The Artesh in Syria: A fundamental shift in Iranian hard power

The deployment of elements of Iran’s conventional military, the Artesh, to fight in Syria over the past month was surprising.[1]  The Artesh has historically focused on the territorial defense of Iran, and there have been no confirmed expeditionary Artesh deployments to a combat zone since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.[2]  The decision to deploy Artesh troops was likely driven in part by the casualties taken by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) conventional forces in Syria.[3]  The rhetoric from Artesh senior leadership, however, suggests that the deployment also signals a fundamental shift in the Artesh’s previously defensive posture. The Supreme Leader and Iran’s military leaders appear to have decided to re-purpose elements from the Artesh to support the IRGC actively in its mission of defending and expanding the Islamic Revolution abroad.  Such a change would have dramatic implications for the scale and capability of Iranian hard power in the Middle East.

Iran’s decision to deploy Artesh troops to Syria has been well-documented by AEI’s Critical Threats Project and elsewhere.[4] It has been less clear who ordered the Artesh to the fight and how it has been integrated into the pro-Assad military structure in Syria. Recent statements by Artesh commanders and casualty data over the past weeks suggest that Artesh officer cadre are integrated within the larger IRGC command and control structure in Syria. This development is significant not only because it shows that the Artesh can deploy abroad and fight, but also because it demonstrates a hitherto unseen IRGC capability to conduct joint operations with limited numbers of Artesh forces.

The IRGC has rotated officer cadres from its ground forces units into Syria for brief periods (30-60 days) corresponding with major operations there.[5] Artesh troops appear to be integrated within the IRGC’s larger deployment pattern rather than forming a separate parallel force structure on the ground, as Artesh Commander Major General Ataollah Salehi disclosed in a recent interview.[6] He stated that the Artesh forces are not under Artesh command in Syria but are operating under an unnamed organization that has sole command over military operations in the country. He was likely referring to the IRGC Quds Force, which is ultimately responsible for Iran’s military operations in Syria as well as Iraq.[7] Other Artesh commanders have also disclosed that Artesh troops are fighting “alongside” IRGC troops in Syria.[8]

Casualty data suggests that at least some of the Artesh troops are embedded with the Guards even on the frontlines. Of the seven Artesh casualties reported as of this writing, four were reportedly killed during rebel offensives south of Aleppo, where the IRGC has historically kept conventional unit cadres on the frontlines.[9] IRGC casualties have also continued over the last several weeks, including three soldiers on the frontlines south of Aleppo that were reported simultaneously with the four Artesh casualty announcements on April 11.[10] A Fars News Agency report published on May 2 claimed that Artesh Special Forces and IRGC Qods Force operatives are operating in the towns of Al-Hadhar and Zaytan located south of Aleppo.[11]  The decision to place Artesh troops under IRGC command is logical given that any Iranian troops south of Aleppo would likely be dependent upon pre-existing IRGC logistical networks on the ground. It shows a willingness and ability to manage inter-service friction, however, between two organizations with a decades-long record of jealousy and competition.[12]

The Artesh appears to be following the brigade cadre-only model the IRGC used when deploying ground forces during the fall and winter offensives around Aleppo city.[13] All seven reported casualties have been officers, suggesting that the Artesh is mostly limited to brigade cadre without the rank-and-file that should comprise the majority of troops in a ground forces unit (see table below). Artesh casualties are from a number of different Artesh Special Forces brigades, moreover, which indicates that entire units are not being sent to Syria. The commander of the Artesh Ground Forces confirmed this assessment when he stated that the Artesh’s troops in Syria consisted of “service members from various units” rather than a whole unit.[14] Officers were likely selected based on language or other specialized skills that were in demand among the IRGC’s troops. Unconfirmed reports suggest that at least one of the officers was a member of a specialized Artesh hostage-rescue unit and was killed during an operation to free a captured IRGC commander near Aleppo.[15]

Senior Artesh commanders probably welcomed the high-profile mission alongside the IRGC  in order to prove their relevance to state officials that have, until fairly recently, perceived the conventional military as unreliable and uncommitted to the regime’s ideology.[29] The Artesh ground forces commander proudly boasted of the Artesh’s new role in Syria and stated that his troops are ready to “perform the mission wherever that mission might be.”[30]  Other comments from Artesh officers suggest that the Artesh’s leaders have begun to redefine their constitutionally defined mission to protect Iran’s borders to include expeditionary deployments as part of a preemptive doctrine.[31] This bravado by senior Artesh officers mirrors the IRGC’s own rhetoric and hints at a possibly larger transformation in the Artesh’s orientation towards complementing IRGC operations abroad.[32]

The integration of Artesh forces within IRGC operations in Syria is the natural continuation of the Iranian regime’s efforts to consolidate and strengthen its military services in the face of external and domestic threats. The Guards have historically overshadowed the Artesh in terms of funding and procurement, thanks in large part to the IRGC’s unparalleled access to key decision makers within the regime.  The Artesh has nevertheless adopted an increasingly important position within Iran’s security apparatus in recent years, which appears in large part to have been engineered by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[33] The Artesh commander made a point of saying that Khamenei ordered Artesh troops to the fight in Syria, signaling that the Supreme Leader intends to continue elevating the status of the Artesh within the regime’s security establishment, likely in an attempt to foster greater loyalty and unity between the services .[34]

The decision to supplement IRGC forces with elements from Artesh Special Forces brigades is less surprising when one considers the record of cooperation in Iran between special operation forces from both services, however. Artesh Special Forces helped the IRGC establish their own training base for special operation forces in the 1990s.[35] Artesh Special Forces train together with the IRGC Special Forces, known as the Saberin.[36] The Artesh Special Forces have also been documented conducting counter-insurgent operations in northwestern and southeastern Iran, presumably in coordination with the Saberin forces that have traditionally been responsible for counter-insurgency missions in these areas.[37]

The deployment of Artesh troops to Syria demonstrates that the IRGC is capable of integrating Artesh Special Forces within its greater expeditionary command structure, despite institutional rivalries. This development is significant because the Artesh constitutes a sizeable but untapped source of troops for Tehran’s expeditionary operations abroad as the IRGC may be facing constraints on its deployable manpower. It is too soon to assess whether the IRGC intends to--or even is capable of--integrating large numbers of troops from conventional Artesh brigades or enlisted Artesh troops within its operations in Syria or elsewhere. But with the pro-regime forces appearing to ramp up around Aleppo, this is a course of action that  must be monitored closely.