Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10, 2026

Assessment as of: 10:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:45 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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The Kremlin is attempting to center the ongoing US-Russia-Ukraine trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi around significant changes to the European security architecture — an effort to revive its 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO about rolling back NATO's presence in Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on November 10 that it is "absolutely reasonable" to first negotiate the future of the European security architecture and only then move to resolving the war in Ukraine.[1] An unspecified source in the Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi similarly claimed on November 10 that the settlement of the war in Ukraine is "only one point" in a larger discussion on security architecture and is "subordinated" to the main goal of reshaping Europe's “comprehensive” and “indivisible” security architecture.[2] Russian statements about the European security architecture refer to Russia's December 2021 demands that NATO halt new weapons and military personnel deployments to NATO states that joined the alliance after 1997, essentially giving Russia a veto on NATO policy and restricting states’ sovereign choices to join NATO.[3] The Kremlin recently renewed its original 2021 demands of NATO, contradicting Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner's statements in recent days that each country must retain its sovereignty and authority over its security and alliances following peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine and that NATO will remain central to European collective defense.[4]

The Kremlin has repeatedly tried to justify its war against Ukraine by falsely claiming that the possibility of NATO expansion to include Ukraine threatened Russian security. The Kremlin has long alleged that NATO expansion was one of the “root causes” of the war that peace talks must resolve.[5] Neither NATO nor Ukraine, in fact, took any meaningful action towards bringing Ukraine into NATO between 2008 and 2022, however.[6] NATO has never presented a threat to Russian security, but Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 to break NATO and Western unity, as ISW has long assessed.[7] The Kremlin’s long-running cognitive warfare campaign falsely blaming NATO and Ukraine for threatening Russian sovereignty aims to justify Russian efforts to reassert control over former Soviet states and does not reflect a genuine Russian concern for its security.

US, Ukrainian, and European officials publicly agreed on the need for credible post-war security guarantees for Ukraine and the involvement of European officials in future multilateral negotiations to end the war in Ukraine — conditions that the Kremlin has repeatedly and explicitly rejected. US, Ukrainian, and European officials held trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi wherein they agreed on the need for credible security guarantees for Ukraine and the involvement of European officials in future multilateral negotiations to end the war.[8] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Kushner emphasized on November 9 and 10 that a lasting settlement to the war requires durable post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, future involvement of European officials in peace negotiations, and direct engagement between Russia and European officials on broader geopolitical security arrangements.[9] Several Western media outlets reported on November 9 and 10 that US officials asked the Kremlin if it would accept NATO-style Article 4 and Article 5 security guarantees for Ukraine from the United States and NATO that would allow Ukraine to request consultations with NATO states when Ukraine's territorial integrity is under threat and to receive assistance from the alliance in the event of a future attack.[10]

Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the idea of Western security guarantees for Ukraine since 2025 and the possibility of European officials having a seat at the negotiating table so long as the European position falls short of fully embracing Russia's maximalist demands.[11] Lavrov claimed on November 10 that US meetings with European representatives in Abu Dhabi are not a "promising approach" to negotiations.[12] Russian State Duma Deputy Alexander Asafov stated on November 10 that Russia's expectations for the Abu Dhabi talks are "quite modest" and claimed that European participation in the talks could "paralyze" negotiations before they even begin.[13] These statements are consistent with Moscow’s explicit rejections in previous weeks of European participation in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine and go against US, Ukrainian, and European statements in favor of including European officials in future peace talks.[14]

Reported proposals to redraw the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to allow Russia to claim that it seized all of the Donbas region and compel Russia to accept a deal to end the war neglect Moscow's wider territorial aims in Ukraine that go far beyond these two oblasts. The Economist reported on November 9 that US negotiators recently proposed that Ukraine change the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as part of a territorial agreement between Russia and Ukraine such that Russia could claim full control of the two regions without Ukraine surrendering the remaining territory of Donbas that it currently holds.[15] The reported proposal suggests that the new oblast borders would correspond to the territory in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that Russian forces have seized, although it is unclear what legal status the Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts would have. Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated, however, that his territorial ambitions in Ukraine go far beyond Donbas.[16] Russia illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts in September 2022, and the Kremlin has long conditioned Russian society to expect Russia’s illegal annexation of these parts of Ukraine to be permanent.[17] Russian officials also regularly claim that "Novorossiya" — an amorphous invented region in southern and eastern Ukraine — is an integral part of Russia.[18] Novorossiya notably includes not only occupied Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed, but also the Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[19]

Putin and the Russian military command have created a false reality based on exaggerated claims of sweeping advances across the frontline such that the Kremlin would likely try to exploit any discussion of redrawing administrative borders based on the frontline to serve Russia's interest. Senior Russian military and political officials regularly make blatantly false claims of Russian advances on the frontline, often as far as tens of kilometers from the observed frontline.[20] Putin notably claimed on September 2 that Russian forces had seized Svyatohirsk (14 kilometers northwest of Lyman), despite Ukrainian counterattacks having pushed the frontline over 20 kilometers east of the settlement.[21] A leaked Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) map from April 2026 also demonstrated that the Russian military command has a severely distorted view of the frontline, with claims of Russian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast far beyond even the furthest claims from Russian milbloggers at that time.[22] The Russian MoD has also made several false claims in recent months about the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast, despite providing no evidence to support the claims.[23] These exaggerations are a part of a broader cognitive warfare effort that aims to convince the West to force Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands.[24] Such a vast disconnect between the true battlefield realities and Russian official claims about the frontline would complicate any attempt to redraw the administrative boundaries of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and would risk Moscow claiming it holds more territory than it does in reality.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is attempting to center the ongoing US-Russia-Ukraine trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi around significant changes to the European security architecture - an effort to revive its 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO about rolling back NATO's presence in Europe.
• The Kremlin has repeatedly tried to justify its war against Ukraine by falsely claiming that the possibility of NATO expansion to include Ukraine threatened Russian security.
• US, Ukrainian, and European officials publicly agreed on the need for credible post-war security guarantees for Ukraine and the involvement of European officials in future multilateral negotiations to end the war in Ukraine — conditions that the Kremlin has repeatedly and explicitly rejected.
• Reported proposals to redraw the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to allow Russia to claim that it seized all of the Donbas region and compel Russia to accept a deal to end the war neglect Moscow's wider territorial aims in Ukraine that go far beyond these two oblasts.
• Putin and the Russian military command have created a false reality based on exaggerated claims of sweeping advances across the frontline such that the Kremlin would likely try to exploit any discussion of redrawing administrative borders based on the frontline to serve Russia's interest.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on November 10.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian aviation capabilities on the night of November 9 to 10. Russian forces launched 162 drones (including 96 jet-powered) and one Iskander-M ballistic missile against Ukraine overnight on November 9 to 10 and launched 155 drones (including 97 jet-powered), two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and an unspecified number of S8000 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions against Ukraine during the day on November 10.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces are diversifying their long-range platforms for strikes against Russia, which will likely cause a resource allocation dilemma for Russian forces as they have to prioritize between counter-drone and missile defense investments. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces intercepted four Ukrainian AGM-188 Rusty Dagger cruise missiles on the night of November 9 to 10.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used Rusty Dagger missiles in strikes against a Russian defense industrial enterprise in Voronezh Oblast on June 22, 2026.[26] Data from a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 10 successful strikes using Neptune, FP-5 Flamingo, and Storm Shadow cruise missiles in September and October 2026, compared to five successful cruise missile strikes in July and August 2026.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces used Neptune cruise missiles to strike the Kamensky Plant in Rostov Oblast on October 31 and the Proton-Electrotex Plant in Oryol City on the night of November 6 to 7.[28]  The increasingly successful Ukrainian cruise missile strikes indicate that Ukrainian forces are more effectively exploiting the gaps in Russian air defenses resulting from Ukraine’s continuous suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign. The diversification of Ukraine’s strike platforms additionally requires Russian forces to be prepared to contend with a broader range of strike vehicles, forcing them to deploy both counter-drone and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems across a broader geographical area. Deployment of a wider range of strike vehicles complicates Russian detection, tracking, and interception efforts and reduces the predictability of Ukrainian strike patterns. Enterprises that have already invested in counter-drone defenses will face challenges defending against cruise missile strikes and will have to commit new resources to defend against this growing missile threat.

Ukrainian forces struck military aviation infrastructure in Russia that supports Russian Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft on the night of November 9 to 10 as part of efforts to degrade Russia's ability to defend against Ukrainian cruise missile strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian 123rd Aircraft Repair Plant in Staraya Russa, Novgorod Oblast (roughly 640 kilometers from the international border), causing a fire.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the repair plant serves as a repair, service, and modernization site for Russian military aircraft, including the A-50 AEW&C aircraft. Ukrainian strikes have strained Russia's limited number of AEW&C aircraft that provide airspace surveillance and early detection of airborne threats, including Ukrainian cruise missile strikes against Russia. [30]

Ukraine's ongoing long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries continues to degrade Russia's domestic refining capacity and constrain Russia's ability to satisfy its domestic market needs. Ukrainian strikes since late October 2026 have reduced Russia's oil refining capacity by approximately 30 percent, according to two industry sources speaking to Reuters.[31] The sources stated that Russia’s refining capacity fell from approximately 930,000 tons of oil per day to just 700,000 tons of oil per day by the end of October 2026 and estimated that the reduction in crude oil processing could be up to 200,000 tons of oil per day.[32] Ukrainian forces struck at least 13 Russian oil refineries from October 1 to November 10.[33] Russian opposition source Astra reported on November 9 that Russian-state owned oil company Rosneft reintroduced fuel sales restrictions of 50 liters per vehicle and 20 liters per container at Rosneft gas stations in Moscow City amidst the renewed Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian oil refineries.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions southeast of Sumy City. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on November 10 that Russian and Ukrainian forces are fighting in Pokrovka and Novodmytrivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in both settlements, contrary to previous Russian claims.[35]

Ukrainian forces refuted exaggerated claims from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) about recent Russian advances northeast of Sumy City. The Russian MoD claimed on November 10 that elements of the Russian Northern GoF seized Mykilske.[36] The Russian Northern GoF credited elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Mykilske.[37] The Ukrainian 8th Airborne Assault Corps stated that the Russian MoD's claim is false and that Ukrainian forces control the settlement.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City and limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 9 and 10 but did not advance.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian forces are concentrating offensive efforts north of Kupyansk near Radkivka, Kindrashivka, and Holubivka.[40]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area on November 10, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[41]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations north and northeast of Lyman on November 9 and 10 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast and southeast of Lyman.[42]

Russian forces are attempting to accumulate infantry in the Lyman direction to cross the Zherebets River and reestablish positions on its western bank, which Ukrainian forces liberated during Operation Vivaldi. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on November 10 that Russian forces are accumulating infantry in the area and are attempting to cross the Zherebets River to regain the positions that Ukrainian forces liberated during Operation Vivaldi.[43] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are struggling to accumulate forces due to insufficient foliage for concealment and Ukraine’s complete fire control over the few remaining crossings across the Zherebets River. The spokesperson and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) reported that Russian forces are trying to use aviation to strike Ukrainian crossings over the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the area.[44] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukraine’s offensive operations in the Lyman direction have not ended yet and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to shrink the Russian bridgehead at the junction of the Lyman direction with the Slovyansk direction.[45] Russian forces may try to use this forested area east and southeast of Yampil, between the Siverskyi Donets River to the south and the Zherebets River to the north, as a staging ground for infiltration missions towards Lyman and a foothold to support future Russian efforts to cross the river.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Slovyansk and east of Kramatorsk on November 9 and 10 but did not advance.[46] A Ukrainian military source reported on November 10 that Russian forces are close to seizing Rai-Oleksandrivka and that the northwestern part of the settlement is a contested "gray zone."[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently consolidated positions west of Kostyantynivka and conducted infiltration missions in the town itself. Geolocated footage published on November 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions east of Dovha Balka (west of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian forces likely consolidated positions in an area where they previously conducted infiltration missions.[48] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in central Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 9, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[49] A Ukrainian military source reported on November 9 that the dense urban terrain and Russia's extensive use of infiltration tactics complicate efforts to identify the exact locations of Russian and Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka and the areas that Russian forces control.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations southwest of Dobropillya on November 9 and 10 but did not advance.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Separate Commandant’s Regiment (reportedly of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya).[52] This is the first time ISW has observed evidence of this unit operating in Ukraine.

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Novopavlivka and south of Oleksandrivka on November 9 and 10 but did not advance.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 9 and 10 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[54]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 9 and 10 but did not advance.[55]

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian drone infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Group of Forces reported on November 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a facility of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems in Berdyansk (roughly 102 kilometers from the frontline).[56]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 10.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[57]

Russian forces launched 162 drones (including 96 jet-powered drones) and one Iskander-M ballistic missile against Ukraine overnight on November 9 to 10 and 155 drones (including 97 jet-powered drones), two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and an unspecified number of S8000 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions during the day on November 10.[58]

Russian efforts to use long-range strikes to divide Ukraine along the Dnipro River aim to degrade Ukraine’s economy and military and civilian logistics. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 9 that Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure and bridges across the Dnipro River to physically divide eastern and western Ukraine.[59]  Russian forces have intensified strikes against bridges over the Dnipro River in Kyiv City and Zaporizhzhia City since October 2026 to isolate eastern Ukraine from the rest of the country, restrict the flow of logistics to the frontline, degrade the Ukrainian economy, and maximize civilian suffering as a result of power outages and restrictions on the flow of civilian goods.[60]

Russian forces continued targeting Ukrainian energy and critical infrastructure overnight on November 9 to 10, causing widespread power outages. Ukrainian First Deputy Energy Minister Artem Nekrasov stated on November 10 that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in several regions in the past day, causing power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[61]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

A Belarusian delegation travelled to Moscow City to take part in a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Security Council meeting. The Belarusian MoD claimed on November 10 that a Belarusian delegation arrived in Moscow City ahead of the CSTO Security Council meeting on November 11.[62] The Belarusian MoD claimed that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin, and Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov are leading the delegation. Lukashenko met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 10 for unspecified discussions - Putin's and Lukashenko’s sixth meeting in 2026 and their eighth meeting over the past 12 months.[63]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.