Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2026

Assessment as of January 9: 8:15 pm ET

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on January 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian and Russian officials confirmed that Russian forces conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8 to 9, likely as part of the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western support for Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched a medium-range ballistic missile from the Kapustin Yar test site in Astrakhan Oblast overnight, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Russian forces used an Oreshnik missile.[i] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) posted pictures on January 9 of fragments from the Oreshnik missile in Lviv Oblast and reported that Russian forces launched the missile from Kapustin Yar.[ii] Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda stated that Ukrainian monitoring channels reported that Russian forces may have used an Oreshnik missile without a warhead, and the BBC's Russia service similarly assessed that the warhead most likely carried dummy warheads.[iii] Lviv City Mayor Andriy Sadovyi stated that the strike marked the first time a Russian ballistic missile struck Lviv Oblast.[iv] Russian forces have struck Lviv Oblast with drones and non-ballistic missiles before.[v]

A local Ukrainian Telegram channel and some Russian milbloggers, citing unspecified local Ukrainian Telegram channels, claimed that the missile may have targeted the underground gas storage facility in Stryi, Lviv Oblast, but Ukrainian officials and expert sources denied these claims.[vi] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Member Serhiy Nahornyak stated that Lviv Oblast suffered gas supply problems due to the shockwave from the Oreshnik strike, but that the region's gas infrastructure was not the target of the strike.[vii] Nahornyak stated that Russian forces struck a facility that is not connected to gas supplies and that there was no critical damage to gas infrastructure in Lviv Oblast. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov noted that the Oreshnik strike against Lviv Oblast pierced two floors and burned an archive housing documents in a basement, and that Russian claims about a deep strike penetrating dozens of meters into the ground are unrealistic.[viii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the Oreshnik with a conventional warhead could not have damaged the underground gas storage facility, as the facility is hundreds of meters underground and would require either a nuclear weapon or an extremely powerful "seismic" impact to cause even partial damage.[ix] Another Russian milblogger noted that the available footage of the strike does not show the "expected" explosion.[x]

The Kremlin likely targeted the westernmost part of Ukraine with an Oreshnik missile to deter Europe and the United States from providing security guarantees to Ukraine. The Russian MoD attempted to justify the strike as a response to the claimed Ukrainian drone strike targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence in Valdai, Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29.[xi] Western media outlets reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) found that there was no attempted strike against Putin's residence, however, in line with ISW's assessment.[xii] The Oreshnik strike was likely instead part of Russia's nuclear saber-rattling and aimed to scare Western countries from providing military support to Ukraine, particularly from deploying forces to Ukraine as part of a peace agreement. The Coalition of the Willing has recently been working to finalize the details of security guarantees for post-war Ukraine, including the deployment of a multinational assurance force to Ukraine.[xiii] The Kremlin has repeatedly stated that such Western security guarantees would be "unacceptable" for Russia and that foreign troops would be "legitimate" targets for the Russian military.[xiv] The use of a nuclear-capable missile with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload targeting far-western Ukraine was likely meant to threaten the Coalition of the Willing and deter such troop deployments, which would likely enter Ukraine after the war from the west and could potentially operate away from the front line in western Ukraine. Putin framed Russia's first use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine in November 2024 as a direct response to Ukrainian ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes against military objects in Russia, demonstrating how Russia has used the Oreshnik to conduct performative strikes in the past to discourage Western military support for Ukraine.[xv]

Russian forces conducted a long-range combined drone and missile strike on the night of January 8 to 9 that resulted in massive power outages, particularly in Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Bryansk Oblast, 22 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, and one medium-range ballistic missile from the Kapustin Yar test site in Astrakhan Oblast.[xvi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 242 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 150 were Shahed drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 226 drones, eight Iskander-M/S-400 missiles, and 10 Kalibr missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 18 missiles and 16 drones struck 19 locations in Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged critical, residential, educational, and transport infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast.[xvii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that four people in Kyiv City died, and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported that the strikes injured at least 25 people.[xviii] Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted a "double tap" strike against rescue workers responding to an initial strike against residential buildings in Kyiv City.[xix] Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows a damaged ambulance in Kyiv City.[xx] Zelensky noted that Russian drones damaged the Qatari Embassy in Kyiv City, which the embassy later confirmed.[xxi] Ukrainian officials reported that two Iskander-M missiles also struck civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, injuring at least 23 and killing one.[xxii] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast during the day on January 9, damaging two civilian vessels.[xxiii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes significantly damaged electricity transmission systems and power generation infrastructure, leaving at least 500,000 consumers in Kyiv City and 3,000 in Chernihiv Oblast without power.[xxiv] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Ukrainian authorities restored power to over one million people in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast after the Russian strikes on the night of January 7 to 8, but that over 34,000 people in the region remain without power as of the morning of January 9.[xxv]

The US Navy seized another oil tanker with links to Russia that was attempting to bypass US sanctions against Venezuelan oil. US Southern Command reported on January 9 that the US Navy and Department of Homeland Security boarded and seized the Olina oil tanker in the Caribbean Sea.[xxvi] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the Olina has the same unique ship identifying number as the Minerva M, which the United States sanctioned in January 2025 for transporting Russian oil.[xxvii] The WSJ reported that the Olina loaded 700,000 barrels of crude oil from a Venezuelan terminal on December 24, 2025. The Olina previously sailed under a Panamanian flag, and the international shipping registry listed the tanker as having an invalid registration for flying a false flag of Timor-Leste.[xxviii] The ship last transmitted its position in mid-November 2025 near Venezuela.[xxix]

Multiple oil tankers operating near Venezuela have reregistered under Russian flags in recent weeks. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 9 that a sanctioned oil tanker leaving Venezuela, the Veronica, recently changed its name to Galileo and its flag to Russia this week in an effort to evade US Coast Guard boarding attempts.[xxx] The NYT reported on January 7, citing the official Russian vessel registry, that five oil tankers operating in Venezuelan waters in recent weeks — all under US sanctions for shipping either Russian or Iranian oil — recently switched to Russian flags and declared home ports in Sochi or Taganrog, Russia.[xxxi] The Russian Ministry of Transport also authorized the Bella-1, which the United States seized on January 7, to fly under the Russian flag as of December 24.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian officials confirmed that Russian forces conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8 to 9, likely as part of the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western support for Ukraine.
• The Kremlin likely targeted the westernmost part of Ukraine with an Oreshnik missile to deter Europe and the United States from providing security guarantees to Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted a long-range combined drone and missile strike on the night of January 8 to 9 that resulted in massive power outages, particularly in Kyiv Oblast.
• The US Navy seized another oil tanker with links to Russia that was attempting to bypass US sanctions against Venezuelan oil.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military and industrial infrastructure on the night of January 8 and 9. Geolocated footage published on January 8 shows a likely Ukrainian drone strike against the Oryol Thermal Power Plant (TPP), Oryol City.[xxxiii] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Oryol TPP and Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov acknowledged that the strike caused power outages.[xxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[xxxv]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Andriivka and toward Mala Korchakivka, on January 8 and 9.[xxxvi] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka.[xxxvii]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 9 that Ukrainian strikes on Russian forces in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) are complicating Russian evacuation efforts of wounded servicemembers as Russian forces have to walk in easily identifiable groups carrying bodies and equipment to conduct evacuations.[xxxviii] The milblogger added that Russian forces will not be able to conduct full-scale evacuations in Yunakivka, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka in the near future.

Order of Battle: Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[xxxix] Elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[xl]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Starytsya, Vovchansk, Zelene, Buhruvatka, Vovchanski Khutory, Vilcha, and Lyman on January 8 and 9.[xli]

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Velykyi Burluk itself and northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie on January 8 and 9 but did not advance.[xlii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[xliii]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Tyshchenkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Podoly; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Kurylivka; and west of Kupyansk near Myrove on January 8 and 9.[xliv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in Kupyansk.[xlv]

A Ukrainian unmanned systems forces (USF) regiment reported on January 8 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault consisting of one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and one tank in the Kupyansk direction.[xlvi]

A Russian milblogger claimed on January 9 that Russian claims of advance in Podoly are exaggerated and called on Russian forces to cease "flag raising" tactics as they are costly.[xlvii] ISW continues to assess that Russia has increasingly relied on footage showing Russian flag raisings to claim false advances in areas where Russian forces conducted small group infiltration missions and did not establish enduring positions.[xlviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Kurylivka.[xlix]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions south of Borova on January 9 but did not advance in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian servicemembers on the eastern outskirts of Oleksandrivka (south of Borova) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[l]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Lozove (south of Borova).[li]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novovodyane, Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on January 8 and 9.[lii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman) and southeast of Zakitne (east of Slovyansk).[liii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and toward Drobysheve and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Maslyakivka; east of Slovyansk near Siversk, Dronivka, Platonivka, Riznykivka, and Zakitne; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka on January 8 and 9.[liv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are shelling Ukrainian positions north of Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) and Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[lv] Drone operators of the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in northern Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman).[lvi] Drone operators of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk).[lvii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[lviii] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Zakitne.[lix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and infiltrated east of Kostyantynivka.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 8 and 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Novomarkove (northeast of Kostyantynivka), northwest of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka), and northwest of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lx]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions east of Kostyantynivka, during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Novodmytrivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and east of the settlement.[lxii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Stinky; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar, Novodmytrivka, and Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Pleshchiivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; south of Kostyantynivka near Berestok, Ivanopillya, and Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on January 8 and 9.[lxiii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA) reportedly redeployed from Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) to the Chasiv Yar area to relieve elements of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) (formerly the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]).[lxiv] Geolocated footage published on January 8 also reportedly shows drone elements of the Russian 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade striking Ukrainian forces in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[lxv] A Russian Telegram channel, which claims to have insider information, claimed that the commander of the Russian 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, Colonel Eric Selimov, died in a car accident near occupied Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast on January 4.[lxvi] The Telegram channel claimed that the accident killed three servicemembers of the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and injured two servicemembers of the 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are operating west of Ivanopillya.[lxvii] Elements of the 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Sofiivka.[lxviii] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly conducting reconnaissance on Ukrainian positions in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.[lxix] First-person view (FPV) drone operators and reconnaissance elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novopavlivka and Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxx] Loitering munitions operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, and Dorozhnie and toward Kucheriv Yar and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on January 8 and 9.[lxxii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate near Shakhove.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations and infiltrated north of Pokrovsk on January 9 but did not make confirmed advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces are operating in northern Pokrovsk in what ISW assesses was an infiltration operation that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA).[lxxiv]

Refinement of areas under assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian assault in northern Pokrovsk — an area near where ISW previously assessed that Russian forces conducted infiltration operations.[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Sukhetske, Zatyshok, and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and toward Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 8 and 9.[lxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[lxxvii]

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 8 that there are an average of 50 combat engagements per day in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian forces are attempting to increase pressure on Ukrainian defenses by transferring additional reserves to the area and by conducting infiltrations and constant assaults.[lxxviii] Syrskyi noted that Ukrainian forces control northern Pokrovsk.

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on January 9 that Russian forces concentrated more than 10 units at or below the battalion echelon around Myrnohrad.[lxxix] The 7th Corps noted that Ukrainian forces still hold Myrnohrad, but acknowledged that the situation remains difficult and that Russian forces are continuing to concentrate forces in southern Myrnohrad and on the northeastern outskirt of the town. The 7th Corps added that Russian forces intensified infiltration missions into the central part of Myrnohrad. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 9 that Russian forces are adjusting tactics daily in accordance with the situation on the ground and are increasing attempts to infiltrate into Myrnohrad.[lxxx]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating near Rodynske.[lxxxi]

The Russian military command continues to endorse war crimes near Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published an audio intercept on January 9 of a Russian commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion of the 237th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) ordering subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Pokrovsk.[lxxxii] ISW observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions since late October and November 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in these directions and advanced into the towns.[lxxxiii] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on January 8 and 9 but did not advance.[lxxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Oleksandrivka itself; northeast of Oleksandrivka near Piddubne and Ivanivka; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, Krasnohirske, Sosnivka, Vyshneve, and Verbove on January 8 and 9.[lxxxvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 8 to 9. Ukraine’s Special Operation Forces (SOF) reported that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition and supply warehouse of the Russian 51st CAA (SMD) in occupied Hirne (east of Donetsk City, roughly 75 kilometers from the front line).[lxxxvii] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on January 8 that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed a Russian 50N6E multifunction radar attached to an S-350 Vityaz air defense system at an unspecified location in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[lxxxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction, and Russian forces continued to infiltrate north of Hulyaipole.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the western outskirts of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxix]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag in Zelene (north of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[xc] Additional geolocated footage published on January 9 shows Ukrainian forces assaulting a Russian position on the western outskirts of Pryluky, indicating that Russian forces had infiltrated into the settlement at a prior date.[xci]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Zelene.[xcii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and southeast of Svyatopetrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[xciii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky, Bratske, and toward Prydorozhnie, Rizdvyanka, Svyatopetrivka, and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Yehorivka, Andriivka, and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Zlahoda, and Rybne; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka on January 8 and 9.[xciv] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole, Zelene, and Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole).[xcv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate near Bratske.[xcvi] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Zaliznychne.[xcvii] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the western bank of the Haichur River.[xcviii]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows Ukrainian forces operating in central Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xcix]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Pavlivka, and Maly Shcherbaky and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivske and toward Novoyakovlivka on January 8 and 9.[c] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske.[ci]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Viking Drone Detachment are reportedly striking railway infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City.[cii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[ciii] Elements of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Stepnohirsk.[civ] Elements of the 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) and 11th Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Lukyanivske.[cv] Elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[cvi]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 8 and 9.[cvii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[cviii]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against a Russian train loaded with fuel and lubricants at the loading ramp of the Hvardiiske oil depot in occupied Crimea (approximately 200 kilometers from the front line).[cix] Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage confirming the drone strikes on January 8.[cx]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.