Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31, 2026

Assessment as of: 5:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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Russia and Ukraine completed a remarkably successful humanitarian mission in occupied Kherson Oblast, as some Ukrainian civilians returned to Ukrainian-controlled territory. Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets noted that the Oleshky ceasefire is the longest localized ceasefire that both sides have observed since 2022.[1] Lubinets and Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova reported on October 30 and 31 that some residents of occupied Kherson Oblast, particularly from Oleshky, returned to Ukrainian-controlled territory, while others chose to stay in the area or travelled to occupied Simferopol, Crimea.[2] Ukrainian officials reported on October 31 that residents of Oleshky and nearby settlements flew to Belarus and then crossed the border into Chernihiv Oblast.[3] This humanitarian mission was remarkable in that Lubinets traveled to occupied Oleshky and Russia then back to Ukraine, Oleshky residents received humanitarian aid, and at least some civilians successfully evacuated to Ukrainian-controlled areas. The exact number of Oleshky residents who were able to leave the settlement and return to Ukrainian-controlled territory remains unclear as of this writing. ISW will provide further details on this humanitarian operation in the forthcoming Russian Occupation Update.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces appear to have largely abided by the terms of the localized ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast since it came into effect on the morning of October 27, although there are limited allegations of ceasefire violations. Ukrainian Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Maksym Kravchuk reported on October 31 that Russian forces repeatedly violated the terms of the ceasefire, including by using reconnaissance drones and dropping explosives from drones on Ukrainian positions.[4] Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official Rodion Miroshnik claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a civilian vehicle with a drone on the outskirts of Oleshky on October 31.[5] ISW is unable to independently verify these claimed ceasefire violations, but it appears that the humanitarian mission was nonetheless largely successful.

Kravchuk also noted on October 31 that Russian forces are taking advantage of the localized ceasefire in Oleshky to conduct personnel rotations, strengthen their positions and logistics, evacuate wounded and killed servicemembers, and install protection against Ukrainian drones on roads in the area.[6]

The Kremlin is refusing to compromise on its original maximalist demands from 2022 while continuing to ignore Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's offers of large-scale frontline ceasefires as Russia's losses grow disproportionately to its territorial gains. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 30 told reporters at the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting that Russia's position on a peace settlement in Ukraine is well-known and has remained unchanged since the start of the full-scale invasion.[7] Lavrov reiterated Russia's claimed "root causes" of the war, including the alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language and the spread of neo-Nazism in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their maximalist objectives throughout the war while refusing Ukrainian- and US-proposed temporary ceasefires and compromises. Ukraine and the United States first proposed an immediate 30-day ceasefire along the entire frontline on March 11, 2025.[8] The Kremlin rejected that and subsequent proposed ceasefires, and Russian forces have suffered at least 698,000 casualties and gained just over 4,000 square kilometers (about the total area of Rhode Island) since then.[9]

The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia as the obstacle to peace talks — the latest Russian effort to falsely blame Ukraine for Russia's refusal to meaningfully engage in negotiations. Lavrov complained on October 30 about Ukraine's long-range strikes deep into the Russian rear and claimed that these strikes do not signal that Ukraine is preparing for negotiations.[10] Lavrov's statement ignores Russia's own daily long-range strike campaigns against Ukraine and the Kremlin's repeated rejections of US- and Ukrainian-proposed moratoriums on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure.[11] The Kremlin has used Ukrainian strikes — real and alleged — to deflect blame away from Russia for stalled peace negotiations, including after the claimed strike against Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast in December 2025 and the strike against occupied Khorly, Kherson Oblast in January 2026.[12]

The Kremlin continues to try to push European leaders out of peace talks, despite Russian demands that a peace settlement restructure the European security architecture. Lavrov claimed that Europeans are trying to "squeeze" into the negotiating process and questioned the value European representatives could bring to the talks.[13] The Kremlin has recently renewed its public demands that NATO roll back to its 1997 borders – a demand that the Kremlin first issued in 2021 before the start of the full-scale invasion.[14] The Kremlin has nonetheless repeatedly demanded in recent days that European leaders not participate in talks to end the war.[15] Russian efforts to keep European representatives out of peace talks also directly contradict US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to take on increased responsibility for European affairs, including European defenses and support for Ukraine.

The US Department of State approved the possible sale of 500 PAC-3 Patriot ballistic missile interceptors to Ukraine, but the delivery will reportedly not occur for several years.[16] Various Western outlets, citing unidentified sources, reported that the approval is for the delivery of newly manufactured interceptors, which is not expected until after 2030.[17] The sale therefore will not support Ukraine's efforts to defend itself during the expected intense Russian ballistic missile strike campaign in Winter 2026-2027. Ukraine's vulnerability resulting from insufficient ballistic missile interceptor supplies will encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to pursue his current theory of victory that aims to use ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones to force a Ukrainian surrender through a decisive long-range strike campaign over this coming winter.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and Ukraine completed a remarkably successful humanitarian mission in occupied Kherson Oblast, as some Ukrainian civilians returned to Ukrainian-controlled territory.
• Both Russian and Ukrainian forces appear to have largely abided by the terms of the localized ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast since it came into effect on the morning of October 27, although there are limited allegations of ceasefire violations.
• The Kremlin is refusing to compromise on its original maximalist demands from 2022 while continuing to ignore Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's offers of large-scale frontline ceasefires as Russia's losses grow disproportionately to its territorial gains.
• The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia as the obstacle to peace talks – the latest Russian effort to falsely blame Ukraine for Russia's refusal to meaningfully engage in negotiations.
• The Kremlin continues to try to push European leaders out of peace talks, despite Russian demands that a peace settlement restructure the European security architecture.
• The US Department of State approved the possible sale of 500 PAC-3 Patriot ballistic missile interceptors to Ukraine, but the delivery will reportedly not occur for several years.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Borova.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial facility in Rostov Oblast and two oil refineries in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic on October 31 and overnight on October 30 to 31.
• Russian forces launched 134 drones against Ukraine overnight on October 30 to 31 and 168 drones and loitering munitions during the day on October 31.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial facility in Rostov Oblast on the night of October 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kamensky Plant in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov Oblast (approximately 180 kilometers from the frontline) with strike drones and Neptune cruise missiles overnight on October 30 to 31.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes caused a fire at the plant's warehouse and damaged four workshops. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Kamensky Plant produces solid rocket fuel for Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) ammunition and a number of missiles and aviation armaments.

Ukrainian forces likely struck two oil refineries in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic, on October 31. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 31 that Ukrainian forces struck the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic (about 1,200 kilometers from the international border), causing a fire at the L-35 catalytic reforming unit – a key component of the refining process.[20] Geolocated footage published on October 31 shows smoke rising from the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery following Ukrainian strikes in Ufa.[21] Astra noted that Ufa residents reported that Ukrainian drones struck two oil refineries simultaneously.[22] Ukrainian Strategic Communications Center reported on October 31 that Ukrainian forces struck the Bashneft-Novoil and Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim oil refineries with a combined annual processing capacity of 24 million tons of crude oil.[23] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that an unspecified oil refinery in Ufa has suspended operations following the Ukrainian strikes.[24]

Ukrainian forces launched a strike drone package toward Moscow City, prompting the temporary suspension of operations at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed on October 31 that Russian air defenses intercepted 19 Ukrainian drones targeting Moscow Oblast overnight on October 30 to 31.[25] A Russian milblogger published images on October 31 purporting to show balloons flying over Moscow Oblast carrying small drones.[26] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel posted footage on October 31 showing smoke rising near Sheremetyevo Airport that led the airport to introduce temporary flight restrictions for several hours.[27] Astra reported on October 31 that the source of the smoke rising north of the airport was a fire near the TZK Sheremetyevo Fuel and Lubricants depot.[28]

Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of Ukraine’s October 29 strike against the Marinovka Airfield in Volgograd Oblast. Ukrainian OSINT channels published satellite imagery on October 30 showing two destroyed Su-34 fighter-bombers following Ukraine's October 29 strike against the Marinovka Airfield in Volgograd Oblast (roughly 283 kilometers from the international border).[29]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian forces entered Yunakivka (north of Sumy City).[30] The source added that Russian forces are losing many killed in action in the area due to Ukrainian forces' drone superiority.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian officials acknowledged Russian advances along the international border north of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Viktor Trehubov acknowledged on October 31 that Russian forces advanced near Hraniv (north of Kharkiv City along the international border).[32] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are focused more on expanding their advances in the area from the flanks than on advancing deeper into Kozacha Lopan (just south of Hraniv).

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 31.

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Kupyansk on October 30 and 31, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces made confirmed advances.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 30 that Russian forces advanced into central Mala Shapkivka (north of Kupyansk), western Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk), and southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk).[34]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Borova. Russian forces shelled a Ukrainian position south of Zelenyi Hai (northeast of Borova), according to geolocated footage published on October 30, indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the area.[35]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of Ukraine’s ongoing intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and military assets. Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps (AC) published footage on October 30 showing a Ukrainian Hornet drone striking a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in Luhansk Oblast.[36] Geolocated footage confirmed that the strike occurred near Tarasivka (roughly 44 kilometers from the frontline).[37]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 30 and 31 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast and on the eastern outskirts of Lyman.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk on October 30 and 31 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of the city.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in northern and northwestern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 19 and 30, respectively, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in northern Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck three Russian positions in northern Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on October 29, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[41]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction stated on October 31 that Russian forces continue accumulating tanks, armored vehicles, and other equipment in this direction.[42]

Ukrainian forces have conducted an extensive series of drone strikes against Russian railway infrastructure in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps reported on October 28 that Ukrainian forces struck over 100 pieces of rolling stock in Volnovakha (roughly 57 kilometers from the frontline), Yasynuvata (roughly 27 kilometers from the frontline), Yenakiieve (roughly 27 kilometers from the frontline), Donetsk City (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline), Debaltseve (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline), and Dovzhansk (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline).[43] The Ukrainian report does not specify the period over which the strikes occurred.

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 31.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 30 and 31 but did not advance.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 30 and 31 but did not advance.[45]

Ukrainian forces are reporting higher Russian casualty rates in the Hulyaipole direction that are likely prompting the Russian military command to reorganize its forces in the area. The Ukrainian 7^th Rapid Reaction Corps reported on October 31 that the formation killed and wounded roughly 900 Russian servicemembers over the last week - the highest weekly number of casualties since around August 2026.[46] The corps added that the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) is replacing elements of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) with elements of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) along the frontline while the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade replenishes personnel.

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv on October 30 and 31 but did not advance.[47]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 30 that Russian forces maintain a large infiltration zone in an area between Chervona Krynytsia, Charivne, and Bilohirya.[48] ISW cannot determine the shape and precise configuration of the asserted infiltration zone at this time with high enough confidence to change our control of terrain layers.

See topline text for reports about the temporary ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 31.

The Ukrainian intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea is limiting the number of logistics trucks traveling between Russia and occupied Crimea. The occupied Crimean Association of Freight Carriers and Forwarders head Anatoly Tsurkin claimed on October 31 that the number of logistics trucks traveling from Rostov Oblast to occupied Crimea decreased from between 2,000 and 3,000 per day to between 600 and 800 per day.[49] Tsurkin noted that the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) is the only ground line of communication that logistics trucks can use in the area and that Ukrainian drone strikes have also decreased the number of truck drivers willing to drive between Russia and occupied Crimea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[50]

Russian forces launched 134 drones (including 72 jet-powered) against Ukraine overnight on October 30 to 31 and 168 drones and loitering munitions (including 51 jet-powered drones) during the day on October 31.[51] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces struck a combined heat and power plant in Kyiv City and four electrical substations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight on October 30 to 31, leaving around 200,000 households in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and over 80,000 households in Kyiv Oblast without power.[52] Zelensky stated that Russian forces struck a combined heat and power plant in Shostka, Sumy Oblast, a gas distribution facility in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and railway infrastructure in Kharkiv and Dnipro cities on the morning of October 31.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.