7 hours ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:15 AM ET

 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

 

A prominent Russian milblogger noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recently issued fewer claims of Russian forces seizing settlements in Ukraine. The milblogger acknowledged on November 8 that the rate of Russian MoD claims of seizing settlements had recently decreased significantly, marking a notable shift in the pattern of Russian MoD reporting.[1] The Russian MoD and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov collectively claimed that Russian forces seized 38 settlements across the frontline in October 2026 alone.[2] The Russian MoD claimed the seizure of Vasylkove (northwest of Hulyaipole and 18 kilometers from the nearest Russian advance or infiltration area) on November 9, marking the first Russian MoD claim of seizing a settlement since October 28.[3] The prominent Russian milblogger assessed that this shift may suggest that Russian forces have difficulty fighting in colder weather or that Russian MoD officials conducted a “non-public revision” of the current frontline after receiving exaggerated battlefield reports from military commanders. The milblogger assessed that the Russian MoD may also have felt compelled to respond to accurate reporting that the rate of Russian advances has decreased significantly in 2026 compared to 2025.[4] Russian forces lost ground on the battlefield in both September and October 2026, highlighting the increasingly stark contrast between the Kremlin‘s cognitive warfare campaign to portray Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapsing and the actual battlefield reality.[5] This shift in Russian MoD reporting may also indicate that the MoD is leaning into the Kremlin's new theory of victory in Ukraine, which now relies on a deadly and destructive long-range drone and missile campaign against Ukrainian energy and critical infrastructure over the upcoming Winter 2026-2027 to compel Ukraine into surrender.[6]

 

The Russian Central Bank is acknowledging that Russia's war in Ukraine is having mounting economic effect, while trying to present these effects as temporary. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated on November 9 to the Russian State Duma that there should be no rush to lower the key interest rate (which the Central Bank has lowered 10 times since June 2025) as Russia continues to experience significant inflation.[7] Nabiullina acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes against oil refineries, data centers, logistics hubs, and other industrial facilities have constrained Russian production capacity, but claimed that Russian officials are addressing these "temporary" challenges. Nabiullina stated that the gap between the inflation rate and the key interest rate reflects persistent inflationary pressure and the large share of subsidized loans in Russia. Nabiullina added that the Russian Central Bank will continue to lower the key interest rate in 2027 but that it will remain in the double digits. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaigns against Russian energy infrastructure and the recent strikes against Russian logistics facilities — the effects of which Nabiullina acknowledged — are generating additional inflationary pressures on the already-strained Russian economy.[8] Russian authorities thus far have failed to adequately protect their critical infrastructure or quickly repair damage from Ukrainian strikes and are unlikely to be able to rapidly address these issues ahead of or into 2027, the timeline that Nabiullina insinuated.[9]

 

Nabiullina's characterization of Russia's economic strains as temporary contrasts with the Kremlin's preparations for increased budget deficits over the coming years and the mounting costs of wartime economic policies for ordinary Russians. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on November 6 that the Russian State Duma Committee on Budget and Taxes recognized the risk of a shortfall in federal budget revenues for 2027-2029, forecasting an annual deficit of between $63.6 to $67.6 billion or around 1.9-2.2 percent of Russia's GDP.[10] The SZRU reported that the Russian federal government also plans to increase public debt from $56.7 billion in 2027 to $70.5 billion in 2029. The SZRU noted that the Russian government nonetheless plans to spend more than $212 billion on defense in 2027. The SZRU reported on November 8 that 28 percent of all borrowers in Russian banks were struggling to service loans as of August 2026, while 33 companies entered into technical default (a breach of a loan's terms and conditions that does not involve missed payments), of which 17 eventually entered full default, between January and September 2026.[11] The SZRU noted that wage debt reached over 2.5 billion rubles (roughly $30.3 million) by the end of September 2026, while regular Russians have been increasingly relying on debt to pay for basic necessities, including heating. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 9 that hardships and inconveniences are inevitable for Russians in the fifth year of war and encouraged Russians to focus on buying generators and stockpiling fuel, water, food, and medicine.[12]

 

These economically sub-optimal policies to continue funding the Kremlin's war in Ukraine will have long-term economic implications.[13]  Russia is experiencing labor shortages that have caused wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation.[14] Russia has also been increasingly struggling with liquidity problems and high levels of external debt after having steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine.[15] Russian civilians have also experienced severe fuel shortages and price spikes throughout Summer 2026, further straining already tight budgets while fueling inflation.[16] Russian President Vladimir Putin has nonetheless continuously pressured the Russian Central Bank to lower the key interest rate as part of Putin’s efforts to impose a looser monetary policy in order to expand capital and liquidity availability for the Russian military and defense industry.[17]

 

Russian forces continue to lean into highly maneuverable quasi-cruise missiles for strike packages against Ukraine's critical and industrial infrastructure, exploiting Ukrainian air defense and interceptor shortages. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 9 that Russia is fielding a new modification of the Geran-5 long-range strike drone — the Geran-5 K5-K — which the GUR classified as a "small sized cruise missile" due to its aerodynamics and technical characteristics.[18] The GUR reported that the Geran-5 K5-K is shorter and has a narrower wingspan than a typical Geran-5, has a maximum cruising speed of 450 kilometers per hour, has a 1,000-kilometer range, and carries a 90-kilogram warhead.[19] The GUR stated that Russia has already fielded Geran-5 K5-K drones with a thermobaric warhead — an adaptation likely intended to maximize damage, which disproportionately affects civilian areas in Ukraine.[20] Russian forces began integrating inexpensive, highly maneuverable quasi-cruise missiles, including Banderols and Dan-Ts, into their strike packages in mid-2026, likely to exploit Ukraine's air defense interceptor shortages before Ukraine can effectively field a counter to such weapons.[21] Quasi-cruise missiles bridge the gap between slow and inexpensive strike drones and cruise missiles, and modifying a Geran-type drone in this way will likely further confuse and pressure strained Ukrainian air defenses. Russia will likely continue to prioritize the development of quasi-cruise missiles, jet-powered drones, and other more destructive variants of its strike drones in order to devastate Ukraine’s logistics, transportation, and energy infrastructure going into the Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign.[22]

 

Russian forces are also modifying anti-aircraft and ballistic missiles to expand the scale of ballistic trajectory strikes and improve their precision against key Ukrainian transportation nodes, particularly in Kyiv City. A Russian military-focused outlet claimed on November 9 that Russian forces may have used converted RM-48U anti-aircraft missiles (launched from S-300/S-400 air defense systems) with unspecified modifications to target Kyiv City's Northern and Southern Bridges on November 7 and October 27, respectively.[23] The outlet noted that the reported use of RM-48U suggests that Russian forces are increasingly turning to refurbished anti-aircraft missiles to strike ground targets and that these missiles will allow Russia to decrease its reliance on expensive Iskander-M ballistic missiles. The outlet noted, however, that RM-48U modifications are not as precise as Iskander-M missiles. Reuters reported in September 2026, citing data from the Ukrainian General Prosecutor's Office, that Russian forces began using repurposed RM-48Us en masse in strike packages against Ukraine since July 2026, making up over half of the 228 ballistic and hypersonic missiles that Russian forces fired at Ukraine in July and August.[24]

 

Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash" Beskrestnov reported on November 8 that Russian forces have modified Iskander-M ballistic missiles to include radar and optical terminal-guidance systems, which improve the Iskander-M's precision to within a meter, to achieve accurate strikes against Ukrainian bridges.[25] Russian forces have intensified strikes against bridges, particularly in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities, in October and November 2026, likely to complicate the Ukrainian economy and civilian life.[26] Russia's anti-aircraft and ballistic missile modifications suggest that Russia is prioritizing missile adaptations that increase the lethality and scale of Russia’s long-range strike campaign against targets requiring a high degree of precision, such as bridges, and create additional disruptions to the Ukrainian economy and civilian life. 

 

Key Takeaways:

  • A prominent Russian milblogger noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recently issued fewer claims of Russian forces seizing settlements in Ukraine.
  • The Russian Central Bank is acknowledging that Russia's war in Ukraine is having mounting economic effects, while trying to present these effects as temporary.
  • Nabiullina's characterization of Russia's economic strains as temporary contrasts with the Kremlin's preparations for increased budget deficits over the coming years and the mounting costs of wartime economic policies for ordinary Russians.
  • Russian forces continue to lean into highly maneuverable quasi-cruise missiles for strike packages against Ukraine's critical and industrial infrastructure, exploiting Ukrainian air defense and interceptor shortages.
  • Russian forces are also modifying anti-aircraft and ballistic missiles to expand the scale of ballistic trajectory strikes and improve their precision against key Ukrainian transportation nodes, particularly in Kyiv City.
  • Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian missile production facilities overnight. Russia launched 317 drones (including 105 jet-powered) against Ukraine overnight.
  • Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on November 9.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

 

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian missile production facilities overnight on November 8 to 9, likely in an effort to reduce Russia's ability to launch ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[27] Ukrainian officials reported on November 9 that Ukrainian forces struck the Morozov explosives and fuel production plant east of St. Petersburg (roughly 858 kilometers from the international border) overnight on November 8 to 9, damaging three production workshops.[28] Footage published on November 9 reportedly shows a large explosion at the Morozov Plant.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec owns and operates the Morozov Plant, which produces explosives, has developed solid fuel for the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile, and supplies solid fuel charges for the 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missiles.[30] Ukrainian defense technology company Fire Point reported on November 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted 28 successful strikes using FP-1 long-range strike drones and FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles against 10 facilities involved in the production of Iskander-type ballistic missiles between 2024 and 2026.[31]

 

Ukrainian forces likely struck the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Leningrad Oblast overnight on November 8 to 9, marking at least the eighth Ukrainian strike against Russian oil refining infrastructure since October 30.[32] Geolocated footage published on November 8 shows large fires at the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast (roughly 794 kilometers from the international border), the second largest oil refinery in Russia.[33] Leningrad Governor Alexander Drozdenko acknowledged on November 9 that Ukrainian drones struck an unspecified industrial zone in Kirishi.[34] Ukrainian forces have struck the Kirishi Oil Refinery at least six times since March 2025.[35]

 

Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces leveraged new flight paths in their strikes against Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, complicating Russian interception efforts. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 9 that Ukrainian drones flew along Pskov Oblast and approached Kirishi from several directions in their terminal phases, hindering Russian interception efforts.[36] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 9 that Russian air defenses intercepted Ukrainian drones approaching ports on the Gulf of Finland northwest of Kirishi, while other Ukrainian drones approached the Kirishi Oil Refinery from the south and southeast.[37] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces are gradually improving their ability to track Ukrainian drones over the entire flight path in Russia, but that the interception of these drones remains complicated due to the vast territory they need to protect. Russian opposition source Astra reported on November 8 that mobile internet service had temporarily stopped working in St. Petersburg, potentially due to Russian electronic warfare (EW) efforts against the “massive” number of Ukrainian drones present across large areas of Leningrad Oblast.[38]

 

Ukrainian defense company Fire Point provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against oil infrastructure in Samara Oblast. Fire Point published satellite imagery and reported on November 8 that Ukraine used FP-1 drones to strike the Novokuibyshevsk Oil Refinery in Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast (roughly 787 kilometers from Ukraine's border) on October 30, destroying 17 storage tanks and damaging another 17.[39]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 9, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Sumy City.[40]

 

ISW recently collected a report suggesting that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions along the western (right) bank of the Seim River northwest of Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, but this report does indicate a renewed operation into Kursk Oblast. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on November 8 that Ukrainian forces maintain some unspecified positions northwest of Tetkino on the western (right) bank of the Seym River.[41] ISW does not assess that this report indicates a new Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, but rather a refinement of our assessed Ukrainian forward line of own troops (FLOT). Russian and Ukrainian forces both regularly conduct limited cross-border infiltration missions in this area of the Russian-Ukrainian international border.

 

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 8 and 9 but did not advance.[42]

 

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 9.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in and west of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in eastern Myrove (just west of Kupyansk) and in northwestern Kupyansk,  according to geolocated footage published on November 7, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[43]

 

Russian forces maintain limited and unconsolidated positions in Kupyansk. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces maintain limited positions in several parts of Kupyansk but that Russian forces have not been able to stabilize or consolidate these positions as Ukrainian drone operations are interdicting Russian logistics and troop movements.[44] A Ukrainian military source similarly reported that Russian forces are infiltrating various parts of Kupyansk but do not have secured positions.[45] Ukrainian forces recently cleared over 15 kilometers of underground pipeline that lead into Kupyansk during Operation Veles, preventing Russian forces from infiltrating new personnel into northern Kupyansk.[46] This pipeline had previously enabled Russian forces to conduct infiltration missions into Kupyansk and the surrounding area since at least September 2025. Russian forces are likely struggling with the loss of the pipeline to supply remaining infiltrators and conduct infiltrations, preventing Russian forces from consolidating positions in the town.

 

Russian forces are reportedly using recruits from African countries to fill personnel gaps in the Kupyansk direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that the Russian military command is reinforcing the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with recruits from African countries but noted that these recruits lack combat training, language skills, and discipline.[47] Russian forces have struggled with personnel shortages across the frontline, and the Western GoF is particularly overextended (the Western GoF is responsible for the area spanning from Kupyansk through Lyman), which has reduced its ability to effectively allocate resources to priority sectors.[48] The Russian military command redeployed elements of the 1st GTA from the Kupyansk direction to the Lyman direction in October 2026 to stabilize the frontlines, following Ukrainian counterattacks that significantly degraded the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, MMD) and 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]).[49] This reallocation of forces may have in part led the Russian Western GoF command to attach African recruits to the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment. ISW has observed numerous reports of the deployment of African recruits across the theater, including a radio interception that the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) released on November 9, indicating that elements of the Russian 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are using African recruits as human shields to move through the kill zone in the Oleksandrivka direction.[50]

 

 

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast and east of Borova on November 9 but did not advance.[51]

 

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of, southeast of, and towards Lyman itself on November 8 and 9, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Lyman.[52]

 

Russian forces are reportedly attempting to conduct reckless infantry-led, offensive operations across open fields and the Zherebets River (running northeast to southeast of Lyman), contrary to typical Russian offensive operational patterns during the fall and winter seasons. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 9 that Russian forces are more active in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) and are attempting to stabilize the situation in the Lyman direction along the current frontline.[53] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are undertaking more “chaotic” and reckless offensive operations and are using infantry waves to cross open fields and the Zherebets River in a "suicidal manner." The spokesperson noted that this pattern of activity deviates from the pattern of activity Ukrainian forces typically expect from Russian forces during the onset of the fall and winter period and may indicate the Russian military command’s growing sense of urgency in the Lyman direction.

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Russian forces continue to decrease their offensive tempo along the Fortress Belt's eastern flank. The Ukrainian General Staff did not report any activity in the Slovyansk direction on November 9 — amid a pattern of decreasing Russian offensive tempo in the area since October 2026.[54] Russian forces across the theater reduced the intensity of attacks on November 9, attacking only 140 times — the fewest Russian attacks in a singular day since at least August 2026.[55] The decrease in offensive tempo comes as Ukrainian forces have continued limited counterattacks along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and near Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk), southeast of Slovyansk along the E-40 Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway near Yurkivka, as well as further south near Vasyutynske, Tykhonivka, and Malynivka since late September 2026.[56] A Ukrainian military source noted on November 5 that Russian forces are increasingly adopting defensive tactics and have reduced the intensity of operations east of Slovyansk.[57] Ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in the area, combined with the defeat of Russian forces north of the Siverskyi Donets River, are disrupting Russian offensive toward Slovyansk heading into winter.[58] Russian forces may also have reduced their operational tempo to prepare for resuming offensive operations as part of Russia’s Winter 2026-2027 offensive or in anticipation of favorable weather conditions — a normal seasonal occurrence.

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and southwest of Kostyantynivka on November 8 and 9 but did not advance.[59]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations east and southwest of Dobropillya on November 8 and 9 but did not advance.[60]

 

Russian forces continue to exploit seasonal weather patterns and a smaller kill zone to advance. The commander of a Ukrainian special operations division operating in the Dobropillya direction reported on November 9 that Russian forces wait for foggy weather (which disrupts drone operations) to conduct mass infiltration missions and transfer personnel.[61] The commander noted that this pattern is reflected in the width and depth of the “kill zone,” as prolonged periods of foggy weather allow Russian forces to bring personnel and assets closer to the frontline.

 

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Starlink jamming station near occupied Sartana (roughly 106 kilometers from the frontline) on November 8 or overnight November 8 to 9.[62] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the loss of such Russian jamming stations improves the stability of Ukrainian communications and the accuracy of Ukrainian drone operations.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

 

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on November 9.

 

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on November 9 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[63]

 

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are rethinking drone support for small group assaults. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 9 that Russian assault groups consisting of two or three personnel previously used a single Mavic drone for support, navigation, and tactical direction during an assault. The milblogger noted that this practice has become largely ineffective since early 2025 because Ukrainian forces would spot the Mavic drone and because of the abundance of drones across the frontline.[64] The milblogger argued that such a transparent battlefield requires one service member to receive support from at least a dozen drones, including sleeper, reconnaissance, and strike drones, in order to advance. The milblogger claimed that the unspecified actors within the Russian forces are beginning to rethink drone support for Russian assault groups but openly criticized select Russian military commanders for continuing to commit two-person assault groups with inadequate drone support to the battlefield in the meantime. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command will need to accumulate tactical drone stockpiles before launching assaults.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

 

 

Russian sources continue to exaggerate claims of advance in the Hulyaipole direction to envelop Orikhiv from the northeast. The Russian MoD claimed on November 9 that Russian forces, reportedly elements of the 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), seized Vasylkove (northwest of Hulyaipole).[65] Vasylkove is about 18 kilometers from the closest assessed Russian advance or infiltration area. Some Russian milbloggers, including those with Kremlin affiliations, have recently made claims of Russian advances in the area despite these claims being so far from the observed frontline.[66] Pro-Russian sources published footage purporting to show Russian forces raising a flag in Vasylkove in an attempt to demonstrate control over Vasylkove, but ISW assesses that Russian forces are very unlikely to retain any semblance of control over the settlement given the distance to the nearest assessed Russian position.[67] The Russian MoD and pro-Kremlin milbloggers will likely continue to exaggerate the extent of Russian advances in certain sectors of the frontline, including the Hulyaipole direction, to falsely portray Russian forces as capable of relatively rapid advances and threatening Orikhiv from the northeast.

 

Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 9 that Russian forces have tripled the number of assaults in the Hulyaipole direction from September to October 2026.[68] The Ukrainian 7th Corps stated that the most challenging situation is near Hirke, Zaliznychne, Tsvitkove, and Hulyaipilske (all roughly between five and 13 kilometers northwest to southwest of Hulyaipole), where Russian forces are attempting to stage personnel and equipment for further operations westward. The Ukrainian 7th Corps stated that Russian forces are less frequently operating in infiltration groups of two to three personnel and instead conducting one-person infiltration missions.

 

Several Russian milbloggers claimed on November 9 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[69]

 

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 9.

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[70]

 

Russian forces launched 317 drones (including 105 jet-powered) and Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight on November 8 to 9.[71]

 

Russian forces continue targeting Ukrainian energy and critical infrastructure, causing widespread power outages.  Ukrainian First Deputy Energy Minister Artem Nekrasov stated on November 9 that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in several regions in the past day, causing power outages in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi and Chernihiv oblasts.[72] Nekrasov stated that the power supply situation is most dire in Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts but noted that most regions have hourly rolling blackout schedules. Nekrasov stated that Russian forces targeted energy, oil, and gas infrastructure 128 times in the past week (since about November 2) and that there were 219 total instances of Russian strikes damaging or destroying such infrastructure. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck electric substations near Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Cherkasy City; and Vinnytsia Oblast overnight on November 8 to 9.[73] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger praised the ongoing Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure as more systematic than strike campaigns in previous winters but claimed that the power situation in Ukraine will not be sufficiently dire as long as Ukraine's nuclear power plants retain their operational capacity.[74]

 

Russian forces also struck port infrastructure near Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast, and a dry cargo ship southwest of Odesa City in the Black Sea overnight.[75]

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.  

 

[1] https://t.me/dva_majors/101702

[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2026/; 

[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/68881

[4] https://t.me/dva_majors/101702

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/

[7] https://tass dot com/economy/2214989; https://t.me/tass_agency/404695; https://tass dot com/economy/2214763; https://tass dot com/economy/2214757 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/

[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2026/ ;  https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/

[10] https://www.szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/hosduma-vyznala-ryzyk-byudzhetnoho-provalu-ale-skhvalyuie-finansovi-fantazii-uryadu

[11] https://t.me/FISUkraine/2343 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/11/08/ne-mozhesh-zaplatyty-idy-voyuj-u-szr-povidomyly-yak-borgove-navantazhennya-sponukaye-rosiyan-yihaty-gynuty-v-ukrayinu/

 

 

[12] https://t.me/bomber_fighter/27111

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025;

[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025/

[18] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9951

[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/

[20] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9951

[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-inexpensive-quasi-cruise-missiles-an-emerging-threat-for-ukraines-air-defenses/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/

[23] https://t.me/topwar_official/101436

[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-war/revamped-missile-leading-russias-ballistic-onslaught-ukraine-2026-09-18/

[25] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7852

[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/

[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2026/

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42850 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2621

[29] https://t.me/supernova_plus/62735

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42850

[31] https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2119779811736330581?a=OOIPC-x9205ojtN1eDc&s=20  ; https://t.me/firepointofficial/487

[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/

[33] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34271 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/62734 ; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8364 ; https://t.me/astrapress/130595

[34] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/13151

[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/  ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/

[36] https://t.me/arx_spn/31868

[37] https://t.me/rybar/84559

[38] https://t.me/astrapress/130595

[39] https://x.com/FirePointUA/status/2119551885887799800?a=T4hZ33t2t9e2g-RicBc&s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2026/

[40]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38259 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9883 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49747

[41] https://t.me/severnnyi/9879

[42]https://t.me/severnnyi/9883 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38259 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42844

[43] https://t.me/ombr41/3459 ; https://t.me/test428obbps/595 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13411

[44] https://t.me/grvZapad/20310

[45] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14525

[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2026/

[47] https://t.me/grvZapad/20312

[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive

[49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/

[50] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9962 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2024/

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20310

[52]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42844; https://t.me/wargonzo/38259; https://t.me/grvZapad/20310;

[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/11/09/komanduvannya-namagayetsya-zakryvaty-dirky-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okupanty-otrymaly-naganyaj-vid-kerivnycztva/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42844

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846

[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2026/ ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49755

[57] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14506

[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42844 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38259

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42846 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42844 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38259

[61] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/11/09/kilkist-yih-u-tuman-zrostaye-vpyatero-chas-vid-chasu-na-dobropilskomu-napryamku-odnochasno-ruhayetsya-30-grup-protyvnyka/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWkb-BLcGAY

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42851

[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/21981

[64] https://t.me/bayraktar1070/8352

[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/68881 ; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/30507 ; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/30509; https://t.me/voin_dv/21982; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49764; https://t.me/epoddubny/29880; https://t.me/sashakots/65758; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/126815

[66] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/; https://t.me/voin_dv/21947

[67] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2119703160520609917?a=Vc6qLGDmgaWvkxbv12M&s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/21982; https://t.me/Osintpen/3783; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13409

[68] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1864

[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/38259 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21981

[70] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/94425

[72] https://t.me/energyofukraine/8266

[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/68878 ; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/30506

[74] https://t.me/rybar/84560

[75] https://t.me/wargonzo/38266 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/29872 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/101729; https://t.me/epoddubny/29868; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49746; https://t.me/odeskaODA/22632; https://t.me/odeskaODA/22633; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/65872; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3630; https://t.me/mod_russia/68888 ; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/30515