Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:15pm ET

Data cutoff: 12pm on January 26

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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The United States and Europe are finalizing security and economic guarantees with Ukraine that aim to deter future Russian aggression and rebuild Ukraine's post-war economy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 25 that the US-Ukrainian document on US security guarantees for Ukraine is "100 percent ready" and that Ukraine is waiting for the United States to set a date and place for its signing.[i] Zelensky stated that the document will then go to the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) and US Congress for ratification. Zelensky stated that Europe will provide another "layer" of security guarantees, including security guarantees from the Coalition of the Willing and Ukraine's future European Union (EU) membership.[ii] Zelensky stated that EU membership is an "economic security guarantee" and that Ukraine aims to join the EU in 2027. Long-term efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s economy, including by integrating Ukraine into the EU market, are essential for Ukraine’s future security and prosperity but are not a substitute for robust security guarantees that deter future Russian aggression, such as those from the United States and Coalition of the Willing.[iii] Such security and economic guarantees have emerged from the peace process that US President Donald Trump has led in recent weeks, and ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to push Trump to abandon this US-led process and concede to Russian demands.[iv]

The Kremlin continues to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit to falsely portray Ukraine – not Russia – as the unwilling negotiating partner. Lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is delaying the peace process by not accepting territorial concessions.[v] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the territorial issue, which Peskov claimed is part of the "Anchorage formula," is fundamentally important to Russia.[vi] Peskov claimed that it would be a "mistake" to expect any significant results from the recent Ukrainian-Russian-US trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi.[vii] Russian State Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea Mikhail Sheremet claimed that Zelensky has abandoned the negotiation process by refusing to withdraw Ukrainian forces from Ukrainian-held parts of Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts).[viii]

Kremlin officials have been claiming that the Alaska summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine despite no publicly available joint documents or communiques emerging from the summit.[ix] Kremlin officials have not specified the details of the alleged "Anchorage formula" but have insisted that Ukraine’s withdrawal from all of Donbas is an important condition for a peace settlement.[x] A source close to the Kremlin recently told Reuters that the Kremlin considers the “Anchorage formula” to include Ukraine ceding all of Donbas to Russia and freezing the current frontlines elsewhere in southern and eastern Ukraine.[xi] The Kremlin has long demanded that Ukraine cede parts of Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces currently do not occupy.[xii] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely only be able to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast in August 2027, assuming Russian forces are able to maintain their late 2025 rate of advance.[xiii] The Kremlin is demanding that Ukraine cede the unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast in order to save Russia the time and resources needed to seize it militarily. Ukraine has made significant concessions as a result of the recent US-led peace talks, such as working to change Ukrainian laws to allow for elections during the current period of martial law.[xiv] The Kremlin is attempting to blame Ukraine for delaying the peace process despite Russia's demonstrated unwillingness to offer any compromises on Russia's original war aims.[xv]

The Kremlin is reviving its use of nuclear arms control rhetoric to push the United States to make concessions on Ukraine in return for normalizing US-Russian relations. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev gave an interview to Russian state business outlet Kommersant published on January 26 about the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) nuclear arms control treaty, which expires on February 5, 2026.[xvi] Medvedev reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's offer of informally agreeing to adhere to the terms of New START for another year upon its expiration, but only if the United States does the same. Medvedev claimed that the United States has not responded to this proposal and that the prospects of broader US-Russian arms control cooperation aredependent upon the United States accepting Putin's proposal. Medvedev claimed that the United States and Russia must first normalize bilateral relations before Russia can cooperate on bilateral arms control measures. Medvedev also levied thinly veiled threats if the United States does not shift its focus away from peace efforts and toward normalizing US-Russia bilateral relations as the Kremlin desires. Medvedev claimed that US-Russian arms control cooperation contributes to strategic stability but warned that other states could seek nuclear weapons in the absence of this stability. Medvedev asserted that Russia will counter any threats to its security and referenced the Burevestnik and Oreshnik ballistic missiles and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle that Russia debuted in 2024 and 2025.

Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly demonstrated that the Kremlin is not wavering from its original war demands and intends to achieve its objectives militarily if it cannot do so diplomatically.[xvii] Kremlin officials have often emphasized their commitment to Russia's demands around high-profile negotiations, including following the August 2025 US-Russian summit in Alaska and the recent January 23 to 24 trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi.[xviii] The Kremlin has been attempting to use the prospect of improved bilateral US-Russia relations to distract the United States from peace efforts in Ukraine since US President Donald Trump took office in January 2025 and began leveraging the New START treaty in this effort in Summer-Fall 2025.[xix] The Kremlin likely aims to convince the United States to concede to Russian demands on Ukraine in return for improved bilateral US-Russian relations. The Kremlin may also aim to push the United States to abandon the peace process in Ukraine without finalizing a peace settlement in exchange for strategic arms talks, therefore allowing Russia to continue its war unimpeded and without US pressure to make meaningful concessions.

Russian forces are increasingly using Starlink satellite systems to extend the range of BM-35 strike drones to conduct mid-range strikes against the Ukrainian rear. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on January 26 that Russian forces used a Starlink-equipped BM-35 drone to strike Dnipro City (approximately 86 kilometers from the frontline) for the first time.[xx] This strike comes less than two weeks after Beskrestnov reported the first recorded usage of Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones on January 15.[xxi] Beskrestnov noted that the BM-35 drone is more fuel efficient than Russian Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones and has a range of up to 500 kilometers. ISW has only observed evidence that the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies is fielding BM-35 drones to date.[xxii] Russian forces first began fielding the BM-35 in September 2025 and intensified BM-35 strikes in early January 2026.[xxiii] Russian milbloggers and the Rubikon Center itself claimed that Rubikon drone operators employed BM-35s in January 12 to 13 strikes on cargo vessels near Odesa City and a January 17 strike against a Patriot air defense system southwest of Kharkiv City.[xxiv] Russian forces appear to be increasingly relying on Starlinks to increase the range of operation of strike drones while increasingly drone resilience against Ukrainian EW. The reported 500-kilometer range of Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones places most of Ukraine, all of Moldova, and parts of Poland, Romania, and Lithuania in range of these drones if launched from Russia or occupied Ukraine. ISW has observed reports of Starlink-equipped Shahed long-range strike drones beginning in September 2024 and of Rubikon equipping Molniya strike drones with Starlink systems beginning in December 2025.[xxv] ISW continues to assess that Russian mid-range strikes, especially those conducted by Rubikon units, seek to exploit Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems.[xxvi] The threat of Russian mid-range strikes underscores Ukraine’s urgent need for point-defense air defense systems to down drones, as electronic warfare (EW) systems are likely insufficient to defend Ukraine’s critical infrastructure from such a geographically pervasive threat.[xxvii]

Russia’s domestic populace is increasingly bearing the economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 26 that prices for almost all essential goods and services in Russia have been rising since December 2025, shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law in November 2025 that increased the value-added tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026.[xxviii] Russian independent investigative outlet 7×7-Horizontal Russia reported on January 23 that Russian civilians began reporting sharp food price increases since January 1.[xxix] 7×7-Horizontal Russia noted that Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data indicates that the official inflation rate was 1.26 percent from January 1 to 12, while prices of essential goods rose by 1.72 percent, meaning that the 26.7 percent of the price increase of essential goods is due to factors other than the Russian inflation rate. The disparity between the reported Russian inflation rate and price growth reduces consumer purchasing power and causes a decline in real income (an individual's income after adjusting for inflation rates). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Russia service reported on December 28, 2025, that prices for essential goods and services rose across Russia throughout 2025 due to military spending and sanctions.[xxx] RFE/RL reported that excise taxes (taxes imposed per good that businesses often pass on to the consumer) and logistics costs drove up the prices of fuel, utilities, alcohol, and cigarettes in Russia, with gasoline prices rising twice as fast as the official inflation rate. RFE/RL reported that prices for common household items rose between 10 and 25 percent throughout 2025.

The Kremlin has prioritized the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and funding its war in Ukraine, which has led to Russian banks passing lending pressures from the Russian DIB onto consumers.[xxxi] Labor shortages and competition between defense and civilian sectors have also inflated wages and fueled inflation and price spikes.[xxxii] Russia's domestic economic issues are also having outsized impacts on occupied Ukraine, with reported inflation rates of 106.9 percent in occupied Crimea at the beginning of 2026, causing price spikes in passenger transport services, fuel, private education, healthcare, and housing.[xxxiii] The increased VAT, which is functionally removing money from the Russian population as businesses pass most tax increases onto consumers, has only exacerbated already high prices and placed even more of the burden of Russia's costly war in Ukraine onto the Russian people.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Europe are finalizing security and economic guarantees with Ukraine that aim to deter future Russian aggression and rebuild Ukraine's post-war economy.
• The Kremlin continues to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit to falsely portray Ukraine – not Russia – as the unwilling negotiating partner.
• The Kremlin is reviving its use of nuclear arms control rhetoric to push the United States to make concessions on Ukraine in return for normalizing US-Russian relations.
• Russian forces are increasingly using Starlink satellite systems to extend the range of BM-35 strike drones to conduct mid-range strikes against the Ukrainian rear.
• Russia’s domestic populace is increasingly bearing the economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, in the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Slavyansk oil refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai, and that preliminary information indicates that Ukrainian forces struck the plant's primary oil processing plant.[xxxv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant has an annual potential processing volume of over four million tons of oil and is involved in supplying Russian forces. The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters acknowledged on the morning of January 26 that Ukrainian drones struck the refinery.[xxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 25 that Russian forces seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and southeast of Sumy City toward Velyka Pysarivka on January 25 and 26.[xxxviii]

Mashovets reported on January 26 that Russian forces continue attempts to reach field artillery range (15-20 kilometers) of Sumy City along the Pysarivka-Marine line (north of Sumy City) but have been unable to complete this objective thus far.[xxxix] Mashovets reported that Russian forces periodically attack near Andriivka, Pysarivka, Varachyne, Korchakivka, Krapyvshchyna, Yablunivka, and Marine (all north of Sumy City) and near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xl]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Grom-Kaskad drone brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Khylchykhi (northwest of Sumy City).[xli] The Russian military command is reportedly going to use the Grom-Kaskad drone brigade as a basis to form the new Russian unmanned systems forces (USF) brigade that Russian federal authorities are actively recruiting for.[xlii] Lancet loitering munition and Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic drone operators of the Grafa and Lotos groups are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hyrine (northwest of Sumy City).[xliii] First-person view (FPV) and other drone operators of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 51st VDV Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in Sumy Oblast.[xliv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: A Ukrainian military source reported on January 26 that Russian forces advanced in northern Nesterne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlv] ISW thus updated its assessment of Russian operations near Nesterne, which it previously assessed to be infiltration missions due to the lack of additional reporting on Russian presence or attacks in the area, to the level of Russian advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, Lyman, Zelene, Symynivka, Nesterne, Kruhle, and Starytsya and toward Hrafske and Izbytske on January 25 and 26.[xlvi]

Russian forces have failed to make significant gains in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction in the previous three months despite the Russian military command's commitment of a combined arms army (CAA) and three army corps (ACs) to the area. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 26 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces continue attempts to advance toward their primary objective of Bilyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City and southeast of Vovchansk) and secondary objective of Staryi Saltiv (northeast of Kharkiv City and southwest of Vovchansk) but have only advanced about four kilometers west of Vovchansk over the last three months despite intensified combat operations since late 2025.[xlvii] Mashovets stated that Russian forces do not fully control areas near Synelnykove, Tsehelne, Vilcha, and Lyman (all northeast of Kharkiv City and south to southwest of Vovchansk), slowing Russian efforts toward Hrafske (southwest of Vovchansk) and Symynivka (south of Vovchansk). Mashovets noted that the Russian military command’s simultaneous commitment of elements of the Russian 68th and 69th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to efforts in the Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Velykyi Burluk directions and southeast of Velykyi Burluk over the Oskil River have overstretched the 6th CAA and prevented significant advances.[xlviii] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command committed elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division and the 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 11th AC, LMD); the 71st Motorized Rifle Division and the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 14th AC, LMD); and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 44th AC, LMD); to reinforce the 6th CAA, but Mashovets assessed that the commitment of these formations will not significantly change the situation. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command’s commitment of significant forces to the Sumy and Kharkiv directions indicates the importance of Russian forces’ efforts to create ”buffer zones” for territorial exchanges in the event of peace negotiations — in line with ISW’s continued assessment that the Russian military command continues to pursue these efforts for political purposes despite a lack of significant battlefield progress.[xlix]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, the Chechen Kurchaloyevsky Raion Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) department, and of the 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vovchanski Khutory.[l] Drone operators of the 71st Motorized Rifle Division, the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion, and of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Special Purpose Center are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[li]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 25 and 26 but ISW does not assess that Russian forces made any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[lii]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne, Obukhivka and Novovasylivka on January 25 and 26.[liii]

Mashovets reported that the Russian 6th CAA’s efforts to advance toward Ambarne and Hryhorivka (east of Velykyi Burluk) and from positions over the Oskil River toward Novovasylivka and Ridkodub and bypassing Kolodyazne (all southeast of Velykyi Burluk) have stalled since the end of 2025 due to the Russian military command's commitment of the 6th CAA's forces to multiple sectors of the frontline and the recent Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kupyansk direction.[liv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Krasne Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk).[lv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, Podoly, and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on January 25 and 26.[lvi]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova near Serhiivka; and south of Borova near Korovii Yar and Oleksandrivka on January 25 and 26.[lviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Karpivka (southeast of Borova), Krymky, and Lozove (both south of Borova).[lix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.[lx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Lyman.[lxi] Additional geolocated footage published on January 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pazeno (southeast of Slovyansk) and southeast of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[lxii] A Ukrainian military source published maps on January 20 and 23, indicating that Russian forces seized Platonivka (east of Slovyansk) and Dronivka (northeast of Slovyansk) advanced in western Zakitne (east of Slovyansk) at a prior date.[lxiii] Available geolocated footage and Ukrainian reporting indicates that Russian forces also seized Syvato-Pokrovske (east of Slovyansk), Kuzmynivka, and Fedorivka (both southeast of Slovyansk) at a prior date.[lxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southwestern outskirts of Lyman.[lxv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Novoselivka, and Svyatohirsk; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, and Stavky and toward Sosnove; east of Lyman near Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Ozerne; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Riznykivka, Zakitne, and Svyato-Pokrovske and toward Kryva Luka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Bondarne and toward Nykyforivka on January 25 and 26.[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Maslyakivka (southeast of Lyman).[lxvii]

The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) company operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 26 that Russian forces have been trying to enter Lyman for several months in order to advance toward the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.[lxviii] The commander stated that small Russian groups sometimes infiltrate into Lyman but that Ukrainian forces destroy these Russian infiltration groups. The commander reported that Russian losses in the area are six to 12 times more than Ukrainian losses. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River near Bohorodychne (northwest of Lyman) and Starodubivka (east of Slovyansk).[lxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk (east of Slovyansk) and Zakitne.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers southeast of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[lxxi] ISW assesses that this event likely occurred between January 12 and 16, given commercially available satellite imagery and available textual evidence.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Ilinivka and Stepanivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on January 15 and 26.[lxxii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxiii]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on January 26 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Orikhovo-Vasylivka, contrary to Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxv] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division with the claimed seizure of Novopavlivka.[lxxvi]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), indicating that Russian forces likely seized Ivanivka (east of Novyi Donbas) at a prior date.[lxxvii]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: The geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces also recently conducted an infiltration mission into Novyi Donbas that ISW assesses did not change the control of terrain or FEBA at this time.[lxxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that it is unclear whether Russian forces were able to consolidate positions in the settlement.[lxxix] The milblogger noted that Russian forces previously attempted to seized Novyi Donbas in December 2025 but were unable to consolidate positions and retreated from the settlement.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Novyi Donbas, Vilne, and Toretske; and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on January 25 and 26.[lxxx]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction on January 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 22 and 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers in the northern suburbs of Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[lxxxi]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: A Russian milblogger denied Russian claims that Russian forces seized Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and entered Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[lxxxii] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Sukhetske and Zatyshok (just northeast of Sukhetske).

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Udachne; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne on January 25 and 26.[lxxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[lxxxiv]

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on January 26 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction continue to attack in small infantry groups.[lxxxv] The commander of a Ukrainian artillery reconnaissance battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 15 that Russian attacks have slowed since frost has set in but that Russian forces continue to use fiber optic first-person view (FPV) and drone ambushes to target Ukrainian logistics.[lxxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that FPV drone operators of the Russian Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) in the Pokrovsk direction have been using signal repeater drones, allowing the drone operators to operate further back in the Russian near rear and to fly tens of kilometers behind Ukrainian lines.[lxxxvii] The Russian military command is reportedly planning to create the 50th Unmanned Systems Brigade of the Supreme Command from the Grom-Kaskad drone brigade.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Hryshyne.[lxxxix] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Novooleksandrivka and Pryvitne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[xc] Artillery elements of the 268th Artillery Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD [Central Military District}) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[xci] Engineering elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly clearing mines in the Pokrovsk direction.[xcii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya on January 25 and 26 but did not advance.[xciii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove, Sichneve, and Krasnohirske on January 25 and 26.[xciv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrivka itself.[xcv]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a military logistics warehouse in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline).[xcvi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Velyka Novosilka (roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline).

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole).[xcvii]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Nove Zaporizhzhia; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka on January 25 and 26.[xcviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole and Ternuvate (west of Hulyaipole).[xcix]

Winter weather continues to impact ground operations and degrade infantry in the Hulyaipole direction. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 26 that weather conditions have worsened in the Hulyaipole direction and are slowing both Russian and Ukrainian operations.[c] The milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are both using the snowfall to regroup and that both sides are struggling to shelter from enemy drones and weather. The milblogger claimed that many frontline positions have become unusable as infantry must now both hold positions and avoid freezing to death.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces east of Dobropillya.[ci]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian military warehouses near occupied Solodkovodne (about 36 kilometers southeast of Hulyaipole).[cii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Stepove and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Lukyanivske, Pavlivka, Novoboikivske, and Novoyakovlivka on January 25 and 26.[ciii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Prymorske.[civ]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and 239th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[cv]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on January 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 25 and 26.[cvi]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and drone control centers in the Kherson direction.[cvii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 138 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 90 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City.[cviii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 110 drones, that 21 drones struck 11 locations, and that downed debris fell on one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[cix]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.