Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 4, 2026

Assessment as of: 4:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:00 AM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russia's long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of November 3 to 4 heavily targeted central and western Ukraine and caused significant power outages across the country. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 310 drones against Ukraine overnight.[1] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Volyn, Ternopil, and Zhytomyr oblasts — notably heavily targeting central and western Ukraine.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck the Nalyvaikivka electrical substation in Kyiv Oblast and the Chyzhivka electrical substation in Zhytomyr Oblast.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 4 that Russian forces struck an energy facility near Dubrovytsia, Rivne Oblast, using the new Filin cruise missile.[4] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Filin cruise missile may have a maximum speed of 800 kilometers per hour and a range of up to 1,200 kilometers, comes in variants with 50- and 100-kilogram warheads (similar to the payload of a Geran-type drone), and are ground-launched using a solid-propellent booster.[5]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 4 that Kyiv City and Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, and Donetsk oblasts were experiencing emergency power outages and emphasized that energy infrastructure repairs are delayed due to repeated Russian strikes.[6] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on November 4 that Russian forces conducted over 20 strikes against Ukrainian energy systems over the past 24 hours, damaging power plants and substations and causing massive power outages.[7] Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Energy Artem Nekrasov stated that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure are also forcing Ukrainian nuclear power plants to reduce their generation capacity.[8]

Russia's Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign continues to damage critical infrastructure and the Ukrainian economy with precise and repeated strikes that cause significant damage. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 4 that Russian forces have shifted to “more systematic and rational” strikes to “strategically weaken” Ukraine and are targeting system-critical substations and smaller facilities that directly impact electricity flows.[9] Russian strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure are imposing increasingly high costs on Ukrainian society in an attempt to coerce Ukraine into capitulating during Winter 2026-2027.[10] Russia’s Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign mimics its Winter 2025-2026 campaign that sought to degrade Ukraine’s energy security and industrial capacity and reportedly managed to damage or destroy 80 percent of Ukraine’s power generation.[11] Ukraine will likely face similar effects during the Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign unless Ukraine can effectively defend itself against large, daily strike packages of Russian drones and missiles. The provision of Patriot interceptor missiles and other air defense systems and support for Ukraine's energy infrastructure reconstruction is essential to ensure that Ukraine can withstand Russia's increasingly destructive strike campaign.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia's long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of November 3 to 4 heavily targeted central and western Ukraine and caused significant power outages across the country.
• Russia's Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign continues to damage critical infrastructure and the Ukrainian economy with precise and repeated strikes that cause significant damage.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Ozon marketplace warehouses in Russia on the night of November 3 to 4.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Ozon marketplace warehouses in Russia on the night of November 3 to 4. Geolocated footage published on November 4 shows a large fire at an Ozon warehouse in Adygeysk, the Republic of Adygea (roughly 394 kilometers from the frontline) following a reported Ukrainian strike.[12] Ozon Marketplace and Republic of Adygea Head Murat Kumpilov confirmed that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at the Ozon logistics center in Adygeysk.[13]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 3 and 4 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Sumy City.[14] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on November 4 that Russian forces have intensified the tempo of their assaults toward Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[15]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in northeastern Pokaliane, according to geolocated footage published on November 3, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[16]

Russian milbloggers claimed on November 3 and 4 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Velykyi Burluk, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[17]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces concentrated their offensive operations north of Kupyansk on November 3 and 4 but did not advance.[18]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 3 and 4 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Borova.[19]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces denied claims that Russian forces maintain control over Zarichne (northeast of Lyman). The source claimed on November 4 that Zarichne has turned into a contested “gray zone” and that Russian forces are struggling to gain a foothold despite allegations that Russian forces control the settlement.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk on November 3 and 4 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and southeast of Slovyansk.[21]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces likely consolidated positions in northwestern Kostyantynivka. ISW observed evidence of at least eight Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions within a one-kilometer radius in northwestern Kostyantynivka since September 16, indicating that Russian forces consolidated their positions in the area.[22]

Russian forces also recently conducted an infiltration mission in northwestern Kostyantynivka, as evidenced by geolocated footage published on November 2.[23] The Russian infiltrators likely moved from the south, as ISW observed at least 12 Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions in the area to the south of the infiltration point, suggesting a high level of Russian activity in the area.

Russian forces conducted the most offensive operations theater-wide in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on November 3 and 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted 24 assaults in the Kostyantynivka direction between November 3 and 4, the most assaults recorded across the theater on those days.[24] Ukrainian General Staff data from November 3 and 4 also indicates that Russian forces decreased attacks in neighboring Dobropillya direction, where Russian forces had previously concentrated their assaults since at least August 1, 2026.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on November 3 and 4 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on November 4.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 3 and 4 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Orikhiv.[27]

The death toll from Russia's November 2 strike against a humanitarian aid station in Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) has risen to at least 40 people. Zelensky reported that the Russian glide bomb strikes against Komyshuvakha killed at least 40 people as of the morning of November 4 and that more than 30 people may still be under the rubble.[28]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 4.

Ukrainian forces recently continued their suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Pantsir air defense systems and a Russian air defense mobile fire group in occupied Crimea on November 3 or overnight on November 3 to 4.[29]

Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine worsened power outages overnight on November 3 to 4. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on November 4 that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged energy infrastructure in Sevastopol and that regional occupation authorities introduced power supply restrictions following Ukrainian strikes.[30] Kherson Oblast occupation energy operator Khersonenergo claimed on November 4 that a technical issue caused an emergency electricity cutoff across occupied Kherson Oblast.[31] A Russian milblogger and a Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed on November 3 and 4 that there were massive energy blackouts and disrupted water supplies and cellular service in Crimea due to damaged infrastructure.[32]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[33]

See topline text for reporting on Russia's long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of November 3 to 4.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/92980

[2] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/13227; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/28486; https://t.me/Taras_Pastukh/2186; https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy.bunechko/posts/pfbid02JYpzrhY862mcYUyt5CiPVBDKiiDdspcbpD2oHexkbTtTyztmd5k8CB3Q1zu62n3sl; https://t.me/odeskaODA/22584?ct=1793821699089; https://www.facebook.com/igorchaikakovel/posts/pfbid02FDCV9NPi6ES5Zvm96vToJoi3aVLnJxrU5cd48RPzTjCjaKaxNSeoFbm6Nqceq91cl; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/8053?ct=1793822724779

[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/68745

[4] https://t.me/arx_spn/31820?ct=1793822135126

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/

[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21643

[7] https://x.com/MinEnergy_ua/status/2118017200065745322?ct=1793822957175

[8] https://t.me/energyofukraine/8216

[9] https://t.me/rybar/84412; https://t.me/rybar/84411

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/;

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2026/

[12] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/39284 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2117894757716295726; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2117880580545077525

[13] https://t.me/ozonmarketplace/3339 ; https://t.me/muratkumpilov/22359

[14]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42800 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38141 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/101505

[15] https://t.me/severnnyi/9834

[16] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1832826844385232 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13376

[17]https://t.me/dva_majors/101505 ; https://t.me/pionergrupa/15353; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/232012 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9834

[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42800 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38141 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20275

[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42800 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20275 ;

[20] https://t.me/grvZapad/20277

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42800 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/57212

[22] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/39235; https://t.me/polk_210/7343; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38870; https://t.me/soniah_hub/18243

[23] https://t.me/liut_npu/2066; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2117644019140292995?a=8P8AQ0PAZS9j0jZjSHk&s=20; ttps://t.me/WarArchive_ua/39235; https://t.me/polk_210/7343;

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42800

[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/

[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42800 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38141

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42800; https://t.me/motopatriot78/57217; https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14501; https://t.me/wargonzo/38141; https://t.me/voin_dv/21903

[28] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21656; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42805

[30] https://t.me/razvozhaev/25002 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/

[31] https://t.me/khersonenergo/10192

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/38149 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/112077 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/112090 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/112096 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/112112 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/112064 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/112081

[33] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/