Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on September 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command continues to signal its commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win a war of attrition against Ukraine. Putin claimed on September 18 that there are over 700,000 Russian soldiers on the frontline in Ukraine.[1] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on September 17 that Russian forces are advancing on "practically all fronts" in the war.[2] Putin's and Gerasimov's statements are in line with Putin's overarching theory of victory that assumes that Russia has the resources and combat capability to continue gradual advances indefinitely and win a war of attrition against Ukraine.[3] Putin's theory of victory is predicated on the assumption that Russia will be able to outlast Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to resist Russian aggression. Putin has repeatedly indicated that he believes that Russian forces will be able to achieve his war goals on the battlefield, even if they are only making creeping advances, as Putin likely assesses that his troops will be able to leverage their manpower and materiel advantages to overwhelm Ukrainian forces. Putin's and Gerasimov's recent statements are part of wider Kremlin efforts to push Ukraine and the West to immediately acquiesce to Putin's maximalist demands out of fear that a Russian victory is inevitable and that Russian aggression will only increase in the future.[4]

ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force Putin to change his calculus and engage in good-faith negotiations. Russian gains on the battlefield have come at a high cost, with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reporting on September 9 that Russian forces have suffered 299,210 casualties killed and wounded in action since January 2025 alone.[5] Russian forces have been advancing at a creeping foot pace throughout 2025, and Russia's casualty rates have been disproportionately high compared to the amount of territory seized. Putin has also mismanaged Russia’s economy throughout the war, resulting in increased and unsustainable wartime spending, growing inflation, and significant labor shortages.[6] Putin's focus on defense spending and the buildup of Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has notably come at the expense of the civilian economic sectors. Russia's ability to fund its war machine is in part reliant on Russian oil exports, which fund a significant portion of Russia's federal revenues.[7] US President Donald Trump noted these Russian weaknesses, stating on September 18 that Russia is incurring more losses in the war than Ukraine and that Putin will have to "drop out" of the war should oil prices come down.[8]

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on September 18 that Russia is only willing to compromise in Ukraine if a peace settlement ensures Russia's "legitimate security interests" as well as the interests of Russians who live in Ukraine.[9] Lavrov also claimed that the United States understands the need to address the so-called "root causes" of the war.[10] Kremlin officials, including Lavrov, have consistently used "legitimate security interests" and "root causes" as shorthand to reiterate Russia's original war demands, which Kremlin officials have continuously asserted Russia will achieve either militarily or diplomatically.[11] Lavrov is attempting to falsely posture Russia as willing to compromise despite the Kremlin's repeated demands that Ukraine capitulate and acquiesce to Russia's maximalist demands.[12]

The Kremlin is also attempting to manipulate the Trump administration into normalizing US-Russian bilateral relations without concluding the war in Ukraine — contrary to Trump's desired timeline of working on bilateral relations after concluding a peace in Ukraine.[13] Lavrov claimed on September 18 that US President Donald Trump aims to "remove the topic of Ukraine" from the US-Russian agenda in order to "normalize" bilateral economic, technological, and other relations.[14] Lavrov also claimed on September 17 that efforts to "entice" Russian President Vladimir Putin into economic deals with the United States will not stop the war.[15] The Kremlin is attempting to push Trump to separate the war in Ukraine from discussions about US-Russian bilateral relations, particularly in the economic sphere. The Kremlin likely aims to simultaneously continue its war in Ukraine while alleviating the pressure that existing and possible future sanctions are putting on the Russian economy, particularly sanctions targeting the energy revenues that largely fund the war.[16] The Kremlin has similarly leveraged the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev to promote the prospect of expanding US-Russian economic and business relations in order to gain concessions from the Trump administration on Ukraine.[17]

The Kremlin appears to be conducting a coordinated information campaign threatening Finland. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on September 18 that the Finnish government’s “neutral veneer peeled off” and that revanchism is “literally on the rise” in Finland.[18] Russian Environmental Protection, Ecology, and Transport Special Presidential Representative Sergei Ivanov claimed on September 18 that Russian-Finnish relations "practically do not exist" and will not improve in the near future as Finland is a NATO member and is “actively calling for strengthening [its] eastern border.”[19] Ivanov claimed that the Finnish population is unsatisfied with the Finnish government and alleged that the lack of Russian tourists has led to “depopulation” and a weakening economy in southeastern Finland. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly claimed on September 18 that Finland’s NATO membership caused Russians to stop buying property and visiting Finland, leading to “depopulation.”[20]

Ivanov is a member of Putin’s inner circle, serving as the deputy director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) from 1998 to 1999 when Putin headed the organization.[21] Ivanov also served as the defense minister, deputy prime minister, and chief of staff of the Presidential Administration.[22] Ivanov's removal from his position as the chief of staff of the Presidential Administration in 2016 was likely a demotion at the time, but the Kremlin appears to be using him to reinforce ongoing Russian efforts to threaten Finland.[23] Kremlin newswire TASS and other Russian state media outlets notably amplified Lavrov’s, Ivanov’s, and Chepa’s statements.[24] The similar wording in both Ivanov’s and Chepa’s claims and TASS' amplification of their comments suggests that this is a concerted top-down Kremlin informational effort targeting Finland.[25] High-ranking Kremlin officials have increased threats against Finland in recent weeks, including by using language that mirrors the Kremlin’s false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that the playbook Russia is currently using to threaten NATO mirrors the playbook Russia previously used to set informational conditions justifying its aggression against Ukraine.[27]

Lithuanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to several incidents of arson in Europe in late July 2024 that were likely part of Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare campaign that aims to sow fear and discord within Europe. The Lithuanian Prosecutor General's Office and Criminal Police Bureau reported on September 17 that three individuals, two of whom are Russian citizens affiliated with Russian military intelligence services, shipped four packages with incendiary devices from Vilnius to various European countries in late July 2024.[28] Lithuanian authorities reported that three of the packages detonated at the airport in Leipzig, Germany; on a freight truck in Poland; and at a DHL warehouse in Birmingham, United Kingdom between July 20 to 22, 2024. Lithuanian authorities reported that the fourth package reached Poland over land but did not detonate due to a technical failure. The devices reportedly contained homemade electronic timer-controlled incendiary charges as well as additional flammable substances. Lithuanian authorities reported that Lithuanian and other authorities are pursuing charges against 15 total suspects for their involvement in the organization and execution of these acts, including several suspects implicated in the attempted attack against an IKEA shopping center in Vilnius on May 9, 2024. Russia likely intends for these attacks to sow discord and chaos within European states and undermine domestic stability and the harmony between European states. Russia has been engaged in a multipronged hybrid warfare campaign since at least 2022 against Europe that has included electronic warfare (EW) interference and GPS jamming, sabotage missions, arson attacks, and attempted assassinations.[29]

Ukraine and Poland agreed on joint drone development and training mechanisms following the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 to 10. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on September 18 that Poland and Ukraine will create a joint unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) task force that will serve as a platform to coordinate and develop joint drone initiatives.[30] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine and Poland will use the task force to exchange knowledge and experiences with drones, develop and test counter-drone technologies, increase interoperability between Polish and Ukrainian forces, and train Polish forces and engineers on how to use air defense systems to protect against Russian drone and missile strikes. Shmyhal and Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz also signed a memorandum of understanding on September 18 establishing a training ground in Poland where Ukraine will train Polish forces on drone use.[31] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine will help Poland to create a "drone line" that works with EW systems to enable Poland to use drones to repel strikes. Shmyhal added that Ukraine will provide Poland with access to programs to monitor Russian strikes, possibly directed toward Poland. Shmyhal stated that Poland will also receive 43.7 billion euros (about $51.5 billion) from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, the EU's financial instrument to facilitate common defense procurement efforts between EU states in order to boost Europe's defense industrial production capacity.[32] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine and Poland will establish joint defense programs through the SAFE mechanism.[33] ISW continues to assess that the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion was the latest in Russia's yearslong efforts to conduct kinetic provocations against Europe, including through its hybrid warfare campaign, while also increasing its rhetorical provocations threatening neighboring NATO states.[34]

The Kremlin will likely introduce a quota to systematically appoint hand-selected veterans of the war in Ukraine to positions in municipal, regional, and federal government in support of the Kremlin’s long-term campaign to militarize Russian society. A Just Russia Party Leader Sergey Mironov told Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting with political party leaders on September 18 that his party is proposing to establish a three percent quota for Russian veterans serving in municipal, regional, and federal government positions.[35] Mironov claimed that he agrees with Putin's belief that veterans must form the "future elite" in Russia. Putin responded to Mironov’s proposal, claiming that it is an "attractive idea," but warned that such a quota might turn into "formalism." Putin claimed that there are 700,000 Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine and that the Kremlin will need to be diligent about selecting the right candidates via the Time of Heroes program (the Kremlin’s program that prepares loyal veterans of the war in Ukraine for work in government and state enterprises). Putin and Mironov are likely setting informational conditions to systematically appoint veterans who are loyal to the regime to positions of power. ISW continues to assess that Putin launched the Time of Heroes program to ensure that Russian society is deeply militarized and ready to make greater sacrifices in the war in Ukraine and during potential Russian aggression against NATO in the future.[36]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly extended Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's military service for five more years, demonstrating how Putin continues to retain an aging cadre of loyalists despite his stated efforts to raise a new, younger elite. A source close to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) told Russian outlet RBK on September 18 that the Kremlin extended Gerasimov's service term, with another source specifying that the Kremlin extended his term for five more years.[37] Gerasimov turned 70 years old on September 8, reaching the standard mandatory retirement age. Putin notably signed a decree in March 2021 that removed the mandatory retirement age for senior presidential appointees, allowing them to serve past the age of 70.[38] Putin awarded Gerasimov with the Order of Courage on September 8, despite the fact that Russian veterans and ultranationalists frequently criticize Gerasimov for his command incompetence.[39] A Kremlin insider source assessed on September 9 that Putin retained Gerasimov in order to maintain stability in the chain of command.[40] Russian independent newspaper The Moscow Times reported that Gerasimov is likely at least the fourth known senior Russian military and security official who has maintained his role after reaching the mandatory retirement age.[41] Putin's commitment to retaining aging but loyal military and security officials within his inner circle contradicts the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to appoint younger veterans of the war in Ukraine to positions of power. Putin is also contradicting his promises from the early 2000s not to remain in power past the age of 65.[42]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed the departure of Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak from his senior Kremlin position. Peskov claimed on September 18 that Kozak resigned voluntarily but did not offer details about his departure.[43] ISW continues to assess that Kozak’s repeated disagreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the war in Ukraine suggest that Putin and possibly other Kremlin powerbrokers, such as Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, removed Kozak from his position or pushed him to “resign” on his own.[44] A Russian insider source Kozak’s departure demonstrates the ineffectiveness of his policies, particularly those related to former Soviet states, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltics, and is a signal that the Kremlin views its current foreign policy model in the post-Soviet space as insufficient.[45]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on September 18. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on September 18 that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers.[46] Ukraine's “I Want to Find” project reported on September 18 that Russia received the bodies of 24 KIA servicemembers.[47]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command continues to signal its commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win a war of attrition against Ukraine.
• ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force Putin to change his calculus and engage in good-faith negotiations.
• The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is also attempting to manipulate the Trump administration into normalizing US-Russian bilateral relations without concluding the war in Ukraine - contrary to Trump's desired timeline of working on bilateral relations after concluding a peace in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin appears to be conducting a coordinated information campaign threatening Finland.
• Lithuanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to several incidents of arson in Europe in late July 2024 that were likely part of Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare campaign that aims to sow fear and discord within Europe.
• Ukraine and Poland agreed on joint drone development and training mechanisms following the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 to 10.
• The Kremlin will likely introduce a quota to systematically appoint hand-selected veterans of the war in Ukraine to positions in municipal, regional, and federal government in support of the Kremlin’s long-term campaign to militarize Russian society.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly extended Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's military service for five more years, demonstrating how Putin continues to retain an aging cadre of loyalists despite his stated efforts to raise a new, younger elite.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strikes campaign against Russian oil and gas infrastructure overnight on September 17 and 18. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) reported on September 18 that SOF drone operators conducted a strike against the Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka Oil Refinery in Volgograd Oblast, halting production.[48] The SOF reported that the refinery is the largest producer of fuel and lubricants in Russia’s Southern Federal Okrug and that it has an annual processing capacity of 15.7 million tons, which is 5.6 percent of Russia's annual oil processing. A Russian Volgograd Oblast monitoring Telegram channel and Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on September 18 that at least 11 long-range Ukrainian drones flew over Volgograd Oblast, including near the refinery, and that there are no reported fires.[49] Militarnyi reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Volgogradneftepererabotka Oil Refinery twelve times from March 2024 to September 2025. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka Oil Refinery and the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Oil Refinery in the Republic of Bashkortostan.[50] A Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) source informed Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on September 18 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Oil Refinery, which is roughly 1,400 kilometers from the border with Ukraine and produces gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and fuel oil.[51] The SBU source added that the drone strike damaged the ELOU-AVT-4 unit in the heart of the facility responsible for purifying oil and converting it into fuel products. Geolocated footage published on September 18 indicates that there is a fire at the enterprise.[52] Republic of Bashkortostan Head Radiy Khabirov claimed that two Ukrainian drones struck the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Oil Refinery and that there was a fire at the enterprise.[53] Operational Headquarters of Krasnodar Krai claimed on September 18 that drone debris caused a fire near an oil and gas facility in Novominskaya in Krasnodar Krai.[54]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, and in Ryzhivka, Sumy Oblast; north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky on September 17 and 18.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Sadky, and Yunakivka.[56]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that there is no functioning Russian command and control near Oleksiivka and that Ukrainian forces are "battering" the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in the area, as the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) fails to support the 2nd Battalion due to risk of Ukrainian drone strikes.[57] The milblogger accused the commander of the 2nd Battalion of following "idiotic orders" and sending Russian infantry into assaults in groups of four to 10 rather than one to two, which makes the infantry more susceptible to Ukrainian drone strikes.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino (northwest of Sumy City).[58] Elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating in Tetkino, and regiment scouts are conducting reconnaissance on the outskirts of the Ryzhivka forest area (south of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast).[59] Drone operators of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast, and drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Bryansk and Chernihiv border areas.[60]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City within Vovchansk, including on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River, and near Synelnykove on September 17 and 18.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[62] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Milove and toward Khatnie (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[63]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie and Ambarne and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Hryhorivka and Obukhivka on September 17 and 18.[64]

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 18 that Russian forces are conducting diversionary operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction to disperse Ukrainian reserves, but suggested that Russian forces could escalate these attacks into full-fledged offensive operations to threaten the flank or rear of Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv direction and potentially near Chuhuiv (southeast of Kharkiv City).[65]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), north of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk), near Holubivka (northeast of Kupyansk), and near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[66]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Novoosynove on September 17 and 18.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kupyansk and near Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk) and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk) and pushed Russian forces toward Myrove and Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[68]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on September 18 that Russian forces are not advancing on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in Kupyansk but are attempting to seize positions in rear areas using infiltration tactics.[69] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are fighting against Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that managed to infiltrate the city via underground gas pipes in urban areas on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River in Kupyansk. The commander noted that Ukrainian forces damaged the pipes to prevent Russian forces from leveraging them for infiltrations and that the number of Russian sabotage groups is very high on the west bank in Kupyansk.

Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that there are no Russian forces in central Kupyansk.[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that central Kupyansk is a contested “gray zone.”[71]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are infiltrating and amassing in northwestern Kupyansk from Radkivka and that Russian forces intend to seize bridges across the Oskil River within central Kupyansk.[72] Another Russian milblogger claimed that simultaneous Russian attacks in the Kamyanka-Krasne Pershe area (northeast of Kupyansk) and the Odradne area (east of Velykyi Burluk) could allow Russian forces to advance toward Kolodyazne and Dvorichanske (both northeast of Kupyansk and southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[73] The milblogger claimed that such Russian advances would enable Russian forces to improve logistics across the Oskil River and may allow Russian forces to transport heavy equipment across the river near Mytrofanivka and Fyholivka (both northeast of Kupyansk), which Russian forces have been unable to accomplish in recent months.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and toward Bohuslavka and Borivska-Andriivka and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka and Hrekivka on September 17 and 18.[74]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to central Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[75]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on September 17 that Russian forces have nearly seized Zarichne (east of Lyman).[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman) and within the central and northern areas of the settlement.[77] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces seized Yampil (southeast of Lyman), but a Russian milblogger rejected this claim.[78]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Novoselivka, Serednie, and Derylove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and toward Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on September 17 and 18.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yampil and Torske.[80]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on September 18 that Russian forces recently tied EW systems to the wheels of 25 motorcycles during an assault, but Ukrainian forces repelled the attack.[81] The spokesperson noted that there is no shortage of Russian personnel in the Lyman direction.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Shandryholove.[82]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[83] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on September 17 that Russian forces are advancing in Siversk.[84]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk toward Nykyforivka and Bondarne on September 17 and 18.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka direction on September 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka) and seized Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[86]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky, Oleksandro-Shultyne, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Toretsk, and Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Shcherbynivka, and Katerynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and toward Mykolaipillya on September 17 and 18.[87]

The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on September 18 that Russian forces struck Kostyantynivka with an unguided FAB-250 glide bomb, killing five civilians and damaging residential infrastructure.[88]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and attacking Ukrainian forward positions near Toretsk.[89] The spokesperson noted that Russian drone operators are focusing on striking Ukrainian GLOCs five to 10 kilometers in the near rear and that Russian forces continue to deploy pairs of soldiers to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses and establish an assembly point. The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported that Ukrainian forces have encircled Russian forces near Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) since roughly August 28.[90]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervone (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[91] Drone operators and other elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaipillya.[92] Drone operators of the 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian military vehicles on the roads to Kostyantynivka to congest GLOCs.[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) and are advancing east of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Hruzke (both northeast of Dobropillya), and Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[94]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Novyi Donbas on September 17 and 18.[95] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne and Pankivka.[96]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi informed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on September 18 that Ukrainian forces liberated 160 square kilometers and seven unspecified settlements and cleared over 170 square kilometers and nine unspecified settlements during the Ukrainian forces’ ongoing counteroffensive in the Dobropillya tactical area.[97] ISW assesses that Syrskyi is referring to Petrivka, Vesele, Hruzke, Rubizne, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Dorozhnie, Stepy (all northeast of Dobropillya), and likely either Pankivka, Shakhove, or Ivanivka (northeast, east, and southeast of Dobropillya, respectively). The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported that Ukrainian forces have isolated Russian forces near Kucheriv Yar since roughly August 28.[98]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in western, central, and eastern Pokrovsk along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Donetsk highway and north of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[99]

Geolocated footage published on September 17 indicates that Russian forces conducted an infiltration within eastern Pokrovsk.[100] ISW does not assess that this infiltration constitutes a confirmed change in control of terrain at this time.

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, Sukhetske, Krasnyi Lyman, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Novopavlivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi, Molodetske, Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne, and toward Novopidhrodne; west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne on September 17 and 18.[101]

An officer of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 18 that Russian forces continue to conduct small infantry missions with drone support to probe Ukrainian defenses and reach the Ukrainian near rear.[102] The Ukrainian officer noted that the Russian force presence in the Pokrovsk direction is reportedly the largest since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion and that Russian forces use small infantry tactics to infiltrate and establish assembly points and armored vehicles to dismount a greater number of infantry. Another officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are leveraging small group tactics and strikes to interdict the E-50 Donetsk-Pokrovsk highway and disrupt Ukrainian GLOCs.[103] The Ukrainian officer noted that Russian forces often attempt to advance without armor or helmets to move more quickly. The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported that Ukrainian forces have interdicted Russian forces, reportedly along the Razine-Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk), since roughly August 28.[104] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 18 that Russian forces are accumulating on the eastern flank of Myrnohrad in preparation for an assault on the city itself.[105] Gerasimov inspected the Central Grouping of Forces on September 17 and claimed that the most intense fighting is occurring in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian forces have failed to stop Russian advances.[106]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), including drone operators of its Sarmat Battalion, are reportedly operating within Pokrovsk.[107] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment reportedly continue to help target airstrikes near Novopavlivka.[108] Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) and of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[109]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novmykolaivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka and Tovste on September 17 and 18.[110]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on September 18 that Russian forces are utilizing very little equipment because Ukrainian drone strikes in the area are destroying Russian small infantry groups, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[111] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are struggling to counteract Ukrainian drone strikes with small arms and EW systems.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Kalynivske (south of Velykomykhailivka) and north of Khoroshe (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[112]

Russian forces attacked in the forests just east of Velykomykhailivka; northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove, Piddubne, Oleksandrohrad; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha and Novoheorhiivka; and south of Velykomykhailivka near Berezove and Kalynivske and toward Orestopil on September 17 and 18.[113] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Berezove, Kalynivske, and Orestopil.[114]

Gerasimov claimed on September 17 that Russian forces continue to develop an offensive in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[115]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[116]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced marginally within central Novoivanivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[117]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novoivanivka and near Olhivske and Novomykolaivka (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[118]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novoivanivka, Uspenivka, Olhivske, Novomykolaivka, and Poltavka and toward Okhotnyche and Novohryhorivka on September 17 and 18.[119] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoivanivka and Kalynivske.[120]

Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” project reported that unknown actors started a grass fire on August 30 near the headquarters of the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) near occupied Voskresenka (southeast of Hulyaipole) that killed 18 Russian soldiers, many of them officers.[121]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Vyshneve (northeast of Hulyaipole).[122] Drone operators of the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Hulyaipole direction.[123]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within southern Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[124]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Prymorske farther than available geolocated footage indicated and into southern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[125]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni; and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on September 17 and 18.[126] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske.[127]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk.[128] Elements of the Chechen 270th Akhmat-Kavkaz Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[129] Drone operators of the Pioneer Crew of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces north of Orikhiv.[130]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi road bridge on September 17 and 18.[131]

The Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on September 17 that Russian forces have conducted routine glide bomb strikes against Inhulets (northeast of Kherson City) since September 13, killing one civilian and wounding 13, including a three-year old girl.[132] The Kherson Oblast Police reported on September 18 that Russian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes injured five police officers at checkpoints in Beryslav (northeast of Kherson City) and Bilozerka (west of Kherson City).[133] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently increased shelling and drone strikes near Komyshany (just west of Kherson City) and that Ukrainian forces are planning an imminent false flag strike against a medical campus in Dniprovskyi Raion, Kherson City, suggesting that Russian forces will likely strike the campus.[134] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unguided (FAB) glide bomb strikes against residential infrastructure in Darivka (northeast of Kherson City) and Mykilske and Sadove (both east of Kherson City).[135]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 40 Shahed-type drones and 35 Gerbera-type and other drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[136] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 48 drones and that 26 drones struck six locations in Ukraine. Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration Head Viacheslav Chaus reported on September 18 that Russian forces conducted an overnight “double tap” drone strike against firefighters in Nizhyn City, Chernihiv Oblast, that killed one firefighter and injured two.[137] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck residential, commercial, and rail infrastructure in Kyiv and Poltava oblasts.[138]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

A Telegram channel reportedly affiliated with the Wagner Group claimed on September 18 that Wagner personnel have been training Belarusian forces in Belarus since 2023.[139]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.