Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 25, 2026

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Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia's commitment to its original war aims and reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine, amid continued reporting that negotiations will resume in the coming days. Two US officials told Politico on January 24 that Ukrainian and Russian delegations will meet in Abu Dhabi again on February 1.[i] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on January 24 that the Russian-Ukrainian-US trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi were "very productive" and confirmed that the delegations made plans to continue talks next week.[ii] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated on January 24 Russia's commitment to the alleged "fundamental understandings" that Russia claims that Russia and the US developed at the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit.[iii] Kremlin officials have repeatedly exploited the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2024 Alaska summit to obfuscate Russia's efforts to impede the peace process and claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine despite the lack of a clear joint outcome or communiqué.[iv] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) amplified an interview from its Second Department of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director Alexei Polischuk on January 25 in which he reiterated Russia's commitment to resolving the so-called "root causes" of the war, which Polischuk defined as Ukrainian neutrality and non-nuclear status, restoring protections for ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, ousting Ukraine's current government, and resolving "security threats" against Russia – all a restatement of elements of Russia's original war aims.[v] Polishchuk also reiterated Russia's rejection of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine, including the deployment of a foreign peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine. Polishchuk stated that the negotiating parties should finalize a peace agreement before negotiating security guarantees, rejecting both the timeline and component agreements of the effort that US President Donald Trump's team is leading.

Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov made a statement suggesting that the Kremlin is using its participation in ongoing negotiations with the United States to stave off a significant increase in US pressure against Russia that could impede its war effort. Peskov stated on January 24 that Trump's "knee-jerk" foreign policy methods do not align with Russia's own and that the Kremlin views these methods as designed to force others to "bend over the knee."[vi] Peskov claimed that those who "bend" to Trump "will continue to bend over" and that it is imperative that Russia not bend to Trump. The Kremlin has been pursuing a balancing act since February 2025 between posturing strength to its populace and allies while engaging the United States enough to avoid additional American pressure that could compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to compromise from his original war aims and engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war.[vii] Peskov's overt criticism of Trump’s mode of foreign policy and assertion that Russia must not compromise in the face of US pressure suggests that the Kremlin seeks to ensure that the Trump administration does not dole out additional restrictive measures directly against Russia. Peskov’s statement may be a tacit Kremlin acknowledgement of Russia’s own vulnerabilities to increased pressure. ISW continues to assess that the West, including the United States, has failed to invalidate Putin’s theory of victory and that the Kremlin has offered no indication of a willingness to compromise.[viii] The United States and Europe may be able to invalidate Putin’s theory of victory and compel Russia to make concessions through additional pressure, such as augmenting Ukrainian military capabilities, sanctioning and seizing foreign Russian assets, and reducing Russia’s access to resources it needs to sustain its long-term war effort.[ix]

Russia continues to intensify recruitment efforts for the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) that may also staff the conventional Russian ground forces. Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported on January 22 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) launched a federal recruitment drive for contract soldiers in the Russian USF.[x] Kommersant reported that the Russian MoD is now offering one-year contracts stipulating that the MoD can only place the recruit in the USF, cannot transfer the recruit to non-USF units (such as infantry), and must discharge the recruit upon the expiration of the original contract if the recruit refuses to sign a renewal. Russian MoD representatives told Kommersant that the MoD seeks young candidates with analytical skills, computer proficiency, fine motor skills, and vestibular stability – prioritizing technological professionals and students. Other reporting suggests that the Russian MoD may use at least some individuals recruited for the USF in the conventional Russian ground forces, however. Russian opposition outlet Astra confirmed on January 24 that the Russian MoD has been conducting a recruitment campaign at Russian universities since mid-January 2026.[xi] Astra spoke to students at Russian universities who attended a Russian MoD recruitment presentation and stated that the MoD forced students to sign an acknowledgement that they understood that the contract was for a year and that they could leave after one year of service. Astra reported that the Higher School of Economics in Moscow acknowledged in a separate response to a lawyer that Russian students were not signing a special contract for the USF but rather a standard MoD contract. Astra reported that the lawyer stated this standard contract could allow the Russian military command to assign these recruits as infantry and send them to the frontlines, possibly keeping the students in the military even after the expiration of the one-year contract. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is trying various means to increase recruitment to offset high casualties on the frontlines, which include using the need to protect critical infrastructure as a thin justification to conceal wider efforts to prepare active reservists for deployment.[xii] The Kremlin has also concentrated compulsory partial call-up efforts in Russia‘s central regions to shield larger and more politically sensitive population centers, such as Moscow City, from compulsory force generation efforts.[xiii]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov as a Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology on January 25. Fedorov noted on January 25 that Beskrestnov is one of Ukraine's best experts in the field of drones, electronic warfare (EW), and Russian military decision making; Beskrestnov will focus on developing systemic solutions against Russian strike and reconnaissance drones.[xiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia's commitment to its original war aims and reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine, amid continued reporting that negotiations will resume in the coming days.
• Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov made a statement suggesting that the Kremlin is using its participation in ongoing negotiations with the United States to stave off a significant increase in US pressure against Russia that could impede its war effort.
• Russia continues to intensify recruitment efforts for the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) that may also staff the conventional Russian ground forces.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov as a Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology on January 25.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike reportedly with HIMARS against Russian energy infrastructure in Belgorod Oblast on the night of January 24 to 25. Footage published on January 24 shows explosions and fires at the Belgorod Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Belgorod City after a likely Ukrainian strike.[xv] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes damaged energy infrastructure and caused fires in Belgorod City and claimed the strike was with a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).[xvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on January 24 and 25 but did not advance.[xvii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 25 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northern Nesterne (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Starytsya, Izbytske, Vovchanski Khutory, Vovchansk, and Kruhle on January 24 and 25.[xix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the southeastern outskirts of Vovchansk and near Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City), Izbytske, Starytsya, and Vovchanski Khutory.[xx]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on January 24 that Russian forces are amassing groups of poorly trained servicemembers, mostly compiled of former prisoners, migrants, and mercenaries from poor backgrounds, to attack in highly attritional infantry lead assaults, while keeping well-trained drone operators and artillery elements behind "disposable" infantry.[xxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka, Khatnie, and Ambarne on January 24 and 25 but did not advance.[xxii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself, northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on January 24 and 25.[xxiii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 25 that Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin visited elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk, approximately five kilometers from the frontline).[xxiv] ISW has not observed any other evidence about Bastrykin’s reported visit.

Order of Battle: Interceptor drone operators of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.[xxv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[xxvi]

On January 24 and 25, Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Serhiivka and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka.[xxvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 25 but did not advance.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 25 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions along the Donetska railroad line southeast of Lyman – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[xxviii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka and Ozerne; and southeast of Slovyansk near Zvanivka and Bondarne and toward Nykyforivka on January 24 and 25.[xxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk (east of Slovyansk) and Zakitne.[xxx]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0504 Kostyantynivka-Pokrovsk highway west of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka).[xxxi]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Markove; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Ilinivka, Yablunivka, and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka and toward Pavlivka on January 24 and 25.[xxxii]

Order of Battle: First person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 4th Assault Battalion (Usaty Battalion Afipsa) of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are observing Russian strikes on Ukrainian forces east of Berestok.[xxxiii] FPV drone operators of the 89th Tank Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[xxxiv] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[xxxv] Lancet loitering munition operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Osykove (just south of Druzhkivka).[xxxvi] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka.[xxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Ivanivka, Shakhove, and Toretske; and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on January 24 and 25.[xxxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Svitle; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 24 and 25.[xxxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Hryshyne.[xl]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction during a reduced platoon-seized mechanized assault.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on January 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) during a reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault.[xli] Ukrainian volunteer Serhiy Sternenko reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault and struck two Russian tanks, two armored personnel carriers (APCs), an artillery cannon, Russian infantry in cover, a transport vehicle, an antenna, and a buggy.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 24 and 25.[xlii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske on January 24 and 25 but did not advance.[xliii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka and Pryluky; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Varvarivka, Nove Zaporizhzhia, and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda and Solodke; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on January 24 and 25.[xliv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole, Kosivtseve, and Bratske (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[xlv]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[xlvi] Elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction, likely referring to eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[xlvii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the southern outskirts of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[xlviii]

Refinement of areas under Russian control: The geolocated footage published on January 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces also maintained positions or recently advanced in the southern outskirts of Mala Tokmachka, areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xlix]

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Myrne; west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Prymorske, and Stepove; and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske, Pavlivka, Novoyakovlivka, and Novoboikivske on January 24 and 25.[l]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 7th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[li]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on January 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 24 and 25.[lii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reportedly continue to operate in occupied Kherson Oblast.[liii] Elements of the 98th VDV Division, including its 331st VDV Regiment and 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[liv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles from Bryansk Oblast and 102 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones – of which 70 were Shaheds – from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Donetsk City.[lv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 87 drones, that 15 drones struck 10 locations, and that officials are still clarifying the impact of the missile strikes. Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged residential areas and a shopping center in Kharkiv City, and an industrial enterprise and civilian infrastructure in Poltava Oblast.[lvi]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 25 that Russian forces launched over 1,700 long range strike drones, over 1,380 glide bombs, and 69 missiles against Ukraine in the past week (about January 18 to 25).[lvii]

Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported on January 25 that 1,676 high rise buildings in Kyiv City remained without power due to Russia's January 23 to 24 strikes against Kyiv City energy infrastructure.[lviii]

Ukrainian drone manufacturer Wild Hornets published footage on January 24 showing Ukrainian forces using the STING interceptor drone to down a Russian Shahed-107 drone, which Russian forces began fielding as of November 2025.[lix] Wild Hornets reported that a single Ukrainian drone unit used STING interceptor drones to down 22 Russian aerial targets within six hours.[lx]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus continues to support Russia's war effort. Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service First Deputy Head Oleh Luhovskyi stated on January 24 that the Belarusian defense industrial base (DIB) is fully integrated with Russia's DIB, supplying Russia with ammunition and unmanned systems as well as repairing Russian military equipment.[lxi] Luhovskyi stated that over 80 percent of Belarusian industrial enterprises are supporting Russia's 2025-2037 State Defense Order and State Armaments Program. Any sanctions relief that Western states may provide Belarus will benefit the Russian economy, as Russia and Belarus share a land border and have been developing a common market.[lxii]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.