Assessment as of: 8:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russia and Ukraine continued observing a limited ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast on October 28, but it remains unclear whether Ukrainian civilians will have a legitimate and duress-free choice to return to Ukrainian government-controlled Ukraine. Ukraine’s Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets and Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova confirmed on October 28 that there were no ceasefire violations in Russian-occupied Oleshky in the first 30 hours since the agreement entered into force on the morning of October 27.^[1] US First Lady Melania Trump reported on October 27 that the limited ceasefire will cover other unspecified areas of Kherson Oblast to provide safe passage for humanitarian convoys, and sources told the BBC on October 27 that the ceasefire extends to all of Kherson Oblast.[2] Fox News published on October 28 reported photos of the ceasefire agreement confirming that the Ukrainian delegation and Oleshky residents who wish to evacuate to Ukraine will travel to Anapa, Krasnodar Krai in Russia and then to Gomel, Belarus on October 31.[3] The part of the agreement that Fox News reported did not provide details on how the evacuated Oleshky citizens and the Ukrainian delegation will subsequently travel from Belarus to Ukrainian government-controlled Ukraine, however. The photos of the ceasefire agreement indicate that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces (GoF) is facilitating the ceasefire. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov inspected the Russian Dnepr GoF and met with its commander, Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, on October 27, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that they primarily discussed Russian unmanned system operations in the area.[4] Russian forces may use the limited ceasefire to reconstitute its forces in Kherson Oblast. It remains unclear how Russian authorities will treat Ukrainians evacuated from Oleshky and whether Russian authorities will provide the residents a legitimate and duress-free choice to return to Ukrainian government-controlled Ukraine.[5]

The Kremlin continues efforts to persuade the Trump administration to make economic concessions and pursue business cooperation with Russia, even as Russia continues to refuse to make any concessions of its own to end its war in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on October 27 that the October 9 US-Russia diesel deal is a “purely business agreement” and that there were “no conditions or stipulations whatsoever” requiring any Russian political action or security concerns in exchange for the US purchase of Russian diesel.[6] Lavrov also noted that the informational war around Ukraine will continue and even has a “tendency to escalate.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on October 13 that there is “no direct connection” between the US-Russia diesel deal and peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[7] Lavrov’s and Peskov’s statements notably contradict Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev’s October 12 claim that the diesel deal facilitates efforts for peace in Ukraine and Dmitriev’s October 17 claim that the suspension of some US sanctions on Russia would facilitate a “lasting peace” in Ukraine.^[8] High-ranking Kremlin officials are attempting to separate economic agreements with the United States from peace negotiations in order to obtain US economic concessions that will support Russia’s continued war effort while Russia has made no concessions that would enable any meaningful peace negotiations.[9] Kremlin officials have repeatedly affirmed Russia’s commitment to its long-standing maximalist military goals in Ukraine and refusal to make any concessions toward a peace settlement.[10]

Kremlin officials continue attempts to exclude Europe from peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine while reiterating Russia’s 2021 demand for NATO to rollback its presence in Europe. Lavrov claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s October 27 call with Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store demonstrated the European desire to “squeeze” themselves into peace negotiations.[11] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on October 28 that Russia, Ukraine, and the United States do not plan to have European representatives at the planned trilateral peace negotiations in November.[12] Peskov, however, claimed on October 25 that Russian would support a European peace negotiator, especially one who wants to facilitate a peace settlement.[13] Peskov’s statement suggests that Russia will only support European negotiators who will surrender to Russia’s maximalist demands for full Ukrainian capitulation. Lavrov’s and Ushakov’s statements came against the backdrop of the Kremlin’s recent renewal of the demands it first articulated in December 2021 that included retrograding the membership of NATO states that joined the alliance since 1997 — effectively granting Russia a veto over NATO internal policies and curtailing the sovereignty of many European states to choose to join alliances.[14] The Kremlin has routinely tried to exclude European leaders from peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, including portraying the United States and Russia as the only relevant negotiating actors.[15]

Three unidentified — possibly Russian — unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) struck a cargo ship off the coast of Bulgaria on October 28. Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitar Stoyanov stated on October 28 that three USVs struck the Constship Jet container ship approximately “21 miles” (likely referring to nautical miles) southeast of Shalba, Bulgaria.[16] Automatic identification systems (AIS) data from Marine Traffic, a shipping tracking website, indicates that the Liberian-flagged Constship Jet ship was traveling from Haifa, Israel to Constanta, Romania, and Greek shipping company Contships Management stated that the vessel’s crew included four Ukrainians.[17] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Constship Jet could have been carrying unspecified cargo to Constanta, a supply hub for Ukraine.[18] The October 28 strike comes against the backdrop of recent Russian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea, including drone strikes against civilian vessels near and within Romanian territorial waters on October 13, 14, and 23 and within the Bulgarian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on October 5 and overnight on October 12 to 13.[19]

Russia continues to actively support Iranian-backed operations against US allies in the Middle East. [NOTE: A version of the following text also appeared in ISW-CTP’s October 28 Iran Update.] A Switzerland-based geospatial intelligence firm told the Associated Press on October 28 that it has consistently observed Russian military satellites positioned above major Saudi energy and military sites in the days prior to and following Houthi drone and missile strikes against Saudi Arabia.[20] Russian satellite activity followed a similar pattern around strikes against Saudi infrastructure originating from Iraq, where the Houthis maintain a presence. A Saudi official and a high-ranking Houthi official separately told the Associated Press that Russia is providing satellite-based targeting intelligence to the Houthis, reportedly through Iranian military advisers who are operating in Yemen.[21] Russian pre- and post-strike imagery very likely enables the Houthis and Iranian military advisers to conduct battle damage assessments of their strikes.[22] The geospatial intelligence firm observed 40 instances of Russian satellite positioning over Saudi military and energy sites between July 1 and October 19, including the September 10 drone strike on the Saudi East-West Pipeline.[23] Russian support is enabling the Iranian-supported Houthi campaign to constrain Saudi Arabia’s ability to export oil during a global energy crisis that Iran has caused by striking ships in the Strait of Hormuz.[24]

Russian support for Houthi efforts to disrupt Saudi energy exports is consistent with long-standing Russian support for Iran and its regional partners, particularly the Houthis. Russia previously provided the Houthis with satellite-based targeting intelligence to help the group strike US vessels and international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in 2023 and 2024, for example.[25] The Houthis supported Russia, in turn, by promising to not target Russian vessels in the Red Sea and by recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia in Ukraine.[26] Russia has also provided targeting intelligence to support Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia and other regional targets during the current conflict in the Middle East, according to unspecified sources speaking to the Associated Press.[27] Russian intelligence sharing with Iran and its partners in the ongoing war demonstrates how Russia is directly supporting Iranian and Iranian-backed efforts to disrupt global energy markets and raise the cost of oil.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and Ukraine continued observing a limited ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast on October 28, but it remains unclear whether Ukrainian civilians will have a legitimate and duress-free choice to return to Ukrainian government-controlled Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to persuade the Trump administration to make economic concessions and pursue business cooperation with Russia even as Russia continues to refuse to make any concessions of its own to end its war in Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continue attempts to exclude Europe from peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine while reiterating Russia’s 2021 demand for NATO to rollback its presence in Europe.
• Three unidentified — possibly Russian — unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) struck a cargo ship off the coast of Bulgaria on October 28.
• Russia continues to actively support Iranian-backed operations against US allies in the Middle East.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Oleksandrivka and northeast of Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced north of Kostyantynivka.
• Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missile and 88 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian industrial infrastructure on October 27 and 28.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against industrial infrastructure in Tula and Lipetsk oblasts overnight on October 27 to 28. Geolocated footage published on October 28 shows a fire at the NAK Azot chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast (roughly 348 kilometers from the international border) following a reported Ukrainian strike.[29] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev acknowledged that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged an unspecified industrial site in Novomoskovsk.[30] Ukrainian defense company Fire Point indirectly confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the NAK Azot chemical plant.[31] Additional geolocated footage published on October 28 shows a fire at the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant in Novolipetsk, Lipetsk Oblast (roughly 280 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) following a reported Ukrainian strike.[32]

A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of Ukraine’s October 24 strikes against industrial facilities in Omsk City. A Ukrainian OSINT channel confirmed on October 28 that the October 24 strikes damaged gas separation and final production units at the Omskiy Kauchuk Chemical Plant, finished product and pipelines at the Poliom polypropylene manufacturing plant, and two sections of an Ozon warehouse facility in Omsk City (roughly 2,500 kilometers from the international border).[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 28, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced in the area.[34]

Ukrainian forces refuted the Russian MoD’s exaggerated claims about recent Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on October 28 that Russian forces seized Barylivka (northeast of Sumy City).[35] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Barylivka.[36] The Ukrainian 8th Corps stated that the Russian MoD’s claim about the seizure of Barylivka is false and that Ukrainian forces maintain control over the settlement.[37]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russia air defense assets in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-2M air defense system near Rzhava, Kursk Oblast (roughly 19 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian border); a radar station near Maloye Gorodkovo, Kursk Oblast (roughly 79 kilometers from theborder); and an electronic warfare (EW) station near Semyachki, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 34 kilometers from the border) on October 27 or overnight on October 27 to 28.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position south of Mala Vovcha (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on October 27, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[39] The Russian MoD claimed on October 28 that Russian forces seized Alisivka (north of Kharkiv City).[40] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Alisivka.[41]

A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 28 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukraine’s Operation Veles has reportedly prevented Russian forces from consolidating positions in northern Kupyansk. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 27 that Ukrainian forces advanced over 15 kilometers in underground pipelines during Ukraine’s recent Operation Veles in the Kupyansk direction.[43] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Viktor Trehubov stated on October 28 that clearing the pipelines during Operation Veles prevented Russian forces from infiltrating new personnel into northern Kupyansk.[44] Trehubov noted that Russian personnel who infiltrated into Kupyansk on prior dates are now dispersed across positions in the town’s northern areas.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 28.

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

NB: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission north of Lyman. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember east of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman), according to geolocated footage published on October 28, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk on October 27 and 28 but did not advance.[46]

Russian forces recently conducted a double-tap strike in Kramatorsk. Russian forces conducted a strike against firefighters responding to a previous Russian strike in Kramatorsk, according to geolocated footage published on October 27.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently advanced and conducted infiltration missions north of Kostyantynivka. A Ukrainian military source reported on October 28 that Russian forces recently entered Klynove (north of Kostyantynivka) and are attempting to gain a foothold southeast of the settlement after previously seizing Bezimyane and Popsane (both southeast of Klynove).[48] The Ukrainian source noted that Russian advances in the area may eventually present a risk to the flanks of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (just southwest of Popasne), as Russian forces attempt to advance towards the city from the east.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on October 27 and 28 but did not advance.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on October 28.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Oleksandrivka as Ukrainian forces continue efforts to slowly threaten the Russian logistics hub at Velyka Novosilka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 28 that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south and west of Novomykolaivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka), after clearing all of Zaporizke (east of Novomykolaivka) on a previous date.[50] Mashovets reported that Russian forces now only maintain a few positions in the forested area where the Berezove-Novomykolaivka road bisects Novomykolaivka, implying that Ukrainian forces cleared Kalynivske (northwest of Novomykolaivka) on a previous date and have advanced to central Novomykolaivka. Mashovets noted that Russian forces are supplying their positions in Novomykolaivka from Obratne (southeast of Novomykolaivka) but that Ukrainian forces are now able to strike this supply line. Mashovets additionally reported that at least three small Russian infantry groups of five to six personnel each are operating northwest of Solodke and west of Rybne (north of Hulyaipole and northwest of Uspenivka) on the western bank of the Yanchur River. Mashovets noted that Russian forces are intensifying their infiltration operations in the area between Zlahoda, Rybne, Pryvilne, and Solodke (all northwest of Uspenivka), likely to be able to strike Ukrainian forces counterattacking further east.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Hulyaipole near Uspenivka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 28 that Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate their positions near Pavlivka and Uspenivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole) along the right (eastern) bank of the Yanchur River.[52] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian positions near Uspenivka are 6.7 kilometers from Poltavka (southeast of Uspenivka).[53]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 27 and 28 but did not advance.[54]

See topline text for reporting on the localized ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 28.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[55]

Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missile and 88 drones and loitering munitions (including 38 jet-powered drones) against Ukraine overnight on October 27 to 28.[56] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 27 that Russian forces have launched over 100 ballistic missiles against Kyiv City and Oblast since October 14, 2026.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 27 that Ukrainian forces have reached an average interception rate of almost 60 percent against Russian jet-powered Geran-4 drones since August 2026 and that Ukraine’s interception rate of jet drones during “individual” strikes can reach 80 percent.[58] Recent Ukrainian Air Force reporting, however, indicated that the Ukrainian jet-powered drone interception rate reached over 75 percent between October 17 and 28.[59] Ukrainian Air Force reporting on Ukrainian interception rates aggregates interceptions of all jet-powered drones, including Geran-3, Geran-4, and Geran-5 drones, while the Ukrainian General Staff report isolated the interception rate of Geran-4 drones.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text for reporting on Belarus’ involvement in the limited ceasefire in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/402731; https://www.facebook.com/dmytro.lubinets?__cft__[0]=AZgQRxRI9CV7bqjjQTAdhcJop4livFFkUPFwUhdn0rWWNvQcJOLxSp3XwjebSucwC94ckxUdzUfyst4VZ8qXtjY3Bsn4qGIJtL3FKKLFvvUqxEyJMjTCx40UYWNa23SPLdC_7nUM1-4GmoqCfqSZLkyy-GRsFtHz&__tn__=-UC%2CP-R

[2] https://x.com/FLOTUS/status/2115116737687330987; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c6lye1w9p2l8o

[3] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/inside-melania-trumps-secret-diplomatic-role-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-deal

[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/68584; https://t.me/mod_russia/68585; https://t.me/mod_russia/68586

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2026/

[6] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2157608/

[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/28209133

[8] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/2109661684184785138 ; https://t.me/kadmitriev/735 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/400764

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_25-8/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/

[11] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2157608/

[12] https://t.me/vestiru/234311

[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/28250803

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_26-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://tass dot ru/politika/13380415; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2026/

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/

[16] https://apnews.com/article/bulgaria-drone-attack-container-ship-black-sea-357e91838a3695acb39d3e361bc2fe72 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/drones-hit-another-container-ship-off-bulgaria-defence-minister-says-2026-10-28/

[17] https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:6043180/mmsi:636019532/imo:9348625/vessel:CONTSHIP%20JET ; https://www.reuters.com/world/drones-hit-another-container-ship-off-bulgaria-defence-minister-says-2026-10-28/

[18] https://t.me/rybar/84227

[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/

[20] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24

[21] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24

[22] https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/training/jts/cjcsi_3162_02.pdf?ver=2019-03-13-092459-350

[23] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24

[24] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/oil-prices-rise-as-houthi-militants-target-saudi-energy-45c38fe0 ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-little-changed-supply-concern-lingers-amid-houthi-attacks-saudi-arabia-2026-10-23/ ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-climbs-mideast-conflict-tanker-attacks-persist-2026-10-11/

[25] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b ; https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64144 ; https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61363

[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-march-5-2025/

[27] https://apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-houthis-iraqi-militias-0989403fb38ccd9d7c9ad11a16e28d24 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-23-2026/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-strikes-cia-facilities-prompt-questions-about-possible-russian-role-2026-07-22/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-9-2026/

[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-19-2026/

[29] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2115309594964582681?s=20 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2115309600886989034?a=Z4107RYS3KmIqsXinZU&s=20 ; https://t.me/astrapress/129542

[30] https://t.me/dmilyaev/22153

[31] https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2115337117077512629?a=-cZy-2OPJVsy3XJpeRI&s=20

[32] https://t.me/dronebomber/41867 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33567 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/120391

[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2026/ ; https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/199 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/v-omsku-pislya-udaru-droniv-poshkodzheni-dva-himzavody-i-vygorila-sektsiya-skladu-ozon-suputnykovi-znimky/

[34] https://t.me/severnnyi/9747 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/231282; https://t.me/dva_majors/101128

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/68601

[36] https://t.me/sashakots/65469

[37] https://t.me/kuaairbome8/1334 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/28/u-8-mu-korpusi-dshv-sprostuvaly-brehnyu-rosiyan-pro-nibyto-zahoplennya-barylivky/ ; https://everyday dot sumy.ua/desantnyky-sprostovuiut-zakhoplennia-barylivky/

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42721

[39] https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/5000; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13327

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/68603; https://t.me/divgen/84761

[41] https://t.me/epoddubny/29691

[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/9747; https://t.me/wargonzo/37942

[43] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2115123249214365851?s=20 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2115123245536219356?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2026/

[44] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/28/%c2%abzmogly-namalyuvaty-sobi-siru-zonu-v%c2%a0golubivczi%c2%bb%c2%a0%e2%80%94-truby-gazogonu-v%c2%a0kup%e2%80%99yansku-vyvely-z%c2%a0ladu-dostatno-efektyvno/

[45] https://t.me/ombr66/3153 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13328

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42718 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42716 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/101128

[47] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2115085857803640942; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPU0bTRYCz0

[48] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14461

[49]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42718 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42716 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37942 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49307

[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3674

[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3674; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3675

[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3674

[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3676

[54]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42716 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42718 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37942 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/101128

[55] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/90990

[57] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/operaciya-veles-posilyuye-nashi-poziciyi-i-demonstruye-rosiy-107049

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42715

[59] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2026/