Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2026

Assessment as of: 9:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:00 PM ET

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Ukrainian officials reported in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield communications network over Ukraine overnight on October 13 to 14 that will significantly disrupt Ukraine’s jet-powered drone interception efforts and intermediate-range strike campaign. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov and former adviser to the Ukrainian defense minister Serhii Sternenko reported on October 14 that SpaceX implemented a speed limit of 100 miles per hour (roughly 160 kilometers per hour) for the terminals connected to the Starshield communications network operating in Ukraine.[1] Starshield is a more secure, jam-resistant, and military-oriented version of a Starlink satellite network that SpaceX designed for government use, while Starlink serves civilian and commercial purposes.[2] Unrestricted Starshield access allowed Ukrainian forces to fly their drones over 100 miles per hour before the October 14 restriction. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk reported on October 14 that the US military and ultimately US President Donald Trump are responsible for decisions related to Starshield’s speed and usage limits but that Starlink is a commercial service that SpaceX controls.[3] Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov responded to Musk and stated that SpaceX restored the connectivity of Ukrainian Starlink terminals up to speeds of 160 kilometers per hour, adding that entirely removing Starshield’s speed limit is critical for Ukraine’s defense.[4] Standard Starlink plans already restrict the Starlink terminals’ connectivity for aerial vehicles exceeding 100 miles per hour.[5] It remains unclear whether the Starshield speed restrictions remain in place as of this writing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 14 that the Kremlin did not receive official statements from Musk about the SpaceX speed limits for Ukrainian forces.[6]

The October 14 Starshield speed restrictions come against the backdrop of recent Russian-attributed arson attacks against Starlink infrastructure in Europe. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev reported on October 14 that Bulgarian authorities are investigating a reported arson attack against Starlink communications antennas in Sofia, Bulgaria.[7] Polish Member of the Council of Ministers and Coordinator of Special Services Tomasz Siemoniak stated that Russian intelligence services are likely behind the September 23 arson attack against Starlink infrastructure in Wola Krobozska, Poland.[8]

Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield or Starlink services over Russia, such that the latest Starshield in-motion speed restrictions cannot affect Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes against targets in Russia. SpaceX has geographically restricted Ukraine’s access to both Starlink and Starshield to Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces rely on alternative methods of communication and point-to-point navigation to strike targets in Russia. The Starshield speed restrictions are unrelated and will not prevent Ukrainian forces from striking Russian oil refineries, data centers, and other stationary targets within Russia.

The speed restrictions on Starshield could have major implications for Ukraine’s interception efforts against Russia’s faster jet-powered drones. Beskrestnov reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces leverage Starlink (likely referring to Starshield) for jet-powered drone interceptions — Ukraine’s most effective solution for countering Russian jet-powered Geran drones.[9] Ukraine has been urgently pursuing domestic production of jet-powered drone interceptors to combat Russia’s increasing use of jet-powered drones, and the Starshield speed restrictions risk disrupting Ukraine’s progress and allowing Russian forces to continue terrorizing Ukraine’s population ahead of and into Winter 2026-2027.[10] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on October 14 that there is a “window of opportunity” that the Starlink (likely referring to Starshield) speed restrictions created during which Russian forces can inflict maximum damage on Ukraine’s infrastructure.[11] Data from the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) between September 24 and October 14 suggests that the Starshield speed restrictions degraded Ukraine’s fixed-wing drone interception efforts as well, further hampering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities on the tactical and operational levels.

The Starshield restrictions will significantly impact Ukraine’s ability to conduct the intermediate-range strikes that have facilitated Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations in key frontline sectors throughout 2026. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces stated on October 14 that Ukrainian forces in the Hulyaipole direction reported drone connection disruptions when flying at speeds of 110 to 120 kilometers per hour, which makes drone control difficult.[12] The corps stated that the Starshield connection restrictions complicated the launch of intermediate-range drones that require rapid acceleration at high speed. The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps has since deleted its original announcement without issuing a subsequent explanation. Starshield-enabled drones, including US-made Hornet drones, serve as the backbone of Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, since Starshield connection allows Ukrainian drone operators to maintain live control at high speeds across Ukraine, including over Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. The Hornet drone’s maximum speed and dive speed exceed the imposed Starshield speed limit, preventing Ukrainian forces from effectively deploying them as strike vehicles.[13] The Starshield speed restrictions will deprive Ukrainian drones from targeting moving Russian vehicles and other dynamic targets in occupied Ukraine. Data from the Ukrainian USF indicates that the intensity of Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics vehicles across the frontline significantly decreased on October 14, very likely as a result of the restrictions on Starshield.[14] The Ukrainian intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) has been a key element of battlefield-shaping efforts that facilitated Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Oleksandrivka and Lyman directions in 2026, and the October 14 Starshield restrictions risk jeopardizing Ukraine’s contesting of the operational initiative.[15]

The Starshield speed restrictions come as Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized more details on Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which has heavily relied on a coordinated, months-long intermediate-range strike campaign to facilitate successful Ukrainian ground advances. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces liberated an additional 101 square kilometers of territory in the operation’s fourth phase, for a total of 277 square kilometers and 16 settlements over Operation Vivaldi’s four phases so far.[16] Biletskyi reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, and Kolodyazi (all north of Lyman) and added that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian forces from bypassing the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the flanks and controlling the E-40 Kharkiv City-Slovyansk highway (also known as the M-03). The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps conducted a months-long intermediate-range strike campaign to shape the battlefield as part of Operation Vivaldi, heavily targeting Russian logistics, fuel supplies, and drone operators, which subsequently degraded Russian forces’ offensive capabilities and facilitated later Ukrainian advances.[17]

Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi continues to generate cascading effects on neighboring sectors immediately north and south of the Lyman area. Biletskyi reported that Ukrainian counterattacks forced the command of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) to redeploy elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) from the Kupyansk direction to the Lyman direction, easing the pressure on Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk) — as ISW recently forecasted.[18] ISW has also observed evidence that Ukraine’s successes during Operation Vivaldi are creating cascading effects for Russian operations north of Lyman in the Borova direction while also hampering Russian efforts to advance toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk from the east.[19] The Russian Southern GoF has slowed its offensive tempo toward Slovyansk from the east, potentially to regroup its forces. The Russian military command likely intended for offensive operations east of Slovyansk to synergize with the Russian Western GoF’s efforts against Slovyansk from the northeast — the effort that Ukrainian forces thwarted during Operation Vivaldi.[20] Ukrainian forces have also been counterattacking east of Slovyansk, which, combined with the defeat of Russian forces north of the Siverskyi Donets River, could further halt the Russian drive toward Slovyansk from the east entirely.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials reported in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield communications network over Ukraine overnight on October 13 to 14 that will significantly disrupt Ukraine’s jet-powered drone interception efforts and intermediate-range strike campaign.
• Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield or Starlink services over Russia, such that the latest Starshield in-motion speed restrictions cannot affect Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes against targets in Russia.
• The speed restrictions on Starshield could have major implications for Ukraine’s interception efforts against Russia’s faster jet-powered drones.
• The Starshield restrictions will significantly impact Ukraine’s ability to conduct the intermediate-range strikes that have facilitated Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations in key frontline sectors throughout 2026.
• The Starshield speed restrictions come as Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps publicized more details on Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which has heavily relied on a coordinated, months-long intermediate-range strike campaign to facilitate successful Ukrainian ground advances.
• Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi continues to generate cascading effects on neighboring sectors immediately north and south of the Lyman area.
• Ukrainian forces struck a data center of the Russian state-owned bank Sberbank in Saratov Oblast and industrial infrastructure in Rostov Oblast on the night of October 13 to 14. Russian forces launched 39 Iskander-M, KN-23, and S-400 ballistic missiles, Zircon and Onyx anti-ship missiles, and 128 drones and loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on October 14.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazenyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck a data center of Russian state-owned bank Sberbank in Saratov Oblast on the night of October 13 to 14 as part of their new long-range strike campaign against Russian data centers and digital infrastructure. Ukrainian defense company Fire Point reported on October 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Sberbank data center.[22] Geolocated imagery published on October 14 shows damage to Sberbank’s data center in Balakovo, Saratov Oblast (roughly 734 kilometers from the international border) following a reported Ukrainian strike.[23] First Deputy Chairperson of Sberbank’s Management Board Alexander Vedyakhin acknowledged on October 14 that Ukrainian forces struck one of Sberbank’s data processing centers but claimed that all bank systems and services are operating normally.[24] Several Russian opposition media sources reported, however, that users of apps from Sberbank and Tochka Banka (another prominent Russian bank); popular websites and apps like Mail.ru, Kontur, Ozon, Megafon, and VKontakte; and internet service provider SkyNet St. Petersburg experienced outages or disruptions in banking services after the Ukrainian strike.[25] The Ukrainian strike against the Sberbank data center is part of Ukraine’s recent long-range strike campaign against Yandex (Russia’s closest analogue to Google) data centers aimed at degrading Russian digital infrastructure, denying Russia the ability to fund its war in Ukraine, and responding to Russian strikes against Ukrainian data centers.[26]

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against industrial infrastructure in Rostov Oblast. Ukrainian forces likely struck the Aksaykardandetal industrial plant in Aksay (roughly 209 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on October 13 showing a large fire at the plant.[27] Russian opposition source Astra reported on October 13 that the fire spread to two warehouses covering an area of roughly 9,000 square meters.[28] A Russian milblogger acknowledged the strike and claimed that the plant specializes in the production of driveshafts, joints, transmission assemblies, and components for specialized machinery.[29]

Russian officials are urging data centers to decentralize their digital infrastructure in order to more easily mitigate service disruptions following Ukrainian strikes. The deputy president and chairperson of the Management Board of Russian state telecommunications operator Rostelecom, Valery Ermakov, claimed on October 14 that Russian companies need to develop backup sites or “doomsday” data centers in order to restore services amid Ukrainian strikes against Yandex data centers.[30] Ermakov stated that a centralized structure of Russian data centers has become a vulnerability and called for Russian digital companies to distribute services across multiple sites and physical locations in order to improve the resilience of Russian digital infrastructure assets. Russian Minister of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media Maksut Shadayev stated on October 14 that Ukrainian strikes against data centers are more complex than strikes against oil refineries or other industrial facilities because data centers require uninterrupted power supply, cooling, and the operation of sensitive server equipment.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on October 11 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces east of Myropillya, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City).[33]

Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian helicopter near the border area of Belgorod Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on October 14 showing a Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone striking and damaging a Russian Mi-28NM attack helicopter, and geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that the strike occurred southeast of Ustinka, Belgorod Oblast (approximately five kilometers from the international border).[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 13 and 14 but did not advance.[35]

Russian officials and milbloggers continue to make unsubstantiated claims about an alleged encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 13 on its Max channel that Russian forces are destroying allegedly encircled Ukrainian forces in Mykolaivka, Varvarivka and Nefedivka (all east of Vovchansk).[36] A Russian milblogger posted a map on October 14 that claimed that Russian forces have closed the pocket between Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk and have encircled Varvarivka and an area between Chorne (east of Vovchansk) and Nefedivka.[37] ISW continues to assess that Russian sources are misrepresenting the situation on the ground, as there is no evidence of an encirclement in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 14, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[39] The Russian MoD claimed on October 13 on its Max channel that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Hrushivka, Blahodativka, Berezivka, Maliivka, and Osynove (all east and southeast of Kupyansk and between roughly four and 14 kilometers from what ISW assesses is the furthest Russian advance).[40]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 14, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[41] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Vovchyi Yar (south of Borova and roughly 17 kilometers from what ISW assesses is the furthest Russian advance).[42]

Russian forces conducted a Shahed-type drone strike against Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast, on the night of October 13 and 14, in an effort to degrade Ukrainian logistics in the Borova and Lyman directions. The Izyum Raion Military Administration reported that Russian forces conducted a series of strikes, including a Shahed-type drone strike, against residential and commercial infrastructure in Izyum, injuring two people.[43] Izyum serves as a logistics hub for Ukrainian forces operating in the Borova and Lyman directions, and a Russian milblogger previously claimed that Russian forces are increasingly striking Izyum in response to recent Ukrainian advances north of Lyman.[44]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

See topline text for reports about Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman direction as part of Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman on October 13 and 14 but did not advance.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, Mykolaivka, Pyskunivka, and Kalenyky on October 13 and 14 but did not advance.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Ukrainian forces stopped counterattacking across the Siverskyi Donets River from Ozerne (east of Slovyansk on the northern bank of the river) toward Kryva Luka (on the southern bank of the river) but are still counterattacking toward other unspecified areas from Ozerne.[47]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in areas far west of the current frontline east of the Fortress Belt, likely as part of Russia’s cognitive warfare campaign to exaggerate battlefield advances. The Russian MoD claimed on its Max channel that the Russian Southern GoFs are conducting offensive operations near Semenivka (directly east of Slovyansk), Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk — all areas far from the furthest extent of assessed Russian advances.[48] The Russian MoD’s reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian advances and falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to available evidence.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Kostyantynivka on October 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[50] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pryiut (west of Kostyantynivka).[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continue efforts to reach the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border from the Pokrovsk area. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on October 13 that Russian forces reprioritized their efforts away from Udachne and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) to Serhiivka (northwest of Udachne and south of the E-50 Pokrovsk-Slovyanka highway) after assessing that Serhiivka would be the best area in which to establish a foothold for further offensive operations toward the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 234th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are operating in the Dobropillya direction, according to a Russian milblogger.[53] ISW last observed elements of the Russian 234th VDV Regiment operating in the Zaporizhia direction in February 2026.[54] Elements of the 234th VDV Regiment were operating near Pokrovsk as of November 2025, therefore, elements of the regiment may be split between the two areas. 

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

The Russian MoD is claiming that fighting is ongoing unfeasibly far from the frontline as part of its cognitive warfare campaign to exaggerate battlefield advances in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions. The Russian MoD claimed on October 13 that the Russian Eastern GoFs conducted offensive operations near Tarasivka (northwest of Novopavlivka and roughly 16 kilometers from the furthest extent of assessed Russian advances in the Novopavlivka direction) and near Havrylivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka and roughly 15 kilometers from the furthest extent of assessed Russian advances in the area).[55] The Russian MoD notably published these claims on its Max channel, and not its Telegram channel, suggesting that the Russian MoD aims to present these exaggerated battlefield successes to the domestic Russian audience.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

The Russian MoD, with co-opted Russian milblogger support, also continues its cognitive warfare campaign to exaggerate battlefield advances in the Hulyaipole direction. The Russian MoD claimed on October 13 on its Max channel that the Russian Eastern GoFs conducted offensive operations near Zalivne and Volnyanka (both northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 19 kilometers from the furthest assessed Russian advances in the area).[57] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger made similarly exaggerated claims on October 13, alleging that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations near and west of Zelena Dibrova (northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 14 kilometers from the furthest assessed Russian advances).[58]

The Russian military command is reportedly accumulating forces in the Hulyaipole direction in anticipation of future intensified offensive operations. Ukrainian 7th Rapid Response Corps Spokesperson Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi reported on October 14 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces in the Hulyaipole direction, in particular along the Verkhnya Tersa River delta where there are leafy areas - likely referring to the Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) area.[59] Russian forces reportedly now have a five-to-one quantitative personnel advantage over Ukrainian forces in the Hulyaipole direction and are building up armored vehicles. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Verkhnya Tersa (immediately south of Vozdvyzhivka).[60]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 13 and 14 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[61]

Russian milbloggers continue to disagree over the control of terrain in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that fighting continues for Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv) and strongholds north of the settlement.[62] Another prominent Russian milblogger claimed on October 14, however, that Russian forces firmly control Mali Shcherbaky as well as areas four kilometers north of the settlement.[63] A third Russian milblogger complained that Russian sources are amplifying unreliable reports from individual frontline soldiers who do not have a full understanding of the actual situation and are thus creating discord in the Russian information environment.[64]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 14.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[65]

Russia launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 39 missiles, including Iskander-M, KN-23, and S-400 ballistic missiles and Zirkon and Onyx anti-ship missiles, from Kursk, Bryansk, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 128 Shahed-type (including 77 jet-powered), Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones; Parodiya-type decoy drones; and Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Oryol City; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed four unspecified missiles and 119 drones (including 59 jet-powered drones), that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 22 locations, and that debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials noted that the Russian drone and missile strikes primarily targeted civilian and energy infrastructure in Kyiv City, Kyiv Oblast, and Kharkiv Oblast and that Russian ballistic missiles struck all three combined heating and power plants in Kyiv City.[68] Russian forces also struck railway infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and Ternopil oblasts.[69] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and residential infrastructure in Lutsk, Volyn Oblast and Rivne Oblast, killing at least six people and injuring at least 21.[70]

Ukrainian officials reported that Ukraine again did not receive early warnings ahead of some of the Russian overnight missile strikes against Ukraine on October 13 to 14. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, initially reported on the evening of October 13 that Ukrainian forces did not receive information about Russian ballistic missile launches from their NATO or US partners.[71] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated later on October 14that Ukrainian forces initially did not receive early warning of the first wave of incoming Russian strikes against Kyiv City but that Ukraine's partners warned about the following three waves of Russian strikes.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.