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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2026
Assessment as of: 8:45 PM ET
Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to use the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit to posture Russia as a superpower and to secure US and Chinese support for his maximalist and unchanged demands to end his war in Ukraine. Putin held a bilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump and a trilateral meeting with Trump and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping on November 19 during the summit.[1] Trump and several Russian officials noted that the war in Ukraine was a central topic of both meetings.[2] Putin reiterated his commitment to his long-standing war goals in Ukraine during a press conference after the trilateral meeting.[3]
Putin agreed with comparisons between his meeting with Trump and Xi and the 1945 Yalta Conference — the meeting where the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union planned the defeat of Nazi Germany and negotiated changes to postwar Europe.[4] Putin stated that the 1945 Yalta Conference codified the Allies’ victory over Nazism and suggested that the trilateral meeting at the 2026 APEC Summit could similarly codify the victory over “neo-Nazism.” Putin also claimed that the Yalta Conference did not divide the world into spheres of influence but rather simply codified “the realities” that emerged after the Second World War. Putin has long falsely accused Ukraine of promoting the neo-Nazi ideology and used these allegations as a pretext for his aggression against Ukraine.[5] Putin attempted to draw false parallels between the trilateral meeting at the APEC summit and the Yalta Conference in order to present Russia, the United States, and the People’s Republic of China as undeniably equal superpowers that can decide how to end the war in Ukraine and divide the world into spheres of influence.
Putin also used his November 19 press conference to make false claims that Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity in 2014 was a “military coup” that forced him to launch the full-scale invasion in 2022.[6] Putin claimed that he “did not start any war at all” and only tried to resolve an existing internal political crisis. Putin has repeatedly used the Revolution of Dignity to falsely portray Russia as a defender and not the aggressor in his war and to justify demands for regime change in Ukraine.[7]
Putin again used non-existent agreements from the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit to distract from the Kremlin’s persistent refusal to take any meaningful steps towards peace in Ukraine. Putin claimed at the press conference at APEC that he previously accepted “compromises” that US negotiators proposed during bilateral US-Russia talks in Anchorage.[8] Putin claimed that responsibility now lies with Ukraine and Europe to agree to these undefined “compromises.” No public agreements emerged from the summit, but reporting indicates that Moscow did not agree to any compromises at the Anchorage Summit.[9] Kremlin demands at the Anchorage Summit included Ukraine’s withdrawal from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Ukrainian neutrality — the same demands the Kremlin issued in 2022.[10] Kremlin mouthpieces often invoke Anchorage to claim that the United States had already agreed to Russia’s preferred way to end the war while cloaking the Kremlin’s role as the single obstacle to peace in Ukraine.[11] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly confirmed in June and July 2026 that there was no agreement between Russia and the United States in Anchorage.[12]
Putin continued attempts to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable, such that Ukraine should capitulate to Russia’s demands now, despite ample evidence that Russia’s battlefield performance has been steadily declining. Putin claimed at the press conference at APEC that Ukraine and Europe need to realize that it is better to agree to Russia’s “compromises” now than to face the “realities” later.[13] Putin further claimed that discussions about territorial issues must proceed from a place of “reality” and that there is “no point” in Ukraine holding on to the remaining 10 percent of Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces allegedly do not occupy. Putin’s claims about Russian successes on the battlefield are divorced from reality, however. Russian high-ranking military commanders routinely present exaggerated advances as part of Russia’s systematic cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray Russian forces as making sweeping advances and Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapse.[14]

Russian forces are failing to achieve their battlefield objectives in reality, and Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2026 have defeated the planned Russian offensive to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast — Putin’s main objective since 2022.[15] Ukrainian forces maintain control of just over 20 percent of Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces have only managed to seize 203 square kilometers (or 0.77 percent) of the oblast since January 2026. Russian forces have also suffered over 420,000 casualties across the theater in 2026, while making net territorial losses for several months of the year.[16] Putin is attempting to portray “10 percent” of Donetsk Oblast as a small amount of territory left that Ukraine will imminently lose, despite the fact that Russian forces have failed to seize even one percent of Donetsk Oblast throughout all of 2026. The remaining 20 percent of Donetsk Oblast that Ukrainian forces control makes up Ukraine’s Fortress Belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions and that Russian forces have tried and failed to seize numerous times since 2014.[17] Russian forces currently have no means of rapidly enveloping, penetrating, or otherwise seizing the Fortress Belt or the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge for the third time in three days, demonstrating the effectiveness of Ukraine’s systematic suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Bridge with Neptune coastal missiles overnight on November 18 to 19, damaging the railway track.[18] This marks the third strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge in three days and follows Ukrainian strikes that completely collapsed the automobile section of the bridge.[19] Ukrainian forces have been conducting a systematic SEAD/DEAD campaign in occupied Crimea, occupied southern Ukraine, Rostov Oblast, and Krasnodar Krai, including strikes against surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, Russian mobile fire groups, and radar systems, in order to degrade Russian air defense capabilities ahead of the strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge.[20]
Ukraine’s strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have cascading effects on Russian logistics into Crimea and potentially on frontline operations, despite Putin’s false claims that the bridge only serves civilian purposes. Putin claimed at the APEC summit that the Kerch Strait Bridge is a “purely civilian facility” and that Russian forces have not used it to transport military equipment, ammunition, or oil and petroleum products.[21] Russian forces have used the bridge for military transport and continue to rely on the bridge to maintain their occupation of Crimea.[22] The destruction of the automobile section and damage to the rail section will force Russia to rely more on the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway that runs along the southern coast of occupied Ukraine in order to supply Crimea and support Russia’s southern force grouping.[23] Ukrainian forces are simultaneously heavily striking the M-14 highway, further complicating this effort.[24] Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Bridge are part of a wider campaign to degrade Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the entire theater.
The Kremlin is again using Ukrainian strikes to falsely paint Ukraine — not Russia — as the obstacle to peace. Putin claimed that there will be no negotiations following the latest Ukrainian strike on the Kerch Strait Bridge despite calls for a ceasefire at sea or a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure.[25] Putin also stated that Russian forces would now retaliate for the strikes on the bridge, despite the fact that Russian forces have been striking major bridges across the Dnipro River in Ukraine for weeks.[26] Putin has rejected every Ukrainian offer for a large-scale ceasefire since Zelensky first offered an opportunity to do so in March 2025.[27] Putin has also rejected moratoriums on long-range strikes.[28] The Kremlin has long stated that it would not accept any frontline ceasefire until a war termination agreement is finalized.[29]
Russian efforts to use Ukrainian strikes — both real and claimed — to stop peace processes are not new. The Kremlin has used specific Ukrainian strikes to justify Russia’s unwillingness to negotiate.[30] The Kremlin’s latest attempt to use Ukrainian strikes to refuse to negotiate comes as Russian forces are escalating their long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. Putin’s rejections of strikes ceasefires come as he continues to double down on a new theory of victory that relies on Russia’s long-range strike campaign to coerce Ukraine into capitulation.[31] Putin’s efforts to portray Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge as escalatory aim to distract from the Kremlin’s own continued unwillingness to negotiate an end to the war.
Putin again rejected European security guarantees for post-war Ukraine at the APEC summit, as the Coalition of the Willing met in Berlin, Germany on November 19. Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner stated on November 19 that he and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff attended a Coalition of the Willing meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, and coalition member states’ national security advisors.[32] Trump called into the meeting to update the coalition on his conversations with Xi and Putin.[33] Kushner stated that NATO will be a central pillar in the coalition’s work on a settlement to end the war in Ukraine.[34] Zelensky and Kushner both noted that the coalition’s meeting focused on credible security guarantees for Ukraine.[35] Putin reiterated on the same day his longstanding position that the introduction of any foreign troops to Ukraine as part of post-war security guarantees — which the coalition began discussing in March 2025 — is unacceptable to Russia.[36]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to use the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit to posture Russia as a superpower and to secure US and Chinese support for his maximalist and unchanged demands to end his war in Ukraine.
- Putin again used non-existent agreements from the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit to distract from the Kremlin’s persistent refusal to take any meaningful steps towards peace in Ukraine.
- Putin continued attempts to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable, such that Ukraine should capitulate to Russia’s demands now, despite ample evidence that Russia’s battlefield performance has been steadily declining.
- Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge for the third time in three days, demonstrating the effectiveness of Ukraine’s systematic suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign.
- Ukraine’s strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have cascading effects on Russian logistics into Crimea and potentially on frontline operations, despite Putin’s false claims that the bridge only serves civilian purposes.
- The Kremlin is again using Ukrainian strikes to falsely paint Ukraine — not Russia — as the obstacle to peace.
- Putin again rejected European security guarantees for post-war Ukraine at the APEC summit, as the Coalition of the Willing met in Berlin, Germany on November 19.
- Russia launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles and 98 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in the Republic of Tatarstan.
- Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Oleksandrivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
- Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
- Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
- Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces recently struck oil infrastructure in the Republic of Tatarstan. Russian opposition source Astra reported on November 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the Kaleikino oil pumping station near Almetyevsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,072 kilometers from the international border) — one of Russia’s key oil pipeline stations in the Transneft-Prikamye pipeline system.[37] Geolocated footage published on November 18 shows the moment and the aftermath of the Ukrainian strike.[38] Liliya Galimova, the spokesperson for the government of the Republic of Tatarstan, acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck oil storage tanks near Almetyevsk on the morning of November 19.[39]
Geolocated footage confirmed a recent Ukrainian strike against a facility housing Russian long-range strike drone operators in Rostov Oblast. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian Neptune cruise missile strike against a hotel housing Russian drone operators in eastern Millerovo, Rostov Oblast (roughly 180 kilometers from the frontline).[40] Russian forces regularly use Millerovo as a launch hub for Russian long-range strike drones.[41]
The Ukrainian General Staff provided updated battlefield damage assessments of recent Ukrainian strikes against two road bridges in Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 19 that Ukraine’s November 14 and 15 strikes damaged the road surface of a road bridge across the Mius River in Taganrog Raion and a road bridge in Lakedemonovka Raion.[42]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 18 and 19 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[43]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian command posts in northern Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian 8th Corps operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on November 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the command post for the 2nd Battalion of the Russian 145th Naval Infantry Regiment (810th Naval Infantry Brigade, Black Sea Fleet) with High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), killing more than 20 Russian servicemembers, a majority of whom were officers.[44]
Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed on November 18 that elements of the Russian 16th Separate Electronic Warfare Brigade (Moscow Military District) are operating in Russia’s border regions — the first time ISW has observed evidence of this unit operating near the frontline.[45]
Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Kharkiv City. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 18 that Russian forces control most of Hrafske, indicating that Russian forces recently infiltrated into areas north and northeast of Hrafske.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[47]
Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[48]
A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on November 19 that Russian forces continued offensive operations within and northeast of Borova, but ISW did not observe evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[49]
The Ukrainian General Staff provided updated battlefield damage assessments of Ukraine’s November 15 strike against a road bridge in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 19 that the Ukrainian strike damaged the roadbed of a road bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River near Pryshyb (roughly 82 kilometers from the frontline).[50]
Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.
Russian forces continued offensive operations near, northeast of, and southeast of Lyman on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and east of Slovyansk and east of Kramatorsk on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[52]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southwest of Druzhkivka. A Russian servicemember assaulted two Ukrainian servicemembers in central Novohryhorivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 18, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission north of Dobropillya. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 18 that Russian forces maintain positions in Vesele Pole, indicating that Russian forces infiltrated into the settlement on a prior date.[54]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on November 19.
Both Ukrainian and Russian forces advanced southeast of Oleksandrivka. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Vesele, according to geolocated footage published on November 18.[55] A Ukrainian military source reported on November 18 that there is a limited presence of small Russian infantry groups in Vesele but noted that Ukrainian forces promptly detect and destroy these groups, such that they struggle to consolidate positions in the settlement.[56] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian mechanized vehicle and a motorized vehicle north of Kalynivske (southeast of Oleksandrivka), according to geolocated footage published on November 18, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northwest of Hulyaipole on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[58]
Russian forces continued limited offensive northwest and west of Orikhiv on November 18 and 19, as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks southeast of Orikhiv.[59]
Russian forces recently attempted to advance to an island in the Dnipro River Basin. Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed several Russian servicemembers attempting to gain a foothold on an island northeast of Hola Prystan (southwest of Kherson City) on a boat, according to geolocated footage published on November 19.[60]

See topline text for further reporting on recent Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[61]
Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles and 98 drones (including 61 jet-powered drones) against Ukraine overnight on November 18 to 19.[62]
Russian forces continued to heavily target Ukrainian energy infrastructure, causing power outages in several Ukrainian oblasts. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on November 19 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts and emergency shutdowns in Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[63] Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi reported that Russian forces struck electrical substations in Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts and agricultural enterprises in four unspecified oblasts on the night of November 18 to 19.[64]
Russian drone debris fell on the territories of the Dutch and Austrian embassies in Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported on November 19 that Russian drone debris fell on the territory of both embassies, causing some limited damage to the embassies and nearby vehicles.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.google.com/goto?url=CAESoQEBxCJF11X3jPVcB4j-DMdZ0WxIcAinCHXDgMRa5v6oMJO-PMrzX_zwsxg-rf5XFB57GL20nh4mP4dKFTj3xJdbL_xTCLIMZ9SKllsX_6DOl4Bra4d_VLB0iPpngLGh1Tr4X_w8Kr9QOmVT7_caoKd30yx_Ld5PRt3LgmKrtj5KDRUd-2-pqNqVL42S0ppO2al4CYuhTTd9SNRKFB05HTXZhA&gsessionid=BRQVAgDJj631648yErLJFXSjFpGDm90Nt38CsJJLHefZJDUaiuDKEw
[2] https://www.vesti dot ru/ns/na-dvukhstoronnej-vstreche-putin-i-tramp-obsudili-konflikt-na-ukraine ; https://suspilne dot media/1454807-u-kremli-zaavili-so-pid-cas-zustrici-trampa-i-putina-tema-ukraini-bula-odnieu-z-golovnih/ ; https://t.me/bazabazon/50922 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/101584 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305 ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/live-blog/trump-xi-putin-nuclear-ukraine-congress-2026-live-updates-rcna610150 ; https://abcnews.com/Politics/trump-china-trip-iran-ukraine-peace-declaration-takeaways/story?id=138292154
[3] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305
[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_18-21/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-12/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-2/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2025/
[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-8/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2025/
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025/ ; https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit ; http://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/ ; https://www.ft.com/content/6b0b4912-9438-4de0-aebe-2a8dd804cbab ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025/ ; https://archive.ph/A0AqV ; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/putins-demand-ukraine-give-up-donbas-no-nato-no-western-troops-sources-say-2025-08-21/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-4/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://www.c-span.org/program/news-conference/secretary-of-state-rubio-speaks-with-reporters-in-bahrain/681714 ; https://tass dot com/world/2151517 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/
[13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russia/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42945
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[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2026/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42805 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/9587 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2026/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/11/16/znyshhennya-rls-abo-ppo-lyshe-predtecha-do-urazhennya-bilsh-vazhlyvyh-obyektiv-u-vms-prokomentuvaly-udary-po-krymu/
[21] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2026/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2026/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/
[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2026/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2025/
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/
[32] https://x.com/jaredkushner/status/2123319813883748586?a=8814XXfVpFepZQZkGys&s=20 ; https://x.com/jaredkushner/status/2123538056275783718
[33] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2123517012739862634?a=RQufUPLzmEgXzrRe9lE&s=20
[34] https://x.com/jaredkushner/status/2123538056275783718
[35] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2123517012739862634?a=RQufUPLzmEgXzrRe9lE&s=20 ; https://x.com/jaredkushner/status/2123538056275783718?a=wsRpkctYHHL5XU2EZWE&s=20
[36] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81305 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025/
[37] https://t.me/astrapress/131508
[38] https://x.com/Magyargeo56/status/2123309345341329872; https://t.me/supernova_plus/63223 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/63215
[39] https://rt dot rbc.ru/tatarstan/freenews/6afe95b03bcf696184fe9c3b ; https://ria dot ru/20261119/tatarstan-2132585268.html
[40] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13742; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13713; https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/247
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/
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[43]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42942; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42939; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/50136; https://t.me/rybar/84772
[44] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1457136339167422; https://t.me/kuaairbome8/1416
[45] https://t.me/red_war_machina/1259
[46] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14560
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42942; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42939
[48]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42942; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42939; https://t.me/wargonzo/38482; https://t.me/severnnyi/9974; https://t.me/grvZapad/20394
[49] https://t.me/grvZapad/20394; https://t.me/wargonzo/38482
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42945
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42942; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42939; https://t.me/wargonzo/38482; https://t.me/grvZapad/20394; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/50179
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42942; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42939; https://t.me/wargonzo/38482;
[53] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2123078155611377764; https://t.me/rus_alania/203
[54] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14561
[55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13487; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/3175
[56] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14561
[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13489; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CDj9wEqr4/
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42942 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42939; https://t.me/voin_dv/22106
[59]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42942 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42939 ; https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14560 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38482 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38482
[60] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2123401456019771400; https://t.me/usbu_kherson/529
[61] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[62] https://t.me/kpszsu/97342
[63] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5653
[64] https://t.me/Koretskyi_official/1179
[65] https://t.me/Ukraine_MFA/11129 ; https://t.me/Ukraine_MFA/11128 ; https://t.me/Ukraine_MFA/11132