Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2025

September 16, 2025, 6:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on September 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the final day of the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 16. Putin, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin visited the Mulino Training Ground in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast and inspected the troops participating in Zapad-2025.[i] Belousov reported that personnel from Russia's Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD/MMD), Aerospace Forces (VKS), Airborne (VDV) Forces, and Northern and Baltic fleets and Belarusian elements of as part of the Union State’s combined Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) participated in Zapad-2025. Putin stated that 100,000 military personnel participated in the exercises, including military personnel from six additional countries. Putin later met with personnel from Bangladesh, India, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Iran. India announced on September 9 that it sent 65 military personnel to the Mulino Training Ground to participate in Zapad-2025 to enhance military cooperation and exchange information about combat tactics with Russia and Belarus.[ii] This is India's second time participating in the joint exercises, after 200 Indian personnel participated in counterterrorism operations during the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2021 joint exercises in September 2021.[iii] Putin notably wore a military uniform to observe the exercises - the second time Putin has worn a military uniform at a public event since the beginning of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[iv] Putin first wore a military uniform during the full-scale invasion while visiting Kursk Oblast in March 2025, and ISW assessed at that time that Putin was likely trying to portray himself as an engaged wartime leader and to share the credit for Russian forces retaking territory in Kursk Oblast.[v] Putin likely attended the September 16 exercises in a military uniform in order to posture Russian-Belarusian military strength against the backdrop of recent Kremlin kinetic and rhetorical escalation against NATO states neighboring Russia, such as Poland and Norway, and repeated Russian threats against the Baltic states and Finland.[vi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage of elements of the Russian Northern Fleet repelling a mock enemy air raid in the Barents Sea and practicing a landing operation with drone support on Sredniy Peninsula, Murmansk Oblast.[vii] The Russian MoD also published footage of elements of the Baltic Fleet conducting a mock cruise missile strike against a naval target and supporting infantry units.[viii] The Russian MoD published footage of elements of the LMD repelling a mock sabotage and reconnaissance mission and conducting mock drone reconnaissance and electronic intelligence missions in Kaliningrad Oblast.[ix] The Russian MoD emphasized that Russian and Belarusian forces focused on integrating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) during the exercises.[x] Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko stated that Belarusian forces practiced the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons and deployment of an Oreshnik ballistic missile system during the exercises.[xi] Muraveiko stated that Belarusian forces also practiced integrating drones, motorcycles, and robotic platforms – common systems that Russian forces utilize in Ukraine – during the exercises. ISW continues to assess that Russian and Belarusian forces are using the Zapad exercises to implement some tactical lessons from Russia's experience in Ukraine.[xii]

Ukraine's ongoing long-range strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure continues to degrade Russia's oil and gasoline markets, likely affecting Russia's long-term ability to finance its war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 16 that Ukraine's Special Operation Forces (SOF), alongside unspecified Ukrainian forces, conducted a drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast, resulting in several explosions and a fire.[xiii] The Saratov refinery specializes in gasoline, diesel fuel, and oil fuel production and other oil products; has a 4.8-million-ton production capacity; and supplies the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment.

 Reuters reported on September 16 that three industry sources stated that Russian state-controlled petroleum company Transneft warned producers that Transneft may need to reduce output following a series of Ukrainian drone strikes on critical export ports and refineries.[xiv] Two industry sources told Reuters that Transneft recently restricted unspecified oil firms' ability to store oil in the Transneft pipeline system and warned producers that they may have to accept less oil if Transneft's infrastructure sustains further damage. The three sources informed Reuters that the Ukrainian strikes could force Russia, which accounts for nine percent of global oil production, to ultimately cut output. Reuters noted that Russia lacks significant capacity to stockpile oil and Russian industry sources reported that Russia has already lost some oil exporting capacity following August 2025 Ukrainian drone strikes against the Ust-Luga oil terminal in Leningrad Oblast. Reuters reported on September 15 that two industry sources stated that Ukrainian forces damaged a unit at the Russian Surgutneftegaz's Kirishinefteorgsintez refinery plant, one of Russia's largest oil refineries, in Leningrad Oblast in a drone strike on September 14, forcing authorities to halt operations due to a subsequent fire.[xv] Reuters reported that the unit accounts for nearly 40 percent of the plant's total processing capacity of roughly 20 million tons per year. Sources told Reuters that the Ukrainian strike caused a fire and damaged a furnace and other unspecified equipment at the unit, which may take up to a month to repair. The sources noted that the plant aims to boost operations at other units to compensate for the damage, which will allow the plant to maintain 75 percent of its processing volumes. Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure, particularly against oil refineries, is generating compounding effects on Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine and exacerbating chronic gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xvi]

 Ukraine continues to demonstrate its adeptness at innovating and fielding drones with increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) technology while maintaining accessible costs, significantly augmenting Ukrainian drone effectiveness. Ukrainian outlet United24 Media reported on September 15 that Ukrainian drone producer Vyriy and Ukrainian defense technology company The Fourth Law (TFL) are launching mass production of Vyriy-10 first-person view (FPV) drones.[xvii] United24 Media reported that Vyriy equipped the Vyriy-10 drones with TFL's TFL-1 terminal guidance module, an advanced AI guidance system that will enable drone operators to execute more precise strikes and navigate environments with pervasive electronic warfare (EW). TFL Head Yaroslav Azhnyuk stated that several Ukrainian units have leveraged the modified Vyriy-10 drones to increase drone strike effectiveness by two to four times. United24 Media noted that the drones cost approximately $448, making it only slightly more expensive than traditional Ukrainian-made FPV drones. The integration of Ukrainian drones with AI guidance systems represents a significant technological advancement that will enable Ukrainian drone operators to conduct more accurate strikes and bypass frontline Russian EW to strike targets in the Russian near rear.[xviii]

 Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to rhetorically distance himself from Russia’s recent incursion into Polish airspace in an attempt to obfuscate the fact that Belarus is de facto a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Lukashenko claimed on September 15 in response to Russia’s incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 to 10 that Belarus was not involved in any drone incursions into Polish and Lithuanian that Belarusian forces downed drones heading toward Poland and spent "massive" resources destroying the drones. Lukashenko claimed that Belarus informed Polish authorities about the drones that Belarusian forces failed to down. Lukashenko accused Poland of “playing dirty tricks” and claimed that Poland clearly has unspecified plans that Belarus must ”unravel“ and ”resist.“ Lukashenko’s statements are likely an attempt to deflect from the ways Belarus is cooperating with Russia and assisting Russia's war effort, including through the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 military exercises, Belarusian efforts to assist Russia in its

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the final day of the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 16.
• Ukraine's ongoing long-range strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure continues to degrade Russia's oil and gasoline markets, likely affecting Russia's long-term ability to finance its war in Ukraine.
• Ukraine continues to demonstrate its adeptness at innovating and fielding drones with increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) technology while maintaining accessible costs, significantly augmenting Ukrainian drone effectiveness.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to rhetorically distance himself from Russia’s recent incursion into Polish airspace in an attempt to obfuscate the fact that Belarus is de facto a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

A source within Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that GUR operat at this facility.[xxiii] Russian state media outlets claimed on September 16 that locals reported road closures and military helicopters flying near Vladivostok (immediately west of Shchitovaya) following the explosions.[xxiv] The Primorsky Krai Anti-Terrorism Commission claimed on September 16 that malfunctions of gas infrastructure caused the explosions in Shchitovaya.[xxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Varachyne on September 15 and 16.[xxvi]Russian milbloggers, including a milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and counterattacked near Andriivka and Oleksiivka.[xxvii]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on September 16 and claimed that first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies struck the Romny Compressor Station near Nadyarne (northwest of Sumy City).[xxviii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that North Korean forces are deployed to the second echelon of Russia's defense along the international border in Kursk Oblast in order to relieve Russian forces previously guarding the border.[xxix] The milblogger claimed that North Korean forces are poorly trained, impulsive, and do not appreciate the complexity of border operations and that Russian forces are confused by North Korean mining and demining practices. The milblogger claimed that North Korean forces are also participating in demining operations in Kursk Oblast along with elements of the Russian . The milblogger also claimed that there is poor coordination between Russian units operating in the Tetkino direction and that Russian forces are failing to organize strikes against Ukrainian positions in the area.[xxx]

The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are encircling Russian forces in Oleksiivka.[xxxi] The milblogger claimed that the situation is reminiscent of Russian forces’ retreat from Kindrativka and that Russian forces will likely retreat from Oleksiivka in the near future, particularly given the reported poor quality of newly-arrived personnel in the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]).[xxxii] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command will redeploy elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s 2nd and 3rd battalions to Oleksiivka in order to reinforce Russian positions in the area and prevent a ”complete encirclement” by Ukrainian forces. The milblogger claimed that it is unrealistic for Russian forces to hold Oleksiivka but complained that the Russian military command will continue to deploy Russian forces into highly attritional assaults in order to maintain the appearance of operational stability in Sumy Oblast.[xxxiii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in Sumy Oblast have switched to defensive operations after recently seizing most of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating in Tetkino.[xxxv] Drone operators of the 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[xxxvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove on September 15 and 16.[xxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vesele (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[xl]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on September 15 and 16.[xli]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to Sadova Street in Kupyansk.[xlii]

 Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane on September 15 and 16.[xliii]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have fire control over roughly five kilometers of the H-26 Kupyansk-Kharkiv City highway near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[xliv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 16 but did not advance.

 Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Borova toward Shyikivka; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 15 and 16.[xlv]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction stated that the number of Russian personnel in the area has decreased by 10 to 15 percent in the past one to two weeks, likely due to significant Russian personnel losses, but that the Russian military command is deploying reinforcements to the area.[xlvi] The deputy commander stated Russian forces continue to attack in small fireteams consisting of two to four personnel and are conducting three to five assaults per day.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shyikivka.[xlvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

 Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced between Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and Dronivka (east of Yampil), near Serednie, in Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman), and in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[xlviii] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have seized roughly half of Shandryholove.[xlix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Myrne (northeast of Lyman) and the dam north of the settlement.[l]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie and toward Derylove; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne and Kolodyazi and toward Stavky; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on September 15 and 16.[li] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Zarichne.[lii]

Geolocated footage published on September 15 shows Russian forces in civilian clothing (an act of perfidy – a violation of the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory) operating on Molodizhna Street in Yampil during a likely infiltration mission.[liii] The Ukrainian 11th Army Corps reported on September 15 that Russian forces are resorting to perfidy to infiltrate Yampil and conduct sabotage in the Ukrainian near rear.[liv] The 11th Army Corps reported that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Yampil and the surrounding areas. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in Yampil are part of sabotage and reconnaissance groups that have conducted raids but have not consolidated positions within the settlement.[lv] Another milblogger claimed that there is information that Russian forces entered Yampil from the northeast, but that fighting has not started within the settlement.[lvi]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are using large numbers of drones and infantry during assaults in the area and are occasionally using motorcycles to move quickly toward Ukrainian positions and attack from different sides.[lvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have interdicted the dirt road and railway between Yampil and Dronivka.[lviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

 Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk).[lix]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on September 15 and 16.[lx]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 15 and 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within southeastern Kostyantynivka and along the T-0504 hmut-Kostyantynivka highway northwest of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka).[lxi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka.[lxii] Another Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka.[lxiii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Mykolaivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, and Katerynivka; south of Druzhivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on September 15 and 16.[lxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar.[lxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in and near Kostyantynivka.[lxvi] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[lxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Hruzke, east of Dobropillya near Vilne and Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on September 15 and 16.[lxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within western and southern Pokrovsk.[lxix]

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Kozatske, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Zvirove and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on September 15 and 16.[lxx]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are moving all available forces to the Pokrovsk direction, including redeploying forces from Kursk Oblast and operational reserves from unspecified frontline areas.[lxxi] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are losing 10 to 20 personnel for every meter of territory gained and are not attacking with armored vehicles due to the risk of Ukrainian drones striking the equipment. The chief of staff reported that Russian forces have been trying to attack the eastern flank of Myrnohrad with armored vehicle support over the past few weeks, but Ukrainian forces destroyed the vehicles before the vehicles reached the line of contact.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dachne and west of Horikhove (both southeast of Novopavlivka).[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on September 15 and 16.[lxxiii]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are attacking in small fire teams with up to four personnel on foot and are suffering high losses.[lxxiv] The commander reported that Russian forces are wedging into the seams of the Ukrainian defense and are using motorcycles to transport infantry to frontline positions as compared to Spring 2025 when Russian forces would use motorcycles to attack.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevstove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Vorone, Maliivka, Ternove, and Shevchenko on September 15 and 16.[lxxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly conducting air support for assault groups of the 218th Tank Regiment and the wider 127th Motorized Rifle Division in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[lxxvi]

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on September 15 that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 41st CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) in occupied Donetsk City on September 8

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advantage: Geolocated footage published on September 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southeastern Novoivanivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxviii] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may attempt to leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to attack westward into northeastern Zaporizhia Oblast if Russian commanders assess that most of Ukraine’s frontline defensive fortifications are oriented east to west against attacks from the south, rather than north to south against attacks from the eas

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast and south of Novoivanivka and north of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[lxxx]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Berezove, Novomykolaivka, Olhivske, Poltavka, and Novoivanivka on September 15 and 16.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are using up to 800 drones per day in the Hulyaipole, Kherson, and Orikhiv directions.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, southwest of Orikhiv toward Kamyanske, and southeast of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka on September 15 and 16.

A Russian milblogger claimed that the outskirts of Prymorske remains a contested “gray zone.”[lxxxiv]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian emergency services reported that Russian forces conducted artillery and glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City, injuring 13, including two children, and damaging civilian and residential infrastructure.

forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction September 15 and 16 but did not advance. [lxxxvi]

Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are attacking near the Antonivsky rail and road bridges (east of Kherson City) and near the Dnipro River island delta (southwest of Kherson City).[lxxxvii] Volo

The Ukrainian National Police reported that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian Red Cross Society vehicle with a drone near Darivka (northeast of Kherson City) overnight on September 15 and injured two employees.[lxxxviii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 113 Shahed-typera-type, and other drones – including roughly 70 Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[lxxxix] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 89 drones and that 22 Russian drones struck six locations and debris fell on two locations throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces launched over 100 drones and 150 glide bomb strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Kherson oblasts on the night of September 15 to 16 and that Russian forces have already used more than 3,500 drones, almost 190 missiles, and over 2,500 glide bombs against Ukraine in September 2025.[xc]

Zelensky reported and geolocated footage confirms that a Russian drone struck the Ukrainian Institute of Advanced Qualification of Pharmacy Specialists of the National Pharmaceutical University in central Kharkiv City, Kharkiv Oblast during the day on September 16.[xci] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that the drone strike heavily damaged the roof of an administrative building at the university and Ukraine's State Emergency Service reported that the drone strike caused a fire

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko presented on September 16 a draft proposal clarifying Belarus' military doctrine.[xciv] Muraveiko's proposal clarifies the content, scope, and timeframe for Belarus to respond to and repel military aggression and the responsibilities of Belarusian officials in the event of military aggression against Belarus. The proposal states that an act of military aggression against any state the Russian-Belarusian Union State will be considered an attack on Belarus and justification to introduce martial law. The proposal also reportedly accounts for the growing need to counteract information operations amid military operations.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.