The State of the Axis of Resistance: Assessing Risks and Opportunities for the United States

Executive Summary:

Iran has suffered repeated defeats across the Middle East since the beginning of 2024. Israel has severely damaged the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance in its campaigns against Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen and severed Iranian access to its militia allies in the Levant. And Israeli operations have eliminated key Iranian and Iranian-backed figures and degraded Iranian air defenses and missile forces. Tehran has thus become more vulnerable and lost much of its regional influence and ability to project force, bringing it to its weakest in decades. These defeats have reduced the threat to US interests, personnel, and partners in the Middle East and afforded the United States the strategic bandwidth to focus its attention and resources on other parts of the globe.

There is no guarantee, however, that these victories will last. Iran and its Axis of Resistance remain hostile to the United States and its partners and expect more conflict. They will spend the coming years rebuilding their strength and collaborating with major US adversaries, such as China, North Korea, and Russia, to erode US global influence and undermine the US-led international order. Tehran and its militia allies will, of course, need years of concerted effort and investment to return to their previous levels of strength. But if left unchecked in that time, they will likely succeed, which would enable them to again plunge the Middle East into instability.

The United States cannot accept that risk, as it was under those conditions that Hamas invaded Israel and ignited a war that rapidly spread across the Middle East. Washington faced numerous crises suddenly, as Iranian and Iranian-backed forces attacked American service members, international shipping, and key US partners. Tehran meanwhile accelerated its nuclear activities, at one point having enough fissile material to produce nine nuclear weapons within weeks. These challenges yanked US attention and resources back to the region and away from other global priorities, such as competition with China and Russia. Incurring such a strategic surprise in the Middle East at some future point when the United States has already committed itself to managing crises elsewhere in the world, such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, could be catastrophic.

The United States should therefore capitalize on the moment of relative weakness affecting Iran and
its Axis of Resistance to make lasting gains and prevent them from rebuilding. That means solidifying
recent progress and using the positive momentum to further constrain Iranian and Iranian-backed forces across the Middle East. Washington has an unprecedented opportunity in this regard. Pressing this advantage could reduce the medium- and long-term threats to US interests, personnel, and partners and help stabilize the region after two years of widespread conflict. It could also help ensure that the United States can safely focus on advancing its interests and defending its principles elsewhere.
This report provides recommendations that form a foundation from which the United States can develop a more coherent, long-term approach to containing the Iranian threat and promoting Middle Eastern stability.

First, the United States must collaborate with its international partners, especially the European countries, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and rebuilding its offensive capabilities. Negotiations are a perfectly viable way to prevent nuclear proliferation in principle. But the United
States must remain prepared to use force—as it has already to tremendous effect—to prevent Iran
from becoming a nuclear power. The United States and its international partners must also enforce the UN “snapback” sanctions that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany reactivated against Iran. Those sanctions include an international arms embargo that will hinder Iran’s efforts to rebuild its offensive capabilities with foreign assistance.

Second, the United States should support an international effort to establish a new Palestinian governing authority that opposes Hamas and can rebuild the Gaza Strip. That authority could manage the distribution of aid, housing of displaced Gazans, and administration and reconstruction of the strip. It could supplant Hamas as the primary political power in the strip and gradually erode Hamas’s influence. This is the most effective way to create long-term peace in the Gaza Strip; military operations cannot achieve this effect alone, because they challenge Hamas at the military level but not the political one. The international community would, of course, need to support a new governing authority with financial and security assistance, especially as that authority works to
destroy the remaining Hamas remnants. Egypt and the Gulf states are well poised to assist here.

Third, the United States should aggressively support the full implementation of the Israel-Lebanon
ceasefire agreement, which requires that the Lebanese government and military remove Hezbollah forces from southern Lebanon and prevent the group from rebuilding militarily. Newly elected Lebanese
leaders have voiced their desire to disarm Hezbollah promptly. Hezbollah has responded characteristically with threats to the government, highlighting the risk inherent in trying to disarm the group. But Hezbollah is weaker now than at any point in decades; Washington has a rare window of opportunity to defeat a terror group that has long antagonized the United States and killed many Americans. The United States should also explore how to collaborate
with regional partners and use sanctions to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting.

Fourth, the United States must support long-term Syrian stability and a political order that integrates all ethno-religious minorities, reconciles rival political factions, and destroys Assad-era militant and criminal networks that seek to destabilize the country. Promoting such stability requires maintaining the US force presence in Syria as part of the international coalition to defeat ISIS. The United States should also pressure the transitional government and its backer, Turkey, to build a broad-based and fully representative political system. The United States should similarly press the transitional government to pursue fair and transparent justice against former Assad regime officials who committed crimes against the Syrian people. Doing so would minimize the appeal to some Syrian elements of supporting anti-government networks tied to Bashar al Assad and potentially aligned with Iran.

Fifth, the United States should increase support for—rather than abandon—Iraqi leaders who wish to
see their country independent from Iranian domination. The United States should retain its force presence in Iraq, as it empowers those Iraqi leaders, and collaborate with them to constrain and marginalize Iranian-backed militias. Washington must also be prepared to use force against those militias should they again threaten US service members. The militias stopped attacking US personnel after the United States threatened their key leaders, many of whom are designated terrorists. The United States can maintain this deterrence while exploring political and economic measures with Iraqi leaders to minimize Iranian influence there. The militias will respond threateningly, which is why Iraqi leaders need US backing and protection.

Finally, the United States should seek to render the Houthis unwilling to attack international shipping and US partners. The Houthis are currently willing to do both. Airstrikes alone cannot deter the Houthis. And the United States cannot tolerate a future wherein transit through the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman is under the constant threat of Houthi attack. That would imperil US sailors and vessels transiting the region and continue inflating shipping prices. The United States should specifically be prepared to
support local partners in conducting offensive ground operations against the Houthis. A committed US effort to back partners in challenging Houthi political control is the most straightforward—and perhaps only—path to render the Houthis unwilling to conduct attacks outside Yemen.

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