late 2025 for both parties to fulfill their obligations and complete the plan was three months.[59] Issues such as the sequencing of anti-FDLR operations and Rwanda’s withdrawal, the FDLR’s presence in M23-controlled areas, the Congolese army’s continued collaboration with the FDLR, and defining valid FDLR targets have hindered implementation of the dual-sided plan, however.[60] These technical disagreements, along with continued mutual distrust and a major M23 and Rwandan offensive in South Kivu province, derailed the implementation of the Washington Peace Accords in late 2025.

The launch of anti-FDLR operations comes less than two weeks after the United States hosted senior Congolese and Rwandan officials in Washington, DC, to jump-start the Washington Peace Accords.[61] The United States, the DRC, and Rwanda released a joint statement that said that the DRC and Rwanda had agreed to a “series of coordinated steps to de-escalate tensions and advance progress on the ground.”[62] CTP assessed on March 26 that the restart of the peace accords likely contributed to M23’s and possibly the RDF’s recent withdrawals from the front lines in North Kivu province.[63] The DRC and Rwanda reportedly agreed to anti-FDLR operations in six operational zones—five in M23-controlled areas, and one in an area that the Congolese government controls—during the meetings in Washington.[64] French state media reported in late March that the United States wants both sides to complete the military plan by the end of 2026, with an initial assessment before April 15.[65]

Close personal ties between the FARDC and the FDLR will likely undermine the upcoming campaign, however. Numerous UN reports since 2022 indicate that the FARDC collaborates closely with the FDLR, which remains an important FARDC proxy force in the fight against Rwanda and M23.[66] Senior FARDC officers have colluded with the FDLR by warning FDLR fighters of imminent anti-FDLR operations that the FARDC has conducted under international pressure, allowing FDLR’s high command to evade death or capture.[67] The UN reported in July 2025 that the FARDC restored relations with the FDLR after the most recent anti-FDLR operations in late 2024, transferred more money and weapons to the group, and continued to rely on it “systematically” to fight M23 on the front lines.[68]

These ties undermined the first phase of the FARDC’s campaign under the US-mediated peace process that began in late 2025. The FARDC spokesperson issued a formal call for the FDLR to disarm and surrender peacefully in early October 2025.[69] The FARDC then reportedly sent senior officers to government-controlled areas in North Kivu to coordinate an “awareness campaign” for the FDLR’s surrender as part of the Washington process in early November.[70] The UN reported in December 2025 that the FARDC’s announcement caused tension between the FARDC and FDLR and certain pro-Congolese government Wazalendo factions.[71] The report said that certain FARDC officials “reassured” the FDLR that cooperation would continue, mainly because the FDLR is involved heavily in combating M23.[72] The FDLR publicly rejected the call to disarm and said that it would refuse to surrender until the Rwandan government opens an inter-Rwandan dialogue and allows the return of refugees.[73] Rwanda has criticized this campaign and the DRC’s efforts, accusing the Congolese government of stalling on its commitments and relying on “endless ‘awareness-raising’” that has not translated into action on the ground.[74] M23 accused the FARDC of using the FDLR in several offensives on its positions on April 1.[75]

China

Author: Yale Ford

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a major critical minerals agreement. Louis Kabamba, the Congolese mining minister, signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese minister of natural resources for bilateral cooperation on developing mineral resources on March 26.[76] The deal establishes a framework for boosting local mineral processing and strengthens PRC investments in Congolese copper production, geographical exploration and data sharing, and local infrastructure.[77] The PRC will be the main backer of a $29 billion iron ore project located in the northeastern DRC that the DRC unveiled in early 2026.[78] The deal also establishes a joint dialogue mechanism to monitor the implementation of projects.[79] The DRC is already set to benefit from duty-free exports to the PRC beginning on May 1, as part of a new tariff regime that Chinese President Xi Jinping announced with 53 African countries in early 2026.[80]

The DRC has tried to weaken Chinese dominance over its mineral sector in recent years, and the new deal likely reflects the DRC’s strategy to balance its external partnerships and maintain partner diversity, so it does not become similarly reliant on its new partnership with the United States. The DRC has tried to dilute Chinese dominance of its mining sector for nearly a decade. The PRC signed a major mining deal with the DRC in 2007, which gave Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) unprecedented access to Congolese copper and cobalt in exchange for development financing in a “resource-for-infrastructure” deal.[81] The PRC committed to invest about $3 billion in infrastructure projects in return for mining rights to sites in the southern DRC worth around $93 billion.[82] Former DRC President Joseph Kabila renegotiated the 2007 deal in 2017 and approved a revised mining code in 2018, but the arrangement remained favorable to the PRC.[83] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi has sought to restructure the partnership and court non-Chinese investment since coming to power, but Chinese SOEs and policy banks controlled 80 percent of Congolese exports of cobalt and at least eight of the 14 largest cobalt mines by 2025.[84]

The United States and the DRC have deepened economic ties since signing a critical minerals partnership in early December 2025.[85] The partnership stipulates that US companies will receive the right to invest first in promising mineral reserves and other investments that the Congolese government identifies—thus blocking the PRC—and adds to an evolving list reviewed by the Joint Steering Committee, which held its first meeting in early February 2026.[86] The framework significantly expands US involvement in the DRC and commits the DRC to redirect mineral exports west toward the Atlantic Ocean via the US-funded Lobito railway corridor. The partnership has led to a growing number of deals between the DRC and US companies, and the DRC has already sent several copper shipments to the United States since early January 2026.[87] Reuters reported in early March 2026 that insecurity, permitting disputes, and bureaucratic delays have slowed cooperation, however.[88]

The latest agreement with the PRC is likely intended primarily to balance among its external partners and maximize foreign investment through diversification, rather than to increase Chinese dominance in the DRC. The US-DRC strategic partnership agreement is more expansive than the deal with the PRC, and CTP assessed in mid-March that the Congolese government views the US-DRC partnership as a quid pro quo, tying preferential US access to Congolese mineral reserves to expanded US security assistance in the fight against M23 and Rwanda in the eastern DRC.[89] Tshisekedi boasted in a speech in late March that the United States had agreed to put an end to Rwandan aggression, “help us build an army to protect our country,” and invest a significant sum of money that will benefit local populations.[90] US companies have also been most interested in cobalt, copper, and lithium, all of which the United States lists as critical minerals, while the major investment in the new DRC-PRC deal is an iron mine, which is not on US critical mineral lists.

Tshisekedi is also relying on the United States for regime security. CTP assessed that Tshisekedi likely also aims to trade minerals for security and US diplomatic backing to ensure his regime’s survival, which is threatened by the war in the eastern region, framing greater US security assistance as crucial to protect US investments in the DRC.[91] Reuters cited an unspecified US diplomat in early March 2026 who said that the DRC is “deliberately slowing” some mining deals to prompt the United States to step up pressure on M23.[92] Kabamba had said at a major mining conference in South Africa in early February 2026 that the DRC would look elsewhere for viable partners as it seeks to diversify its partnerships if the US-DRC framework does not advance concretely.[93]

China uses its dominance over mineral markets to artificially manipulate mineral prices and make it economically infeasible for competitors to enter the market. China’s monopoly gives the PRC little incentive to follow safe or fair business practices, as Chinese SOEs are frequently implicated in environmental disasters and human rights violations. A Chinese-owned mining company spilled toxic acid into several neighborhoods and waterways in Lubumbashi, a major mining town with three million people in the southern DRC, causing significant environmental damage and killing thousands of fish in early November 2025.[94] This exploitative strategy also prevents African governments from benefiting from bidding wars between prospective partners in a free and fair market. African governments are dependent on China for mineral export revenue, which can be a vital source of income for many governments. The DRC placed export restrictions on cobalt in early 2025, in part to curtail Chinese price fixing.[95]

Burundi

Author: Yale Ford

A large explosion at a Burundian army (FDNB) weapons depot rocked Bujumbura, Burundi’s biggest city and economic capital across the border from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). An FDNB weapons depot at a military site known as Base Camp in the southern part of Bujumbura blew up, affecting several districts in the city—some more than three miles away—for several hours on March 31.[96] FDNB spokesperson Gaspard Baratuza claimed on March 31 that a fire caused by a “serious electrical accident” in the ammunition storage room detonated explosive material.[97] Unverified reports in Burundian and French outlets, including Agence France-Presse, said that a drone attack or a projectile that landed on the stockpile triggered the ignition.[98] Baratuza claimed on April 1 that the incident killed 13 people and wounded over 50.[99] Burundian media cited non-official sources on April 1 who said that as many as 80 people may have died in the blast.[100]

Figure 5. Large Explosion Rocks Bujumbura

Source: Yale Ford.

The potential destruction of an FDNB base as a result of the incident could affect the FDNB’s operations in the eastern DRC against M23. The FDNB is the Congolese army’s (FARDC’s) most important military ally in South Kivu province. The FARDC uses Bujumbura and its airport, about 16 miles to the east of Uvira town in South Kivu, as a rear base and staging ground for FDNB-FARDC military operations against M23. The FDNB began a partial redeployment of troops to South Kivu via Lake Tanganyika in late December 2025 and early January 2026 after M23 withdrew from Uvira, numbering at least 5,000 troops by late February.[101] Base Camp is a key logistics base for the FDNB, with several military installations, a fuel station, and storage sites for weapons and other military equipment, that plays a role in supplying the FDNB in the eastern DRC.[102] Base Camp had reportedly received weapon shipments from Tanzania and an unspecified European country intended for use in the DRC in late March before the weapons depot exploded.[103]

Nigeria

Authors: Alexis Thomas and Liam Karr

Nigerian forces have successfully slowed the Islamic State West Africa Province’s (ISWAP’s) recent offensive, likely with support from US military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. Major Nigerian counterterrorism successes have slowed ISWAP attacks in recent weeks. Nigerian security forces repelled a complex attack in Malam Fatori on the night of March 18, claiming to kill at least 80 militants.[104] At least 100 ISWAP militants attacked Nigerian military positions in Malam Forti with ground forces supported by armed drones.[105] The Nigerian military reportedly ambushed the attackers with concealed ground forces and pre-positioned air assets after luring in the militants. The military repelled another ISWAP attack on a forward operating base in Mandaragirau on March 28, claiming to kill 38 militants with ground troops and precision airstrikes.[106] ISWAP has recently slowed its attacks in the northeast, signaling the end of a Ramadan offensive that began in late February.[107] The offensive increased the rate, severity, and complexity of attacks against Nigerian military camps in the northeast and overwhelmed Nigerian security forces prior to their recent tactical adaptations.[108]

US ISR support has likely helped the Nigerian military repel ISWAP attacks. “International technical partners” warned the Nigerian military before the Malam Forti attack that ISWAP forces were mobilizing.[109] A Nigerian military spokesman stated on March 21 that the US has provided intelligence from ISR missions to Nigerian field commanders, allowing the military to predict incoming assaults and preemptively strike.[110] US officials told Reuters that it has multiple MQ-9 Reaper drones operating in Nigeria to provide intelligence support to the Nigerian military.[111]

Africa File Data Cutoff: April 2, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.