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6 hours ago
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2026
Assessment as of: 4:30 PM ET
Data Cutoff: 11:15 AM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
Two Ukrainian drones struck the Russian Sparta II cargo ship — a ship that has supported Russian military logistics — in the Gulf of Finland on November 21. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko and Kaliningrad Oblast Governor Alexey Besprozvannykh reported on November 21 that two drones struck the Sparta II while it was en route from St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, to Kaliningrad City, Kaliningrad Oblast, in neutral waters of the Gulf of Finland and roughly three nautical miles (roughly 3.7 kilometers) from Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[1] Geolocated footage published on November 21 shows a fire on the Sparta II following the strikes.[2] Automatic identification system data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that Sparta II was sailing from St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, to Kaliningrad City and that the ship is under US and Ukrainian sanctions as part of logistical infrastructure supporting Russian military activities.[3] A Russian shipping company, Oboronlogistika, that provides logistics services for the Russian Ministry of Defense, owns Sparta II.[4] Russian forces used Sparta II to evacuate military assets, including S-300 air-defense systems, from the port of Tartus, Syria, in Winter 2024-2025.[5]
A Finnish Border Guard officer confirmed that Ukrainian drones struck the Sparta II while it was in Russian territorial waters (likely referring to the area near Russia’s EEZ), and Finnish Defense Forces reported that drones struck the ship in international waters west of Russia’s Gogland Island.[6] Estonian Police and Border Guard Board reported that drones struck the Sparta II when it was in Estonia’s EEZ, but within the area of responsibility of the St. Petersburg Maritime Rescue Center and in shipping lanes open to international vessels.[7] Finnish Border Guards added that the damaged Sparta II drifted from international waters north into Finnish territorial waters after being hit and that Finnish authorities are leading the rescue operations.[8] States’ territorial waters extend for up to 12 nautical miles (about 22 kilometers) from the states’ shoreline, compared to the EEZ, which extends for up to 200 nautical miles (roughly 370 kilometers) from the baseline. States have nearly complete sovereignty and jurisdiction over their territorial waters but no full sovereignty in their EEZ. International vessels can pass through a country’s EEZ because maritime law treats the EEZ as international waters for navigation. Special maritime boundary agreements delimit maritime boundaries through the narrow Gulf of Finland and into the northern Baltic Sea, given many countries share these waters in close proximity.[9]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed temporary localized ceasefires to evacuate Ukrainian civilians from 15 settlements along or near the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts — areas where a ceasefire is possible due to how the geography of the Dnipro River provides a stable frontline that impedes ground operations or forces being directly in contact with each other. Russia and Ukraine conducted a successful humanitarian ceasefire in the Kherson direction to evacuate civilians from occupied Oleshky and nearby settlements in October 2026, and Zelensky proposed cooperation to conduct another such ceasefire to evacuate additional settlements.[10] Zelensky proposed on November 21 temporary localized ceasefires in Radensk, Kostohryzove, Hola Prystan, Stara Zburivka, Nova Zburivka, Hladkivka, Velyki Kopani, Kardashynka, and Velyka Kardashynka in occupied Kherson Oblast and Kamyanske, Verkhnya Krynytsia, Vasylivka, Mayachka, Zlatopil, and Dnirporudne in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Zelensky noted on November 14 that Ukrainian officials had provided the United States with a list of multiple occupied settlements that would benefit from a humanitarian ceasefire but that the Kremlin had rejected those options.[11] The Kremlin has yet to respond to Zelensky’s November 21 proposal as of this writing.


The geography of these settlements is significant, and a ceasefire is only feasible in this limited area of the theater due to how the Dnipro River provides a stable frontline. All 15 settlements are either immediately along the bank of the Dnipro River or the Kakhovka Reservoir, like Oleshky, or within several kilometers south of the Dnipro River in the Russian near rear. A ceasefire to evacuate civilians is feasible in these areas only because the Dnipro River and Kakhovka Reservoir are major water obstacles that prevent active ground fighting across the current lines of control. A ceasefire in these areas would mainly require Russian and Ukrainian forces to agree to stop drone strikes and indirect fire missions across the river and would have minimal bearing on active ground operations.
Ceasefires are inadvisable in areas where the battlefield geography provides no stable frontline, however. The Kremlin previously proposed a ceasefire in Kostyantynivka — a settlement where a ceasefire is not possible because Russian forces do not control the city and because the front line there is not stable.[12] ISW has long assessed that any ceasefire in Ukraine requires a geographically stable and defensible frontline.[13] The geography of the frontline in Donbas does not support a ceasefire at this time.
Senior Kremlin officials continue to make explicit statements outlining Moscow’s ultimate goal to control most of Ukraine, including Kyiv. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated in a recently released documentary for Russian state television channel Channel One (Perviy Kanal) about the Russian Orthodox Church that southeastern Ukraine and most of central Ukraine, including Kyiv City, are “without a doubt traditionally Russian lands.”[14] Lavrov stated that Moscow must achieve its war goals in Ukraine and defeat alleged Russophobia in “the space now called Ukraine.” Such Russian statements are not new. The Kremlin launched a concerted information campaign even prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 that spread the idea that Russia would control most of Ukraine and leave a small rump state in western Ukraine.[15] Senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly publicly resurfaced Russia’s aspirations to control most of Ukraine since then.[16] Moscow has long attempted to justify its 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine with claims that these areas of Ukrainian territory are “traditionally” Russian, and Russian officials have specifically labeled Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa cities as “Russian.”[17] Kremlin officials also repeatedly reference "Novorossiya" — an invented region in Ukraine that Russian officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an “integral” part of Russia.[18] Lavrov’s statement in the documentary, however, covers an even wider swathe of Ukrainian territory than the traditional concept of Novorossiya. ISW has long assessed that one of the reasons Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022 was to regain full control over Ukraine after other efforts to do so had failed.[19] Continued statements from Kremlin officials about Moscow’s unwavering commitment to achieving its expansive war goals are incompatible with reported recent US proposals to end the war.[20]
Key Takeaways:
- Two Ukrainian drones struck the Russian Sparta II cargo ship — a ship that has supported Russian military logistics — in the Gulf of Finland on November 21.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed temporary localized ceasefires to evacuate Ukrainian civilians from 15 settlements along or near the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts — areas where a ceasefire is possible due to how the geography of the Dnipro River provides a stable frontline that impedes ground operations or forces being directly in contact with each other.
- Senior Kremlin officials continue to make explicit statements outlining Moscow’s ultimate goal to control most of Ukraine, including Kyiv.
- Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk, northeast of Lyman, and southeast of Dobropillya.
- Russia launched three ballistic missiles and 148 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
- Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
- Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
- Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces recently conducted a flag raising mission north of Sumy City as part of efforts to falsely claim Russian control over the area. Geolocated footage published on November 21 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag in northern Varachyne after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[21] Russian sources cited the footage to claim that Russian forces control Varachyne.[22] A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka and Sadky (both northeast of Sumy City).[23]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)
A November 21 Russian missile strike against the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam northeast of Kharkiv City likely aims to degrade Ukrainian logistics in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and represents at least the third strike against the dam in the past year. The Kharkiv Oblast Infrastructure Restoration and Development Service reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against a section of the T-21-11 Chuhuiv-Velykyi Burluk highway on the night of November 20 to 21, causing suspension of traffic across the dam.[24] Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against the dam in April 2026 and a missile strike in December 2025.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russian strikes against the dam very likely aim to degrade Ukrainian ground lines of communication supplying the Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk directions both by flooding the area south of the dam and degrading the road on top of it.[26] The strikes are part of Russia’s battlefield air interdiction campaign that aims to facilitate subsequent Russian advances by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline defenses.
Russian forces recently expanded their infiltration zone northeast of Kharkiv City. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 21 that Russian forces control Mala Vovcha (east of Vovchansk) and most of Hrafske (southwest of Vovchansk).[27] Russian presence in these settlements indicates that Russian forces have infiltrated Mala Vovcha through Rybalkyne (north of Mala Vovcha along the international border) and Hrafske through Prylipka (north of Hrafske) and Lyman (northeast of Hrafske).
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Velykyi Burluk roughly 12 kilometers from the nearest assessed Russian advances. Geolocated footage published on November 21 shows Russian servicemembers operating in central Rohozyanka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk, taking advantage of inclement weather to facilitate Russian mechanized assaults. Russian forces recently advanced west of Kamyanka, according to geolocated footage published on November 21, which shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian MT-LB armored personnel carrier in the area.[29] A Ukrainian military source reported on November 21 that Russian forces took advantage of adverse weather conditions to break through Ukrainian defenses.[30] Inclement weather, such as fog, strong wind, and rain, creates poor flight conditions for Ukrainian drone operations and decreases visibility, increasing the time it takes for Ukrainian drone operators to detect Russian mechanized assaults. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated a capability to maintain a very short sensor-to-strike delay even in adverse weather, suggesting that the purpose of Russian mechanized assaults in these weather conditions is to rapidly advance further into the kill zone rather than to move undetected. Adverse weather also decreases the number of Ukrainian reconnaissance drones operating simultaneously in the air, potentially allowing Russian forces to draw available Ukrainian reconnaissance assets to advancing Russian armored vehicles and simultaneously conduct infiltration missions using small infantry groups elsewhere.
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on November 21 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[31]
Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Ivanivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 20 that shows a Ukrainian strike against a Russian armored vehicle in the area.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River east of Slovyansk on November 20 and 21 but did not advance.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in northern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 19, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya direction reported on November 21 that Russian forces seized Bilytske and use the settlement along with Pokrovsk and Rodynske (both southeast of Dobropillya) as a staging area for assaults toward Dobropillya.[35]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian air defense systems in occupied Donetsk Oblast. A unit of the Ukrainian National Guard published footage on November 21 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[36]
Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)
A Ukrainian military source reported on November 20 that Ukrainian forces advanced toward Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka) from the west and north.[37]
Russian forces recently conducted two infiltration missions south and southwest of Oleksandrivka. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in central Ostapivske (south of Oleksandrivka) and southwest of Ternuvate (southwest of Oleksandrivka), according to geolocated footage published on November 17 and 19, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 20 and 21 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Hulyaipole direction.[39]

See topline text for reporting on Ukraine's humanitarian ceasefire proposal in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground operations in the Kherson direction on November 21.
Russian and Ukrainian officials are providing an additional assessment of the damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge following Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara stated that the debris from the automobile section of the Kerch bridge has obstructed the maritime passage through the Kerch Strait.[40] Khmara stated that it will take Russian authorities between several months and a year to repair the damaged structure. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Nikitin claimed on November 21 that rail traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge has resumed and is operating as usual.[41] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on November 21 that Russian forces had struck Ukrainian bridges 109 times before Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge, contrary to Russian claims that Ukrainian strikes against the bridge were a major escalation.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[42]
Russian forces launched three ballistic missiles and 148 drones (including 87 jet-powered drones) against Ukraine overnight on November 20 to 21.[43] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 21 that Russian forces struck a civilian area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing two people, including a child, and injuring 58 people, including six children.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces struck the Kryvyi Rih Thermal Power Plant in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight on November 20 to 21.[45]
Russian forces deployed the new Filin small cruise missile as part of their recent strike package. A Ukrainian border detachment reported on November 21 that Ukrainian forces intercepted the new Russian Filin small cruise missile over Chernihiv Oblast.[46] The detachment reported that Filin is a small surface-to-surface cruise missile capable of flying at very low altitudes. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate previously reported that Russian forces began using Filin missiles in late summer 2026.[47] The Russian deployment of Filin and other small cruise missiles is part of Russia’s continued focus on production of scalable and more cost-effective ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that are difficult for Ukrainian forces to intercept at scale, bridging the gap between cheap one-way attack drones and expensive cruise missiles.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/13336; https://t.me/besprozvannih/6750?ct=1795284866942
[2] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8426
[3] https://war-sanctions.gur.gov dot ua/en/transport/ships; https://ofac.treasury dot gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/russian-harmful-foreign-activities-sanctions
[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-cargo-vessel-struck-by-drones-finland-says-it-is-fire-its-waters-2026-11-21/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-27/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2024/
[6] https://yle dot fi/a/74-20258273; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-cargo-vessel-struck-by-drones-finland-says-it-is-fire-its-waters-2026-11-21/
[7] https://news.err dot ee/1610202715/russian-cargo-ship-on-fire-in-gulf-of-finland-after-reported-drone-strike
[8] https://news.err dot ee/1610202715/russian-cargo-ship-on-fire-in-gulf-of-finland-after-reported-drone-strike
[9] https://faolex.fao dot org/en/documents/LEX-FAOC022312/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-republic-of-finland-est-1996; https://www.ecolex dot org/details/treaty/agreement-between-the-republic-of-finland-and-the-kingdom-of-sweden-on-the-delimitation-of-the-boundary-between-the-continental-shelf-and-fishery-zone-of-finland-and-the-economic-zone-of-sweden-and-the-northern-baltic-sea-tre-152664/; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/47886
[10] https://suspilne dot media/1455848-zelenskij-nazvav-timcasovo-okupovani-naseleni-punkti-evakuaciu-z-akih-proponue-ukraina/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-importance-of-ukraines-fortress-belt-geospatial-intelligence-terrain-analysis/
[14] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2165530/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_13-10/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_13-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_22-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-11/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-7/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-11/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-7/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-11/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-occupied-ukraine-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-december-4-2025/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/weakness-is-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-the-war-must-end/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2026/
[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13510; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/23413; https://t.me/Osintpen/3841
[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/234198; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/23413
[23] https://t.me/severnnyi/9989; https://t.me/wargonzo/38540
[24] https://www.facebook.com/100071551149706/posts/1166805649047796/?rdid=6qFrNAxG8LBEknXk#; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1455740-ruh-pecenizkou-dambou-na-harkivsini-perekrili-cerez-raketnij-udar-marsrut-obizdu/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/
[27] https://t.me/severnnyi/9989
[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13506; https://t.me/hisnikii/2377; https://t.me/Osintpen/3842
[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13509; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/5348
[30] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14569
[31] https://t.me/grvZapad/20420
[32] https://x.com/Vlad_23456/status/2123865939145830437; https://t.me/ab3army/7672
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42961; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42958
[34] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2123849408290975944; https://t.me/BatalionOfficial/1293
[35] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1455618-vikoristovuut-tanki-rosijska-armia-ponovila-mehanizovani-sturmi-dobropilla-naviso/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwwL57UrNxM&t=2s
[36] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2012484106092753; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/na-donechchyni-lasar-group-znyshhyv-pantsyr/
[37] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14567
[38] https://www.facebook.com/groups/541007968010235/posts/1356609089783448/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13504; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13505; https://t.me/BBS_110/788
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42961 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42958 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38540 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/22125
[40] https://suspilne dot media/1455842-zelenskij-poskodzenna-krimskogo-mostu-na-misica-zablokue-sudnoplavstvo-v-kercenskij-protoci/ ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1455850-rosii-znadobitsa-kilka-misaciv-sob-pidnati-poskodzeni-konstrukcii-mostu-cerez-kercensku-protoku-hmara/
[41] https://ria dot ru/20261121/most-2133120665.html
[42] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[43] https://t.me/kpszsu/97974
[44] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2124094793089175687
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/69201
[46] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1169599276012109
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/