Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 7, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russia launched a massive and deadly combined drone and missile strike package across northern, eastern, and western Ukraine on the night of October 6 to 7 — killing and wounding at least 128 civilians, including at least five children. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched an unspecified number of anti-ship and ballistic missiles, 48 Kh-101 or Iskander-K or Kalibr cruise missiles, and 130 strike (including 46 jet-powered) and decoy drones against Ukraine on the night of October 6 to 7 — primarily targeting Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[1] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes killed 20 and injured 55 in Pryluky, Chernihiv Oblast; killed one and injured two in Zaporizhzhia City, Zaporizhia Oblast; killed two and injured three in Oleksandriya, Kirovohrad Oblast; and killed two and injured 41 in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[2] Russian forces also conducted Iskander-M ballistic missile and drone strikes against logistics, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City, Kyiv Oblast, injuring two.[3] Russia’s massive October 6 to 7 strike package purposefully impacted a geographically diverse set of targets across Ukraine as part of Russia’s ongoing effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and maximize civilian harm by targeting civilian, transportation, energy, and logistics infrastructure and further degrade Ukraine's energy infrastructure and economy ahead of Winter 2026-2027.[4] Russia intends for these strikes to complicate civilian life by increasing brutality and lethality — destroying civilian and residential infrastructure, introducing constant fear and uncertainty to daily life, and degrading the domestic Ukrainian economy.[5] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated that escalated Russian strikes on civilians inflicted more Ukrainian casualties from January to August 2026 than in all of 2025.[6] Russian forces caused at least 15,280 civilian deaths and injuries in Ukraine during the first eight months of 2026, a 55 percent increase compared to the same period in 2025.[7]

Recent Russian technological adaptations to jet-powered Geran-type drones allow Russian forces to focus cruise and ballistic missile strikes on a smaller, more specific target set without significantly increasing missile expenditure. Several Russian milbloggers observed on October 7 that Russian forces are leveraging multiple, high-volume waves of drones and missiles concentrated on a limited number of targets, rather than conducting missile strikes against a larger number of separate targets across a wider geographic area.[8] Russian forces frequently use concentrated drone and missile strikes to overwhelm localized Ukrainian air defenses and destroy urban centers.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces concentrated 30 cruise missiles against Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast, and Oleksandriya and Svitlovodsk, Kirovohrad Oblast, alone during the October 6 to 7 strike package.[10] Russia's jet-powered Geran drones can more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses at greater operational depths compared to conventional Geran-type drones, partly enabling Russia’s ability to rapidly escalate and concentrate cruise and ballistic missile strike packages launched in multiple waves against priority targets across Ukraine.[11]

Russia will likely leverage this new strike pattern as it prepares to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure during what will likely be a brutal Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign.[12] Russia's jet-powered drone advantage is contributing to Russia's increasingly concentrated, brutal, and deadly strike campaign tactics that also increasingly strain Ukrainian air defenses and degrade civilian and critical infrastructure, making civilian life in Ukrainian cities unbearable and degrading the Ukrainian economy. Russia likely intends to use its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign to try and break Ukrainian morale and make daily life in Ukraine untenable such that Ukraine capitulates to Russia's demands, although these tactics have not worked in the past and are unlikely to work this winter. The development, production, and procurement of cost-effective countermeasures to Russian jet-powered drones and small cruise missiles are vital to Ukraine’s efforts to enhance the adaptability and resilience of its air defense umbrella against emerging Russian technological adaptations, including those Russia might field after Ukraine develops effective counters to jet-powered drones. Russia’s increasingly large strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, with both US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other forms of air defense, for a diverse, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[13]

The Kremlin is consolidating strategic logistics assets under Russian state control. Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom announced on October 7 that it acquired the remaining 51 percent stake in Delo Group (Russia's largest logistics and transportation operator), combining with Rosatom's existing 49 percent stake, which it acquired between December 2019 and August 2022, to take 100 percent ownership of Delo Group.[14] Rosatom stated that it plans to consolidate all Rosatom logistics, including Delo Group assets, to create Russia’s largest national logistics company, representing 50 percent of Russia’s total container handling market and 44 percent of its rail container shipping market.[15] Delo Group companies include rail, container, port, multimodal logistics, information technology (IT), and shipping operators, and their combined assets include seven marine container terminals, one grain terminal, 46 railway container terminals, approximately 40,000 container flatcars, and 11 vessels; Delo Group operates strategic port infrastructure in the Baltic and Black Sea basins and in the Russian Far East.[16] Rosatom's acquisition of Delo stake comes against the backdrop of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, which has significantly disrupted Delo operations in port areas such as Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[17] The Russian government now controls the majority of Russia’s logistics and transportation market through state-owned companies like Rosatom, likely in the hopes of achieving greater control over the cost of shipping and over the defense of the logistics network, amid Ukrainian strikes.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched a massive and deadly combined drone and missile strike package across northern, eastern, and western Ukraine on the night of October 6 to 7— killing and wounding at least 135 civilians, including at least four children.
• Recent Russian technological adaptations to jet-powered Geran-type drones allow Russian forces to focus cruise and ballistic missile strikes on a smaller, more specific target set without significantly increasing missile expenditure.
• The Kremlin is consolidating strategic logistics assets under Russian state control.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Oleksandrivka.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure.  

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazenyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck two oil facilities and a training ground in Perm Krai and Samara and Astrakhan oblasts, as well as unspecified targets in the Black Sea.[18] Footage published on October 6 shows a Russian oil tanker on fire in the port of Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, following a likely Ukrainian strike.[19] Russian authorities claimed that Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) struck a Liberian-flagged oil tanker off the Black Sea coast.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck unspecified targets at the Seshcha Air Base in Seshcha, Bryansk Oblast (approximately 148 kilometers from the international border).[21]

Ukrainian sources provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDAs) for recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukraine's October 2 strike against the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 937 kilometers from the international border), damaged 11 RVS-2000 oil tanks, three RVSPK-50000 oil tanks, a section of pipelines, and an automated petroleum products loading station.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine's October 4 strike against the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant in Astrakhan City, Astrakhan Oblast (roughly 810 kilometers from the frontline), damaged elements of two gas purification units and the U-1731 secondary distillation unit.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 7 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.^[23] Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced near Korenok (northwest of Sumy City), Korchakivka (north of Sumy City), and Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City).[24]

Ukrainian forces continued their short- and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian electronic warfare (EW) station near Grinevo, Bryansk Oblast (approximately 21 kilometers from the international border), and a Russian radar station in Yelionka, Bryansk Oblast (approximately 12 kilometers from the international border) — all on October 6 or overnight into October 7.[25]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission east of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) as Russian milbloggers continue to exaggerate claims of Russian advances near the seam between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Bulruk directions. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember southeast of Khrypuny (east of Vovchansk), according to geolocated footage published on October 6, after a likely Russian infiltration mission.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 6 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Loshakove (east of Vovchansk) and east of Vilkhuvatka (southeast of Vovchansk and northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[27] Russian milbloggers continue to make increasingly exaggerated claims of Russian advances northeast of Kharkiv City, likely in an attempt to reinforce the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in this area.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Kupyansk and southeast of Kupyansk near Kivsharivka and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on October 6 and 7 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in northern Kupyansk.[29]

Russian forces are increasingly using reconnaissance drones in the Kupyansk direction. The commander of a Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on October 7 that Russian forces are using reconnaissance drones, including the Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone, at scale in the Kupyansk direction.[30] The commander noted that specialized Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) units were previously the primary operators of the reconnaissance drones and that Russian forces are using navigator-pilot pairs and spotter groups to more effectively operate new reconnaissance drones in the Kupyansk direction.

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on October 7 that Ukrainian forces control Novoplatonivka (north of Borova) and Hrekivka and Druzhelyubivka (both southeast of Borova) contrary to Russian claims of control over the settlements.[31]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) 

Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks toward the eastern bank of the Zherebets River northeast of Lyman, as Russian forces struggle to contain Ukrainian gains from Operation Vivaldi. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks along the Zherebets River.[32] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian manpower and drone superiority are preventing Russian forces from consolidating positions around Lyman itself. The milblogger's claims are consistent with recent reports of continued successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman direction that ISW has observed.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces are reportedly redeploying personnel to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion reported on October 7 that the Russian military command is transferring additional forces, including USF and Spetsnaz elements, from deprioritized areas of the front line to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction to create conditions for combined arms operations and the attempted seizure of the agglomeration before the onset of winter.[34] The current Russian rate of advance precludes Russian forces from completing the Russian military command's delusional goal of seizing the Fortress Belt by this deadline, even with additional personnel in the area.

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission east of Kramatorsk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in western Malynivka (east of Kramatorsk), according to geolocated footage published on October 7, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and west of Kostyantynivka on October 6 and 7 but did not advance.[36]

Russian forces continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against frontline settlements north of Kostyantynivka to set conditions for future offensives. The Russian MoD claimed on October 7 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-500 glide bomb strike against purported Ukrainian positions near Molocharka (north of Kostyantynivka).[37] Russian forces regularly conduct glide bomb strikes against settlements in the near rear, in part to create ruins that Russian infantry can use for cover and concealment during subsequent ground offensive operations.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and east to southwest of Dobropillya on October 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Dobropillya.[39] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing west along the Vodyana River to reach Novofedorivka and Kryvorizhzhya (both west of Dobropillya).[40]

The Russian MoD is continuing to falsely claim that Russian forces are operating within Dobropillya despite continued Ukrainian reporting about the lack of Russian positions in the town and about Ukrainian advances near Dobropillya. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Dobropillya area reported on October 6 that Ukrainian forces cleared tens of Russian positions near Hruzke and Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Dobropillya) over an unspecified timeframe.[41] The Russian MoD claimed on October 7 that Russian forces captured the park area, the community center, and two production facilities at the mine in Dobropillya.[42] ISW has not observed any evidence to suggest that Russian forces have advanced into Dobropillya beyond limited infiltration efforts that do not constitute doctrinal control of terrain. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly refuted Russian claims that Russian forces have consolidated positions in Dobropillya.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 7.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Oleksandrivka. Russian forces struck Ukrainian servicemembers north of Komar (east of Oleksandrivka), according to geolocated footage published on October 6.[44] Russian milbloggers previously acknowledged that Ukrainian forces liberated Perebudova (just north of Komar) and contested Russian control over the settlement.[45]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 6 and 7 but did not advance.[46]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 6 and 7, likely as part of efforts to envelop Orikhiv from the west and east, but did not advance.[47]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 7.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[48]

See topline text for reports on Russia's overnight strikes against Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to strike civilian vessels in national and international waters of the Black Sea, posing an increased risk to civilian freedom of navigation in this area. Zelensky confirmed on October 6 that Russian forces conducted a combined drone and USV strike against two vessels in the Bulgarian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Black Sea on October 6, sinking one vessel and severely damaging the other.[49] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on October 6 that Russian strikes against civilian vessels in international waters represent the expansion of Russian aggressive behavior and are increasingly posing a risk to civilian freedom of navigation.[[50]]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/83516

[2] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2107732058978046439?s=20 ; https://www.facebook.com/UA.National.Police/posts/pfbid027FYzNE6jeT6hoM2zGeLaCUAHTnWfdxejJoxtRPkEJoZo1C7DAqevQmXdpR6Fd5XSl?__cft__[0]=AZh74bAJLthsrLfoa_KB5j_ciBZa7u-BWKweQ_ctUAu4ZJe5W8ygiAL09cSl60275Xi9CuAOBHsl2o6JGjmGfhnU5rtEayCLXnttfVozCkxXd2tvmeiaOWsIoaQsKQKQRP_fCdSiMvlAOPM69lXolz2N8Gw3Zz0yLozHuyUo_9pISDuDd88qHAeTbCooK0P_1_bF3CBbkJ0mXy4HUY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-y-R ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/68148 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/68156 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/68164 ; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/27302 ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34962 ; https://www.facebook.com/sergio.fedorenko/posts/pfbid02GZACocFAikUV2ycUo8RDdnbAqLAo3nce41j8Fd2fRnkwFq8dDpix1LdRLj2M9XW6l?rdid=iMp0uQ6KJGUo27FE ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34936 ; https://poltava.to/news/88492/ ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34936

[3] https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2999 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/3001 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/60428 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7777 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7778 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/778 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7783 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7785 ; https://suspilne dot media/culture/1421255-rosijska-ataka-na-kiiv-ulamki-poskodili-paviljoni-kinostudii-dovzenka/

[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026 /; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/

[6] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/12750

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/

[8] https://t.me/wargonzo/37452; https://t.me/dva_majors/100111

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-26/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5-5/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/

[10] https://t.me/dva_majors/100111

[11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-inexpensive-quasi-cruise-missiles-an-emerging-threat-for-ukraines-air-defenses/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/

[14] https://atommedia dot online/press-releases/zayavlenie-generalnogo-direktora-goskorporatsii-rosatom-o-priobretenii-stoprotsentnoy-doli-v-gk-delo/ ; https://www.rbc dot ru/business/18/02/2026/699488f49a79479b935715c2 ; https://www.delo-group dot com/news/801/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[15] https://www.delo-group dot com/news/801/

[16] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/9008103

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2025/

[18] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2107739631206768705?s=20

[19] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2107499481063436492; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2107498484253511875 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2107498197564440791?s=20

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2107467835253399859?s=20

[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/399089 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399090 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399091 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399092

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42497

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42498 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445; https://t.me/severnnyi/9536

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/severnnyi/9536; https://t.me/z_arhiv/34046

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42497

[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13146 ; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/4594

[27] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34052

[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492; https://t.me/grvZapad/20012; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/07/vtrachayut-polkovnykiv-fsb-yaki-pilotuyut-drony-ahilles-rozpoviv-pro-polyuvannya-na-pilotiv-novitnih-orlaniv-10/; https://youtu.be/lmGmAk4bAvU?t=782

[31] https://t.me/grvZapad/20012

[32] https://t.me/rybar/83751

[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/

[34] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1421357-rf-perekidae-specpidrozdili-j-operatoriv-droniv-na-kramatorskij-napramok-67-ombr/

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13151; https://t.me/stribat33oshp/2293

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/68014

[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492; https://t.me/rybar/83750 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100101; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445

[40] https://t.me/rybar/83750

[41] https://t.me/skala425/1005; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGUxhDV4Zn4&t=1s; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/06/azov-ta-skelya-vidkynuly-rosijski-vijska-v-rajoni-dobropillya/

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/68023

[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-updates-september-2026-present/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/

[44] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2107474630403412156; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13147 ; https://t.me/btr80/41853

[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/

[46]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21455

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42492; https://t.me/wargonzo/37445; https://t.me/voin_dv/21455  

[48] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[49] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2107542545848787104?s=20; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21253; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ye-onovlena-informaciya-vid-rozvidki-pro-pidgotovku-rosiyana-106769 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/

[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/06/%c2%abde-ta-mezha-yaku-rosiya-ne-mozhe-perestupaty%c2%bb-udary-po-sudnah-u-vidkrytomu-mori-rozshyryuyut-geografiyu-agresiyi/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w